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This study is a meta-theoretical inquiry on how long-term and short-term time 
perspectives articulated in both theory and political practice shape understandings and 
practices of international politics. Pursuit of this inquiry was motivated by a 
dissatisfaction with the existing International Relations (IR) literature’s limited 
understanding of the significant roles long-term and short-term time perspectives play in 
shaping theoretical claims and political practices. This dissatisfaction is addressed in this 
study in three ways. First, it conceptualises and differentiates articulated time 
perspectives into five distinct categories: long-term historical, short-term historical, 
short-term present, short-term future, and long-term future. Second, this study uncovers 
and details the salient functions of each distinct time perspective and their potential 
effects on theoretical claims or political practices. Finally, this study provides analyses 
of illustrative examples pulled from two unconnected case studies, one theoretical and 
one practical, to show how time-related aspects (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, and 
contingent) attributed to claims or practices by different time perspectives delimit what 
a theory can convey or a political practice can achieve. As a consequence, this study is 
intended to provide readers with new analytical tools and insights that are necessary to 
unpack the complex relationship between theories and practices of international politics 
and time.   
 To make this study and its resultant contributions possible, an analytical framework 
and language of time perspectives were developed predominantly from the fields of 
Organisational Management, Organisational Behaviour, and History. This new 
analytical framework and language was used to examine time perspectives and their 
effects within two case studies, one theoretical (i.e. Morgenthau’s theory of international 
politics) and one practical (i.e. the Oslo Accords). Illustrative examples of each of the 
five time perspectives and their effects were pulled from each case study and analysed 
to highlight the co-existence of multiple time perspectives within each case, the ubiquity 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
  The following study is a meta-theoretical inquiry on long-term and short-term 
time perspectives and their effects on the understandings and practices of international 
politics. In this study time perspectives are understood as constructs of time having both 
temporal depth and temporal focus with respect to the past, present, and the future that 
can attribute time-related aspects to claims and practices.1 They can be either long-term 
or short-term, however, their distinctions are not pre-determined independent of the 
context in which they appear.2 Thus, this study understands time perspectives as being 
amorphous, context dependent, and potentially open-ended. Specifically, this study 
aims to present a twofold argument. One part of my argument is that embedded within 
a theory of international politics and the political practice of a peace process there are 
multiple long-term and short-term time perspectives that uniquely shape claims and 
practices articulated within or derived from a theory or a peace process.3 The second 
part of my argument is that each embedded time perspective can be categorised into 
one of five distinct time perspectives with each category of time perspective performing 
a particular set of salient functions in both theory and practice. The five time 
perspectives analysed and discussed in detail in this study include the following time 
perspectives: long-term historical, short-term historical, short-term present, short-term 
future, and long-term future.4  
The differentiation of these five time perspectives is not intended to make a claim 
regarding the normative value of differentiation, as differentiation may not always be 
                                                            
1 Each part of the construct (e.g. temporal depth, temporal focus) is detailed in Chapter 3, sections 1 - 2. 
Chapter 4 addresses each time-related aspect (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, and contingent) that a time 
perspective can attribute to a claim or practice.  
2 Chapter 3, section 3.3 addresses ways of distinguishing between long-term and short-term time 
perspectives. 
3 Each time perspective provides what Nietzsche refers to as ‘different eyes we can use to observe’ 
international politics and develop corresponding claims. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Eng.: Penguin Books, 1969), 
19. 
4 The following words are italicised throughout this study of time perspectives to indicate to the reader 
when particular time perspectives are being addressed: long-term time perspective(s), short-term time 
perspective(s), long-term historical time perspective(s), short-term historical time perspective(s), short-
term present time perspective(s), long-term present time perspective(s), medium-term time perspective(s), 
short-term future time perspective(s), long-term future time perspective(s), historical time perspective(s), 
present time perspective(s), and future time perspective(s). 
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necessary or warranted.5 A normative claim that is advanced in this study is that readers, 
theorists, and policy makers should reflect upon the time perspectives articulated within 
a theory or practice in relation to the five time perspectives addressed in this study. The 
value of this reflection is that the aforementioned groups will improve their 
understanding of the effects time perspectives have on IR theory and practice. Therefore, 
differentiation among time perspectives has analytical value, a point that will be 
illustrated in detail throughout this study.    
  To discern these differentiations and highlight their analytical value, this study 
adopted an unorthodox approach. This approach involved using unconnected 
theoretical and empirical case studies for illustrative purposes. This approach was 
instrumental in narrowing down the salient functions performed by time perspectives 
of a particular category, as well as helpful in strengthening support of my argument that 
salient functions for each category of time perspectives were shared across theory and 
practice.6 Consequently, this study did not attempt to discover or address any direct 
connections between time perspectives embedded within a theory and those embedded 
within a practice.7 Furthermore, this study does not seek to discover if or how one case 
study influenced another. Alternatively, this study takes the preceding step to clearly 
illustrate to the reader that particular types of long-term and short-term time 
perspectives and their corresponding functions 1) are persuasive within articulations 
                                                            
5 For example, a short-term historical time perspective might be excluded from a peace process because it 
unnecessarily embeds into a peace process historical hostilities that have largely been resolved in everyday 
society or are being addressed more effectively by other means.     
6 If theoretical and empirical case studies were connected to one another, then it would be reasonable to 
conclude that salient functions of a particular category of time perspectives would be similar. Conversely, 
the usage of unconnected case studies, as found in this study, does not immediately suggest any 
similarities of salient functions performed by a particular category of time perspectives. 
7 For more on IR discussions regarding the direct connections between theory and practice see Michel 
Foucault, Paul Rabinow, and Nikolas S. Rose, The Essential Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of 
Foucault, 1954-1984 (New York: New Press, 2003), 170-7; Friedrich Kratochwil, “Reflections on Theory and 
Practice,” (working paper presented at the Degree Conferring Ceremony of the European University 
Institute, October 3, 2003), 1-11; Joseph Lepgold, "Is Anyone Listening? International Relations Theory and 
the Problem of Policy Relevance," Political Science Quarterly 113, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 43-62; David 
Mutimer, “Practically Theoretical: Reading State Policy as IR Theory” in Theory in Practice: Critical 
Reflections on Global Policy — Selected Proceedings of the 10th Annual YCISS Conference, Kyle Grayson 
and Cristina Masters eds., (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 2003), 9-13; Steve 
Smith, "International Relations and International Relations: The Links between Theory and Practice in 
World Politics," Journal of International Relations and Development 6, no. 3 (September 2003): 233-39; 
Stephen M. M. Walt, "The Relationship between Theory and Policy in International Relations," Annual 
Review of Political Science 8, no. 1 (June 2005): 23-48; Marysia Zalewski, “’All these theories yet the bodies 
keep piling up’: theory, theorists, theorising,” in International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, ed. Steve 
Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 340-53.  
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relating to international politics and 2) uniquely shape understandings and practices of 
international politics.  
 As will be illustrated and explained throughout this study, the time perspectives 
addressed are able to shape understandings and practices articulated within a theory or 
peace process because they contribute to the attribution of particular aspects to claims 
and practices made within a theory or peace process. The significance of these 
attributions is that they act as internal preferences and biases within a theory or peace 
process. As internal preferences and biases, they shape what claims about and practices 
of international politics are made within a theory or a peace process, as well as how these 
claims and practices are understood and interpreted by readers. Consequently, what can 
or cannot be conveyed about international politics or what processes can or cannot be 
executed in the practice of international politics are delimited by embedded time 
perspectives. Therefore, the analysis presented in this study helps to explain the 
connections between time perspectives and their delimiting effects within a theory or 
peace process. Furthermore, the forms time perspectives can take (e.g. long-term and 
short-term) and what their potential effects can be within a theory or a peace process 
(e.g. pre-emptively assigning meaning to international political phenomena in the 
future) were also included in this study. By exploring and unpacking this relationship 
and related details, my study contributes to advancing the discipline’s own 
understanding of how the usage of particular time perspectives within a theory or peace 
process shape the study and practice of international politics.8 Considered in a broader 
context, my study also contributes insights to the relationship between international 
politics and time.  
The four ways this study moves beyond existing IR scholarship are as follows.9 
First, my study questions the usefulness of IR scholars maintaining taken-for-granted 
understandings of long-term and short-term time perspectives, their roles, and their 
effects within a theory or peace process. Second, my study takes the discipline of IR to 
task for its limited awareness of and reflection upon the multitude of long-term and 
                                                            
8 Mira Moshe, “Temporary versus Permanent: Time Framing in the Israeli Political Arena,” Time & 
Society 18, no. 1 (March 2009), 159; Luigi Muzzetto, "Time and Meaning in Alfred Schütz," Time & 
Society 15, no. 1 (March 2006): 5-31. 
9 Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2008); Andrew Hom, Christopher McIntosh, Alasdair Mackay, and Liam Stockdale, eds., Time, 
Temporality and Global Politics (Bristol: e-IR, 2016). 
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short-term time perspectives that exist within an individual theory or peace process and 
their corresponding effects. Third, this study provides IR scholars with a means for 
discovering the presence and/or absence of long-term and short-term time perspectives 
within a theory or peace process; texts regarding Morgenthau’s theoretical 
commitments in relation to international politics and the Oslo Accords’ peace process 
serve as the two illustrative case studies in this thesis.10 Finally, my study supplants the 
existing understandings and language of long-term and short-term time perspectives 
with more informed and detailed understandings and language.11 The development of 
these understandings and language enables scholars to newly identify, articulate, and 
assess how different long-term and short-term time perspectives shape understandings 
of and practices in international politics. This ability to augment the understandings of 
and language used to articulate time perspectives and their effects was made possible 
through my reconceptualisation of existing understandings of time perspectives into the 
five distinct time perspectives presented in this study.  
The advantages of this reconceptualisation of time perspectives are threefold. 
First, this reconceptualisation is more reflective of theoretical and practical 
differentiations with respect to the past, the present, and the future.12 Moving beyond 
the typical monolithic segmentation of perspectives of time into ‘the past’, ‘the present’, 
and ‘the future’ found in the IR literature, my reconceptualisation acknowledges the 
variety of nuanced time dimensions in theory and practice that exist within each 
segment of time. Second, without using a reconceptualisation of time perspectives, the 
presence or absence of particular long-term and short-term time perspectives shaping a 
theory or peace process would go unnoticed and limit the depth of analysis possible 
regarding the relationship between time perspectives and their effects. In comparison 
to existing underdeveloped conceptualisations of time perspectives within IR, my 
reconceptualisation of time perspectives provides a more panoptic research lens through 
which time perspectives (present or absent) and their effects become easier to identify 
                                                            
10 References to the ‘Accords’ or ‘Oslo Accords’ appearing throughout this thesis collectively refer to both 
Oslo I and Oslo II peace agreements made between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO). When necessary, however, specific references to either Oslo I or Oslo II will be noted and cited 
separately. 
11 Barbara Adam, “Modern Times: The Technology Connection and its Implications for Social 
Theory,” Time and Society 1, no. 2 (May 1992), 175. 




and study.13 Third, my reconceptualisation is not intended to do any of the following: 
place initial value judgements on individual time perspectives, indicate that there is a 
hierarchy existing among the five time perspectives,14 suggest which time perspectives 
should or should not appear in a theory or peace process to elicit particular 
understandings or outcomes, or suggest that including all five time perspectives make a 
theory or peace process more superior to another containing fewer time perspectives.15 
Consequently, my research enables scholars to assess which time perspectives a theory 
or peace process prioritises and deemphasises on a theory’s or peace process’s own 
terms. This is in contrast to scholars imposing their own subjective valuations of time 
perspectives or relying on predefined, external valuations from another discipline or 
scholar, both of which might alter research outcomes.16   
 
  The aforementioned advantages of reconceptualising time perspectives 
collectively relate to this study’s unpacking of the relationship between time 
perspectives and their effects within a theory or peace process. The unpacking of this 
relationship articulated in my study was necessary to generate insights into this 
relationship and its effects on the study and practice of international politics. The 
awareness cultivated in the following study prompts readers to reflect upon the unique 
framing and interpretative functions long-term and short-term time perspectives 
(present or absent) perform. As illustrated in this study, insights gained from such a 
reflection help to draw attention to the potential distortive effects present and absent 
time perspectives have on a reader’s and disciplinary understandings of international 
politics. Consequently, my study encourages readers to think about whether similar 
                                                            
13 Awareness of other aspects of time, such as its speed, rhythm, or ordering function in society, also 
become evident via these research lens, but these notions are not addressed in this study. Examples of 
discussions regarding these other aspects include: Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration: A New Theory of 
Modernity, trans. Jonathan Trejo-Mathys (Columbia University Press, 2013);   Ty Solomon and Brent J. 
Steele, “Micro-Moves in International Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 23, 
no. 2 (June 2017): 267–91; Tarja Väyrynen, “Rethinking National Temporal Orders: the Subaltern Presence 
and Enactment of the Political,” Review of International Studies 42, no. 4 (2016): 597–612. 
14 For an example illustrating that hierarchy can exist among time perspectives, see Klaus H. Goetz, “Time 
and Power in the European Commission,” International Review of Administrative Sciences 80, no. 3 
(September 2014), 591.  
15 Regarding the last point, it is easy to see how the inclusion of historical time perspectives within the Oslo 
Accords can retain historical hostilities within present-day relations between Israel and the Palestinians. 
This retention does not create a contemporary environment conducive for the peace process to be 
succeed.    
16 Goetz, “Time and Power in the European Commission,” 578; Niklas Luhmann, Politische Planung: 
Aufsätze zur Soziologie von Politik und Verwaltung (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971), 143-64. 
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long-term and short-term time perspectives and their corresponding effects are present 
or absent within the theories or peace processes they use or study. Furthermore, as my 
study moves the reader through the reflection process, the reader can gain an 
understanding of the limitations of what a theory or peace process is potentially able to 
and unable to explain or deliver. By explaining the delimiting effects time perspectives 
have, my research contributes new insights to the discipline’s own understanding of how 
long-term and short-term time perspectives 1) work within theories of international 
politics or peace processes and 2) shape the study and practice of international politics. 
To demonstrate the potential insights the unpacking of the relationship between time 
perspectives and their effects can yield, Morgenthau’s theory of international politics 
and the Oslo Accords’ peace process were selected for analysis as illustrative case studies 
for my thesis.  
 
1.1 Why the foci on time perspectives and their effects?  
  My interest in analysing long-term/short-term time perspectives and their effects 
initially stemmed from my educational and professional experiences. During these 
experiences, observations were made about the role time -- in the forms of deadlines, 
timed processes, and individual, organisational, and governmental time perspectives – 
played in politics.17 Reflecting upon these observations, I questioned whether time also 
had a role to play within an IR theory or peace process.18 By exploring this relationship, 
my thought was that the subsequent findings might lead to insights about my 
observations regarding the role time appeared to play in the study and practice of 
international politics.19 However, attempting such an ambitious research endeavour on 
time, while worthwhile, was not pursued. There were two practical reasons for not 
                                                            
17 Prior to starting my PhD, I worked over a decade at various universities in the United States with diverse 
groupings of student, community, academic, and government stakeholders. Outside of higher education, 
my professional experience also includes working at the Oregon State Senate as a member of the Senate’s 
administrative and parliamentary staff and with the World United Nations Association in New York on a 
global project. 
18 In this study a theory is understood to be closely related to the study of international politics, while a 
peace process is understood to be representative of a practice of international politics. 
19 Such a thought was not unfounded as work regarding how Western standardised time came to play a 
dominate role in thinking about and the execution of international politics has shown. As example see: 
Andrew R. Hom, "Hegemonic Metronome: The Ascendancy of Western Standard Time," Review of 
International Studies 36, no. 4 (2010): 1145-170; Eviatar Zerubavel, "The Standardization of Time: A 
Sociohistorical Perspective," American Journal of Sociology 88, no. 1 (1982): 1-23. 
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pursuing such a comprehensive study; IR literature constraints and word limit. 
Regarding the first, as indicated by the absence of or limited discussions and 
understandings about non-Western calendar/local clock-time,20 ‘deep time’ in relation 
to addressing global environmental issues,21 and the sense of suspended time 
experienced by refugees, migrants, and displaced persons,22 IR literature on time has not 
been comprehensive nor exhausted. In relation to the second point, the enormity and 
complexity of the concept of time, with all its various facets (e.g. speed, rhythm, nature), 
within the context of international politics would quickly exceed the word limit imposed 
upon this thesis.23 Any attempt to stay within the word limit would at best offer only a 
limited understanding and interpretation of time with respect to international politics.24 
Consequently, my research aims were scaled down to a more manageable level which 
both continued to address my general interest in the relationship between time and 
international politics, as well as make a meaningful contribution to IR’s understanding 
of that relationship. 
To make this study feasible, my research focus was narrowed down to analysing 
particular perspectives of time. The perspectives selected for analysis were long-term 
and short-term time perspectives of the past, the present, and the future. With regards 
to long-term and short-term time perspectives, they were chosen for practical and 
substantive reasons. As a collective, the long-term and short-term time perspectives 
discussed in this study represent just one among many ‘other aspects of time and 
temporality that should also be of interest to students of the international, as they are 
                                                            
20 Via a review of work done by other IR scholars on time and through Nobert Elias’s sociological work on 
time, Hom helps to highlight that notions of time are the results of subjective timing practices which 
suggests an implied understanding within IR that non-Western calendar/local clock-times exist. For 
further details see Andrew R Hom, “Timing is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and 
International Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 1: 69–79. For a sampling of other 
measurements, depictions, and experiences of time which have effected international politics but remains 
understudied see Kristen Lippincott and National Maritime Museum, The Story of Time (London: Merrell 
Holberton in Asssociation with National Maritime Museum, 1999). 
21 David Farrier, “What Does Deep Time Mean?,” The Atlantic, October 31, 2016, https://www.theatlantic 
.com/science/archive/2016/10/aeon-deep-time/505922/ (accessed October 5, 2017). For an earlier 
articulation of the concept of ‘deep time’ see: James Hutton, Theory of the Earth (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger 
Publishing, 2000). 
22 Marita Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience: Narratives in Forced Migration Research,” Journal of 
Refugee Studies, 20, no. 2 (June 2007): 248–264. 
23 For a sample of the various facets of time that have been discussed in IR see: Andrew Hom, Christopher 
McIntosh, Alasdair Mackay, and Liam Stockdale, eds., Time, Temporality and Global Politics. 
24 Even noteworthy attempts to discuss time with respect to international politics have acknowledged that 
their work by no means is comprehensive nor offers the final word on the topic; for an example see 
Kimberly Hutchings, “Time and the Study of World Politics,” Millennium 46, no. 3 (June 2018), 255-57. 
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elsewhere in the social sciences and humanities [(and natural sciences)]’.25 By focusing 
on just long-term and short-term time perspectives rather than everything related to time 
found within a theory or peace process, my research scope was significantly reduced 
without compromising the contributions my research could make to the discipline. 
Aside from my aforementioned intuition, research from the fields of Organisational 
Management and Organisational Behaviour suggests that there is a relationship between 
time perspectives and the claims made within a theory or embedded within a practice 
that is worth exploring. Furthermore, the same research supports the idea that time 
perspectives can be used to recover an awareness of and analyse how understandings 
and practices of international politics are shaped.26 In other words, the use of long-term 
and short-term time perspectives and the analysis of their effects is not without 
precedent in other disciplines, as is the case within IR.27  
Furthermore, the decision to select long-term and short-term time perspectives as 
the focus of my study rather than time-related aspects such as rhythm, speed, or cyclical 
tendencies was threefold. First, these time perspectives were more discernible in both 
my theoretical and empirical case studies than the aforementioned time-related aspects. 
Second, the effects of the five time perspectives addressed in this thesis were consistently 
evident across my analysis of the texts articulating Morgenthau’s theory and the Oslo 
Accords’ peace process; the aforementioned time-related aspects were not always 
evident. Third, long-term and short-term time perspectives were helpful in recovering 
awareness of other time–related aspects found within my case studies.28 In the end, my 
                                                            
25 Tim Stevens, Cyber Security and the Politics of Time (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 37. 
26 Jennifer M. George and Gareth R. Jones, “The Role of Time in Theory and Theory Building,” Journal of 
Management 26, no. 4 (August 2000): 657–84; Deborah Ancona, Paul S. Goodman, Barbara S. Lawrence, 
and Michael L. Tushman, "Time: A New Research Lens," The Academy of Management Review 26, no. 4 
(October 2001): 645-63; Deborah G. Ancona, Gerardo A. Okhuysen, and Leslie A. Perlow, "Taking Time to 
Integrate Temporal Research," The Academy of Management Review 26, no. 4 (October 2001): 512-29. 
27 As a point of clarification, this statement is not meant to undervalue the insightful connections that 
have been made in IR literature between notions of the past, present, and future and theoretical claims 
about international politics; for an excellent example see Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian, eds., 
Time, Temporality and Violence in International Relations: (De)fatalizing the Present, Forging Radical 
Alternatives (London: Routledge, 2016). The statement is intended to highlight that my study is distinct 
within existing IR literature.   
28 The other time-related aspects, such as speed or rhythm, were detectable within the context of the 
different time perspectives analysed, but not elaborated on in this study. Conversely, time perspectives 
were not necessarily detectable within the context of other time-related aspects. In the case of the former 
statement, to detect a rhythm in international political history, it is necessary to demarcate the historical 
period within which a rhythm is to be sought. In the case of the latter statement, the speed of a political 
action as moving either quickly or slowly cannot be known without separately knowing the long-term or 
short-term historical, contemporary, or future context in which the action takes place.   
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selection of long-term and short-term time perspectives was made because collectively 
they alluded to the variety of time-related aspects that could potentially be found within 
a theory or peace process, as well as captured the multitude of minor, nuanced effects a 
particular articulation of time (e.g. long-term historical time perspective) can have on a 
theory or peace process. Therefore, the insights about time perspectives contained in 
this study are intended to provide entry points which various readers can use to begin 
to develop an understanding of what time is and how it operates within a theory or 
political practice, the discipline, and the international political sphere. 
To further narrow down the scope of my study, my study focused namely on the 
effects time perspectives have within a theory or peace process. In particular, my interest 
was in how time perspectives shape a theory or peace process via its claims. Claims were 
chosen as points for analysis for three reasons beyond what has been alluded to in the 
previous two paragraphs. First, claims can be found within every theory of international 
politics or peace process. Their ubiquity guarantees at least one part within a theory or 
peace process where the effects of time perspectives should be evident and an analysis 
can begin. Identifying claims as reliable parts within a theory or peace process where 
analysis of time perspectives and their effects can begin was necessary because there was 
no guarantee that each of the five time perspectives would be present or apparent within 
Morgenthau’s theory or the Oslo Accords.29 Second, analysing specific claims versus an 
entire theory or peace process concentrates my analysis on particulars as opposed to 
generalities. Although analysing a theory or peace process in the broad, abstract sense 
may help discover time perspectives and their broad effects, less dominant time 
perspectives and the nuanced or cumulative effects of various types of time perspectives 
on a theory or peace process remain obscured and unclear. Conversely, the advantage of 
focusing my analysis on claims is that claims provide defined aspects within a theory or 
peace process upon which to conduct an analysis that is both relevant to a theory or 
peace process as a whole, as well as able to capture minute details about various effects 
different time perspectives have that might otherwise be missed by a broad analysis 
across multiple theories or peace processes. Finally, claims are sites within a theory and 
                                                            
29 Although no claim was found in my research to be without at least one time perspective associated with 
it, the possibility of such a claim existing in another theory or peace process cannot be conclusively ruled 
out by my research. Nevertheless, my research suggests the possibility is highly unlikely as such a claim 
without any time perspective attached to it would by default be considered timeless. 
11 
 
peace process where connections between time perspectives and a theory or peace 
process can be found. Insights gained from an understanding of these connections 
enables readers to augment their understanding of where and how the relationship 
between time perspectives and claims shape a theory’s explanations of international 
politics or peace process’s outcomes.30 Furthermore, these insights help to trace and 
explain residual effects of this relationship found elsewhere within a theory or peace 
process.31 For the aforementioned reasons, claims within Morgenthau’s theory and the 
Oslo Accords were used in this study’s analyses.  
 
1.2 Why one theory and why one peace process?   
  To analyse and illustrate the relationship between long-term and short-term time 
perspectives and their effects on shaping a theory of international politics or peace 
process, one theory and one peace process were chosen to serve as case studies for this 
thesis. The three reasons for choosing a single theory and a single peace process were as 
follows. First, analysing one theory of international politics and one peace process rather 
than multiple theories or peace processes provided more opportunities to recover, 
analyse, and discuss nuanced and detailed insights about the long-term and short-term 
time perspectives and their effects within one specific theoretical context and one 
specific empirical context.32 Limiting my research to one illustrative theoretical case 
study and one illustrative empirical case study made the evolution of the arguments and 
ideas presented in this study easier to follow for the reader.  
  The second reason for choosing to analyse one theory and one peace process 
relates to the three secondary, yet important intentions of my study. Those three 
intentions are: 1) to illustrate that multiple long-term and short-term time perspectives 
can co-exist within a single theory or peace process, 2) to draw the awareness of the 
reader to the complex ways multiple long-term and short-term time perspectives interact 
                                                            
30 The insights shared in chapters 5-9 indicate that claims are unique in that they are rudimentary sites 
within a theory and a peace process where notions of time and perceptions of reality interact. 
31 In section 5.8, residual effects of this relationship within the context of Morgenthau’s theory will be 
addressed in greater detail. For example, the reasons for Morgenthau’s underdeveloped of long-term future 
time perspectives is the result of his interpretation of the long-term effects nuclear weapons have on his 
ideas of immortality.  
32 Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, “The Role of History in International Relations,” Millennium 
Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (December 2008), 362. 
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with one another and in relation to claims made within a theory or peace process, and 
3) to begin to identify the salient functions each type of time perspective performs within 
international politics. Had multiple theories and peace processes been used to illustrate 
evidence supporting my arguments, then the complex dynamics among long-term and 
short-term time perspectives and their relations to claims within a single theory or peace 
process might have been less prominent. For example, historical time perspectives and 
their effects on claims can overshadow the presence and effects of future time 
perspectives.33 In other words, examples from one theory and one peace process 
provided sufficient evidence to support the arguments made throughout my study.  
  Finally, one theory and one peace process was chosen for analysis because a 
theory’s and peace process’s time perspectives are not always explicit and therefore 
requires a familiarity with a theory’s or peace process’s unique way of articulating time 
perspectives to recover them and their corresponding effects.34 This familiarity 
(developed in chapters 5-7 in regards to Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments and 
chapters 8-9 in regards to the Oslo Accords’ peace process) was necessary for this study 
in order to recover and recognise time perspectives and their relationships with each 
other and to claims. Conversely, including overviews of the different terms and concepts 
used by various theories and peace processes to articulate time perspectives, their 
relations, and their effects on each theory and peace process would create unnecessary 
confusion in my analysis and hinder the advancement of my arguments.  
 
1.3 Why Morgenthau’s theory as a theoretical example?   
  For the purposes of illustrating long-term and short-term time perspectives and 
their effects within a theory of international politics, Morgenthau’s theory of 
international politics served as the illustrative theoretical case study from which 
examples were drawn for my analysis. Thus, this study is not aimed at developing an 
understanding of Morgenthau himself, but aimed at developing an understanding of 
                                                            
33 Paul W. Schroeder, “History and International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, but Fit or Misfit,” 
International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997), 64; Joseph MacKay and Christopher David LaRoche, “The 
Conduct of History in International Relations: Rethinking Philosophy of History in IR Theory,” 
International Theory 9, no. 2 (July 2017), 209; Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, "Polities Past 
and Present," Millennium - Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (December 2008), 366. 
34 The same can be said about a theory’s or peace process’s implicit articulation of the relationship between 
time perspectives and claims. 
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how time perspectives are articulated within a theory and what their effects might be. 
The advantages of using Morgenthau’s theory as an illustrative case study are manifold.  
Throughout texts articulating parts of Morgenthau’s theory, Morgenthau maintains an 
awareness of time and its relationship with international politics that is consistent and 
coherent across his texts, even when that awareness is not always explicitly stated.35 
Contained within this time-conscious context were numerous examples of each of the 
five time perspectives and their effects on claims made within his theory as detailed later 
in chapters 5-7. Therefore, this time-rich context was ideal and conducive for achieving 
the aims of my research project. Furthermore, as a founding theory of international 
politics, Morgenthau’s theory contains one of the first widely adopted theoretical 
contexts within the discipline where all five time perspectives and their effects on claims 
were explicitly and implicitly expressed.36 In recognition of the fact that early theories 
of international politics prepared and laid the foundation for ways of thinking about 
international politics which later theories built upon or responded to as the discipline 
matured, a conscious effort was made to select an early theory within the discipline. 
Consequently, Morgenthau’s theory was chosen as an initial case study to begin to 
explore how time perspectives shape a theory’s explanations and understandings of 
international politics.37 Finally, in relation to the previous point, subsequent theories of 
international politics have adopted and built upon some specific knowledge claims 
derived from Morgenthau’s theory (e.g. notions of power in relation to national interest, 
balance of power, and contingency). Therefore, the insights gained from my analysis 
may also provide preliminary understandings about corresponding relationships found 
                                                            
35 Despite how prolific Morgenthau was in writing about international politics, no separate treatise 
regarding his thoughts on time or notions of long-term and short-term time perspectives has been found 
among his known published and unpublished works.  
36 Among the early theories within the discipline, Liberalism and Marxism were also considered for use in 
my thesis as theoretical case studies. However, these other early theories were not selected for analysis 
because a main or dominate text articulating either theory of international politics that was edited and 
updated by the original author(s) over an extended period of time could not be found. Conversely, 
Morgenthau’s 1956 Politics among Nations (2nd edn.) provided a main text that was dominant in the 
discipline over several decades, edited and updated by the original author, Morgenthau, until his death in 
1980. Such a text made it possible to analyse potential changes in time perspectives within a theory’s 
articulation over an extended period of time. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956). 
37 ‘If our discipline [i.e. US international relations] has any founding father, it is Morgenthau,’ quoted in 
Stanley Hoffmann, “An American Social Science: International Relations,” Daedalus 106, no.3 (Summer 
1977), 44.  
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in other theories such as neorealism and constructivism.38 Consequently, as 
Morgenthau’s theory and corresponding texts were formative for the discipline, insights 
gained from my analysis are not limited to his theory but may also contribute to a 
broader understanding of how time perspectives affect understandings and 
interpretations throughout the discipline of IR.   
 
1.4 Why the Oslo Accords’ peace process as an empirical example?  
  To illustrate the presence and absence of time perspectives and their effects in 
political practice, the Oslo Accords were selected as the empirical case study.39 Like 
Morgenthau’s theory, an explicit and implicit awareness of time and its relationship with 
international politics was evident within the Accords. Despite the Accords’ dominant 
focus on the future, examples of all five time perspectives and their effects on claims 
made within the peace process outlined in the Accords could be found. The presence of 
all five time perspectives within the Accords allowed me to illustrate that salient 
functions and effects that time perspectives play in a theory (as noted in my analysis of 
Morgenthau’s theory) also appear in a peace process. In addition to containing all five 
time perspectives, the Accords also provided an opportunity to compare time 
perspectives at various implementation stages of a peace process (e.g. Oslo I time 
perspectives vs. Oslo II time perspectives). This ability to compare time perspectives 
enabled my study to identify what time perspectives were retained between agreements 
and what time perspectives were added or altered between agreements. The 
aforementioned features are not unique to the Accords’ peace process, however, and 
thus suggest that insights gained from my analysis of the Accords’ time perspectives and 
effects may not be limited to the peace process outlined within the Accords.  
                                                            
38 For an example of links between Morgenthau and a neorealist thinker see Kenneth N. Waltz, “Realist 
Thought and Neorealist Theory,” Journal of International Affairs 44, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), 25-26. 
For a persuasive argument linking realism and constructivism see Michael C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter 
in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power 
Politics,” International Organization 58, no. 4 (Fall 2004), 654-59. 
39 “Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (Oslo I),” conclusion date: 
September 13, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Guide to Mideast Peace Process, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx 
(accessed December 28, 2018); “The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement (Oslo II),” conclusion date: 
September 28, 1995, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Guide to Mideast Peace Process, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/the%20israeli-palestinian%20interim%20 
agreement.aspx (accessed December 28, 2018). 
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  What set the Accords apart from other peace processes (historical and 
contemporary), as well as other political processes and practices (e.g. parliamentary 
processes, diplomatic negotiations) that could have been included in this study were 
four features that the Accords collectively exhibited.40 First, the Israeli-Palestinian 
relations (that the Accords were designed to improve) continue to be confrontational. 
Consequently, using the Accords as an illustrative case study allowed the time 
perspective recommendations for future peace processes presented in chapter 9 to be 
read as potential ways of addressing an ongoing concern within international politics 
rather than purely speculative comments on periodic or passed historical concerns. 
Furthermore, these recommendations illustrate that increased differentiation of time 
perspectives might hinder the prospects of peace.41 Second, because of the clear linkages 
between liberal and democratic peace theories and the peace process as articulated 
within the Accords, my study was able to draw attention to (though not develop in 
detail) the effects that the time perspectives shaping a particular theory can have on the 
practice of international politics. Third, each of the five time perspectives and their 
intended corresponding effects were clearly articulated throughout the Accords. These 
clear articulations made the Accords an ideal case study that allowed the identification 
of time perspectives and their effects to be traced over time in the context of a particular 
political practice. Finally, the Accords has been and continues to be referenced in the IR 
literature on Israeli-Palestinian relations, (post-)liberal peace processes, and peace 
studies after 20+ years as a seminal historical example that scholars and policymakers 
repeatedly use to help guide the research and future development of peace processes.42 
Therefore, the effects of insights shared in my study are not limited to time-related IR 
literature, but have a potentially broader relevance and effect in multiple IR sub-fields 
                                                            
40 While I recognise that other peace processes and political processes and practices might exhibit one or 
more of these four features, the Accords offered a practical example exhibiting all four features that I was 
already familiar with.     
41 An example of the differentiation of time perspectives as being problematic to the prospect of peace can 
be seen in the Accords’ differentiation of the past. The long-term and short-term time perspectives included 
within the Accords embeds long-term and short-term historical hostilities within the peace process which 
might not be the most relevant or pressing hostilities in the present. Thus, increased differentiation of the 
past only adds to the hostilities in the present. Further discussion regarding the differentiation of time 
perspectives within the Accords is covered in chapters 8 and 9. 
42 Erika Weinthal, "Water as a Basic Human Right within the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," American 
Diplomacy (October 2017): 1-5; Moshe Yaalon, “How to Build Middle East Peace: Why Bottom-Up is Better 
than Top-Down,” Foreign Affairs, 96, no. 1 (January 2017), 73, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles 
/israel/2016-12-12/how-build-middle-east-peace (accessed September 27, 2018). 
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(e.g. policy studies, peace studies).   
 
1.5 How was my analysis conducted?  
  Close readings of texts articulating Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments and 
the Oslo Accords’ peace process were conducted to recover evidence of embedded time 
perspectives and their effects within the texts. Thus, my reading of these texts is 
instrumental and done for illustrative purposes rather than an exploration into how 
these texts and their time perspectives have been used in the discipline. Because the 
time perspectives and their effects can differ in regards to the textual context(s) within 
which they are articulated and my study was analysing relationships underexplored in 
IR, this study required a close reading of both case study texts and the use of a conceptual 
framework new to IR. The latter was primarily derived from Organisational 
Management and Organisational Behaviour literature on time perspectives, with further 
adjustments originating from History, Psychology, and IR.43 Collectively they provided 
a reading lens through which time perspectives and their effects could be identified and 
analysed. Thus, the case study texts were viewed as areas in which to look for and mine 
time perspectives and their effects, much in the same way that historians view historical 
accounts as areas in which to look for and mine contingencies and their residual effects.   
  To recover and analyse the long-term and short-term time perspectives and their 
effects within the analysed texts, a two-pronged approach was used. One part of my 
approach employed various concepts of time and time-related language drawn from 
both IR and non-IR literatures to help broadly conceptualise, identify, distinguish, and 
articulate the time perspectives and their effects recovered in my analyses of the two 
unconnected case studies. The second part of my approach utilised a hermeneutic 
framework from social theory when reviewing key texts relevant to each case study.44 
This framework, influenced by Judith Shklar’s work on hermeneutics, was instrumental 
in rendering new insights about time perspectives and their effects explicitly and 
implicitly embedded within Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords’ peace process, as well 
                                                            
43 Within IR, there is a well-established practice of importing ideas and methods from cognate disciplines 
to help develop and augment the existing explanations IR has to offer in regards to international politics. 
Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, “The End of International Relations Theory?,” European 
Journal of International Relations 19, no. 3 (September 2013), 413.     
44 This framework is detailed in section 2.2. 
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as time perspective recommendations to consider in the development of future peace 
processes.45 As will be detailed further in chapters 2-4, the aforementioned parts 
collectively constituted a methodology that was useful for the purposes of my study and 
also helped to mitigate the subjectivity which hermeneutic frameworks can be 
susceptible to.  
 
1.6 Thesis structure  
  Following this introductory chapter, the remainder of my study unfolds in three 
parts, across nine chapters, as follows.46 Part I begins with Chapter 2’s review of the 
various IR and non-IR literatures consulted for this study, as well as a methodological 
description regarding the hermeneutic approach used to recover time perspectives and 
their effects from selected case study texts. My review covered four broad areas of 
literature: international politics and time, discussions of time in non-IR disciplines, work 
on and by Morgenthau and in relation to his theory of international politics, and the 
Oslo Accords. The primary aims of my review are threefold. First, my review draws 
attention to the absences and under-theorisations of time perspectives and their effects 
existing within the IR literature. Second, my review highlights why and what insights 
regarding time perspectives and their effects on theories and practices studied in other 
disciplines were used in this study to help develop and articulate understandings of how 
time perspectives shape a theory of international politics or peace process. Finally, my 
review of the IR time-related literatures and those relevant to each case study provided 
the contexts necessary to conduct my analysis and to understand where my study’s 
insights made contributions to the existing literatures. 
  Following my literature review is Chapter 3 which primarily focuses on ways of 
conceptualising, identifying, and distinguishing between the five time perspectives 
analysed and discussed within each of the two unconnected case studies. Additionally, 
the chapter covers those time perspectives that are not extensively addressed in this 
study (e.g. long-term present time perspectives) to address the limits of my study. Within 
                                                            
45 Judith Shklar, "Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle," Social Research 53, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 449-473. 
46 Part I (i.e. chapter 2-4) provides the context, concepts, and methodology used to in this study to conduct 
my analysis of the selected case studies. Part II (i.e. chapters 5-7) details my analysis of the selected 
theoretical case study (i.e. Morgenthau’s theory). Part III (chapters 8-9) details my analysis of the selected 
empirical case study (i.e. the Accords’ Peace Process). 
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this chapter, readers are introduced to a novel understanding of time perspectives as 
constructs of time that have both temporal focus and temporal depth with respect to 
the past, present, or the future. Additionally, this chapter’s discussions regarding anchor 
points, the aggregation of periodisations, and comparisons between time perspectives 
offer readers new ways in which time perspectives can be identified and distinguished 
within a theory or peace process. Collectively, the details and distinctions presented in 
this chapter help the reader to grasp how each of the five time perspectives recovered 
and analysed in the case study chapters 5-9 were differentiated from one another, as well 
as from other time-related constructs (e.g. time horizons).  Furthermore, the 
conceptualisation of time perspectives and means of distinguishing them presented in 
Chapter 3 enable readers to pursue research interests regarding time perspectives within 
other theories and peace processes that have either previously appeared too daunting or 
not possible. In other words, the contents of this chapter open up new areas of research 
which contribute to the discipline’s broader understanding of how time is articulated 
within international politics.  
  In Chapter 4, although brief, three key time-related aspects used in this study are 
presented. The three aspects addressed in the chapter include perennial, ephemeral, and 
contingent. These aspects were highlighted because they are key time-related aspects 
that time perspectives can attribute to claims and practices. Attribution of these aspects 
yield particular effects on individual claims and practices, as well as in aggregate on a 
theory or a peace process. Therefore, the discussions of these three aspects within this 
chapter were essential to articulate because they provide the reader with a general 
awareness and understanding of what time-related aspects are embedded and 
articulated via time perspectives. Furthermore, this awareness and understanding aided 
in the identification and tracing of the effects time perspectives have within each of the 
case studies. To generate a general awareness and understanding of these aspects, 
different sections within the chapter address 1) how each aspect is understood within 
this study individually, 2) in relation to time perspectives which attribute them to claims 
and practices within as a theory or peace process, and 3) in relation to one another. In 
the course of these articulations, the first hints of how a theory or peace process is 
significantly shaped and delimited by its time perspectives are illustrated. 
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  Chapter 5 marks a crucial point in my thesis (and the beginning of Part II) where 
my study begins its use of case studies to illustrate and detail the application of methods 
and concepts addressed in chapters 3 and 4, as well as the time perspectives and 
corresponding effects these methods and concepts helped recover from each case study. 
Opening this portion of my study is my analysis of how long-term and short-term 
historical time perspectives were articulated and conceptualised within Morgenthau’s 
theory of international politics, as well as their individual and collective effects on claims 
made within his theory. From my analysis insights are gained about the different salient 
functions and effects that long-term and short-term historical time perspectives have on 
Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments. For example, long-term historical time 
perspectives were found to have effects on how understandings and explanations of the 
past get extended and reified in the future. In the case of short-term historical time 
perspectives, they were found to provide novel insights about how various claims of 
different perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics interact and fit 
together on a sub-macro level which are difficult to ascertain from Morgenthau’s 
accounts of the past as a whole.47 The chapter ends by illustrating how insights obtained 
from my analysis of historical time perspectives can be used to develop new 
understandings of how notions of the future within Morgenthau’s theory were shaped.     
As a whole, the chapter’s detailed account of the various historical time perspectives and 
their effects within Morgenthau’s theory helps to illustrate how an enhanced 
understanding of a theory’s articulations of the past can support and delimit theoretical 
explanations of international politics. 
  My analysis of time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau’s theory 
continues in Chapter 6 with a focus on the short-term present time perspectives and their 
corresponding effects. The chapter begins with a discussion of the ubiquitous presence 
of these perspectives across theories of international politics. Indications as to why 
short-term present time perspectives are so pervasive were gained from my analysis of 
the functions they perform within Morgenthau’s theory and their effects. For example, 
international politics is initially problematised within Morgenthau’s theory via his 
                                                            
47 Hobson and Lawson make similar distinctions between different levels of generality of the past with the 
highest being mega-macro and the lowest being micro. In my distinction of a sub-macro level, this level 
is lower than the mega-macro but higher than the micro which I interpret as at the level of an individual 
person. John M. Hobson and George Lawson, "What Is History in International Relations?," Millennium-
Journal of International Studies 37, no. 2 (December 2008), 420.   
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theory’s short-term present time perspectives. The chapter continues on to analyse and 
discuss how these time perspectives characterise the present within Morgenthau’s 
theory. This helps to explain the relations between his theory’s present and its 
articulated past and future, and date-stamp his theory and the claims made within it, as 
well as their effects. Similar to the final section in Chapter 5, this chapter’s final section 
demonstrates how insights obtained from my analysis of short-term present time 
perspectives help to explain how these time perspectives shaped notions of the future 
within Morgenthau’s theory. Collectively, the insights recovered from my analysis of 
short-term present time perspectives highlight and suggest that no theory of 
international politics can exist without including at least one articulation of this 
particular time perspective. 
  Concluding my analysis of time perspectives and their effects within 
Morgenthau’s theory is Chapter 7 which addresses his theory’s short-term and long-term 
future time perspectives. The first part of the chapter focuses on short-term future time 
perspectives and their effects. In addition to providing predictions or approximations 
about the immediate future, my analysis reveals that these future time perspectives also 
extend a theory’s explanations and explanatory power beyond the known/knowable 
world. This awareness led to insights about how particular unknowns of the near future 
become known and certainty gets attached to near future predictions. The second part 
of the chapter addresses the long-term future time perspectives within Morgenthau’s 
theory and their effects. The insights gained from my analysis of these particular future 
time perspectives indicate that these time perspectives help 1) define the duration of the 
future validity of each theoretical claim, 2) determine the applicability of claims in 
familiar and unfamiliar international political contexts, 3) articulate what known aspects 
of international politics are retained in the distant future, and 4) introduce new claims 
about the distant future into a theory. The final part of the chapter considers the 
cumulative effects these future time perspectives have on Morgenthau’s theory to suggest 
that the neglected analysis of future time perspectives and their effects limits disciplinary 
understandings of a theory and its claims. 
  Chapter 8 marks the beginning of Part III where my second case study is 
introduced. The second case study analyses the manifestations of and shaping effects 
that time perspectives have on a peace process, specifically the peace process articulated 
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in the Oslo Accords. Similar to my analysis of Morgenthau’s theory, my analysis of the 
Accords’ peace process illustrates and details the application of methods and aspects 
addressed in chapters 3 and 4, as well as the time perspectives and corresponding effects 
these methods and aspects helped recover from the Accords. Furthermore, my analysis 
of the Accords also capitalises on the explanations and discussions from chapters 5-7 to 
articulate unacknowledged understandings of time perspectives and their effects within 
the Accords’ peace process. My analysis of the Accords begins in Chapter 8 which 
consists of three parts. The first part outlines what a peace process is understood to be 
within this study and the connections between the Accords’ peace process and theories 
of liberal and democratic peace. The second part provides an overview of the Accords’ 
historical contexts regarding 1) the primary issues the Accords were intended to address 
and 2) what circumstances made drafting the Accords necessary and possible. The final 
part describes how the time perspectives within the Accords’ peace process were 
demarcated via the extreme anchor points articulated within the Accords. Together, all 
three parts provide the necessary basis which made my analysis of time perspectives and 
their effects within the Accords possible. Furthermore, this basis also contributed to the 
formulation of the recommendations made in regards to the development and 
evaluation of future peace processes detailed in Chapter 9. 
  In Chapter 9, each of the five time perspectives and their effects within the 
Accords are analysed and discussed. Noteworthy insights recovered in the analysis of 
the Accords’ historical time perspectives include the following: the key roles long-term 
historical time perspectives played in suggesting that Israeli-Palestinian relations were 
perennially confrontational and how short-term historical time perspectives were used 
to legitimise the Accords’ peace process. In regards to my analysis of the Accords’ short-
term present time perspectives, the recovered insights suggest that these time 
perspectives provided an incomplete contemporary context of the situation which 
potentially limited the extent of the peace that the Accords’ peace process could achieve. 
Finally, key insights from my analysis of the Accords’ future time perspectives indicated 
that the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives delimited the peace process’s 
immediate future to such an extent that the peace process was unable to adjust to near 
future realities as they arose and that the long-term future time perspectives were the 
least developed among all the time perspectives found within the Accords.  In addition 
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to drawing attention to the salient functions and effects of each time perspectives within 
the Accords, each section of this chapter also included recommendations as to how the 
insights gained from my analysis could be used to improve the success of future peace 
processes addressing Israeli-Palestinian relations.    
  Following my analysis of the aforementioned empirical case study (i.e. the 
Accords), is the final chapter of my thesis. The aims of this concluding chapter are 
twofold. The first aim is to pull together the acquired understandings of long-term and 
short-term time perspectives and their effects obtained from both case studies into a brief 
summary that provides readers with key insights that may be useful in recovering time 
perspectives and their effects found within other theories and peace processes. The 
second aim of the concluding chapter is t0 highlight two future areas of research which 
insights from this thesis can be used to explore further. These two future areas of 
research include further investigations into manifestations of long-term present time 
perspectives within international politics and the conceptualisation of notions of time 
(e.g. block time vs. growing block time) used in the articulation, study, and practice of 
international politics. Both aims help to emphasise three main points raised throughout 
this thesis: 1) time perspectives and their effects can appear in a multitude of forms, 2) 
various manifestations of time perspectives and their effects can profoundly shape and 
delimit corresponding explanations and practices of international politics, and 3) that 
the insights shared in this thesis can be and should be further developed to augment 
disciplinary understandings within IR regarding the relationship between theory and 
the practice of international politics and time. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
  Identifying and recovering long-term and short-term time perspectives and their 
effects found within texts articulating Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments and the 
Accords’ peace process was made feasible via a review of multiple bodies of literature 
(particularly related to time) from different disciplines and the usage of a hermeneutic 
framework when reading through the case study texts analysed for time perspectives. 
Consequently, this chapter provides an overview of the various literatures consulted for 
this study and the contributions they made which led to my insights about time 
perspectives and their effects detailed in latter chapters. The chapter begins with two 
sections that address how the literatures consulted came to be so diverse and detail the 
hermeneutic framework used to recover time perspectives and their effects from the case 
study texts selected for analysis. The remaining sections of the chapter address the 
various literatures consulted in this study in more detail. Literatures reviewed for this 
study and covered in this chapter include, but are not limited to, IR literature on time, 
by and on Morgenthau, and regarding the Accords’ peace process, as well as time-related 
literature from non-IR disciplines such as Organisational Management, Organisational 
Behaviour, History, Philosophy, Physics, and Sociology. As will be detailed in this 
chapter, the consultation of literatures outside of IR was necessary to address the 
research questions posed in this study because the existing IR literature on time was 
found to only partially address my research questions. Given the diversity of literatures 
consulted in this study, addressing them separately within the aforementioned 
groupings would be counterproductive as it would detract from how they might 
complement or relate one another. Consequently, the literatures were grouped into 
three broad categories under the following headings: International Politics and Time, 
Non-IR Literature on Time, and Case Study Literatures related to Morgenthau’s theory 
and the Oslo Accords. Within each of the three aforementioned categories are 
subcategories of literature which serve as sub-section headings in this chapter.  
In the first section, the IR literature on time is reviewed to provide a glimpse of 
how time is or is not understood and discussed within existing IR literature and where 
gaps in the literature lay and are in need of attention. Particular attention is given to 
contemporary discussions of time within IR to indicate how this study relates and 
contributes to those discussions. The second section covers non-IR literature on time 
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that was consulted to address understandings of time perspectives and their effects 
found to be under-theorised in or missing from the consulted IR literature regarding 
time. The third section is broken into two substantive parts: literature relevant to my 
theoretical case study on Morgenthau’s theory and literature relevant to my empirical 
case study on the Oslo Accords’ peace process. The first part includes a review of 
literature written by Morgenthau on his theory of international politics or relevant to 
his theoretical commitments and literature written on Morgenthau. The literature by 
Morgenthau, particularly Politics among Nations, was essential to this study as it 
provided examples illustrating how time perspectives shape individual theoretical 
claims.48 The literature on Morgenthau helped indicate how an awareness of time 
perspectives within a theory draws attention to the problems with some of the critiques 
levelled against Morgenthau’s theory and suggests what other critiques along similar 
lines may have greater merit. The second part of my case study literatures section 
addresses literature on the Oslo Accords. This literature helped provide historical, 
conceptual, and theoretical backgrounds necessary to conduct an analysis of time 
perspectives and their effects within this study’s chosen empirical case study, the Oslo 
Accords. Collectively, these three sections constitute my review of the literature 
consulted for this study. 
  In addition to the aforementioned reasons for reviewing the literature included 
in this study, this review is also directed toward satisfying six broad aims. The first aim 
includes locating this study within the existing IR literature addressing: 1) notions of 
time in relation to international politics, 2) Morgenthau and classical realism, and 3) the 
Oslo Accords, peace, and peace processes. Furthermore, this review also helps to locate 
this study (and IR’s handling of time perspectives) in relation to non-IR disciplines. The 
second aim of this review is to address the rationale for selecting and emphasizing 
                                                            
48 Although all five editions of Politics among Nations published during his lifetime (plus the 1985 sixth 
edition following his death in 1980) were reviewed for this study, the second edition published in 1956 
served as the main edition cited in throughout this thesis for three reasons. First, as noted in the preface 
to the second edition, the second edition was an attempt by Morgenthau to clarify his original arguments 
made in the first edition (1948) and incorporate new developments and conditions in international politics 
(e.g. containment policy) which had yet to fully manifest at the time of the first edition’s publication. 
Second, editions subsequent to the second edition contained no significant differences apart from a few 
updated examples illustrating points made in 1956. Even the sixth edition published in 1985 remained 
substantively similar to the second edition published in 1956. Finally, the second edition was 
representative of his ‘original’ articulation of a theory of international politics that went on to shape 
readers’ understanding of international politics for decades.     
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particular works used within this study. The third aim is to identify key ideas, concepts, 
authors, and ways of thinking that shape[d] IR discourses relevant to this study. The 
fourth aim this review seeks to meet is to delimit where the gaps of knowledge exist 
within the IR literature as it relates to time perspectives and their effects within a theory 
or peace process. The fifth aim is to illustrate how non-IR literature can be used to help 
fill in some of the aforementioned gaps in IR. The final aim is to highlight the value and 
necessity of looking at literature from within IR and across various disciplines to gain a 
more panoptic and deeper awareness and understanding of time perspectives and their 
effects within the field of IR.  
 
2.1 Selection of literature  
  Prior to beginning my review of the literature consulted for this study, three 
comments need to be addressed in regards to how the literature came to be so diverse 
and how the case study texts (e.g. Politics among Nations and the Accords) were read. 
First, the diversity of literatures consulted emerged organically as a result of the 
limitations of the consulted IR literature and in an effort to sufficiently address the 
questions posed in this study. For example, as the 2018 Millennium special conference 
issue on time in relation to international politics illustrates, recent research that aims to 
unpack the complexities of temporalities of and within international politics has 
revealed novel insights about temporality, but these insights are limited.49 Such 
literature offers limited discussion about the long-term and short-term time perspectives 
of the past, present, and future which attribute particular aspects to claims necessary for 
certain notions of temporality to be perceived.50 Had I not been familiar with non-IR 
literature addressing time-related issues relevant to this study prior to beginning my 
research, the limitations within the IR literature would have been less evident. Allowing 
these gaps in the consulted IR literature to guide the selection of the non-IR literature 
consulted for this study was essential to delimiting what time-related literature was 
                                                            
49 Sarah Bertrand, Kerry Goettlich, and Christopher Murray, eds., “The Politics of Time in International 
Relations,” Special conference issue, Millennium 46, no. 3 (June 2018): 251-52. 
50 For recent exception see Scott Hamilton, “Foucault’s End of History: The Temporality of 




consulted for this study.51 Without this delimitation, locating the time-related literature 
relevant to this study among the vast amount of literature on time found within 
disciplines such as History or Physics would have been far more difficult and impractical. 
Admittedly, however, this process of selecting literature means that some literature 
relevant to this study was missed. Nevertheless, the literature that was captured by this 
process was sufficient to address the questions posed in this study and offer novel 
insights about time perspectives and their effects. 
  The second reason helping to explain the diversity of literature related to how 
this study was set-up. The broad aim of the study was to separately unpack the 
relationship between time perspectives and a theory or peace process by analysing the 
effects time perspectives have within each case study. Because this study includes both 
a theoretical case study and an empirical case study to illustrate how time perspectives 
and their effects manifest in each case study separately, this study had to draw on 
specific literature that was relevant to just one of the case studies. For example, a review 
of United Nations (UN) Security Council (SC) Resolutions 24252 and 33853 was motivated 
by the potential insights they might reveal about historical and future time perspectives 
and their effects within the Oslo Accords rather than any potential insights they might 
reveal within Morgenthau’s theory. Consequently, this led to a selection of literature 
that was more diverse and at times less applicable across both case studies than would 
have otherwise been the case. For example, if the empirical example chosen in this study 
was a peace process that had been authored by Morgenthau and put into practice, then 
literature used in regards to the theoretical case study on Morgenthau’s theory would 
have also likely had relevance to the empirical example. By calling attention to the set-
up of the study as a contributing factor to the diversity of literature consulted in this 
study, the reader is also made aware of the delimiting effects the set-up of this study has 
had on the selection of literature reviewed.  
                                                            
51 As a consequence of this selection process, classical time-related literature was not used in this study. 
Examples of such literature include Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978) and Henri 
Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, with Reference to Einstein’s Theory  (1922), trans. Leon Jacobson (New 
York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965). 
52 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Twenty-second year, “Middle East,” S/RES/242, November 22, 
1967, https://undocs.org/S/RES/242(1967) (accessed December 28, 2018). 
53 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Twenty-eighth year, “Cease-fire in Middle East,” S/RES/338, 




2.2 Methodological considerations and explanations 
  To recover and analyse the long-term and short-term time perspectives and their 
corresponding effects embedded within Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments and the 
Accords’ peace process, a hermeneutic framework was used.54 In this study, 
hermeneutics is understood as requiring a close reading and examination of texts in an 
attempt to interpret and understand their contents.55 The hermeneutic framework used 
in this study was based upon Judith Shklar’s application of W.G. Runciman’s work on 
social theory to hermeneutics.56  Essentially, Runciman outlines a hermeneutic 
framework consisting of 3+1 sequential stages: 1) reportage (i.e. raw data), 2) explanation 
(i.e. why did something occur), 3) description (i.e. interpretation, call for social action), 
and 4) evaluation.57  Runciman’s hermeneutic framework was specifically selected for 
this study for three reasons. First, the framework enabled me to simultaneously conduct 
an analysis of and draw attention to various aspects of time perspectives and their effects 
within the selected case studies, as well as present evaluations and recommendations 
derived from insights gained via my analysis. Second, the framework outlined the 
sequential stages that helped to make the hermeneutic approach used for my analysis 
clear to readers of this study so they can differentiate it from other hermeneutic 
approaches.  Finally, the framework enabled various notions of hermeneutics to be 
brought together under one umbrella, notions which added substance to the framework.  
  Among the various notions, five in particular are worth noting as they help 
readers understand how hermeneutics is understood in this study. First, hermeneutics 
is an exchange between the interpreter and the text.58 Second, interpretations play 
emancipatory roles of mainstream critiques or prompt calls to action.59 Third, the 
distance between the hermeneutics of faith (i.e. Gadamer) and doubt (i.e. Habermas) 
                                                            
54 Included in this recovery are the anchor points, aggregations, relations among time perspectives, and 
time-related aspects (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, contingent) that time perspectives attach to claims and 
practices, all of which are addressed further in chapters 3 and 4. 
55 For the purposes of this research, the word “text” only refers to written texts. 
56 Shklar, “Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle”; W. G. Runciman, A Treatise on Social Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
57 Runciman, A Treatise on Social Theory; Shklar, “Squaring the Hermeneutic Circle,” 465-70. 
58 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Seabury, 1975), 
331. 
59 Jurgen Habermas, “The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality,” in The Hermeneutic Tradition, eds. Gayle 
Omiston and Alan Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990): 245-272. 
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can be reconciled.60 Fourth, distinct meanings of words, sentences, and paragraphs 
within the text limit the extent of their possible interpretations and consequently give 
them an objective-like quality.61 Finally, consulting texts beyond the specific text under 
examination may help recover, confirm, or refine meanings and understandings of the 
texts being examined.62 This latter notion was particularly helpful in my analysis because 
it led to the consultation of multiple texts by Morgenthau or referenced within the 
Accords which yielded an awareness of Morgenthau’s general theoretical context 
regarding international politics and the international political context surrounding the 
Accords’ peace process.63 An awareness of these contexts were crucial in this study for 
two reasons: 1) to maintain coherent interpretations of time perspectives and their 
effects found within Morgenthau’s theory or the Accords’ peace process and 2) to 
provide the necessary scaffolding from which to read (i.e. see) where time perspectives 
and their effects appeared in texts articulating Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments 
or details of the Accords’ peace process.  In other words, the other literature provided a 
check on my subjectivity which affected my resulting interpretations. 
The aforementioned hermeneutic framework was applied to two different 
groupings of texts: one grouping of texts articulating Morgenthau’s theoretical 
commitments and another grouping of texts articulating the Accords’ peace process. 
Each grouping of texts were read and analysed separately ensuring that the hermeneutic 
process for each remained uncontaminated by the other. Consequently, the 
manifestations of time perspectives and their effects for each case study were derived 
separately from each corresponding grouping of texts, rather than from one another or 
some other external source. Therefore, the purpose of using a hermeneutic framework 
was not to yield comprehensive interpretations of all the functions and effects of time 
perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory or the Oslo Accords nor to recover 
                                                            
60 Anshuman Prasad, “The Contest over Meaning: Hermeneutics as an Interpretive Methodology for 
Understanding Texts,” Organization Research Methods 5, no.1 (January 2002), 23; Paul Ricoeur, 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, trans. J. B. Thompson (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981) 144; Gayle Omiston and Alan Schrift, eds., The Hermeneutic Tradition (Albany: SUNY Press, 
1990), 22. 
61 Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” Review of Metaphysics 25, no. 1 (September 
1971), 23-26. 
62 Quentin Skinner, “Motives, Intentions and the Interpretation of Texts,” New Literary History 3, no. 2 
(Winter 1972): 393-408; Quentin Skinner, “Hermeneutics and the Role of History,” New Literary History 
7, no. 1 (Autumn 1975): 209-232. 
63 Texts pertaining to his works on domestic politics were excluded from this study as domestic politics 
are not part of the scope of this thesis. 
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Morgenthau’s personal time perspectives or the origins of the Accords’ time perspectives 
from the texts. The purpose was more modest; to use hermeneutics as a means of 
rendering understandings and interpretations of the examined texts that helped 
conceptualise undertheorised contemporary understandings of long-term and short-
term time perspectives and their effects.    
 
2.3 International politics and time 
  To begin to develop understandings of time perspectives and their effects in 
relation to Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords’ peace process, the broader 
relationship between international politics and time must first be reflected upon. The 
relationship between international politics and time has been, is, and will be ever-
present and perennial as there is no record of an international political phenomena 
existing outside of time. This characterisation suggests that international politics cannot 
be fully understood or interpreted without accounting for time in the same way that 
certain laws of physics cannot be fully understood or interpreted without accounting for 
time.64 In light of this intimate relationship, it is surprising how undertheorised 
concepts of time are within IR in comparison to other disciplines such as History65 or 
Philosophy66 which also have intimate relationships with time but have made extensive 
efforts to theorise and develop deep understandings of time.67 Nevertheless, this study 
is not the first to call attention to this deficit within the IR literature.68 Occasional, yet 
notable efforts to explicitly unpack this relationship made within IR highlight the 
ripeness of investigating this relationship further and allude to the profundity of 
potential insights to be gained from such an investigation. A few examples of the 
concepts and ideas emerging from such efforts include understandings of time with 
                                                            
64 For examples from Physics see Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black 
Holes (London: Bantam, 2011); Carlo Rovelli, The Order of Time, trans. Erica Segre and Simon Carnell 
(Allen Lane: Penguin, 2018). 
65 Time is central to the discipline of History as its primary focus is on one segment of time, the past and 
its relations to various other segments of time past, present, or future.  
66 For an example of Philosophy’s interest in developing notions of time see Emily Thomas, Absolute Time: 
Rifts in Early Modern British Metaphysics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018).   
67 These two disciplines were singled out as IR literature heavily draws on both to develop and support 
international political claims. 
68 See Kimberly Hutchings, Time and World Politics; Christopher McIntosh, "Theory across Time: The 




respect to international politics as an event,69 as subjective and constructed,70 as 
progressive,71 as linear, cyclical, and measureable,72 and as a product of timing73.74  
  While these efforts might be considered as attempts at developing grand theories 
explaining the relationship between international politics and time, this study does not 
interpret these efforts in this way. The understanding proposed here suggests rather to 
understand these efforts as representing limited perspectives and explanations of 
particular aspects of the relationship between international politics and time. Similarly, 
this study also intends to provide limited insights and explanations about particular 
aspects of this relationship, namely focusing on claims within a theory or peace process. 
This study, however, differs markedly from the aforementioned efforts in that it brings 
them all together under a specific set of categories, foremost long-term and short-term 
time perspectives. In other words, this study helps to recover various notions of time (e.g. 
as an event, as linear, as progressive) in articulations of international politics via an 
examination of long-term and short-term time perspectives and their effects within a 
theory or peace process and to illustrate how they interrelate to one another. 
Consequently, the insights and explanations shared in this study complement previous 
efforts of making sense of time within IR, as well as they add previously unrecognised 
perspectives of the relationship between international politics and time to the existing 
body of IR literature. Furthermore, the insights and explanations shared in this study 
move understandings of the relationship between international politics and time closer 
to a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship. This can be helpful in the 
potential development of broader conceptualisations of time with respect to 
international politics.75 Furthermore, enhancing the comprehensiveness of 
                                                            
69 Tom Lundborg, Politics of the Event: Time, Movement, Becoming (London; New York: Routledge, 2012). 
70 Lee Jarvis, Times of Terror: Discourse, Temporality and the War on Terror (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009); Ty Solomon, "Time and Subjectivity in World Politics," International Studies 
Quarterly 58, no. 4 (December 2014): 671-81. 
71 Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," European Journal of International Relations 9, no. 
4 (December 2003): 491-542. 
72 Barbara Adam, Time and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990); Wai Chee Dimock, “Non-
Newtonian Time: Robert Lowell, Roman History, and Vietnam War,” American Literature 74, no. 4 
(December 2002): 911-31; Elman and Elman, “Role of History,” 359. 
73 Andrew R. Hom, "Timing Is Everything: Toward a Better Understanding of Time and International 
Politics," International Studies Quarterly 62, no. 1 (March 2018): 69-79. 
74 For a brief overview of how time has been addressed within IR, see McIntosh, “Theory across Time.” 
75 Nobel Prize recipient Wilczek’s discussion regarding appearance of dodecahedron in nature and theory 
illustrates how the development of understandings of one key aspect of nature can greatly advance toward 
a more comprehensive theoretical understanding of a wide range of phenomena occurring in nature. 
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contemporary understandings of this relationship also has the potential to 
simultaneously support and challenge pre-existing understandings; points that will be 
illustrated in the analyses found in chapters 5-9. 
 
2.4 Narrowing the focus   
  Among the IR literature with respect to time reviewed, there are a few works in 
particular that were instrumental in directing and narrowing my study’s focus on time 
perspectives and their effects within a theory or peace process. To begin with, 
Christopher McIntosh’s work on the relationship between temporality and IR theories 
presented three points which were instrumental in shaping my study.76 First, his work 
argues that ‘[h]ow IR understands and represents time inextricably shapes the 
knowledge claims it produces’.77 In other words, perspectives of time affect international 
political claims.78 The notion that particular aspects of time can affect claims led to the 
generation of research questions addressed throughout my study. These questions 
included: What particular aspects of time, rather than time in general, affect claims? 
What do the manifestations of these effects look like? Second, McIntosh argues that 
assumptions about time are embedded in the work done on and in IR and suggests that 
these assumptions are not always consistent within the discipline.79 This inconsistency 
can result in creating distinct notions of time that may or may not correspond with other 
notions of time articulated elsewhere within the IR literature or beyond. Questions that 
I developed from this argument and addressed in my study include: How are 
assumptions about time embedded into a theory or peace process? What can explain the 
inconsistencies among the embedded assumptions? The final point McIntosh suggests 
is that pursuing various lines of inquiry regarding individual aspects of time present 
opportunities to gain an awareness of the flaws and accuracies within historical and 
contemporary understandings of international politics.80 The consequences of this 
awareness are threefold. This awareness can potentially 1) help IR scholars refine existing 
                                                            
Frank Wilczek, A Beautiful Question: Finding Nature’s Deep Design (London: Penguin Books, 2016), 295-
302. 
76 McIntosh, ‘Theory across Time”. 
77 Ibid., 465. 
78 For an example of perspectives of time affecting claims, see Hamilton, “Foucault’s End of History”.  
79 McIntosh, “Theory across Time,” 467, 471. 
80 Ibid., 467. 
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understandings of international politics, 2) indicate how best to avoid generating flawed 
interpretations in the future, and 3) encourage scholars to take time more seriously in 
their study and conceptualisation of international politics. Remaining mindful of these 
consequences prompted and supported the narrow focus on long-term and short-term 
time perspectives taken in this study.  
  Helping to narrow the focus of my study and ground it further in the IR literature 
was Kimberley Hutchings’s Time and World Politics. In her book, Hutchings describes 
how assumptions about time within theories of international politics shape the study of 
international politics. These assumptions and their effects on theories can be partially 
understood, according to Hutchings, by examining two notions of time, chronos (i.e. a 
long-term time perspective) and kairos (i.e. a short-term time perspective) and how they 
interact with one another. The relevance of her work to my study is threefold. First, by 
arguing that assumptions about different perspectives of time found within a theory 
affect theoretical interpretations,81 her work supports my study’s argument that 
relationships exist between long-term and short-term time perspectives and a theory or 
peace process. Second, Hutchings’s work suggests that time is not singular within nor 
isolated from international politics but heterotemporal and inherently a part of 
international politics.82 The notion that time is heterotemporal is crucial to my study 
because it suggests that time is multifaceted and there is a multiplicity of times. 
Understanding time as multifaceted was essential to explaining how long-term and 
short-term time perspectives of the past, present, and future can co-exist and relate to 
each other within a theory or a peace process.  
  The notion that time is multifaceted also prompted my study’s deeper analysis of 
the co-existence among multiple time perspectives within a theory or peace process, as 
well as comparison among multiple time perspectives and their effects.83 This analysis 
and comparison led to a recovery of distinctions among/within types of time 
perspectives and their effects on claims made within a theory or peace process which 
Hutchings does not detail. For example, the kairos Hutchings refers to is just one type 
                                                            
81 Hutchings, Time and World Politics, 3, 36-7, 43-6, 73, 170-1. 
82 Hutchings’s argument that time is an inherent part of international politics is shared by McIntosh who 
draws on Hutchings work. Hutchings, Time and World Politics, 166-73. 




of short-term time perspective that is unique to the present; my study, however, also 
recovers other short-term time perspectives in the past and the future. The third 
relevance of Hutchings’s work to my study is her characterisations regarding chronos 
and kairos, as being long-term and short-term respectively, when discussing time in its 
entirety. The usage of these characterisations suggests that they are useful ways of 
distinguishing between time perspectives. The extent of their usefulness, however, is not 
fully explored by Hutchings. My study picks up from where Hutchings’s work ends to 
help recover and develop deeper understandings about the diversity of time perspectives 
and their effects which manifest at the level of an individual theory or practice of 
international politics.   
  While Hutchings’s work was instrumental in providing ways of thinking broadly 
about notions of long-term and short-term time perspectives and their relations/effects, 
it was not sufficient. Literature regarding history and historical perspectives with respect 
to international politics offered additional insights on how to think locally (i.e. within 
one segment of time) about similar distinctions and relationships within a particular 
segment of time found in a theory or peace process (e.g. the past, the present, and the 
future).84 For example, work on the four modes of history in IR (e.g. history within 
historicism, historicist historical sociology, traditional history, and radical historicism) 
was useful for thinking about how awareness of both the macro and micro levels of 
history (i.e. the general vs. the particular) can be captured within notions of long-term 
and short-term time perspectives. Together these different time perspectives provide a 
wider scope of detail and understanding of international politics in the past, as well as 
in the present and future.85 Likewise, Davenport’s work on how the constructions and 
limitations of historical narratives shape what can be known (and not known) about the 
‘international’ is helpful in explaining the delimiting effects subjective time perspectives 
can have on claims and practices.86  
                                                            
84 Work by Chakrabarty regarding the interaction of ‘local’ histories offers insights about how to think 
about multiple time perspectives within a particular segment of time. Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing 
Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton University Press, 2009), 71, 94-5. 
85 Hobson and Lawson, "What Is History in International Relations?," 420-30. 
86 Andrew Davenport, "The International and the Limits of History," Review of International Studies 42, 
no. 2 (April 2016), 248-49; R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); 
Hobson and Lawson, “What is History in IR?,” 428-9. 
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  Collectively, this historical literature enabled my study to recover a deeper, 
nuanced understanding of the delimiting effects time perspectives within a particular 
segment of time (i.e. the past) have on a theory or peace process. The aforementioned 
understandings from the IR literature on history complement the broader 
understandings of long-term and short-term time perspectives, their relations, and their 
effects derived from Hutchings’s research. Consequently, my study was able to approach 
my analysis of time perspectives, their relations, and their effects at macro and micro 
levels. The understandings of time perspectives and their effects recovered from the 
consulted historical literature, however, is limited in the sense that it applies largely to 
historical time perspectives and their effects. To apply the insights gained about 
historical time perspectives more broadly to time perspectives of the present and future 
would suggest that all time perspectives and their effects are the same; they are not. 
Similar literature delving into the complexities of time perspectives of the present and 
the future is presently absent in IR, but present in other disciplines. This observation is 
surprising considering the amount of literature in IR that is devoted to contemporary 
and future international political issues and contexts. My study aims to address this 
absence by developing understandings within IR of present and future time perspectives 
and their effects. These understandings will accompany work that has already been done 
with respect to historical time perspectives, as well as enable new avenues of research 
that will lead to insights into how present and future time perspectives shape theory and 
practice. 
  Also markedly missing from or found to be underdeveloped within the IR 
literature related to time were three issues which my study aims to address. First, a 
review of the IR literature suggests that no consistent and clear criteria and methods for 
identifying and distinguishing between long-term and short-term time perspectives, 
particularly long-term and short-term time perspectives within a single segment of time 
(e.g. the past, present, and future), and their effects as they are articulated within a 
theory or peace process.87 Second, the consulted IR literature lacks a useful definition of 
what a time perspective is. Finally, the reviewed IR literature on time suggests a lack of 
awareness and understanding of the diversity of time perspectives and corresponding 
                                                            
87 The inconsistencies and lack of clarity of criteria can be attributed to timing differences and perceptions 
of what time is. For an exemplary discussion regarding both points see Hom, “Timing is Everything”. 
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effects that exists within IR and how these time perspectives and their effects interact 
with one another. To address these issues, concepts and language relevant to time found 
within non-IR literature were incorporated into my study. These incorporations made 
my analyses of time perspectives and their effects or extent of effects within a theory and 
peace process possible at both the macro and micro level. The following section covers 
the non-IR literature and corresponding notions relevant to my study.  
 
2.5 Non-IR literature on time   
  To address the aforementioned concerns, relevant time-related concepts and 
language from non-IR literature were introduced into my study. This non-IR literature 
was consulted because other disciplines were found to have provided relevant lines of 
inquiry that recovered insights which filled in some of the gaps found in the IR literature. 
In particular, the insights obtained from the consulted non-IR literature helped provide 
ways of conceptualising and articulating key concepts and aspects used in this study 
such as what time perspectives are and what relations exist between time perspectives 
and a theory or peace process. Beginning with the concept of time perspective, concepts 
used to define and differentiate between multiple time perspectives in my study were 
drawn heavily from the Business sub-fields of Organisational Management and 
Organisational Behaviour, both of which I had familiarity with prior to this study.88 
These concepts include classifications of time perspectives (e.g. discontinuous vs. 
incremental; short-term vs. medium-term vs. long-term) and means of identifying each 
(e.g. activity mapping; rates of change).89 Of particular usefulness were three temporal 
                                                            
88 Although not used in my study, work done by Zimbardo on time perspectives suggests potential ways 
in which IR scholars studying the role of emotions within international politics might begin to think about 
and articulate relations between emotions and time perspectives. For an example of the application of 
Zimbardo’s work on time perspectives in an international context see Anna Sircova, Fons J. R., Evgeny 
Osin, Taciano L. Milfont, Nicolas Fieulaine, Altinay Kislali-Erginbilgic, Philip G. Zimbardo, et al., “A Global 
Look at Time: A 24-Country Study of the Equivalence of the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory,” SAGE 
Open 4, no. 1 (January 2014): 1-12. For a more extensive discussion of Zimbardo’s work on time perspectives 
see Philip G. Zimbardo and John N. Boyd, The Time Paradox: The New Psychology of Time that will change 
your Life (New York: Free Press, 2008); Macieji Stolarski, Nicolas Fieulaine, and Wessel van Beek, eds., 
Time Perspective Theory; Review, Research and Application: Essays in Honor of Philip G. Zimbardo (Cham: 
Springer, 2015).  
89 Jennifer M. George and Gareth R. Jones, “The Role of Time in Theory and Theory Building,” Journal of 
Management 26, no. 4 (August 2000): 657–84; Abbie J. Shipp, Jeffrey R. Edwards, and Lisa Schurer 
Lambert, "Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus: The Subjective Experience of the Past, 
Present, and Future," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 110, no. 1 (September 2009): 
1-22; Sabine Sonnentag, "Time in Organizational Research: Catching up on a Long Neglected Topic in 
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constructs borrowed from Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert: temporal depth, temporal 
focus, and time perspective.90 As will be detailed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, these 
three constructs contributed to the conceptualisation of time perspectives used in this 
study, a conceptualisation which remains ill-defined within IR literature.  
  In addition to helping conceptualise and differentiate time perspectives in my 
study, this literature also indicated novel ways of thinking about and articulating the 
relationship between time perspectives and a theory or political practice. For example, 
work by Orlikowski and Yates highlights how the structuring of time and the 
(re)production of that structure delimit practices within organisations,91 while work by 
George and Jones make similar observations within respect to a theory.92 Elias’s work in 
sociology with respect to time parallels the aforementioned structuring of time, but 
emphasises the subjectivity of the structuring and reproduction process.93 Together, 
both works indicate that the ways notions of time are structured within a theory or a 
practice affect the study and understanding of phenomena. This awareness that the 
structure and notions of time have and continue to affect the study and understanding 
of phenomena is not new in IR. For example, work by Agathangelou and Killian on post 
colonialism and Chakrabarty on the subaltern illustrate how post-colonial temporalities 
and conceptualisations of the past can bias or open up the study and understandings of 
international political phenomena.94 The work by non-IR scholars mentioned earlier in 
this paragraph, however, enabled my study to call attention to similar effects of time 
raised in the IR literature, as well as other effects, from a different angle via general 
notions of time perspectives which are not linked to any particular theory or school of 
thought. The advantage of flagging up relations between a theory or peace process and 
time perspectives and their effects via time perspectives is that they allow scholars from 
different (if not opposing) theoretical backgrounds to participate in the emancipatory 
work done within IR by critical theorists. In other words, the work by George and Jones 
                                                            
Order to Improve Theory," Organizational Psychology Review 2, no. 4 (2012): 361-68; Ancona, Okhuysen, 
and Perlow, “Taking Time to Integrate.”  
90 Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, “Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus.” 
91 Wanda J. Orlikowski and JoAnne Yates, “It’s About Time: An Enacted View of Time in Organizations,” 
Organization Science 13, no. 6 (November 2002): 684–700. 
92 George and Jones, “Role of Time in Theory.” 
93 Norbert Elias, An Essay on Time, revised ed., complete English ed. The Collected Works of Norbert Elias; 
v. 9 (Dublin, Ireland: University College Dublin Press, 2007). 
94 Agathangelou and Killian, Time, Temporality and Violence; Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe. 
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helps create a neutral space for others to analyse and discuss relations between a theory 
and time perspectives within a single discipline, as well as across disciplines; this study 
aims to create similar space within IR. 
  In addition to providing this study with ways of conceptualising time 
perspectives, their relations with a theory or practice, and their effects, the non-IR 
literature consulted for this study also contributed to the framing and answering of 
broad and nuanced research questions addressed in my study. For example, the 
questions and insights included within work by George and Jones on the role of time in 
theory and theory building inspired my study to look for, recover, and examine 
distinctions between aggregations of time and the perennial and ephemeral effects of 
particular aspects of a claim among long-term and short-term time perspectives within a 
theory or peace process.95 While their work had broad implications throughout my 
study, the contributions of other non-IR works in this study were more limited but 
essential to addressing particular questions or issues raised when analysing particular 
time perspectives and its effects. Illustrative examples include Hartog’s work (in history) 
regarding the dominance of present time perspectives in shaping perceptions of the past 
and future96 and the relevance of Wilczek’s discussion of strong and weak forces at the 
sub-atomic level (in physics) to thinking about interactions between perennial and 
ephemeral aspects of a claim.97 Without consulting this non-IR literature, the lines of 
inquiry pursued in my study, as well as the insights they helped recover, would have 
been limited in comparison to relying on IR literature alone. 
  Although the non-IR literature cited in my study draws from a number of 
different disciplines, the selection of non-IR literature included in my study is limited in 
regards to its scope. As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the selection was 
driven by absences or underdevelopments identified within the consulted IR literature. 
Consequently, the non-IR literature included in my study is not intended to be 
representative of any universal, interdisciplinary understandings of notions of time, 
their relationships to a theory or process, or their effects. For example, understandings 
                                                            
95 George and Jones, “Role of Time in Theory.” 
96 François Hartog, "Time and Heritage," Museum International. 57, no. 3 (September 2005), 14; François 
Hartog and Saskia Brown, Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2015). 
97 Wilczek, A Beautiful Question, 243-73, 304. 
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of notions of time in Philosophy rely less on mathematical calculations than 
understandings of notions of time found in Physics. Furthermore, the questions and 
insights borrowed from the selected non-IR literature are not necessarily representative 
of a particular discipline’s primary research focus or understanding. For example, the 
strong and weak forces addressed by Wilczek explain some phenomena studied in 
Quantum Physics but feature less prominently in explanations of phenomena studied in 
classical mechanics.98 As a result, volumes of non-IR literature regarding notions of 
time, their relationships to theory and practice, and their effects not consulted in this 
study may be of use in future studies of time with respect to international politics.99  
 
2.6 Case study literatures 
  The broad theoretical and conceptual framework shared in the previous two 
sections constitute the first half of this chapter’s review of the literature relevant to my 
study. The remaining sections of this chapter provide overviews of the literatures 
consulted for the two case studies included in my study. The first section addresses the 
primary literature by Morgenthau on or in relation to his theory of international politics 
and the secondary literature on Morgenthau’s theory. The second section covers the 
primary and secondary literature relevant to my study of the Oslo Accords. In addition 
to providing the limitations of the scopes of the reviews and foundations for each of 
these case studies, these reviews also help to flag up time-related issues that have either 
remained unaddressed or undertheorised within each case study’s corresponding 
literature. The identification of these issues in this chapter helps to frame and indicate 
how my study contributes to existing literatures relevant to each case study. Greater 
detail of the issues and suggestions mentioned in these sections are presented in the 
analyses and discussions articulated in chapters 5-7 regarding Morgenthau’s theory and 
chapters 8-9 regarding the Oslo Accords. 
                                                            
98 Jessica Wilson, "Newtonian Forces," The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58, no. 2 (June 
2007), 179. 
99 For example, Albert Einstein’s work on special relativity could provide some insights into how the 
automation of international political processes reduces the time lag between political decision and 
political action to the point where the absence of a time lag can become problematic in times of natural 
disasters, humanitarian crises, or war. Albert Einstein, The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Volume 2: 
The Swiss Years: Writing 1900-1909, trans. Anna Beck, consultant Peter Havas (Princeton: Princeton 




2.6.1 Relevant works by Morgenthau  
  Morgenthau’s work on international politics and his related theory was the 
central focus and concern of my theoretical case study. Consequently, Morgenthau’s 
Politics among Nations serves as the main text in my analysis and discussion of time 
perspectives and their effects within a theory.100 Among the various works Morgenthau 
wrote over his lifetime, this book was chosen as the main text to work from for two 
reasons. First, the book is a substantive articulation of Morgenthau’s theoretical 
commitments and their application in international politics that offers multiple 
illustrations of all five time perspectives and their effects.101 Second, the majority of his 
other works on international politics and theory, including those written prior to and 
after his arrival in the U.S., relate back to concepts and explanations that can be found 
within this book.102 This book alone, however, was not enough to conduct a thorough 
analysis of or develop an understanding of the time perspectives and their effects 
contained within Morgenthau’s theory. Therefore, his other works on international law, 
morality, and power for example, have also been included in my analyses and 
discussions. Review and inclusion of these additional works was necessary to clarify and 
recover particular understandings and explanations of the time perspectives and their 
effects found within his theory of international politics.103  
  While Morgenthau wrote extensively on international politics and related topics, 
to date, no specific treatise on time perspectives or their effects as they relate to either 
his theory of international or domestic politics has been found.104 This absence is 
noteworthy considering the frequent and consist references to time Morgenthau made 
                                                            
100 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations.   
101 Ibid., 3. 
102 Beyond 1947, Morgenthau’s works in English were essentially rearticulations and refinements of his 
earlier European works. Christoph Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 2001); Oliver Jütersonke, “The Image of Law in Politics among Nations,” 
in Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Morgenthau in International Relations, Michael C. Williams, ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 93-117; William E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and 
Beyond (Cambridge, England: Polity Press, 2009), 24. 
103 Included in these additional works that were particularly helpful in clarifying Morgenthau’s articulation 
of time perspectives were: Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics (1946; repr., Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965); Hans J. Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master? (New York: New 
American Library, 1972); Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Limitations of Science and the Problem of Social 
Planning," Ethics 54, no. 3 (April 1944): 174-85.  




across his body of work on politics (domestic and international) and related topics.105 
Furthermore, these references to time found throughout his overture illustrate that time 
was of great concern to him and suggest that they were not made in passing but included 
within his work as a result of careful consideration.106 Therefore, the references to time 
made in his work regarding international politics and its theory were considered in my 
study to be worthy of analysis. Additionally, they were interpreted as sufficient places 
within his texts to begin to identify and understand the time perspectives embedded 
within his theory and their effects on claims about international politics made within 
his theory. Therefore, in the absence of a specific treatise written by Morgenthau on time 
perspectives and their effects on his theory, my study offers a limited substitute with 
insights that contribute to enhanced understandings of Morgenthau’s theory.  
  While a thorough analysis of the entire body of Morgenthau’s work might have 
been one approach to distilling Morgenthau’s time perspectives in relation to 
international politics, this was not necessary for my study for the following reasons. 
First, the scope of my case study regarding Morgenthau’s work is focused only on time 
perspectives articulated in this work as they relate to international politics and not 
domestic politics. Therefore, the texts that deal exclusively with domestic politics were 
not addressed in detail in my study.107 Second, some of his early work while living in 
Germany, Spain, and Switzerland – particularly on law, morality, and politics -- were 
either not as fully developed as some of his later works on the same topics that were 
produced after his immigration to the U.S. or already incorporated into his work done 
in the U.S.108  Consequently, these later works produced during his time in the U.S. will 
be referenced more frequently than his earlier works. However, where unique insights 
into his time perspectives are found in his early German works (which cannot be found 
                                                            
105 Evidence of the importance of time perspectives in Morgenthau’s work on topic related to politics (e.g. 
love and evil) can be seen in following examples: Hans J. Morgenthau, “Love and Power,” Commentary 33, 
no. 3 (March 1962): 247-51; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Evil of Politics and the Ethics of Evil," Ethics 56, no. 
1 (October 1945), 1, 14. 
106 Morgenthau “weighed the individual words on a precise scale, both for their substantive suitability and 
their aesthetic quality,” quoted from Frei, Morgenthau: An Intellectual History, 28. 
107 Certainly some of his time perspectives in relation to his thoughts on international politics may be 
similar to those found in relation to his thoughts on domestic politics, but this assumption should not be 
made without a closer examination of his work on domestic politics. For instance, Morgenthau’s time 
perspectives with regards to domestic politics exclusively are subject to different time contingencies (e.g. 
annual local municipal election/nomination cycles) that are not present nor relevant to the international 
political arena.   
108 Frei, Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography, 6; Jütersonke, “The Image of Law,” 110; Scheuerman, 
Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, 24. 
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in later English works or editions), appropriate attention was given.109 Finally, much of 
his newspaper commentaries, praises and critiques of others, and transcribed lectures, 
offer little if any insight into his theory’s time perspectives or their effects that cannot 
already be found in the texts most frequently cited throughout my study.110  
 
2.6.2 Regarding Morgenthau and his theory 
  The previous section articulated the limitations of scope of my review of 
Morgenthau’s work and the value my study contributes to understanding time 
perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau’s theory. Along similar lines, this 
section aims to articulate the limitations of the scope of my review of work done with 
respect to Morgenthau and his theory, as well as how my study relates to that existing 
literature. Having been a central figure in the study of international politics post-World 
War II and a formative contributor to a theory of international politics (i.e. classical 
realism) that has been fundamental to the evolution of the discipline, Morgenthau and 
his work have received considerable, ongoing attention over the decades.111 A sampling 
of the foci of literature on Morgenthau and his theory include: his critiques of liberalism, 
international law, and positivism; intellectual influences on his work; how his concept 
of ‘interest defined as power’ effects his and others’ interpretations and understandings 
of international politics; the strengths and weaknesses of claims made within 
                                                            
109 Much of his Spanish work was lost upon his hastened flee from Spain during the Spanish Civil War and 
consequently is not referenced in this thesis.  
110 Any absence of references to time in such commentaries and texts, however, should not suggest that 
the role time plays within IR theory is any less significant for him, but suggest that the focus of these 
pieces did not require him to discuss time explicitly. 
111 The following listing of references is not exhaustive, but intended to illustrate an ongoing engagement 
with Morgenthau’s work over decades: Arnold Wolfers, "The Pole of Power and the Pole of 
Indifference," World Politics 4, no. 1 (October 1951), 42-3; Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Ghazi A. R. Algosaibi, "The Theory of International Relations: 
Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics," Background 8, no. 4 (February 1965): 221-56; John A. Vasquez, 
"Colouring It Morgenthau: New Evidence for an Old Thesis on Quantitative International Politics," British 
Journal of International Studies 5, no. 3 (1979): 210-28; Richard K. Ashley, "Political Realism and Human 
Interests," International Studies Quarterly 25, no. 2 (June 1981): 204-36; Judith Ann Tickner, “Hans 
Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation,” Millennium 17, no. 3 (December 
1988): 429–40; Hans-Karl Pichler, “The Godfathers of “Truth”: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in 
Morgenthau’s Theory of Power Politics,” Review of International Studies, 24, no. 2 (April 1998), 185–200; 
Murielle Cozette, “Reclaiming the Critical Dimension of Realism: Hans J. Morgenthau on the Ethics of 
Scholarship,” Review of International Studies 34, no. 1 (January 2008): 5–27; Alison McQueen, Political 
Realism in Apocalyptic Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 147-91.  
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Morgenthau’s theory; and how his theory has been misread, misunderstood, and 
misused.112 This broad literature was necessary to consult for two reasons. 
  First, consulting this literature filled in key knowledge gaps regarding 
Morgenthau and his theory that enriched my understanding of Morgenthau’s 
background, concepts and claims within his theory of international politics, and how his 
work has been (mis)understood and (mis)used.113 Without this enhanced 
understanding, the time perspectives and their effects within Morgenthau’s theory 
would have been more difficult to identify, unpack or trace, and explain during my 
analysis. Second, the consulted literature helped to identify a marked absence in the 
Morgenthauian literature of detailed analyses and discussions of time, time perspectives, 
and their effects within Morgenthau’s theory; a notable exception is work by Hom and 
Steele regarding Morgenthau’s notion of indeterminate, open time.114 Given the 
considerable attention Morgenthau gives to time in his theory, it is surprising that not 
more literature on Morgenthau has addressed time-related topics. The analyses and 
insights shared in my study suggest that understandings of time perspectives and their 
effects within Morgenthau’s theory have been taken for granted or interpreted as 
irrelevant among scholars working on Morgenthau’s theory. Furthermore, my study 
introduces novel understandings of claims made within Morgenthau’s theory, time 
perspectives articulated within his theory, and the effects of those time perspectives on 
claims that are more reflective of Morgenthau’s own text which help fill in the 
aforementioned absence in the existing literature, as well as delimit the ways in which 
Morgenthau’s theory can be read and interpreted. 
 
                                                            
112 Frei, Morgenthau: An Intellectual History; Daniel J. Levine, “Why Hans Morgenthau Was Not a Critical 
Theorist (and Why Contemporary IR Realists Should Care),” International Relations 27, no. 1 (March 2013): 
95–118; Vassilios Paipais, “Between Politics and the Political: Reading Hans J. Morgenthau’s Double 
Critique of Depoliticisation,” Millennium 42, no. 2 (January 2014): 354–75; Michael C. Williams, The Realist 
Tradition and the Limits of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 82-127; 
Michael C. Williams, ed., Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau in International 
Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Scheuerman, Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond. 
113 Hartmut Behr and Amelia Heath, “Misreading in IR Theory and Ideology Critique: Morgenthau, Waltz 
and Neo-Realism,” Review of International Studies 35, no. 2 (April 2009): 327–49. 
114 Andrew R. Hom and Brent J. Steele, “Open Horizons: The Temporal Visions of Reflexive Realism,” 
International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (June 2010): 271-300. 
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2.6.3 The Oslo Accords and relevant works 
  The second case study included in my study regarded the time perspectives and 
their effects on the peace process articulated within the Oslo Accords. This prompted a 
review of literature regarding the Oslo Accords, the history of relations between Israel 
and the Palestinians over the contested territories, and the study of peace and peace 
processes in general. Consequently, the literature reviewed in this section is largely 
unrelated to that which was addressed in the previous section regarding Morgenthau’s 
theory.115 My review of literature for this case study began with the texts of both Oslo I 
and Oslo II. Together, the two texts constitute the Oslo Accords and served as the 
primary texts analysed for my empirical case study. After reviewing the texts, it was 
apparent that the Accords were written as a timing document for a liberal democratic 
peace process. Furthermore, it was apparent that the peace process was constructed as 
a series of time-indexed steps and stages progressing in a linear fashion toward a 
particular end (i.e. peace). This made tracing the effects of time perspectives within the 
peace process easier to follow during my analysis.116 Consequently, as a timing 
document, the Accords were naturally conducive to conduct my study on time 
perspectives and their effects on a peace process.  
  Included in my review of the text of the Accords, were reviews of other texts 
mentioned within the Accords. These other reviewed texts included UN Security 
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the three letters exchanged between Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Palestine Liberation Organisation’s (PLO) Chairman Yasser 
Arafat, and Norway’s Foreign Minister Johan Jorgen Holst117, and various peace 
                                                            
115 Although Morgenthau did write on relations between Israel and the Palestinians in the contested area, 
these pieces were not included in my review of literature regarding the history of relations between Israel 
and Palestine as they would be create connections between the two case studies which are not addressed 
in this thesis. For a sampling of Morgenthau’s views regarding Israel and the Palestinians see M. Ben 
Mollov, "Responsible Power, Irresponsible Power: Israel and Vietnam According to Hans J. 
Morgenthau," Israel Affairs 7, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 25-48. 
116 On these points, literature regarding process tracing was helpful. For more see: Andrew Bennett and 
Colin Elman, “Case Study Methods in the International Relations Subfield,” Comparative Political 
Studies 40, no. 2 (February 2007): 170–95; Michael Howlett and Klaus H. Goetz, “Introduction: Time, 
Temporality and Timescapes in Administration and Policy,” International Review of Administrative 
Sciences 80, no. 3 (September 2014): 477–92; Tasha Fairfield and Andrew E. Charman, “Explicit Bayesian 
Analysis for Process Tracing: Guidelines, Opportunities, and Caveats,” Political Analysis 25, no. 3 (July 
2017): 363–80.  
117 Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, September 9, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-plo%20recognition%20%20exchang 
e%20of%20letters%20betwe.aspx (accessed September 2, 2018); Yasser Arafat to Norwegian Foreign 
Minister John Jorgen Holst, September 9, 1993, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/ 
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agreements. These peace agreements included the Gaza-Jericho Agreement118, the 
Preparatory Transfer Agreement119, and the Further Transfer Protocol120.121 Reviewing 
these other texts that were mentioned within the Accords was necessary for my study 
because they either directly embedded particular time perspectives into the Accords 
(e.g. UN Security Council Resolutions 242 embedded historical time perspectives) or 
were instrumental in identifying and developing understandings of the Accords’ time 
perspectives and their effects on the peace process. Although these other texts 
specifically mentioned in the Accords, along with the text of the Accords themselves, 
provided the bulk of the content from which the Accords’ time perspectives and their 
effects on the peace process were able to be identified and traced, they alone were not 
sufficient to recover all the time perspectives embedded within the Accords nor their 
effects.  
  My review of the Accords and other texts explicitly mentioned within them 
indicated that there were time perspectives and effects that could not be understood or 
explained via these texts alone. To help address these issues, my review was expanded 
to include literature on the history of the contested territory, historical and 
contemporary relations between Israel and the Palestinians, and notions of liberal and 
democratic peace. In regards to the history on the contested territory and Israeli-
Palestinian relations, my review of the UN General Assembly Resolution 181 was helpful 
in recovering awareness and understanding of long-term historical and long-term future 
                                                            
mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israel-plo%20recognition%20%20exchange%20of%20letters%20b 
etwe.aspx (accessed September 2, 2018); Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to Yasser Arafat, September 9, 1993, 
Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/is 
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118 “Gaza-Jericho Agreement,” conclusion date: May, 4, 1994, Economic Cooperation Foundation – The 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/618 (accessed August 
3, 2018). 
119 “Preparatory Transfer Agreement,” conclusion date: August 29, 1994, United Nations Peacemaker – 
Peace Agreements Database, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IsraelOPt_94082 
9_AgreementPreparatoryTransferPowersResponsibilities.pdf (accessed August 3, 2018). 
120 “Further Transfer Protocol,” conclusion date: August 27, 1995, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs – Guide 
to Mideast Peace Process. https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/further%20transfer% 
20of%20powers%20and%20responsibilities.aspx (accessed August 3, 2018). 
121 Discrepancies between the time perspectives articulated within the Accords and those found within 
either of the three agreements were not explicitly addressed in my study for two reasons. First, such an 
analysis lay outside the scope of my study. Second, the final paragraph of the Preamble in Oslo II explicitly 
stated that the content of Oslo II superseded these three agreements, thus making the discrepancies 
among time perspectives a non-issue for my study.   
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time perspectives implicitly embedded into the Accords.122 Furthermore, Resolution 181, 
along with works by Dowty and Milton-Edwards provided the historical and 
contemporary contexts regarding the contested lands and Israeli-Palestinian relations 
necessary to understand why the Accords was needed, why it was supported, and what 
its aims were.123 Helping to understand the aims of the Accords’ peace process (i.e. the 
manifestation of an everlasting liberal and democratic peace), as well as the type of peace 
process the Accords was modelled after, literature on liberal and democratic peace by 
Maoz and Russett, Doyle, Richmond and Franks, and Baugmgart-Ochse was 
consulted.124  
  In addition to the literature aforementioned, my review of literature relevant to 
my case study on time perspectives and their effects on the Accords’ peace process also 
included literature that was critical of the liberal and democratic peace process, offered 
assessments of the Accords’ peace process after its failure to deliver lasting peace, and 
regarding general notions of peace. This grouping of literatures was instrumental in 
developing recommendations as to how time perspectives within future peace processes 
might be configured to improve their odds of success. In regards to literature critical of 
liberal and democratic peace processes, works by Darby and Mac Ginty, Mac Ginty, and 
Richmond provided insights that guided my recommendations on how time 
perspectives within future peace processes could be used to avoid or minimise the issues 
time perspectives created within the Accords’ peace process that led to its failure.125 
                                                            
122 United Nations General Assembly, Second year, “Future Government of Palestine,” A/RES/181(II)A-B, 
November 29, 1947, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/181(II) (accessed 
August 8, 2018). 
123 Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, 3rd ed. (Cambridge, England: Polity, 2012); Beverley Milton-Edwards, The 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: A people’s war (Oxon: Routlege, 2009). 
124 Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986," The 
American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (September 1993): 624-38; Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, 
David E. Spiro, and Michael Doyle, “The Democratic Peace,” International Security 19, no. 4 (April 1995): 
164-84; Michael W. Doyle, "Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace," American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 
(August 2005): 463-66; Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs 12, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 205-235; Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign 
Affairs, Part 2,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no. 4 (Autumn 1983): 323-353; Michael W. Doyle and 
Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” The American 
Political Science Review 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 779-801; Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal 
Peace Transitions: Between Statebuilding and Peacebuilding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2009); Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, "Democratization in Israel, Politicized Religion and the Failure of the 
Oslo Peace Process," Democratization 16, no. 6 (November 2009): 1115-142. 
125 John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence, and Peace Processes 
(Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); Roger Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace: The Rejuvenation of Stalled 
Peace Processes and Peace Accords (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Roger Mac 
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Likewise, accounts of the failures of the Accords’ peace process and the subsequent 
context of Israeli-Palestinian relations by Said and Reinhart were helpful in thinking 
about what time perspectives will be needed in future peace processes.126 Finally, 
literature regarding notions of peace was consulted to provide a general understanding 
of the various types of peace that time perspectives within a peace process can help to 
create and sustain, as well as how time perspectives can be used to limit the scope of the 
peace a future peace process is intended to generate.127 
 
2.7 Chapter summary 
  This chapter’s intention was to provide the reader with the broad and diverse 
scope of the literature used throughout my study, as well as a description of the 
methodology used to read through the selected case study texts analysed for time 
perspectives. This review included general IR literature on time, as well as specialised IR 
literature relating to each of the selected case studies. Helping to enhance 
underdeveloped or missing understandings and notions of time recovered from my 
review of the aforementioned IR literatures were concepts and insights borrowed from 
non-IR literature in areas such as Organisational Management, Organisational 
Behaviour, History, and Physics. The literature covered in the aforementioned sections 
was consulted namely for two reasons. First, it provided crucial theoretical and practical 
links that made my study feasible. Second, it helped identify and introduce notions of 
time that were necessary to recognise, unpack, and articulate time perspectives and their 
                                                            
Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Oliver P. Richmond, A Post-liberal Peace (London: Routledge, 2011). 
126 Edwards W. Said, The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and after, 2nd ed. (London: Granta, 2002); Tanya 
Reinhart, The Road Map to Nowhere: Israel/Palestine since 2003 (London: Verso, 2006). 
127 Kyle Beardsley, "Agreement without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency 
Problems," American Journal of Political Science 52, no. 4 (October 2008): 723-40; Johan Galtung, "On the 
Meaning of Nonviolence," Journal of Peace Research 2, no. 3 (1965): 228-57; Johan Galtung, "Violence, 
Peace, and Peace Research," Journal of Peace Research 6, no. 3 (1969): 167-91; Johan Galtung, “Twenty-Five 
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Oliver P. Richmond, “The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace’,” Conflict, Security and 
Development 6, no. 3 (October 2006): 291-314; Oliver P. Richmond, Peace in International Relations (New 
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47 
 
effects addressed in this study. Considered together, these literatures enabled the 
analyses and discussions of time perspectives and their effects articulated in my study 
to recover insights that 1) complement existing IR research on time, 2) enhance 
disciplinary understandings of time perspectives and their effects, and 3) challenge how 
orthodox and alternative claims about and practices of international politics are 
perceived. Furthermore, this review helps to situate my study within the IR literature on 
time in general, as well as illustrate how my study relates to the specialised literatures 
within IR regarding Morgenthau’s theory of international politics and the Oslo 
Accords.128  
  In the next chapter, the first instances of how the insights gained from the 
aforementioned literature review were used in my study are demonstrated. In that 
chapter I address how time perspectives were defined and distinguished among one 
another throughout my study via anchor points, the aggregation of time, and in relation 
to one another. The resulting definitions and distinctions derived from my synthesis of 
both IR and non-IR literatures exemplify the added value that the non-IR literatures 
have brought to my study. Furthermore, the chapter illustrates how the reviewed non-
IR literature helped my study introduce new understandings of time perspectives within 
IR and contributes to moving existing time-related research within IR in new directions. 
These new directions of research help to recover novel insights about the significant 
shaping effects different long-term and short-term time perspectives have within a theory 
or a peace process. While some of the broader effects are mentioned in the following 
chapter because of their usefulness in distinguishing among time perspectives, the more 
nuanced effects will be detailed in the case study chapters 5-9. Hence, the next chapter 
serves as a fundamental part of the foundation upon which the arguments and claims 
made throughout my study rest.  
 
  
                                                            




Part I: Analytical Tools 
Chapter 3: Defining Time Perspectives     
Ascertaining an awareness and understanding of the relationships between and 
effects of distinct time perspectives are difficult tasks. Among the factors contributing 
to this difficulty, three include: 1) the obscurity of time perspectives within a theory or 
peace process, 2) the lack of awareness and understanding among scholars of relations 
between time perspectives and a theory or peace process, and 3) the thinking of time 
perspectives as limited to three segments of time (i.e. the past, the present, and the 
future).129  However, these difficulties can be overcome by reconceptualising what time 
perspectives are, learning how to differentiate them from one another, and recovering 
an awareness of their presence or absence within a theory or peace process. The 
following chapter addresses these three points at length with the intention of providing 
a foundational understanding of time perspectives upon which the analyses found in the 
subsequent chapters 5-9 are built.  
  The chapter begins by clarifying what is meant by the term ‘time perspective’. 
This clarification involved the development of a clear conceptualisation of what a time 
perspective is as one was not readily available within the existing IR literature. To help 
clarify what time perspectives are, I imported various time-related concepts are from the 
fields of Organisational Management and Organisational Behaviour to IR. These 
concepts include temporal depth, temporal focus, long-term, and short-term. The 
resulting reconceptualisation of time perspectives used in this study (see Table 3.1 
below) moves IR scholars beyond thinking of time perspectives as akin to one 
dimensional and homogenous segments of time, such as the past, the present, and the 
future. What lies beyond this narrow thinking in regards to time perspectives is thinking 
of time perspectives as being multifaceted with both temporal depth and temporal focus. 
Thus, the ideas presented in this chapter are intended to be initial steps that lead to 
deepening and enriching the reader’s current thoughts about time perspectives within 
                                                            
129 Regarding the first point, the obscurity is primarily the result of time perspectives not consistently 
being articulated in explicit language within a theory or peace process. Often references to time 
perspectives are implicit and requires extra effort and a basic understanding of time perspectives to 
recover their presence or absence within a theory or a peace process. I am not the first to call for more 
explicit articulations of time perspectives to be made. For a recent example see, MacKay and LaRoche, 
“Conduct of History,” 229. 
49 
 
Table 3.1: Conceptualisations of Time Perspectives   
 Temporal Focus 
















the context of international politics. These initial steps toward the reconceptualisation 
of time perspectives were necessary to recover an awareness and understanding of the 
shaping roles time perspectives play within a theory or a peace process which an analysis 
using one dimensional and homogeneous conceptualisations of time perspectives would 
miss or struggle to capture. Consequently, the reconceptualisation of time perspectives 
presented in this chapter enable readers to retrieve existing and new insights about the 
relationships between time perspectives and a theory or peace process and their effects 
that might otherwise be missed and difficult to obtain.131  
  After outlining how time perspectives are conceived of in this study, the next 
section of the chapter addresses the means used for determining how to identify and 
distinguish between time perspectives, as being either long-term or short-term. These 
means include the identification of anchor points, determining how periodisations are 
aggregated, and having an awareness of how time perspectives compare to one another. 
In other words, the temporal depth and temporal focus of a time perspective are 
identifiable through the aforementioned means. The benefit the using the methods 
outlined later in section 3.3 is their broad utility and applicability across various theories 
and peace processes. This claim of the broad utility and application of these methods is 
supported by the design of the methods which can be used to identify and differentiate 
time perspectives with or without the use of (nor availability of) numbers or dates. In 
other words, as long as time in mentioned or implied within a theory or peace process, 
                                                            
130 Theories of international politics and peace processes do not typically articulate the present as being 
long-term, however, the long-term present time perspective appears in the table because it can be useful 
to describing certain phenomena (e.g. the daily life experiences of refugees awaiting review of their official 
status or how Australia’s aboriginal populations think about the present). 
131 The insights regarding development obtained from the analysis in Chapter 5, Section 3.4 of short-term 
historical time perspectives is an illustration of this point. 
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these methods can help recover different time perspectives. The identification and 
differentiation of time perspectives within a theory or peace process is significant 
because they are necessary initial steps to recovering an awareness and understanding 
of the particular ways in which time perspectives affect how claims and processes 
articulated within a theory or peace process are understood and function. These 
methods grew out of a recognition that pre-defined lengths of long-term and short-term 
time perspectives brought in from outside a theory or peace process would have little to 
no relevance to the time perspectives articulated within a theory or peace process. In 
other words, time perspectives are uniquely determined by each individual theory or 
peace process. Therefore, the methods were intentionally developed to enable the reader 
to apply them across different theories or peace processes to study long-term and short-
term time perspectives and their effects. Using these methods, the reader is able to 
differentiate between the various time perspectives addressed throughout this thesis: 
long-term historical, short-term historical, short-term present, short-term future, and 
long-term future.132  
  Concluding the chapter is a discussion of outlier time perspectives not fully 
explored in this thesis.  The outlier time perspectives discussed include medium-term 
and long-term present time perspectives.  Although these particular time perspectives are 
not fully explored in this study, they are mentioned in this chapter for four reasons.  The 
first reason for mentioning them is to acknowledge their existence, which helps to 
emphasise the multiplicity of time perspectives within international politics beyond the 
multiplicity that is addressed in this study. The second reason is to indicate that they 
represent future lines of inquiry readers might want to pursue with respect to these time 
perspectives as they appear in international political phenomena. The third reason is to 
provide explanations as to why they are not fully explored in any of the subsequent 
chapters. Finally, addressing these outlier time perspectives explicitly at this point in the 
thesis helps to further narrow the reader’s attention on the five time perspectives 
analysed and discussed throughout this thesis.  
  
                                                            
132 Further details regarding each time perspective are elaborated in chapters 5-9. 
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3.1 Constructing time perspectives 
  The concept of a time perspective as understood and applied within my study 
borrows from a combination of temporal constructs identified by Shipp, Edwards, and 
Lambert with respect to organizational management and behaviour.133 Each temporal 
construct these authors highlight is useful in helping to identify and articulate different, 
implicit aspects of time mentioned within a theory or peace process. Although the 
constructs are used by Shipp, Edwards, and Lamberts to study individuals’ behaviours 
with respects to time within the contexts of organizations (e.g. companies), the 
constructs are also applicable within the context of international politics. Just as the 
collective behaviours of individual employees manifest in organisations in the latter’s 
processes, beliefs, and justifications for pursuing various goals or making certain 
decisions, so to do the collective behaviours of individual actors (e.g. policymakers, 
states, diplomats) manifest in international politics in the processes, beliefs, and 
justifications for political actions and decisions. Among the multiple constructs 
identified by Shipp, Edwards, and Lamberts, those constructs relating to and describing 
strictly affective or behavioural aspects of time within a theory were excluded from my 
conceptualisation of a time perspective. These aspects were excluded because their 
significance was only evident after grasping the significance of three particular 
constructs: temporal depth, temporal focus, and time perspectives.134 As a result, the 
aforementioned three constructs regarding temporal depth, temporal focus, and time 
perspectives were included within my understanding of time perspectives and are 
addressed in the following paragraphs.    
3.1.1 Temporal depth  
  First, temporal depth refers to what extent or how much of the past and future 
are taken into consideration from a present situation.135 Therefore, the temporal depths 
of the time perspectives articulated within a theory or peace process are linked to how 
far back in history (e.g. 100 years) or how far forward into the future (e.g. 10-20 years) 
                                                            
133 Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, “Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus,” 3-4. 
134 Constructs such time attitude, temporal orientation, hurriedness, pacing style, and preferred 
polychronicity related more to effects and behavioural elements that were beyond the scope of this 
research project. Ibid., 3-4.      
135 Allen C. Bluedorn, The Human Organization of Time: Temporal Realities and Experience (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2002), 114. 
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references are made within a theory or peace process. For example, in the case of 
Morgenthau’s theory, the historical temporal depth goes back thousands of years to 
ancient civilizations in Greece, India, and China when examining the historical examples 
he cites throughout his work.136 In the Accords’ peace process, the historical temporal 
depth only extends back decades to the mid-20th century.137  Regarding the temporal 
depth of the future, Morgenthau offers limited insights conveying an awareness of a 
future extending into infinity but not forever because of the existence of nuclear 
weapons.138 The temporal depth of the future with respect to the peace process outlined 
in Accords extends over years to the end of the permanent status negotiations.139 As 
these examples illustrate, temporal depths do not necessarily have to be symmetrical 
between the past and the future within a theory or peace process nor are depths similar 
when comparing like depths between a theory and a peace process.140 This lack of 
symmetry and similarity, however, is not insignificant as it can inform scholars about 
where the historical and future attention of a theory or emphasis of a peace process may 
lie.141 In addition to helping recognise the asymmetry of or dissimilarities between the 
historical and future temporal depths, surveying these temporal depths within a theory 
or peace process together gives scholars an indication of the scope of a theory or peace 
process and the timespan within which claims and processes are considered to be valid 
or have relevance.142 As examples, the scope of Morgenthau’s theory covers several 
millennia while the scope of the Accords’ peace process is limited to decades. While the 
existing definition of temporal depth provided by Shipp and her colleagues is useful, it 
can be augmented further. 
  The above definition is limited in two ways. First, the definition refers only to the 
temporal depths of the past or the future in its entirety. This definition does not make 
reference to the temporal depths that exist simultaneously within the past or the future. 
In other words, my study of time perspectives did not begin with the predisposition that 
                                                            
136 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4. 
137 Oslo I, preamble and art. I. 
138 Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, 144-53. 
139 An end date for the permanent status negotiations is not explicitly defined in the Accords.  
140 Bluehorn, The Human Organization of Time, 116-17. 
141 Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, “Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus,” 3. 
142 Edgar Kiser and Michael Hechter, “The Debate on Historical Sociology: Rational Choice Theory and Its 
Critics,” American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 3 (November 1998), 797; Hobson and Lawson, “What is 
History in International Relations?,” 422; MacKay and LaRoche, “Conduct of History,” 213; McIntosh, 
“Theory Across Time,” 492. 
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the past or the future as articulated within a theory or peace process is making reference 
to one historical depth or one depth in relation to the future. Consequently, the concept 
of temporal depth has been augmented in this study to also refer to the time-related 
lengths of various periodisations of the past or the future as articulated within a theory 
or peace process.143 Morgenthau’s references to the Napoleonic War and World Wars I 
and II are examples of different periodisations with dissimilar lengths that co-exist 
within the whole of the past he articulates within his theory.144  Although how a 
periodisation’s temporal depth is classified (as either long-term or short-term) will be 
discussed later in this chapter in section 3.3, the reasons as to why temporal depths of 
periodisations warrant examination in the first place must be made clear. Examining the 
temporal depths of periodisations can inform readers about how a theory or peace 
process structures the following: 1) the scope (in relation to time) of its arguments, 2) 
evidence supporting claims, or 3) the flow of phenomena or processes.145 For example, 
using both long-term and short-term periodisations, the Accords was able to define the 
issue its peace process was attempting to solve (i.e. scope), what type of peace was 
sought (i.e. claims), and the durations of various steps or stages included in the peace 
process (i.e. flow). Therefore, the inclusion of periodisations with varying lengths within 
a theory or process suggests these variations are necessary to convey significant aspects 
of a theory or peace process.146 Furthermore, they suggest an awareness among the 
author(s) of a theory or peace process of distinctions between temporal depths. Thus, 
by augmenting the definition of temporal depth to also apply to periodisations within 
the past or the future and not just the past or the future as a whole, enables readers to 
gain an awareness of the effects different temporal depths of periodisations have on 
claims and processes. 
                                                            
143 Helge Jordheim, “Against Periodization: Koselleck’s Theory of Multiple Temporalities,” History and 
Theory   51, no. 2 (May 2012), 157; Reinhart Koselleck, Zeitschichten: Studien zur Historik (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), 9. 
144 Hans J. Morgenthau, “World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” The Review of Politics 10, no. 2 
(April 1948), 157. 
145 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, International Order and Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Sketch of Post-War 
International Politics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1978), 117; George Lawson, “The Promise of Historical 
Sociology in International Relations,” International Studies Review 8, no. 3 (September 2006), 415-16; 
McIntosh, “Theory Across Time,” 488-89; Russett, Layne, Spiro, and Doyle, "The Democratic Peace," 169-
70. 
146 Hartog and Brown, Regimes of Historicity, 25. 
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  The second limitation of the definition Shipp and her colleagues provide in 
relation to temporal depth regards a lack of discussion about the temporal depth(s) of 
the present. This omission is significant because it suggests the temporal depth of the 
present either does not exist or does not matter. However, articulations about the 
present in relation to the past and future within Morgenthau’s theory of international 
politics or within the Accords’ peace process contradict this interpretation and suggest 
otherwise.147 Acknowledging the temporal depth(s) of the present has significance for 
two reasons. First, theories of international politics and peace processes at times 
segment time into the past, the present, and the future as illustrated within my two cases 
studies. Each segment is articulated as distinct from the other even though they are 
connected and effect one another as the final sections in chapters 5-9 illustrate. Part of 
their distinctions among the segments of time stem from their temporal depths. 
Therefore, if the present did not have temporal depth, then no gap would be 
distinguishable between the past and the future.148 Relating to the aforementioned 
reason, the second reason acknowledging the temporal depth of the present is 
significant is because the temporal depth of the present is distinct from that of the past 
or the future; it is either shorter than the past or the future or longer if the present is 
perceived as an all-encompassing present.149 Regardless of whether the temporal depth 
of the present is interpreted as long, short, or close to zero within a theory or peace 
process, that depth will never be equal to the temporal depths of a past or a future.150 
This distinction of the temporal depth of the present matters, as will be addressed in 
later chapters, because it enables readers to see more clearly how claims and processes 
are bound by the context of time perspectives present or absence and it reinforces the 
uniqueness of present time perspectives. For the aforementioned reasons, therefore, the 
notion that present time perspectives within a theory or peace process have temporal 
depths was accepted and addressed in this study. 
                                                            
147 Examples found in Morgenthau’s theory and the Accord’s peace process are provided in chapters 5 
and 9 repsectively.  
148 Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought (New York: Penguin, 
1993), 3, 9; Hartog and Brown, Regimes of Historicity, 88. 
149 Hartog and Brown, Regimes of Historicity, 33-4. 
150 In theory, the temporal depth of the past and the future of a theory or peace process could be equal, for 
example plus and minus 50 years from the present. In this example, however, the temporal depth of the 
present could never be 50 years; it might be defined as something less than 50 years as in a ‘today’ or as 
infinity if the present was thought of as all-encompassing. Saint Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, trans. 




3.1.2 Temporal focus 
  In addition to temporal depth, time perspectives were also understood in this 
study to have temporal focus. Temporal focus (i.e. emphasis) regards where the 
attention of a time perspective rests or centres on with respect to the past, the present, 
and the future.151 Temporal focus in essence indicates the emphasis of a time perspective. 
Although the intensity of the focus may vary, it need not be singular in focus. For 
example, a theory may maintain multiple foci as Morgenthau’s references to segments 
of time in terms of the past, present, and future illustrate.152 Temporal focus can also 
include a focus on the temporal depth (i.e. long-term and short-term) within the past, 
present, and future. For example, references within the Accords’ peace process to its 
long-term and short-term steps and stages focus on those of the past, present and the 
future. Furthermore, considering the temporal foci of time perspectives within a theory 
or peace process in the aggregate can be helpful to understanding what the overall 
temporal focus of a theory or peace process is. For example, considering collectively the 
temporal foci of the time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory indicates that the 
overall temporal focus of his theory was on the past and the present, not on the future; 
the Accords’ overall temporal focus was on the future, in particular the short-term 
future.  Identifying the overall temporal focus within a theory or peace process can also 
offer some insights as to why certain claims were or were not made within a theory or 
why certain time perspectives appear more or less prominent within a peace process. 
For example, the Accords’ overall temporal focus on the future helps explain why 
historical time perspectives appear less prominent in the texts of the peace process 
beyond the preambles of Oslo I and Oslo II. Therefore, for any of the aforementioned 
reasons, including temporal focus as part of my construct of time perspectives enabled 
me to recover various insights about time perspectives and their effects within 
                                                            
151 Shipp, Edwards, and Lambert, “Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus,” 3-4; Efrén O. 
Perez and Margit Tavits, "Language Shapes People's Time Perspective and Support for Future-Oriented 
Policies," American Journal of Political Science 61, no. 3 (January 2017): 715-27; Philip G. Zimbardo, John N. 
Boyd, "Putting Time in Perspective: A Valid, Reliable Individual-Differences Metric," Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology 77, no. 6 (December 1999): 1271-288. 
152 The multiple foci found in Morgenthau’s theory are unpacked in chapters 5-7. 
56 
 
Morgenthau’s theory or the Accords’ peace process that temporal depth alone would not 
have allowed.   
  To bring both temporal depth and temporal focus together, the construct of a 
time perspective was brought into this study from the Organizational Management and 
Organisational Behaviour literature. The construct of a time perspective describes an 
overarching view of time that includes the constructs of time mentioned above, as well 
as others.153 In essence, a time perspective provides a broad, umbrella category under 
which multiple constructs of time (e.g. temporal depth and temporal focus) can be 
bundled together to help make sense of a theory’s or peace process’s articulations of 
time. Within the IR literature, this bundling of constructs within a time perspective is 
namely done on the macro-level rather than on sub-macro levels which also offer 
overarching insights into the theory (e.g. long-term and short-term time perspectives 
within the past or the future).154 Essentially, a macro-level time perspective bundles 
constructs of time within a time perspective of the past as a whole, a time perspective of 
the present as a whole, or a time perspective of the future as a whole. Conversely, a sub-
macro level time perspective bundles constructs of time within a time perspective that 
is part of a whole as in a long-term or short-term time perspective of the past. While 
macro-level time perspectives are addressed in my study, I also concentrate on 
recovering insights about sub-macro level time perspectives. This additional 
concentration on sub-macro level time perspectives 1) broadens the notion of time 
perspectives currently found within IR, 2) enables time perspective analysis to move 
beyond macro-level analysis, and 3) provides deeper insights into a theory’s or peace 
process’s articulations of time.   
 
                                                            
153 The other constructs not discussed in my research include temporal orientation, time attitude, 
preferred polychronicity, hurriedness, and pacing style. While these other constructs are important, their 
significance are best understood and interpreted within a known or identified context of time that 
includes the temporal focus, temporal depth, and time perspectives. For details see Shipp, Edwards, and 
Lambert, “Conceptualization and Measurement of Temporal Focus”; Susan Mohammed and David 
Harrison, “Diversity in temporal portfolios: How time-based individual differences can affect team 
performance” (paper presented at the Academy of Management Conference, Philadelphia, PA, August 3-
8, 2007): n.a. 
154 George Lawson, “The Eternal Divide? History and International Relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations 18, no. 2 (September 2010), 211; William Robinson, Transnational Conflicts: Central 
America, Social Change, and Globalization (London: Verso, 2003), 2; Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, 
"Theorizing Emotions in World Politics," International Theory 6, no. 3 (November 2014), 496-97; Solomon 
and Steele, “Micro-moves in International Relations theory,” 274. 
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3.2 The segmenting and naming of time perspectives    
  As a result of the combination of the aforementioned constructs, the following 
conceptualisation of time perspectives was developed. Time perspectives are a theory’s 
or peace process’s constructs of time having both focus and depth with respect to the 
past, present, and the future. This conceptualisation of time perspectives was 
subsequently applied to my time perspective analysis of Morgenthau’s theory and the 
Accords’ peace process. Embedded within this conceptualisation is the idea of time 
being segmented into three parts: the past, the present, and the future. The root of this 
segmentation of time is derived from Saint Augustine155 and prevalent within IR.156 The 
significance of this segmentation of time and its inclusion in my conceptualisation of 
time perspectives is threefold. First, Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords both share 
Augustinian notions of time where the past is followed by the present, which in turn is 
followed by the future; in essence time is linear. Second, a segment of time identified as 
the ‘past’, ‘present’, or ‘future’ denotes the temporal focus of the time perspective (e.g. 
focus on the past over the present and the future). Finally, this segmentation of time lays 
out the three basic time perspectives that could possibly exist or be recognised within a 
theory or peace process: a historical time perspective, a present time perspective, and a 
future time perspective. The emphasis placed on ‘could’ is to acknowledge that a theory 
or peace process does not have to possess or recognise all of the three basic time 
perspectives. Consequently, this conceptualisation of time perspectives does not inhibit 
its applicability to theories or peace processes that may exclusively acknowledge only 
one or two segments of time. 
  Studying time perspectives only in regards to the past, present, and future (i.e. 
temporal foci), as mentioned earlier, offers limited, one dimensional insights into a 
theory’s or peace process’s time perspectives and their effects. To gain further insights 
into the temporal depths of time perspectives and their effects, notions of long-term and 
short-term were introduced and analysed in my research. The idea that long-term and 
short-term denoted the temporal depths of time perspectives and that long-term and 
short-term time perspectives could affect both a theory of international politics and a 
                                                            
155 Saint Augustine, Confessions, 234-243.  
156 Iver B. Neumann and Erik F. Øverland, “International Relations and Policy Planning: The Method of 
Perspectivist Scenario Building,” International Studies Perspectives 5, no. 3 (August 2004), 267. 
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peace process were derived primarily from Organisational Management studies 
addressing similar notions of long-term and short-term and their effects on theory and 
organisational policy.157 Although the terminology referring to time perspectives or 
elements of them such as temporal focus and temporal depth are often less explicit in a 
theory of international politics or a peace process than in commercial organisations and 
management policies, long-term and short-term time perspectives nevertheless exist 
within a theory or peace process and shape one another.158  
  In addition to helping establish linkages between long-term and short-term time 
perspectives and a theory or process, the Organizational Management literature also 
provided conceptualisations of long-term and short-term time perspectives which were 
not too rigid as to limit their usage and applicability to this study. In other words, what 
is long-term and short-term is not set in the literature to specific lengths of time. In the 
literature long-term and short-term time perspectives are presented as amorphous, 
context dependent, relational, and lacking specific quantification; in other words, 
indeterminacy and openness are defining attributes of time perspectives. The 
significance of continuing to think of time perspectives in this way makes time 
perspectives ubiquitous analytical tools that can be applied to any theory or peace 
process regardless of the units of time used or acknowledged within either.159  Rather 
than imposing an arbitrary, fixed length in years, decades or centuries (i.e. temporal 
depth) of what constitutes long-term or short-term, each time perspective remains open 
to being (re)defined by a theory or peace process, as well as in relation to other time 
perspectives (e.g. long-term past in relation to short-term past). Three conclusions 
follow from this conceptualisation of time perspectives. First, there are limits to how 
long-term and short-term can be defined and standardised. Second, what defines long-
term and short-term within a theory or peace process is context specific. Finally, long-
                                                            
157 For further detail about the effects of long-term and short-term time perspectives on organisations and 
management see Ancona, Goodman, Lawrence, and Tushman, "Time: A New Research Lens"; Ancona, 
Okhuysen, and Perlow, “Taking Time to Integrate”; Orlikowski and Yates, “It’s About Time”; Natalie 
Slawinski and Pratima Bansal, “A Matter of Time: The Temporal Perspectives of Organizational Responses 
to Climate Change,” Organization Studies 33, no. 11 (November 2012): 1537–63; Sonnentag, “Time in 
Organizational Research”.  
158 For a notable exception within the IR literature acknowledging the existence and importance of 
studying long-term and short-term time perspectives see Ken R. Dark, The Waves of Time: Long-term 
Change and International Relations (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 3-4.   
159 Examples of units of time found within a theory or a peace process include but are not limited to years, 
centuries, and general references to the distant past or near future. 
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term and short-term time perspectives found among various theories or peace processes 
may share similar characteristics and have similar shaping effects even though the 
factors (e.g. units of analysis, examples cited) (re)defining time perspectives and their 
durations may differ. While ideas of openness and non-quantification of time 
perspectives are maintained in my understanding and interpretation of long-term and 
short-term, further distinctions between the two were needed to enhance their utility as 
analytical tools in my research.   
 
3.3: Distinguishing between long-term and short-term  
3.3.1 Anchor points 
  To distinguish between long-term and short-term time perspectives of the past, 
present, and future within the context of any particular theory of international politics 
or peace process, I identified three factors necessary to take into account: anchor points, 
aggregation of periodisations, and comparison to one another.160 Locating these factors 
required a close reading of the texts being analysed in relation to each case study. The 
first factor regards anchor points specifically related to time as referenced within the 
case study texts. Anchor points are those explicit and implicit references to events, 
periods, and notions associated with time (e.g. immortality) that indicate bracketed 
portions of the past, present, or future.161 Figure 3.1 below depicts how different anchor 
points bracket portions of time. Although the specific anchor points included within 
texts articulating Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords’ peace process differ, as will be 
illustrated later in this study, the remarks about anchor points that follow are broadly 
applicable to the various types of anchor points found in both case study texts.   
 
  
                                                            
160 George and Jones, “Role of Time in Theory,” 661-62. 
161 Nazli Choucri, "Forecasting in International Relations: Problems and Prospects," International 
Interactions 1, no. 2 (1974), 70; Gary King and Langche Zeng, "When Can History Be Our Guide? The 
Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference," International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 1 (March 2007), 205; Elias, An 
Essay on Time, 59; McIntosh, “Theory Across Time,” 478, 488, 190; Jonathan Matusitz and Eric Kramer, "A 
Critique of Bernstein’s beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis," Poiesis & 
Praxis 7, no. 4 (June 2011), 293; Solomon, “Time and Subjectivity.” 
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(Anchor point) (The Present as 
an anchor  point) 




This time line (not to scale) illustrates the various types of anchor points articulated within the case study 
texts that partition time within the texts.  Such anchors can be used to identify and distinguish among 
long-term and short-term time perspectives of the past, present, and future. 
 
 The initial anchor point to consider is the present.162 A present serves as an 
anchor point because it can be consistently identified within a theory or peace process 
even though when a present is may vary from theory to theory or peace process to peace 
process. For example, the present within Politics among Nations can be roughly linked 
to the book’s publication year in 1956 while the present of the peace process detailed in 
Oslo I can be more precisely dated to September 13, 1993, the signing of Oslo I. The 
identification of the present is important because it can be used to identify a theory’s or 
peace process’s contemporary world. Identifying when the contemporary world is, as 
Chapter 9, section 5 regarding the presents of the Accords illustrates, matters when 
analysing the effects of similar time perspectives from the different presents.  
 Using a present as an anchor point is essential to a study of time perspectives and 
their effects because it provides a time reference within a theory or peace process where 
analyses of the time perspectives can consistently begin and comparisons of time 
perspectives between different theories and/or peace process can be made.163 Regarding 
the first point of using a present as an anchor point to begin analyses of time 
perspectives, the advantage of using this particular anchor point is that it can mark the 
beginning or ending of some (but not all) time perspectives.164 Furthermore, with the 
                                                            
162 Lundborg, “The Becoming of the “Event”: A Deleuzian Approach to Understanding the Production of 
Social and Political “Events”," Theory & Event 12, no. 1 (January 2009): n.a., https://muse.jhu.edu/ 
(accessed February 1, 2017): n.a.; Hartog, Regimes of Historicity, xiv-xv. 
163 “Each actually present now creates a new time-point because it creates … a new object point.” Edmund 
G. Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), trans. John Barnett 
Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 68. 
164 Examples of time perspectives that do not have the present as an anchor include short-term historical 
time perspectives with anchors situated entirely in the past (e.g. the interwar period between WWI and 
WWII, the period of the Roman Empire). 
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identification of this present anchor point any references made to events or phenomena 
preceding or following it can be easily assigned to either the past or the future. 
Consequently, this way of sorting international political events and phenomena, enabled 
by this particular anchor point, is an initial step needed to begin to identify historical 
and future time perspectives.  
  Regarding the second point about enabling comparisons, a present provides a 
shared anchor point from which different time perspectives can be defined and 
compared. These comparisons may be internal or external comparisons among historical 
and future time perspectives within a theory or peace process where the present of the 
same theory or peace process is used as a common anchor point.165 Such comparisons 
can draw attention to the (a)symmetry of time perspectives on either side of the 
present.166 For example, the temporal depth of short-term future time perspectives found 
within Morgenthau’s theory extend out for a few years while its short-term historical 
time perspectives extend back for decades and centuries.167 In addition to providing a 
place from which analyses can begin and comparisons can be made, a present can also 
serve as a shared anchor point which helps to make sense of the internal structure of 
long-term and short-term time perspectives of the past and the future and their 
arrangement within a theory or peace process. For example, the Accords’ present serves 
as a shared anchor point for its long-term and short-term future time perspectives 
articulating the various steps and stages of the Accords’ peace process; without an 
awareness of this shared point, distinguishing between the Accords’ future time 
perspectives would be difficult.168 
  In addition to the present, other equally important anchor points to consider 
include two extremes, one historical and one futural.169 These two particular anchor 
                                                            
165 Mei Wang, Marc Oliver Rieger, and Thorsten Hens, "How Time Preferences Differ: Evidence from 53 
Countries," Journal of Economic Psychology 52 (February 2016): 115-35. Present time perspectives can also 
be compared as detailed in Chapter 6. 
166 Jordheim, “Against Periodization,” 153. 
167 See Chapter 5 for examples. 
168 See Chapter 8, section 5 for clarification of this example. 
169 References made to time horizons in the IR literature are one type of extreme anchor points. Time 
horizons, however, typically only refer to future extreme anchor points rather than extreme anchor points 
of the past. For an example see Ronald R. Krebs and Aaron Rapport, "International Relations and the 
Psychology of Time Horizons," International Studies Quarterly 56, no. 3 (September 2012): 530. For a 
broader definition of what a time horizon is from Sociology that has similarities to how time perspectives 
are defined in this thesis see Andrew Abbott, "Conceptions of Time and Events in Social Science Methods: 
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points mark the theoretical limits of the past and future mentioned within a theory or 
peace process. For example, references to ancient Greece within Morgenthau’s theory 
and the sought-after peace of the Accords’ peace process mark historical and futural 
extreme anchor points respectively.  Unlike the anchor point referring to a present, 
extreme anchor points are subjectively chosen by those individuals constructing a theory 
or peace process.170 These extreme anchor points identify the subjectively chosen limits 
of long-term historical and long-term future time perspectives that could be found within 
a theory or peace process. Likewise, these anchor points also mark the subjective extent 
or scope of a theory’s explanatory power or peace process’s remit;171 in essence, the whole 
of a theory’s or peace process’s timescape172 that cannot be easily overcome. Extending 
from the present, retrospectively and prospectively, to the extreme limits, all long-term 
and short-term time perspectives can in part be defined within a theory or peace process 
in relation to their proximities to the present and the extreme limits of the past and 
future.173  
Having an awareness of extreme anchor points can also be useful in determining 
the focus or orientation of a time perspective toward or away from the present and the 
extremes. Consequently, determining the focus or orientation of a time perspective is 
another way of differentiating between a long-term and a short-term time perspective.174 
For example, within Morgenthau’s theory one of the recurring long-term historical time 
                                                            
Causal and Narrative Approaches," Historical Methods: A Journal of Quantitative and Interdisciplinary 
History 23, no. 4 (Fall 1990), 144; Bluedorn, The Human Organization of Time, 265. 
170 Because the author(s) of a theory or architects of a peace process cannot arbitrarily determine when 
the anchor point of the present is apart from the present itself, this particular anchor point is less 
subjective than the extreme anchor points.  
171 Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, "Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: 
Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries," International Security 22, no. 1 (Summer 1997), 15. Care 
should be taken not to interpret these extreme anchor points as the beginning and the end of a theory’s 
explanatory power with the beginning in the past and the end in the future. A theory may interpret the 
present as the beginning and the end simultaneously, where long-term and short-term time perspectives 
of the past and the future derive from the present (i.e. the start) and are (re)evaluated in the present (i.e. 
the end). Discussions in organizational theory regarding ‘fit narratives’ provide good examples about how 
to think about the present as a beginning and an end; for sample discussions see Abbie Shipp and Karen 
Jansen, "Reinterpreting Time in Fit Theory: Crafting and Recrafting Narratives of Fit in Medias 
Res," Academy of Management Review 36, no. 1 (January 2011), 77; B. J. Cohler, “Personal narrative and life 
course,” in Life-span Development and Behaviors, vol. 4, eds. P. B. Blates and Orville G. Brim (New York: 
Academic Press, 1982), 207; Sonnentag, “Time in Organizational Research,” 365. 
172 For details regarding timescapes see Barbara Adam, “Of Timescapes, Futurescapes and Timeprints,” 
(paper presented at Lueneburg University, June 17, 2008), 1-9. 
173 See sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 for discussions regarding other ways of distinguishing between the two time 
perspectives within contexts provided by a theory or peace process. 
174 Laura L. Carstensen, Derek M. Isaacowitz, and Susan T. Charles, "Taking Time Seriously," American 
Psychologist 54, no. 3 (March 1999), 178. 
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perspectives extends from the present to Greek antiquity; conversely there is a short-
term historical time perspective included within Morgenthau’s discussion of the 
existence of states as international actors that extends from the Treaty of Westphalia to 
the present.175 In the former, the focus is oriented toward antiquity, not the present; the 
latter has a focus toward to the present. The aforementioned example also demonstrates 
differences in the proximities between present and extreme anchor points. 
Consequently, without the identification of anchor points, distinguishing between time 
perspectives is more challenging. 
 
3.3.2 Aggregation 
  The second factor necessary to distinguish between the two time perspectives 
relates to the subjective aggregations and scopes of time perspectives. In general, though 
not always, a long-term time perspective of the past or the future accounts for multiple 
periodisations defined and referenced throughout a theory or peace process.176 For 
example, in articulations of Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments long-term historical 
time perspectives collectively account for a number of periodisations of the past which 
illustrate examples that support the claims made within his theory. Each periodisation 
is essentially a short-term time perspective that relates to a particular era or timeframe, 
movement, duration of war or peace, vision, or strategy articulated within a theory or 
peace process. A long-term time perspective aggregates these periodisations into a series 
that consecutively follow one another and/or overlap with each other to create a broad 
overview of time as a whole (i.e. past, present, and future) or a segment of time (e.g. the 
past).177 Although short-term time perspectives can aggregate multiple periodisations, 
                                                            
175 The significance and reasons for Morgenthau making these distinctions are addressed in more detail 
in Chapter 5.  
176 For more on periodisations and different ways of interpreting what they are, see Kathleen Davis, 
Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Tom Lundborg, “The Limits of Historical 
Sociology: Temporal Borders and the Reproduction of the ‘Modern’ Political Present,” European Journal 
of International Relations 22, no. 1 (March 2016), 103-4; Jordheim, “Against Periodization”.  
177 Lawson, “The Promise of Historical Sociology,” 415; Andre Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Economy in 
the Asian Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Barry Gills, “World System Analysis, 
Historical Sociology, and International Relations: The Difference a Hyphen Makes,” in Historical Sociology 
of International Relations, eds. Stephen Hobden and John Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 141-62; John M. Hobson, "Reconstructing International Relations Through World History: 
Oriental Globalization and the Global–Dialogic Conception of Inter-Civilizational Relations,” 
International Politics 44, no. 4 (July 2007): 414-430.  
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they remain embedded within long-term time perspectives which aggregate far more 
periodisations. To illustrate, consider the Accords’ various redeployment phases of 
Israeli military forces as individual short-term future time perspectives articulating 
distinct periodisations within the peace process. These periodisations are embedded and 
aggregated within a long-term future time perspective alongside additional 
periodisations (e.g. the future permanent settlement negotiations between Israel and 
the Palestinians) relevant to the peace process. Figure 3.2 provides an illustration of how 
different aggregations of periodisations can be useful in distinguishing between long-
term and short-term time perspectives.   
 
Figure 3.2: Aggregating phases of the Accords’ redeployment of Israeli military forces 
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First Phase      
     
                           ��������� 
     Phase 1              Phase 2               Phase 3 
 





 Multiple periodisations aggregated together 
as ‘Further Redeployments’  
Time Perspectives Short-term  
time 
perspective 
 Long-term time perspective containing 
multiple short-term time perspectives. 
 
Anchor points and redeployment phases obtained from Oslo II, Appendix 1. 
 
 If the aforementioned aggregations are not apparent in a theory or peace process 
via specific dates or events, time perspectives may also aggregate time in more general 
terms.178 For example, references to a ‘distant past’ or ‘the past’ as a whole in both 
Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords aggregate time for long-term time perspectives 
without the mention of periodisations.  Similarly, references to the ‘recent past’ or parts 
of the past aggregate time for short-term time perspectives. Aggregations of time with 
respect to the present and future can also be made through general terms. For example, 
                                                            
178 The general terms mentioned in this paragraph bare resemblance to the ‘time rules and temporal 
practices’; for more see Goetz, “Time and Power in the European Commission.”   
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terms like ‘the present’, ‘now’, and ‘it is time’ aggregate time for short-term present time 
perspectives.  In regards to aggregations of time in the future, terms like ‘near future’ or 
‘immediate future’ can aggregate time for short-term future time perspectives while 
references to a ‘distant future’ or ‘unforeseeable future’ can aggregate time for long-term 
future time perspectives. This way of aggregating time perspectives, initially addressed 
in greater detail in Chapter 5, also creates scopes of time (either long or short) that do 
not necessarily require making reference to any other time perspectives. Consequently, 
a theory or peace process could have a long-term historical time perspective and a short-
term future time perspective without also having to make reference to a short-term 
historical time perspective and a long-term future time perspective elsewhere.  Although 
this issue does not arise in my study because both cases studies address all five time 
perspectives, it is worth mentioning to highlight the point that a theory or peace process 
need not articulate every time perspective that is analysed and discussed within this 
study.  As will be addressed in later chapters, each time perspective present within or 
absent from a theory or peace process has specific shaping effects which delimit claims 
and processes in unique ways and thus warrants careful study.  
 
3.3.3 In comparison to one another 
  The final criteria used to distinguish between time perspectives is in regards to 
how time perspectives compare to one another in terms of temporal depth, temporal 
focus, and salient functions within a theory or peace process, as well as across theories, 
across processes, or between a theory and a peace process.179 Examining the comparisons 
between time perspectives, internally and externally, is useful in two of the following 
circumstances. First, internal comparisons are helpful under the following conditions: if 
a theory or peace process addresses both the past and the future in broad, generic terms 
that reference the whole of each segment of time, then comparing the amounts of time 
between the present and extreme anchor points of each segment of time within the 
theory can be helpful in determining which time perspectives are long and short. Similar 
                                                            
179 Regarding the latter point, the comparisons made in this study between time perspectives found 
within each case study help to highlight similar functions performed by each type of time perspective or 
draw attention to their differences in terms of duration. The comparisons, however, are not made to 
indicate that the time perspectives within the Accords are influenced by the same time perspectives 
delimiting Morgenthau’s theoretical commitments.   
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to anchor points, time-indexed case studies and examples cited by a theory or peace 
process can also help establish a sense of the portions of time considered within various 
time perspectives. To illustrate this point, consider two time perspectives appearing 
within a theory or peace process, one relating to the past and another regarding the 
future. Both use generic language, but the specific historical examples articulated extend 
as far back as World War I from a present moment of analysis in 2019. Conversely, 
specific references or predictions regarding the future do not extend beyond 10 years. 
The comparison between the two time perspectives is illustrated in Figure 3.3.  
 
Figure 3.3: Internal comparisons between time perspectives  
Outbreak of  
World War I 
                                                                                                             Present  
                                                                                                             moment 
Trump no longer  
US President 
     1914                                                                                            2019                2029 
        [-----------------------------------A-------------------------------][-------B------] 
Although not to scale, this depiction clearly shows that the historical time perspective ‘A’ is a long-term 
time perspective in comparison to the temporal depth of future time perspective ‘B’.    
 
Based upon this example of an internal comparison of time perspectives within a single 
theory or peace process, the extent of time the historical time perspective draws upon is 
much more extensive than what the future time perspective takes into consideration. 
Consequently, in this example, a theory’s or peace process’s historical time perspective is 
long-term and its future time perspective is short-term.  
  Like internal comparisons, external comparisons can also be useful under 
particular circumstances (not found in this study) to further distinguish between time 
perspectives. For instance, determining the distinctions between time perspectives of 
the same classification (e.g. multiple short-term time perspectives) across multiple 
theories, peace processes, or between a theory and a peace process can be difficult. By 
comparing the time perspectives of one theory or peace process to an external source 
with its own grouping of time perspectives, the differences among time perspectives 
with similar classifications become starkly evident. For example, when a comparison of 
long-term historical time perspectives found within the Accords to long-term historical 
time perspectives embedded within Russett’s work supporting theories of democratic 
peace, the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives are clearly shorter (e.g. 20th 
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Century) than those found in Russett’s work.180 Initially, both time perspectives were 
classified as long-term time perspectives within a limited context, but when placed in the 
broader disciplinary context of international politics, they are reclassified. Becoming 
aware of these external differences is important because it draws attention to how 
restrictive or comprehensive certain time perspectives are within a theory or peace 
process.181 Furthermore, insights gained from external comparisons can indicate where 
potential changes to time perspectives can be made to either improve the explanatory 
power of a theory or the comprehensiveness of a peace process in the future. For 
example, gaining an awareness that the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives 
are short-term historical time perspectives in comparison to the long-term historical time 
perspectives found within Morgenthau’s theory suggests that the historical 
comprehensiveness of Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives are comparatively 
limited.  As will be detailed in chapters 8 and 9, this limited comprehensiveness of the 
past accounted for within the Accords’ misses key aspects of the Israel-Palestinian 
conflict and affects the potential comprehensiveness of the Accords’ peace process. 
Thus, by extending the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives to account for a 
greater expanse of time covering centuries, a future peace process’s efforts to build 
lasting peace may be more comprehensive and effective. As these examples briefly 
illustrate, external comparisons between time perspectives can also be useful in 
recognising the explanatory limitations or strengths of time perspectives embedded 
within a theory and a peace process, as well as how best to alter them to improve their 
objectives. 
  In addition to clarifying the distinctions between time perspectives, internal and 
external comparisons of time perspectives are also helpful in determining the overall 
                                                            
180 The direct comparison between the Accords’ time perspectives and those of Russett’s theory of 
democratic peace are warranted here as the elements of democracy and liberalism integrated into the 
Accords’ peace process appear to closely mirror those found in Russett’s theory. For more on Russett’s 
work on democratic peace theory see: Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-
cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett, "The 
Classical Liberals Were Right: Democracy, Interdependence, and Conflict, 1950-1985," International 
Studies Quarterly 41, no. 2 (June 1997): 267-93; John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, "The Kantian Peace. The 
Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885-1992," World 
Politics 52, no. 1 (1999): 1-37.  
181 David A. Whetten, “What Constitutes a Theoretical Contribution?,” Academy of Management Review 
14, no. 4 (October 1989), 491-92. 
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temporal foci within a theory or peace process.182 Knowledge of one or more temporal 
foci emerges through internal and external comparisons of the various time perspectives 
present or absent within the theory or peace process being examined. For instance, 
Morgenthau’s theory has well-developed articulations of the past that includes long-
term and short-term historical time perspectives and articulations of the present that 
includes short-term present time perspectives. Conversely, equally developed long-term 
and short-term time perspectives with respect to the future are not found in 
Morgenthau’s theory.183 Thus, the temporal foci of his theory appears to be on the past 
and the present, rather than the future. This finding is consistent with Morgenthau’s 
own claims that his theory was not designed to provide predictions about the future of 
international politics.184 In regards to the temporal foci of the Accords’ peace process, 
they are centred on the future, particularly the future in the short-term. As will be 
developed in later chapters, these temporal foci shape how a theory or peace process 
interprets and understands international politics. Therefore, the ability to assess and 
distinguish between theories or peace processes through comparisons of temporal foci 
can aid readers in selecting the most appropriate or relevant theories or peace processes 
to use in their research or policy pursuits. 
 
3.4 Outlier time perspectives 
  The discussion thus far has been primarily concerned with distinguishing 
between long-term and short-term perspectives (of the past and the future), as well as 
among them. Little attention, however, has been given to other potentially relevant time 
perspectives, namely the medium-term time perspectives and the long-term perspectives 
of the present, which requires explanation. These time perspectives indicate two of the 
limits of my study of time perspectives. With regards to medium-term time perspectives, 
they have not been singled out or clarified in this study to the same extent as long-term 
                                                            
182 Temporal foci of a theory regards where the attention of a theory rests or centres on with respect to the 
past, the present, and the future. This definition is derived from the earlier discussion of temporal foci 
with respect to time perspectives addressed in section 3.1.2. 
183 The suggestion here is that the more differentiated a theory is in terms of time perspectives, the 
analytically more versatile it might be. However, it is not necessary to include multiple time perspectives 
if a theory is constructed to only offer limited insights into what is known about international politics 
rather than what cannot be known because it has not occurred. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4, 
14, 18; Algosaibi, “Hans J. Morgenthau and His Critics,” 225-26. 
184 Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, 42. 
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and short-term time perspectives for three reasons. First, in contrast to long-term and 
short-term time perspectives, medium-term time perspectives do not feature prominently 
in the explicit language used within theories and peace processes, or in discussions 
within academia or among policy makers.185 Second, among the literatures reviewed for 
this study the Organizational Management literature mentions medium-term time 
perspectives the most, but only on rare occasions and only medium-term time 
perspectives with respect to the future.186 Generally, the literature consulted for this 
study focuses on discussing the significance of long-term and short-term time 
perspectives. Finally, medium-term time perspectives can be re-characterised as either 
extended short-term time perspectives or reduced long-term time perspectives to fit 
within a theory’s or peace process’s existing long-term and short-term time perspective 
designations. The would-be medium-term time perspectives can also be classified as 
either a version of a long-term or short-term time perspective by examining the 
orientation of the would-be medium-term time perspective toward either the present or 
one of the extreme anchor points in the past or future. For the aforementioned reasons, 
time perspectives were not classified within my research as medium-term to avoid 
overemphasising their significance as a distinct category of time perspectives 
emphasised within IR and to recognize that such perspectives were already accounted 
for within the long-term and short-term classifications analysed and discussed 
throughout this study. 
  Similar to medium-term time perspectives, long-term present time perspectives 
have not been discussed in detail because the case studies included in this study do not 
include articulations of long-term present time perspectives and not all criteria (e.g. 
anchor points) used for distinguishing long-term and short-term time perspectives of the 
past and the future are applicable to making similar distinctions between present time 
perspectives. For example, unlike using the present as a central anchor point to 
determine long-term and short-term time perspectives of the past and the future, there 
is no central anchor point independent of the present from which to evaluate the time 
                                                            
185 For a example of a rare incident where medium-term time perspectives are mentioned see Gerald 
Schneider, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Sabine Carey, "Forecasting in International Relations: One Quest, 
Three Approaches," Conflict Management and Peace Science 28, no. 1 (February 2011), 9-10.   
186 For examples see Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, “Taking Time to Integrate,” 525; Mary Anne Devanna, 
Charles Fombrun, and Noel Tichy, "Human Resources Management: A Strategic Perspective,” 
Organizational Dynamics 9, no. 3 (Winter 1981): 53, 55, and 61. 
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perspectives within the present. Furthermore, the extreme anchor points of the present 
and their proximity to one another cannot be determined in a way that the extreme 
anchor points for historical and future time perspectives can be. In addition to the 
difficulty of determining anchor points, analysing how different present time 
perspectives are aggregated would be challenging. Examining the aggregation of a 
present long-term or short-term time perspective would require two different 
conceptualisations of what constitutes the present. These conceptualisations might 
include distinguishing between the present as an is and the present as always becoming, 
whether the former is longer than the latter, or it might include notions of the present 
as all-encompassing of the past and the future, temporary, or permanent.187 However, 
these ways of aggregating present time perspectives are not typically articulated within a 
theory or peace process and would be at odds with how Western IR theories and peace 
processes have historically made references to the present (i.e. the present as a segment 
of time in relation to the past and the future). 
  Stemming from unstudied and undertheorized notions of the present, Western 
IR theories conceptualise the present time perspective as one dimensional and having a 
shorter finite nature in comparison (internally and externally) to long-term and short-
term time perspectives of the past and the future. Consequently, a present time 
perspective is frequently classified as a short-term time perspective. However, novel 
notions of long-term time perspectives of the present deserve acknowledgement as they 
may be useful in discussing present time perspectives within particular contexts found 
within the international political sphere.188 One example relates to notions of 
maintaining a status quo of international politics in the present. This maintenance 
implies that change in the present has not occurred and suggests a long-term time 
perspective of the present is possible. Another example refers to the period of time 
experienced by refugees when they are waiting to be ‘processed’ after fleeing systematic 
                                                            
187 Tom Lundborg, "The Becoming of the “Event”; Moshe, “Temporary versus Permanent”.  
188 Here discussions regarding block universe theory (B-theory) of time from philosophy and physics were 
not included, but offer other ways of thinking about long-term present time perspectives that may be useful 
in the future as IR develops knowledge of time perspectives. For more information see Dan Falk, “A Debate 
Over the Physic of Time,” Quanta Magazine, July 19, 2016, https://www.quantamagazine.org/a-debate-
over-the-physics-of-time-20160719/ (accessed October 5, 2016); Lisa Leininger, review of Objective 
Becoming: In Search of A-ness, Analysis 78, no. 1 (January 2018): 108–117; John Ellis McTaggart, "The 
Unreality of Time," Mind 17, no. 68 (October 1908): 457-74; Emily Paul, review of Objective Becoming, by 
Bradford Skow, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67, no. 4 (December 2016): 1201–1205; 
Bradford Skow, Objective Becoming (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015).     
71 
 
persecution or war-torn regions and arrive on the foreign shores of unprepared 
countries. For these refugees, this period of waiting in the present is considered never 
ending as their futures are unknown to them and their daily situation seems to not 
change; in essence the present becomes an experienced long-term present for these 
refugees.189 While both examples suggest long-term time perspectives of the present are 
possible, the literature, theories, and peace processes regarding international politics 
has yet to address them in detail and continues to discuss a time perspective in the 
present as short-term and one dimensional. Similarly, my research engages little with 
the notion of a long-term present time perspective because both Morgenthau’s theory 
and the Accords’ peace process classify the present time perspectives as exclusively short-
term.  
  Thus far this section has provided explanations as to why these particular outlier 
time perspectives were not addressed within this study and indicated the limits of this 
study. The final purpose of this section is to draw attention to a preference of time 
perspective articulation that exists within a theory or peace process. As my analyses of 
time perspectives will later illustrate, there is a preference within IR toward articulating 
long-term and short-term time perspectives of the past, present, and future over 
articulating medium-term time perspectives and long-term present time perspectives. The 
noticeable absences of articulations of both medium-term time perspectives and long-
term present time perspectives suggest that these time perspectives are not as vital to 
articulate within a theory or peace process as long-term and short-term time perspectives 
of the past, present, and future. Acknowledging this preference is helpful to 
understanding why variances in articulated time perspectives exists across theories and 
peace processes. In other words, time perspectives within a theory or peace process are 
expressions of preferences.190 Thus, the time perspectives that were recovered from my 
analyses of time perspectives and their effects within my illustrative case studies are of 
significance and not random.  
 
  
                                                            
189 Eastmond, “Stories as Lived Experience,” 251-54. 
190 Whether these preferences are rooted in how international politics is thought about, as my cases studies 
suggests, and/or originate from elsewhere is beyond the scope of this study.   
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3.5 Chapter summary 
  Throughout this chapter, efforts were made to clarify how time perspectives were 
understood in this study, outline what methods were used to identify and distinguish 
between different time perspectives, and articulate the limits of the scope of this study. 
In regards to clarifying how time perspectives were understood in this study, this 
clarification was provided because without it this study would not have been possible. 
Because a clear conceptualisation of how a time perspective is understood within IR was 
not available within the existing IR literature, one was developed. Key concepts 
borrowed from non-IR literatures such as temporal depth, temporal focus, time 
perspective, long-term and short-term, periodisations, and segments of time were used 
to develop the understanding of time perspectives found within this study. Pooling these 
concepts together led to an understanding of time perspectives as constructs of time 
within a theory or peace process that have both temporal focus and temporal depth with 
respect to the past, present, and future. While this understanding was useful in this 
study, it also introduces a novel conceptualisation of time perspectives into IR that 
enables readers to address old and new questions regarding the effects time perspectives 
have on the study, understanding and interpretations, and practice of international 
politics.  
  In addition to providing clarification of how time perspectives are understood in 
this study, this chapter also outlined various methods of identifying and distinguishing 
them from one another. These methods included looking at the time-related anchor 
points and aggregations of the periodisations articulated within a theory or peace 
process, as well as making internal and external comparisons between time perspectives. 
Using these methods, along with the aforementioned conceptualisation of a time 
perspectives, enabled me to identify and distinguish between the five different time 
perspectives found in my illustrative case studies. Those five time perspectives were 
long-term historical, short-term historical, short-term present, short-term future and 
long-term future. Although passing references to the aforementioned long-term and 
short-term time perspectives appear within existing IR literature, the methods used to 
identify them and distinctions between them are not always made clear in the literature. 
Thus, my intentions for outlining the methods appearing in this chapter were threefold. 
First, to provide a clear articulation of the methods used in my study to identify and 
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distinguish between the five time perspectives found and analysed in the two case 
studies. Without a clear articulation of my methods, the distinctions made within this 
study between time perspectives would have appeared random or subjective. The second 
reason for outlining these methods was to provide readers with methods that could be 
used across multiple theories and peace processes. In other words, these methods were 
created as a general standard by which time perspectives could be classified. Finally, 
these methods were designed to make the process of identifying and distinguishing time 
perspectives within a theory or peace process possible without the use of dates or 
explicitly referring to a time perspective as either long-term or short-term.  
  The final section of this chapter addressed outlier time perspectives that were not 
covered in this study. These outlier time perspectives were medium-term and long-term 
present time perspectives. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of these time perspectives was 
included in this chapter for four reasons. First, to highlight particular limits of my study 
with respect to time perspectives. Second, to acknowledge the potential existence of 
these outlier time perspectives within international politics and why I think these time 
perspectives might warrant analysis in future studies of time perspectives. Third, to draw 
attention to the preferred articulations of time perspectives within a theory or peace 
process. Finally, addressing these outlier time perspectives early on in this study and 
why they are not addressed later helps to centre the reader’s attention onto the five time 
perspectives which are featured throughout the remaining chapters: long-term 
historical, short-term historical, short-term present, short-term future, and long-term 
future. Thus, going forward, these outlier time perspectives will not be mentioned later 
in this study apart from a brief mention made in the conclusion regarding future avenues 
of time perspectives research. 
  Based upon the foundation laid in this chapter, five distinct time perspectives 
from Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords’ peace process were able to be recovered for 
analysis. As noted earlier in the chapter, however, identification of a time perspective is 
only an initial step to toward developing an understanding and interpretation of its 
effects within a theory or peace process. Consequently, the next chapter delves into the 
purpose for locating and making distinctions between long-term and short-term time 
perspectives; to recover insights about time-related aspects of international politics 
articulated within a theory or peace process. These insights are important to recover 
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because they indicate what contributions and delimitations time perspectives make 
within a theory or peace process. In particular, these insights help highlight the 
profound effects time perspectives have on claims and practices. To fully appreciate the 
profoundness of these effects, the following chapter addresses three key time-related 
aspects in detail. These aspects are perennial, ephemeral, and contingent.  From the 
subsequent chapter’s explanations of each aspect, the reader will gain an awareness of 
what insights can be gained about the time-related aspects of claims and practices via a 





Chapter 4: Time-related Aspects: Perennial, Ephemeral, and 
Contingent 
  Recovering insights about the time-related aspects of international politics 
articulated within a theory or peace process relies on two things. First, dependable 
methods for identifying and differentiating between time perspectives. Second, a general 
awareness of what time-related aspects might look like and how they might be 
articulated by a time perspective. While the former has already been addressed in the 
previous chapter, this chapter aims to focus on the latter. Consequently, this chapter 
presents three time-related aspects (perennial, ephemeral, and contingent) that time 
perspectives can attribute (i.e. attach) to a claim or practice. The purpose of attributing 
these aspects is to clarify the duration of a claim’s or practice’s manifestation in 
international politics over time. The following discussion of these aspects is important 
because it illustrates how international politics in relation to time is articulated within 
a theory or peace process. In this chapter I have distilled the language and time-related 
aspects of international politics articulated within Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords’ 
peace process into three generic forms that are both accessible to the reader and relevant 
to the aims of this study.  These three aspects are useful analytical tools to analyse which 
time-related aspects each time perspective is attributing to and what effects these 
aspects (and by extension time perspectives) have on how a claim or practice is 
interpreted and functions. Helping to illustrate the relationships between time 
perspectives, time-related aspects they can attribute, and the subsequent effects these 









Figure 4.1:  Observing and attributing time-related aspects via time perspectives 
 
  
      
 
       
 
 










Observing Phenomenon A0 via long-term and short-term historical time perspectives enabled the observer 
to see time-related aspects X and Y exhibited within a specific timeframe. These observations led to the 
attribution of time-related aspects of a claim about the observed phenomenon that clarified the claim 
with respect to time. While the resulting claim is not untrue, it remains incomplete. Without the addition 
of another time perspective (e.g. short-term present time perspective), aspect Z remains unknown. 
 
  The structure of the chapter is designed to highlight the value of the three 
selected aspects and to differentiate them from each other, as well as suggest that both 
long-term and short-term time perspectives can be used to attribute any one of these 
aspects to a claim or practice. The chapter begins with explanations of how perennial, 
ephemeral, and contingent came to be the three time-related aspects selected for this 
study and how each aspect is understood in relation to international politics as 
Exhibited time-related aspects of 
Phenomenon A0 within a specific 
timeframe are X, Y, and Z. 
Aspects observed in Phenomenon A0 
via a long-term historical time 
perspective: X. 
Aspects observed in Phenomenon A0 
via short-term historical time 
perspectives: X and Y. 
X and Y are aspects attributed to 
claim regarding Phenomenon A0 via 
articulated long-term and short-term 
historical time perspectives. 
Resulting claim made about observed 
phenomenon: 
Phenomenon A0 exhibits time-related 
aspects X and Y; aspect Z was not 
observable via historical time perspectives. 
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articulated within Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords’ peace process. These 
explanations are followed by a discussion regarding the relations between the three 
selected aspects and time perspectives. Building upon distinctions made between the 
three aspects and long-term and short-term time perspectives, the final section addresses 
the distinction among the three aspects themselves. Considered collectively, the 
sections detail each time-related aspect individually, what other time-related aspects 
these three aspects can potentially help to recover, and what their relationship is to ideas 
of long-term and short-term. Within each section examples are provided of how these 
time-related aspects and their subsequent effects appear within Morgenthau’s theory 
and the Accords’ peace process.  By the chapter’s end, the ways that time perspectives 
affect a theory or peace process via their attribution of time-related aspects will be made 
clear.  Furthermore, the language and insights acquired by the chapter’s end provide the 
general awareness of time-related aspects associated with articulations of international 
politics needed to carry out my study. As in the previous chapter, by keeping the aspects 
of time and the language used to discuss them concise yet broadly applicable, the 
methods and insights presented in this study remain accessible to various readers and 
of potential use in other studies pursuing similar inquiries. 
 
4.1 Three time-related aspects 
  To arrive at the selection of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent as an 
elementary set of time-related aspects that can be attributed by time perspectives, 
various claims within Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords were analysed in relation to 
time. My review included both prominent and inconspicuous claims such as claims 
regarding power and immortality found in Morgenthau’s theory and, separately, claims 
regarding peace and regional cooperation found in the Accords. Separate reviews of each 
were necessary to become familiar with the articulations of time-related aspects used in 
each case study. This familiarity led to a general sense of what time-related aspects could 
be associated with claims and practices mentioned in each illustrative case study. For 
example, interest was understood within Morgenthau’s theory as a permanent aspect of 
international politics while the historical and contemporary manifestations of interest 
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were understood as impermanent aspects of international politics.191 The time-related 
aspects associated with the aforementioned examples individually highlight two 
fundamental time distinctions that emerged from my separate analyses, aspects that are 
perennial and aspects that are ephemeral. 
 My discussion of the three aspects begins with those aspects that are referred to 
in this study as perennial.192 In a general sense, perennial aspects of international politics 
are considered to be continuous, sustained, and consistently present over long periods 
of time, even infinite in existence (e.g. the idea that there is consistently an ‘other’).193 
Their presences can remain influential (to varying degrees) within international politics 
in the past, present, and future; essentially without identifiable beginnings and/or 
endings.194 For example, the struggle for power and peace are perennial aspects of 
international politics within Morgenthau’s theory, while peace within the Accords is a 
perennial aim of its peace process. Regarding the ephemeral aspects of international 
politics, they are finite in their duration and fail to be sustained over extended periods 
of time.195 The effects of ephemeral aspects on the international political sphere are 
impermanent in comparison to the effects of perennial aspects. Examples of ephemeral 
aspects include references within Morgenthau’s theory to the short-term historical 
dominance of states as international political actors and the Accords’ articulation of the 
implementation of the steps and stages of its peace process within specific timeframes. 
Both aspects are articulated throughout Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords and effect 
how claims are understood and interpreted within each as will be detailed later in the 
Part II (chapters 5-7) and Part III (chapters 8-9). 
                                                            
191 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 5-9; Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, 
The Decline of Democratic Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 90; Peter Gellman, "Hans 
J. Morgenthau and the Legacy of Political Realism," Review of International Studies 14, no. 4 (1988), 254-
55. 
192 My original familiarity with the word ‘perennial’ came from my interest in gardening where plants that 
live more than two years are referred to as ‘perennial’ as opposed to those plant with a shorter lifespan are 
referred to as ‘annuals’. It was only later did I become aware of the usage of ‘perennial’ could also be found 
IR literature, including works by Morgenthau. 
193 Iver B. Neumann, “Self and Other in International Relations,” European Journal of International 
Relations 2, no. 2 (June 1996): 139–74.  
194 Examples of two different types of perennial effects from Morgenthau’s theory include the influence of 
power and nuclear weapons. The influence of the former has no identifiable beginning or end while the 
influence of the latter has a clear beginning with the advent of nuclear weapons but apparent no end. 
195 Douglas B. Klusmeyer, "Contesting Thucydides' Legacy: Comparing Hannah Arendt and Hans 
Morgenthau on Imperialism, History and Theory," The International History Review 33, no. 1 (March 2011): 
9-10; Morgenthau, The Decline of Democratic Politics, 9; Moshe, “Temporary versus Permanent”. 
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  The two aforementioned distinctions, perennial and ephemeral, are significant 
because they delimit the time parameters of different time-related aspects that can 
potentially be attributed via time perspectives, not unlike how Hutchings delimits time 
in relation to world politics using kairos and chronos where time is either classified as 
normal (chronotic) or exceptional (kairotic).196 In other words, each time-related aspect 
that a time perspective can potentially attribute must be either perennial or 
ephemeral.197  This binary principle, however, does not preclude a perennial aspect and 
an ephemeral aspect from being simultaneously attributed to a single claim by multiple 
time perspectives.198 For example, as will be detailed in Chapter 9, the claim of peace 
within the Accords is attributed with perennial aspects by the Accords’ long-term future 
time perspectives while its long-term and short-term historical time perspectives suggest 
that peace is ephemeral. The latter part of this example regarding the long-term and 
short-term historical time perspectives also helps to highlight that similar aspects can be 
attributed by multiple time perspectives. Multiple time perspectives attributing the 
same aspects to a claim or practice can also confirm seemingly inherent aspects of a 
claim or practice.  Although these two time distinctions are helpful to explaining things 
such as the durations of the validity or effects of a claim or practice, their usefulness has 
limits. Namely, they do not explain how perennial and ephemeral claims or practices 
interact with each other nor do they indicate that perennial and ephemeral aspects can 
change. These interactions and changes are explained by a third idea gained from my 
review, the idea that aspects of international politics are contingent. 
  From my analyses, insights were gained about how claims and/or practices 
interact with one another or change in known or foreseeable ways, as well as unknown 
and unforeseeable ways. An example of these interactions can be found in the Accords’ 
articulation of various claims regarding how particular steps and stages within the peace 
process will sequentially unfold within specific timeframes in the short-term future.199 
Illustrating an example that aspects of a claim can change is the Accords’ articulation of 
the nature of Israeli-Palestinian relations changing from one of historical confrontation 
                                                            
196 Hutchings, Time and World Politics, 5. 
197 The explicit mentioning of the terms ‘perennial’ and ‘ephemeral’ appear on rare occasions in 
Morgenthau’s theory, but not within the Accords.  
198 Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe, 16, 22. 
199 An example of not knowing or foreseeing the ways that claims interact with each other can be found in 
Morgenthau’s theory regarding discussions of using theory to predict the future of international politics.   
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to one of peace in the future. Recognising that these interactions are inevitable within a 
theory or peace process and acknowledging that aspects may change over time are 
necessary to providing comprehensive explanations of international politics or how a 
peace process works. The interactions and aspect changes found within my review 
confirm the previous statement, as well as suggest that international politics is 
fundamentally dynamic in both the context of a theory or a peace process. In other 
words, international politics within these contexts is in a constant state of flux.200  
  As will be detailed in my analyses found in chapters 5-9, this sense that 
international politics is in a constant state of flux is the result of the changes of and 
interactions between perennial and ephemeral aspects within a claim or practice and 
their effects among different claims and practices articulated within a theory or peace 
process. Capturing this sense of dynamism is the idea of that claims and practices are 
contingent; an idea which is explicitly addressed within Morgenthau’s theory but also 
apparent within the Accords which tries to mitigate the emergence and effects 
contingencies have throughout the peace process. Consequently, this idea of 
contingency was selected as the third time-related aspect needed in this study. 
Contingent, along with perennial and ephemeral, aptly capture three key aspects of time 
found in both illustrative case studies. Understanding these three aspects as they appear 
within each case study is central of examining time perspectives and their effects within 
each case study. 
  The identification and singling out of these three aspects found in both case 
studies suggest that these three aspects may have been derived from a common source. 
The most obvious common source would be observed manifestations of international 
politics. Considering that both a theory and peace process have to account for and 
contend with actual manifestations of international politics, it is not surprising that 
perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects appear within Morgenthau’s theory and 
                                                            
200 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 2nd ed., introd. Margaret Canovan (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998), 190-91; Hom and Steele, “Open Horizons,” 280; Anthony F. Lang Jr., Agency and 
Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 12; 
Maruyama Masao, "Auf Der Suche Nach Einer Methode Der Ideengeschichte — Eine 
Erinnerung," Leviathan. 17, no. 2 (1989), 193; Felix Rösch and Atsuko Watanabe, "Approaching the 
Unsynthesizable in International Politics: Giving Substance to Security Discourses through Basso 
Ostinato?," European Journal of International Relations 23, no. 3 (September 2017), 612. 
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the Accords’ peace process.201  Consequently, the aspects of perennial, ephemeral, and 
contingent are not included in Morgenthau’s theory or the Accords’ peace process for 
arbitrary reasons. These three aspects are included intentionally in both as reflections of 
what are perceived as real aspects of international politics. For example, Morgenthau’s 
understanding of the state as an ephemeral political entity acting within the 
international political sphere and that the struggle for a balance of power is perennial or 
an understanding within the Accords that an ephemeral liberal democratic peace 
process leads to a perennial peace between two democracies are reflections of what 
manifestations of international politics are perceived to be by each.202 The interactions 
referred to in the aforementioned examples suggest that international politics in both is 
contingent. Therefore, these three aspects should not be considered as unique to 
Morgenthau’s theory or the Accords’ peace process or to this study of time perspectives, 
but representative of time-related aspects which have broader applicability to other 
theories, peace processes, and studies of time perspectives within IR. What is unique to 
a theory or peace process, however, is how these aspects are specifically attributed and 
articulated within a theory or peace process. 
 
4.2 The three aspects in relation to time perspectives   
  The attribution of perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects are not random 
as mentioned earlier, but intended to reflect perceived realities of international politics. 
To help make sense of the perceived realities and capture their various aspects, authors 
of theories and peace processes contextualise these realities within a particular moment 
or span of time, if not both via time perspectives.203 This process is a subjective process 
whereby time perspectives which appear to best capture and contextualise the perceived 
realities are deliberately or implicitly embedded within a theory or peace process. For 
example, the long-term historical time perspective extending back to Greek antiquity 
rather than to the Treaty of Westphalia within Morgenthau’s theory helps contextualise 
the state as an ephemeral international political actor in history and thus attributes 
                                                            
201 Raymond Aron, "What Is a Theory of International Relations?," Journal of International Affairs 21, no. 2 
(1967), 192, 196-97; Charles A. McClelland, "The Function of Theory in International Relations," The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 4, no. 3 (September 1960), 304.  
202 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 9. 
203 Tom Lundborg, "The Becoming of the “Event”.    
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ephemeral aspects to the existence of the state.204 The consequences of this process are 
twofold. First, the subjective selection and construction of time perspectives ends up 
attributing certain perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects to a claim or practice. 
Second, the time perspective(s) used to capture particular, perceived prominent aspects 
of international politics can also end up excluding or deemphasising other aspects.205 
Thus, the selection and construction of time perspectives have effects on what aspects 
of international politics are and are not conveyed within a theory or peace process. In 
other words, time perspectives within a theory or peace process delimit how reflective a 
theory or peace process can be of the realities of international politics.206 In part, this 
subjectivity explains why perceptions of the same phenomena observed within 
international politics might not be universal and how different understandings and 
interpretations of international politics emerge. 
  The relationship between time perspectives and these three aspects is important 
to acknowledge because this relationship is what makes tracing the effects time 
perspectives have within a theory or peace process possible.207 Essentially, the aspects of 
perennial, ephemeral, and contingent are understood within this study as the initial 
effects of the articulation of long-term and short-term time perspectives within a theory 
or peace process. For example, the short-term historical, short-term present, and short-
term and long-term future time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory attribute 
perennial aspects to claims regarding the nuclear condition.208 These initial effects lead 
to additional effects. Using the aforementioned example again, the perennial aspects of 
the nuclear condition suggests that humanity is perennially under threat and could be 
eliminated at any point in the future, thus making the notion of immortality an 
impossibility within Morgenthau’s theory.209 What this example illustrates is that 
through the identification of these initial effects and their relationship with specific time 
                                                            
204 For a critique of the ways in which the state has been ‘imagined and discussed as if it were an effectively 
timeless entity’, see Rob B.J. Walker, “International Relations and the Concept of the Political,” in 
International Relations Theory Today, eds. Ken Booth and Steve Smith (University Park, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1995), 206–227.  
205 Andrew R. Hom, “Patriots All Around: Inter/national Timing, Round Numbers, and the Politics of 
Commemorative Critique,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 63, no. 3 (September 2017), 452.  
206 Jordheim, “Against Periodization,” 166. 
207 Steve Yetiv, "History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches: Thinking about Greater 
Interdisciplinarity," International Studies Perspectives 12, no. 2 (May 2011), 106. 
208 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Death in a Nuclear Age,” Commentary 32 (September 1961): 231–34. 
209 Alison McQueen, "Salutary Fear? Hans Morgenthau and the Politics of Existential Crisis," American 
Political Thought 6, no. 1 (Winter 2017): 78-105; Scheuerman, Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, 146-52. 
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perspectives, additional effects of time perspectives can be traced, recovered, and 
interpreted. Without an awareness of this relationship, the breadth of effects time 
perspectives have within a theory or peace process remains limited.210 Furthermore, the 
tracing of the multiple effects of time perspectives from an awareness of only the initial 
effects without identifying the time perspectives also yields limited insights as to the 
breadth of effects time perspectives have on claims and practices, as well as on other 
time perspectives.211 
  The relationship articulated above is complex. It requires that both sides of the 
relationship (time perspectives and their effects) need to be identified to begin to figure 
out the range of effects time perspectives have within a theory or peace process. Having 
only an awareness of the three aforementioned aspects without an awareness of long-
term and short-term time perspectives limits how well the effects of time perspectives 
can be understood and interpreted. For example, having an awareness that relations 
between Israel and the Palestinians has been perennially confrontational does not 
indicate which time perspective(s) enabled this observation to be made nor its effects.  
Whether the effects are limited to the long-term and short-term time perspectives of the 
past, the past and the present, the present and the future, or just the future cannot be 
determined. In other words, any number of different time perspectives could potentially 
emphasise that the aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations are perennially 
confrontational. Consequently, having only an awareness of what is perennial, 
ephemeral, or contingent within a theory or peace process limits the insights that can 
be gained about the effects time perspectives have on a theory or peace process to those 
of the effects alone. Conversely, as stated at the end of the previous chapter, only having 
an awareness of time perspectives also limits the insights that can be obtained. 
Recognition of the limits of each part of the relationship highlights and reinforces the 
complexity of the relationship between time perspectives and the three aspects, as well 
as why this study places importance on the accounting of both time perspectives and 
the three aspects of time embedded within each illustrative case study.  
                                                            
210 Jacob M. Montgomery, Florian M. Hollenbach, and Michael D. Ward, "Improving Predictions Using 
Ensemble Bayesian Model Averaging," Political Analysis 20, no. 3 (Summer 2012), 272. 





  In discussing the relationship between time perspectives and aspects of 
perennial, ephemeral, and contingent, a few points of clarification need to be made to 
reduce some potential confusion that may arise later in this study as my analyses unfold. 
First, a claim’s perennial aspect does not imply that an aspect is long-term nor does a 
claim’s ephemeral aspect imply that an aspect is short-term. For example, the Interim 
government mentioned in the Accords was a perennial aspect of Palestinian governance 
over a short-term period but it cannot be considered a perennial form of government in 
light of the other time perspectives articulated within the Accords.212 Therefore, any one 
of the three aspects may or may not be attributed to a claim and is relative to the time 
perspective(s) through which that claim is addressed or viewed.213 The second point, in 
relation to the first point, is that long-term time perspectives should not be assumed to 
predominately highlight perennial aspects over ephemeral. Likewise, short-term time 
perspectives should not be assumed to namely emphasise ephemeral or contingent 
aspects. Any one of the five time perspectives mentioned throughout this study can be 
used to subjectively attribute all or any one of the three aspects to a claim or practice.  
Furthermore, the presence as well as the absence of any of these three aspects adds 
significance and meaning to a claim or practice, a point which will be illustrated 
throughout the later analyses found in chapters 5-9.  
  A final point of clarification needing raised is that while any one of the three 
aspects can be attributed via a specific time perspective, the three aspects can also be 
used to assess and characterise aspects of a claim or practice across an aggregation of 
time perspectives.214 For example, the historical examples of the balance of power 
between international political actors as articulated within Morgenthau’s theory via 
short-term historical time perspectives, when aggregated, help to recover that a balance 
of power is ephemeral in its longevity, contingent upon the make-up of the actors in 
existence, their interests, and their capability to exercise power, and a perennial pursuit 
of international political actors. In other words, the aggregation of aspects of claims 
regarding the balance of power across multiple time perspectives ends up attributing 
ephemeral, contingent, and perennial aspects to the balance of power concept found 
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within Morgenthau’s theory.215 This use of these three aspects to characterise a specific 
claim across multiple time perspectives can suggest what general aspects can be 
attributed to a claim or practice and perhaps allude to potential aspects of a claim or 
practice that are relevant beyond the confines of a specific theory or peace process. 
 
4.3 Relations between the three aspects 
  Moving on from addressing relations between time perspectives and time-related 
aspects, the following section addresses how the three aspects relate to one another and 
their corresponding effects. As mentioned earlier in section 4.1, an individual time 
perspective can potentially attribute either a perennial or ephemeral aspect to a claim 
or practice, but not both simultaneously. Multiple aspects, however, can be attributed 
to a single claim or practice via considering that claim or practice through different time 
perspectives. Considered collectively, the various attributed perennial and ephemeral 
aspects provide a picture of the many facets of a single claim or practice. Although these 
aspects are attributed separately, they must relate to one another or fit together. For 
example, within the Accords claims regarding peace between Israel and the Palestinians 
are attributed with ephemeral aspects by the Accords’ historical time perspectives which 
articulate the absence of peace in the past and with perennial aspects by the Accords’ 
future time perspectives which articulate the enduring presence of peace in the future.216 
When aspects of different types do not relate to one another within a claim or practice, 
they can potentially create contradictions within or lead to misinterpretations of a 
theory or peace process. Based on my study, however, these problematic issues are 
largely avoided by nesting the attributed aspects of a claim or practice in relation to one 
another across time.217 In other words, time-bounding each aspect enables each one to 
be co-associated with a single claim or practice.218 Consequently, where such 
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problematic issues arise, this can indicate that either an aspect has been attributed 
arbitrarily and is independent of a time perspective or that a time perspective for a 
particular claim or practice is missing. 
  In addition to addressing the relations among these three aspects across time, 
they also relate to one another in terms of what they convey about the state of existence 
of a claim or practice.219 Therefore, having an awareness of the relations between these 
three aspects is helpful in developing an understanding of the various states of existence 
of claims and practices. Each of the three aspects conveys one aspect about a state of 
existence of a claim or practice within a particular time perspective. A state of existence 
might be permanent (i.e. perennial), temporary (i.e. ephemeral), or dependent upon 
particular circumstances (i.e. contingent). For example, according to Morgenthau’s 
theory interest is a perennial feature of international politics across time; in essence, 
Morgenthau is claiming that the existence and relevance of interest to international 
politics has been, is, and will be perpetual.220 The consequences of such a claim within 
Morgenthau’s theory is that a situation in which international politics does not involve 
interest becomes difficult to imagine and leads to an understanding of international 
politics as contingent upon interest either in its manifestation or pursuit which are 
themselves ephemeral. This example illustrates how identifying one state of existence of 
a claim or practice can lead to an awareness of a claim’s or practice’s other states of 
existence. Furthermore, this example suggests that there are residual effects when these 
three aspects are attributed to a claim or practice. 
  Residual effects, as illustrated in the previous example, are both the results of an 
individual aspect as well as various combinations and interactions between different 
aspects of multiple claims and practices.221 Examples of basic combinations and 
interactions among perennial and ephemeral aspects include perennial and perennial, 
perennial and ephemeral, and ephemeral and ephemeral, all of which are illustrated 
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throughout the analyses found in chapters 5-9. The combinations and interactions of 
these aspects are always contingent upon how aspects are attributed to claims and 
practices. Consequently, the residual effects of combinations of aspects attributed to 
claims about the roots of political problems found in Morgenthau’s theory in contrast to 
those articulated in the Accords are quite different. In the former, the roots of political 
problems are perennial and can never fully be eliminated. Conversely, in the latter, the 
roots are ephemeral and can be addressed. As noted in the following example, the 
residual effects of these combinations and interactions can either be perennial or 
ephemeral. For example, within the Accords combinations of a series of ephemeral steps 
and stages of the peace process were intended to build up confidence (i.e. a residual 
effect) between Israel and the Palestinians so that a perennial peace could be 
established.222 As the demise of the Accords illustrates, however, the residual effects 
cannot always be determined or guaranteed in advance. This is because it is not always 
possible for a peace process (or a theory) to account for every unforeseen factor that may 
arise in the future. Regardless of whether or not the residual effects can be determined 
in advance, it is important to recognise that their effects extend throughout a theory or 
peace process. 
  The idea that these three aspects, when attributed, have residual effects 
throughout a theory or peace process is important to recognise in this study for two 
reasons.  First, if there are residual effects of attributing a perennial, ephemeral, or 
contingent aspect to a claim or practice, then it suggests that aspects attributed to a 
claim or practice can have effects on other claims and practices, as well as broader 
understandings of international politics within a theory or peace process. For example, 
the residual effects of claiming within Morgenthau’s theory that the nuclear condition 
is perennial (since the late 1940s) and that every present is novel (i.e. ephemeral) is that 
humanity can never be certain that immortality will ever be a possibility.223  A second 
reason for acknowledging that attributed aspects have residual effects is that it helps to 
provide an explanation as to how international politics manifests in the past, present, 
and future.224  For this reason to make sense it is necessary to think of attributed aspects 
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of a claim or practice as the preconditions from which international politics manifests. 
For example, the initial interim Palestinian government (i.e. ephemeral) outlined in the 
Accords was a necessary precondition for developing a future democratic Palestinian 
government and implementation of the Accords’ liberal democratic peace process. Both 
of the above reasons also suggest that the connection between the initial effects of 
attributed aspects and their residual effects are traceable.  
  The ability to trace the initial and residual effects of aspects attributed is helpful 
to not only recover the extent of the effects a single time perspective can have on claims 
or practices, but also to gain unique insights about the relations that might exist between 
perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects.225 For example, within Morgenthau’s 
theory historical, contemporary, and future manifestations of international political 
problems are understood as ephemeral manifestations of perennial international 
political problems which never get fully addressed or resolved.226  This interpretation is 
made possible by tracing the apparent initial and residual effects of aspects attributed 
to claims via different time perspectives across the whole span of time covered by 
Morgenthau’s theory. Through this process of tracing the effects of the attributed 
aspects across time, the similarities among the different political problems mentioned 
throughout the theory become evident and lead to a recognition that the ephemeral 
manifestations are not residual effects of the attributed aspects. The ephemeral 
manifestations are moments or periods in time when perennial aspects of a claim within 
Morgenthau’s theory momentarily manifest. Conversely, when perennial aspects are not 
evident, they may still exist but are in a state of hibernation or dormancy until 
contingent circumstances arise again to enable their ephemeral manifestations.227 While 
the aforementioned relations between aspects of perennial and ephemeral might not be 
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recoverable in every theory or peace process, the example nevertheless highlights how 
tracing the effects of aspects attributed to claims and practices within a theory or peace 
process can be used to avoid a misreading of particular effects.  
  From the previous paragraphs, the relations between perennial, ephemeral, and 
contingent are made apparent. Essentially, the perennial and ephemeral aspects 
attributed to claims and practices appear to be what make international politics 
contingent. The idea that international politics is contingent is captured and articulated 
in similar ways within Morgenthau’s theory and the Accords. For example, within 
Morgenthau’s theory perennial and ephemeral aspects attributed to claims govern how 
claims freely function among and interact with each other to generate explanations of a 
contingent international political sphere.  In other words, perennial and ephemeral 
aspects afford claims with a delimited freedom that makes it difficult to predict from the 
claims how international politics will manifest and leaves manifestations of 
international politics open and contingent.228 In the case of the Accords, the perennial 
and ephemeral aspects attributed to its claims try to mitigate the effects of contingencies 
in the world so that the Accords’ peace process can be implemented successfully within 
a contingent international political sphere. Both examples illustrate that perennial and 
ephemeral aspects attributed to claims can be thought of as essentially contingent forces 
shaping how international politics works according to a theory or peace process. These 
forces and their effects, however, are not necessarily equal at all times.229 
  The inequality among attributed perennial and ephemeral aspects and their 
effects is important to acknowledge because it helps to explain why international politics 
may be conceived of as contingent within a particular theory or peace process. This idea 
is not easily grasped and requires further unpacking to fully appreciate. Beginning with 
relations among perennial and ephemeral aspects, the inequality suggested here is not 
meant to imply that perennial aspects attributed to a claim or practice are generally or 
inherently stronger than its ephemeral aspects, nor the reserve.230  What is suggested is 
that the strength of either aspect is contingent upon various combinations and 
interactions of other aspects attributed to the same claim or practice and other claims 
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and practices during a particular period of time articulated within a theory or peace 
process. For example, within Morgenthau’s theory, the strength of the perennial aspect 
attributed to power dominates the theory because other claims have been made subject 
to or must take account for this aspect of power. The resulting inequality of strengths 
among aspects is just one potential source of asymmetry that can lead to a contingent 
international political sphere. Within a theory or peace process the strength of an aspect 
alone, however, is not always sufficient to manifest a contingent world.  
  Although circumstances articulated within a theory or peace process may allow 
for aspects to be expressed or effects to manifest, those circumstances might not always 
favour the strongest aspect. For example, the Accords’ articulation that the 
confrontational perennial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations of the long-term past 
suggests that it was a strong force.231 The Accords also articulated that such a strong 
force could be overcome (via an ephemeral desire for peace and the implementation of 
incremental, ephemeral steps) to make peace a perennial aspect of their relations in the 
short-term and long-term future.232  In this case, the circumstances that led to the 
signing of the Accords enabled ephemeral desires and ephemeral steps to be expressed 
and manifested to such an extent (i.e. strength) that they overcame a historically 
perennial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations and served as the seeds for a potentially 
new perennial aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations defined by peace rather than 
confrontation.233 As this example illustrates, circumstances created within a theory or 
peace process contribute to unequal expressions or manifestations of attributed aspects. 
By highlighting the inequalities among attributed aspects and the effects in the 
aforementioned example, a suggestion is being made that relations between these 
perennial, ephemeral, and contingent aspects are not hierarchical.234 Furthermore, 
addressing these inequalities helps to reinforce the idea that these aspects and their 
effects within a theory or peace process cannot be wholly understood nor appreciated 
without an awareness of how they relate to each other. 
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4.4 Chapter summary 
  The primary aims of this chapter were to clarify how the aspects of perennial, 
ephemeral, and contingent were understood in this study individually, in relation to 
each other, their effects, and the time perspectives that attributed them to claims and 
practices within a theory or peace process. In pursuit of these aims, the chapter was 
divided into three parts: an explanation of and a justification for the selection of the 
three aspects (section 4.1); relations between time perspectives and the three aspects 
(section 4.2); and relations among the three aspects (section 4.3). The chapter began 
with an explanation as to how and why these three particular aspects were used and 
highlighted in this study. The explanation detailed that these three aspects were selected 
because of their prevalence across both case studies and their relationships with time 
perspectives. Included within this explanation were definitions for each aspect that were 
applicable to this thesis.235 Consequently, such an explanation provided a basis for the 
language and aspects used in my subsequent analyses of the selected illustrative case 
studies detailed in the remaining chapters of this thesis. Providing this basis was 
necessary in this study to follow the arguments made and to appreciate the insights 
shared. 
  The second section of the chapter focused on the relationships between time 
perspectives and the three aspects. Essentially, time perspectives are used to attribute 
any one of these three aspects to claims or practices articulated within a theory or peace 
process. The purpose of the attributions of these three aspects is to try to capture aspects 
of a perceived reality of international politics and embed them into a theory or peace 
process. This process of attribution, however, is highly subjective and indicates that time 
perspectives within a theory or peace process subjectively delimit how reflective a theory 
or peace process can be of the realities of international politics. The discussion in this 
chapter of this relationship goes on to highlight that each of one of these aspects 
represents initial effects time perspectives can have. The uniqueness of the relationship 
suggests that awareness of these initial effects is essential to tracing the extent of the 
effects time perspectives have on a single claim or practice and other claims and 
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practices articulated within a theory or peace process. The section ends with a few points 
of clarification that help to both address problematic assumptions that may arise when 
identifying these three aspects, as well as how these aspects can be used to assess and 
characterise aspects of claims and practices across multiple time perspectives. 
  In the chapter’s final section, several relations among the three aspects were 
addressed. The section began with a discussion regarding the relations among the three 
aspects when attributed to a single claim or practice and how they fit together. The 
discussion moved on to addressing how each aspect can be used to articulate different 
states of existence of a claim or practice. Because neither claims nor practices exist in 
isolation from one another within a theory or peace process, they interact and combine 
with one another and lead to residual effects throughout a theory or peace process.236 
These connections between the initial effects of attributed aspects and their residual 
effects were raised in this section to suggest that the effects of time perspectives are 
traceable. Identifying and addressing this ability to trace the effects of time perspectives 
provided this study with a means of recovering the extent of the effects various 
individual time perspectives have within a theory or peace process as a whole. In the 
process of unpacking the residual effects of attributed aspects, this section highlighted 
that residual effects do not always remain localised to a particular claim or practice, or 
to a period of time within a theory or peace process, but can manifest in foreseen and 
unforeseen ways. To help explain this phenomena, this section suggested that perennial 
and ephemeral aspects should be thought of as essentially contingent forces shaping 
how international politics works according to a theory or peace process. These forces 
and their effects, however, are not necessarily equal at all times as the end of the section 
indicated.  
  By the chapter’s end, relations and distinctions among the three aspects, their 
effects, and time perspectives were made clear. This clarity was necessary as it laid a 
foundation of understandings and language that enables the complexity of relations and 
distinctions analysed and discussed in the remaining chapters to be unpacked and 
articulated in a manner that can be followed by the reader. In the subsequent chapters 
of this study, numerous manifestations of each of these three aspects are analysed and 
discussed. While not every manifestation of these aspects found within each case study 
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is mentioned, those that are mentioned provide solid examples of why these three 
aspects were included in this study. The diversity among the manifestations of these 
three aspects across both illustrative case studies highlights the broad applicability and 
usefulness of these aspects when studying the effects of time perspectives within IR 
theory and practice. Furthermore, the diversity of manifestations of these aspects also 
draws attention to the different ways these aspects delimit understandings and 
interpretations of international politics within a theory or peace process. Thus, these 
aspects, along with the time perspectives that attribute them, restrict and shape what 
international politics is and how it works according to a theory or peace process. 
Detailed illustrations of how those restrictions can appear within and effect a theory or 
peace process begin in the following chapter with an analysis of the long-term and short-




Part II: Theoretical Case Study  
Chapter 5: Long-term and Short-term Historical Time Perspectives 
  This chapter marks the beginning of the second part of this study (Part II), where 
the conceptualisations of long-term and short-term time perspectives and the aspects 
they attribute are used to analyse time perspectives and their effects within a specific 
theory. In particular, the purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis of how the 
past, via long-term and short-term historical time perspectives, can be articulated, 
conceptualised, and mobilised within a theory to provide and support particular 
understandings and interpretations of claims about international politics. The following 
analysis has four foci: 1) to illustrate the different types of historical time perspectives 
that can potentially exist within a theory, 2) to identify and reflect upon the functions 
and effects of each historical time perspective in isolation, 3) to articulate the relations 
between the two historical time perspectives, and 4) to explain the relations between 
historical time perspectives and claims as they appear in a theory.237 For my theoretical 
case study, Morgenthau’s theory was selected as the theory from which illustrative 
examples of long-term and short-term historical time perspectives’ manifestations, 
functions, and effects will be drawn. From my analysis of the illustrative examples, 
similarities and distinctions between the two types of historical time perspectives will be 
made clear. These similarities and distinctions will primarily be articulated in terms of 
the salient functions and corresponding effects each type of historical time perspective 
can potentially perform. Embedded within the previous statement are assumptions that 
the functions of these time perspectives are not negligible and that are they perceived 
as having effects on theoretical claims.238 Consequently, time perspectives and their 
effects are assumed to shape the understandings and interpretations of theoretical 
claims to varying degrees and in significant ways.239 By the end of the chapter, three 
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points will be made clear: the potential variety of historical time perspectives that may 
be found within a single theory, the functions they serve within a theory, and their 
effects on theoretical claims. This clarity makes new contributions to an existing 
awareness among readers as to how the study of and understanding of international 
politics has been shaped by historical time perspectives within a theory of international 
politics. 
  To help recover an awareness of the effects historical time perspectives have 
within a theory, the following questions were used to guide my analysis. What 
distinguishing features do long-term and short-term historical time perspectives possess? 
Why include either historical time perspective within a theory? How does the presence 
or absence of a particular historical time perspective effect how theoretical claims are 
understood and interpreted? How do these historical time perspectives help scholars 
make better sense of international politics? While these questions were directed at 
Morgenthau’s theory to illustrate their usefulness in recovering time perspectives within 
a specific theory, their generic wording suggests that they could be directed toward 
other theories of international politics and useful in future studies of time perspectives 
and their effects. To address each question, illuminating examples of historical time 
perspectives were drawn from Morgenthau’s theory and analysed. As illustrative 
examples, they are not meant to provide comprehensive insights applicable to all 
historical time perspectives across all theories of international politics. The insights 
gained from the analysis, however, suggest particular features and effects readers are 
likely to find when analysing historical time perspectives and their effects on claims 
within other theories of international politics used in IR.   
  The chapter is divided into three sections covering long-term and short-term 
historical time perspectives and their effects. The chapter begins by addressing the three 
salient functions which distinguish long-term historical time perspectives from other 
time perspectives found within Morgenthau’s theory. These functions include providing 
a macro-level scope of the past, structuring and aggregating the past, and creating 
timescapes (if not also a trajectory) within a theory. The second section of the chapter 
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examines the functions short-term historical time perspectives can perform within a 
theory. Among the various functions short-term historical time perspectives can perform, 
the most salient function regards the retention of sub-macro level details about the 
practices and manifestations of international politics in the past that are otherwise 
glossed over by or deemphasised within long-term historical time perspectives (e.g. 
emotions, the everyday, influential roles of particular minor actors during specific 
historical periods).240 Retained within these sub-macro level details are articulations 
about how a theory explains 1) the development and historical contexts of international 
politics within particular (historical) situations, 2) the effects of ongoing and temporary 
phenomena on international politics and their coexistence, and 3) the validity and 
applicability across time of claims made within a theory. 
  Unlike the two aforementioned sections of this chapter, which individually focus 
on the functions and effects of each type of historical time perspective, the final section 
emphasises the cumulative effects both long-term and short-term historical time 
perspectives have on shaping understandings of Morgenthau’s theoretical claims 
regarding notions about the future. This shift in focus from individual to cumulative 
effects of multiple time perspectives was necessary to address for two reasons. First, 
historical time perspectives do not exist in isolation from one another within a theory. 
As my analysis of Morgenthau’s theory shows, they co-exist and interact with each other 
in subtle, yet profound ways. These interactions are worth highlighting because they 
offer insights into how particular understandings of theoretical claims are sustained 
within a theory despite the changing historical circumstances accounted for within a 
theory. Such understandings can indicate: when a historical time perspective is more 
dominant over another; how relations among time perspectives support one another 
and fill in explanatory gaps; and/or why understandings may appear contradictory or 
contentious within a theory. The second reason for focusing on the cumulative effects is 
to emphasise how understanding the past as a whole rather than in parts (via a theory’s 
different historical time perspectives) can be helpful in recovering and deepening 
understandings of theoretical claims. To limit the study to the individual level of each 
historical time perspective, either long-term or short-term, would ignore how theoretical 
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claims are shaped simultaneously by multiple historical time perspectives. By the end of 
this section, the relevance of considering how theoretical claims acquire historical 
meaning and contextualisation via long-term and short-term historical time perspectives 
will be made clear.241 
 
5.1 Priming my analysis   
 To help set out the premise of this chapter and starkly draw attention to the roles 
long-term and short-term historical time perspectives play in adding meaning to and 
contextualisation for theoretical claims, the two following excerpts from Morgenthau’s 
work relating to his theory of international politics were provided. The two excerpts are 
useful examples that help to illustrate that distinctions about the past within a theory 
(e.g. the recent past vs distant past) are being made by Morgenthau, specifically between 
long-term and short-term time perspectives of the past.242 Furthermore, as will be made 
clear in the explanation following the excerpts, these two excerpts also serve as examples 
that highlight how historical distinctions provide meaning and context to claims made 
within a theory. Within each excerpt, the words articulating historical time perspectives 
have been bolded and italicised by myself for the reader’s convenience: 
‘International politics embraces more than recent history and current events 
[(i.e. alluding to time perspectives beyond the short-term past and present)]. The 
observer is surrounded by the contemporary scene with its ever shifting emphasis 
and changing perspectives. He cannot find solid ground on which to stand, or 
objective standards of evaluation, without getting down to fundamentals that are 
revealed only by the correlation of recent events with the more distant past and 
the perennial qualities of human nature underlying both’.243 
‘The truth is, though we have learned the lessons of recent history chapter and  
verse, though we have memorized them and have never tired of reciting and 
applying them whenever faced with a problem which seemed to be similar to one 
of those that we failed to solve during the Second World War, yet we have failed 
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to see that behind the specific lessons of history learnt from specific blunders, 
there stands the lesson of history, of all history, which alone gives meaning to 
the lessons to be derived from any particular period’.244 
 
  After reading through these excerpts with a focus on time perspectives, it is clear 
that historical distinctions are being made between long-term and short-term time 
perspectives. These historical distinctions are not arbitrary, however, but add particular 
meaning and context to theoretical claims which is noteworthy. For example, if all the 
bolded and italicised distinctions in the above excerpts were replaced with the words 
‘the past’, then the interpretations of the theoretical claims being made would markedly 
change. The subsequent interpretations of the claims made within either excerpt would 
suggest that they apply at any moment of the past which is not what Morgenthau is 
articulating.245 These changes in interpretations resulting from this word-play exercise 
suggest that associations are not arbitrarily made (or not made) between a particular 
claim and long-term and short-term historical time perspectives, but are intended to 
shape what a theory conveys. In this chapter, my aim is to further unpack the 
aforementioned distinctions between the historical time perspectives beyond what has 
already been addressed in chapter 3 and examine their unique effects on claims. Insights 
gained from this effort will help readers develop new understandings as to why 
distinctions between long-term and short-term historical time perspectives matter in 
relation to theoretical claims, as well as in relation to how international politics is 
understood in regards to the past.    
 
  
                                                            
244 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Lessons of World War II’s Mistakes: Negotiations and Armed Power Flexibly 
Combined,” Commentary, October 1952, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/the-lessons-of-
world-war-iis-mistakesnegotiations-and-armed-power-flexibly-combined/ (accessed June 23, 2016). 
245 The significance of distinction is particularly clear in the second excerpt where Morgenthau is making 
a theoretical claim that a sole reliance on short-term historical time perspectives is problematic. 
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5.2 Long-term historical time perspectives  
5.2.1 A macro-level overview 
  My analysis and illustration of historical time perspectives and their effects within 
a theory begins with those articulated within Morgenthau’s theory. A primary function 
of long-term historical time perspectives within this illustrative theory is to provide a 
macro-level overview of the past, either as a whole or over multiple historical fragments 
of time.246 Taking a macro-level overview enables a theory to identify and consider 
various explanations for what has been observed in international politics in the past over 
extended periods of time. These various explanations are derived from patterns or 
commonalities found among historical international political phenomena.247 For 
instance, without the inclusion of long-term historical time perspectives, Morgenthau’s 
argument that the struggle for power is partly rooted in human nature would be less 
compelling if based on a short-term historical time perspective where the span of time 
covered might be months or years, rather than millennia.248 Further reflection on this 
example indicates that by examining international politics via a long-term historical time 
perspective, it was possible for theorists like Morgenthau to identify human nature as a 
perennial aspect across time which has consistently influenced international politics.249 
Making this theoretical claim that human nature and international politics are 
connected enables Morgenthau to put forward another theoretical claim; namely that 
international politics has a long history which can in part be explained and understood 
via human nature.250 Consequently, international politics in this sense is understood as 
pre-dating the formation of states and their engagement in international politics on the 
world stage.251 Furthermore, by linking international politics to the human nature rather 
                                                            
246 Lawson, “The Eternal Divide?,” 211; Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, 2.  
247 Bluedorn, The Human Organization of Time, 138. 
248 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4-5; Anthony F. Lang Jr., “Morgenthau, agency, and Aristotle,” in 
Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, ed. Michael C. Williams 
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252-3. 
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contributing to the manifestation of international politics. MacKay and LaRoche, “Conduct of 
History,” 216. 




than to time-bound international actors (e.g. states) or manifestations of political 
structures and processes (e.g. treaties), a theory like Morgenthau’s is able to make the 
claim that as long as humans exist so too will international politics in a particular way. 
This linkage illustrated in Morgenthau’s theory is significant because it extends the 
relevance of the explanations a theory provides in regards to international politics 
beyond the past and well into the present and the future via human nature itself which 
exists perennially unchanged during those segments of time.252   
  In addition to helping to identify patterns or commonalities found in the past 
which are likely to persist in the present and the future253, long-term historical time 
perspectives can be used to help make sense of how certain international political 
phenomena come to be classified in particular ways over extended periods of time. For 
example, what might be classified as perennial issues and influences within particular 
short-term historical time perspectives can be re-evaluated and possibly reclassified as 
ephemeral when considered within a broader international political context across a 
greater span of time covered by one or more long-term historical time perspectives.254 
This re-evaluation and possible reclassification is evident in Morgenthau’s discussions 
regarding the balance of power.255 From a short-term historical time perspective, the 
Concert of Europe appeared to be a perennial aspect of international politics within 
Europe.256 When evaluated through a long-term historical time perspective as articulated 
within Morgenthau’s theory, however, the balance of power offered by the Concert of 
Europe appeared to be an ephemeral aspect of international politics within Europe. 
Based on this assessment of the Concert of Europe and other mentioned historical 
periods where a balance of power-system was maintained (e.g. period between WWI 
and WWII), Morgenthau derives two significant insights about international politics 
which shape his theory in profound ways. The two insights drawn from my analysis of 
                                                            
252 Ulrich Beck, Wolfgang Bonss, and Christoph Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: 
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253 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2, The Restoration of American Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 167. 
254 Yetiv, “Thinking about Greater Interdisciplinarity,” 101-04. 
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status quo and peace among European countries. 
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Morgenthau’s theory, detailed below, help to illustrate the potential extent of effects 
long-term historical time perspectives can have on just one claim within a theory.  
 
5.2.2 Why macro-level perennial and ephemeral classifications matter   
  The first insight is that no balance of power structures or alliances among 
international political actors last forever. According to Morgenthau, this finiteness can 
be attributed to the following: 1) the different forms balance of power systems have taken 
(e.g. bilateral, multilateral, League of Nations), 2) the various purposes they have needed 
to serve (e.g. defence, economic), and 3) the changing international political actors (e.g. 
monarchies, empires, states) which have been involved in their construction, operation, 
and maintenance. Recognising that the finiteness of these attributes affecting balance of 
power dynamics in the past over the long-term is unlikely to change, Morgenthau 
remained sceptical of the promises balance of power structures like the UN could offer 
in the present and in the future because the guarantors and attributes of such structures 
are ephemeral.257 Considered in isolation, this long-term historical time perspective 
would suggest that Morgenthau did not consider that a permanent balance of power 
could ever exist.258 Such a reading of Morgenthau’s claims regarding balance of power 
as impermanent is important with respect to his conceptualisation of the present as 
novel.259 The historical shifting balance of power helps provide a historical explanation 
as to why each present in the past has been different (i.e. novel), as well as why any shifts 
in the future balance of power are expected to continue to uniquely affect each present 
in the future.260 Therefore, the dynamism of balance of power within Morgenthau’s 
theory is the norm and a departure from that norm (e.g. a permanent balance of power 
system) would be an indication that a fundamental change has occurred within 
international politics.  
                                                            
257 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 171, 175, 178, 465, and 452. 
258 As my analysis and discussion of short-term present time perspectives featured in Chapter 6 will 
suggest, the present is conceptualised within Morgenthau’s theory as being novel and thus leaves open 
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future present. 
259 The novelty of the present will be detailed further in section 6.2. 
260 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 175, 180, and 187. 
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  This second insight recovered from my analysis of Morgenthau’s long-term 
historical time perspectives relates to how Morgenthau understands the idea of status 
quo in the context of international politics. Using a long-term historical time perspective, 
Morgenthau draws attention to a common, continuous aim among international 
political actors of the past to strive toward conditions of status quo via balance of power 
systems or the formation of alliances.261 For Morgenthau, these power balancing 
phenomena appeared to be accepted ways of providing a status quo that people (e.g. 
politicians, diplomats) repeatedly sought to maintain or return to after periods of 
uncertainty or disorder.262 Maintaining or (re)constituting normalcy within 
international politics was continuously sought out because it provided ontological 
security to international political actors.263 Diplomacy and peace treaties (e.g. Treaty of 
Chaumont, Quadruple Alliance, and Treaty of the Holly Alliance) are examples 
Morgenthau references to illustrate how international actors have tried to manifest 
status quo conditions within international politics.264 This shared aim and the repeated 
historical attempts (even if not long lasting) toward manifesting status quo situations 
within international politics suggest, for Morgenthau, that the aim to create and 
cultivate a status quo offering ontological security to international political actors is 
perennial.265  
  By acknowledging this aim toward manifesting a status quo as perennial and 
power balancing means in international politics as ephemeral, Morgenthau must then 
understand the concept of status quo within international politics as being in a constant 
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state of flux; a flux that is a perennial aspect of international politics.266 This 
understanding is noteworthy because it illustrates how short-term historical 
phenomena (e.g. temporary shifts in power) can come to be understood as long-term 
historical phenomena (e.g. a working balance of power system). Furthermore, the effects 
of this understanding of status quo derived from Morgenthau’s long-term historical time 
perspective are twofold. First, this claim helps to explain what prompts and sustains 
interactions between international political actors in the past, present, and future. 
Second, this claim supports Morgenthau’s other claims, such as every present is novel 
and the manifestation of international politics is dependent upon various contingent 
circumstances (both perennial and ephemeral); both claims will be addressed in more 
detail in subsequent sections of this chapter and in Chapter 6. Consequently, long-term 
historical time perspectives can enable a theory to distinguish between and provide 
insights into the perennial and ephemeral aspects of international political phenomena, 
even when such aspects simultaneously appear within one category of phenomena as 
the above discussion regarding balance of power illustrated.    
 
5.2.3 Structuring and aggregation 
  Helping to clarify distinctions between perennial and ephemeral aspects of 
international politics is just one function long-term historical time perspectives may 
perform within a theory. These historical time perspectives also help to draw attention 
to the significance of particular perennial issues and long-term influences on 
international politics. Essentially, the focus of attention is directed by how historical 
periodisations are structured and aggregated within a theory over the long-term.267 The 
structuring and aggregating of individual and multiple periodisations within a theory’s 
long-term historical time perspective is not arbitrary, but intended to highlight or 
emphasise the dominant themes and concepts central to a theory’s understanding and 
interpretation of international politics in the past.268 In the case of Morgenthau’s theory, 
the past is structured and aggregated in such a way in order to show how international 
politics can be understood through the historical and perennial struggle for power 
among international actors. The structuring and aggregation of the past within a 
                                                            
266 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 18, 140, 143-5, 161-2, 175, and 190. 
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theory’s long-term historical time perspectives, however, is not necessarily objective or 
comprehensive but limited by a theorist’s subjectivity.269 For example, many historical 
periodisations included in Morgenthau’s long-term historical time perspectives are 
structured around the starting and ending of wars, such as Peloponnesian Wars, the 
Napoleonic Wars and World War I, rather than intellectual or social movements. 
Consequently, certain contributions to international political situations in the past 
stemming from particular social or intellectual movements get overlooked or 
deemphasised in contrast to the effects war has on those situations.270 This overlooking 
or de-emphasis is not confined to long-term historical time perspectives, but also 
influence the periodisations reflected in short-term historical time perspectives.271 
Therefore, the subjective structuring and aggregation done within a theory via long-term 
historical time perspectives shape what a theory is able to identify and explain about 
international politics in the past, as well as in the present and the future.   
 
  To a certain extent, however, this subjective structuring and aggregation done 
within theories via their long-term historical time perspectives is understandable and 
acceptable for a practical reason.272 First, long-term historical time perspectives perform 
an important distillation function within a theory whereby the noise (i.e. irrelevant or 
less significant historical detail) of ephemeral issues or influences obtained from an 
examination of international politics in the past in its entirety is reduced, deemphasised, 
or omitted.273 What remains are the underlying perennial issues and influences that have 
effected international politics in the past. For example, the individual diplomatic 
successes and failures of European powers in trying to avoid engaging in two world wars 
within the first half of the 20th Century is not lost on Morgenthau.274 However, as the 
salience of these and similar ephemeral historical phenomena fade into the background 
when considered within the long-term historical time perspectives found in 
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Morgenthau’s theory, the perennial historical significance of the quality of diplomacy as 
an element of national power becomes apparent to him. The distillation function is not 
only helpful in highlighting the commonalities among similar phenomena, as the 
diplomacy example from Morgenthau’s theory illustrates, but it also helps to identify 
shared aspects across different international political phenomena. Referring to the 
diplomacy example again, Morgenthau includes the quality of diplomacy as one of the 
perennial elements of national power because it appeared alongside other perennial 
elements of national power he found when evaluating the role of national power within 
international politics across time.275 Thus the distillation that occurs as a result of long-
term historical time perspectives enables a theory to develop delimited, general 
theoretical claims about international politics that are interpreted as not limited to the 
past, but international politics across time.  
 
5.2.4 Extending a theory’s explanations and relevance beyond the past   
  A second practical reason why long-term historical time perspectives are included 
within a theory is because the structure and aggregation that these historical time 
perspectives provide can be used to extend the explanatory power and relevance of a 
theory beyond the past. This extension is done by employing long-term historical time 
perspectives to state or imply what a theory’s trajectory is.276 Essentially, how a theory’s 
trajectory articulates where international politics was, is, and will be headed in the future 
is shaped by time perspectives. With respect to the historical portion of a theory’s 
trajectory specifically, it stems from long-term historical time perspectives which shape 
how historical international phenomena are understood and interpreted. Serving as the 
basis upon which a theory’s overall trajectory is constructed, the historical trajectory 
(itself constituted from the structuring and aggregation done within long-term historical 
time perspectives) is projected into or mapped onto the present and the future.277 For 
example, throughout Morgenthau’s theory examples of the effects contingencies (e.g. 
shifts in global alliances) have had on international politics in the past are cited as 
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evidence and reasons for concluding that international politics itself is contingent. This 
notion that international politics has been historically contingent is then projected 
throughout Morgenthau’s theory to be the state of international politics across time. 
Thus the overall trajectory of Morgenthau’s theory can be interpreted as one that is 
open-ended and indeterminate because international politics is contingent.278 As the 
aforementioned example from Morgenthau’s theory illustrates, this projecting of the 
past into or mapping onto the present and the future enables a theory to carry 
explanations of international politics in the past forward.279 
  There are a variety of ways through which understandings and interpretations of 
international politics in the past are interpreted to be applicable outside the historical 
context. Historical patterns, trends, and cycles or lack thereof, as well as the anomalies, 
disruptions, and unanticipated contingencies highlighted in the historical trajectory are 
used to substantiate pre-emptive linkages and non-linkages to international phenomena 
in the present and particular visions or versions of the future (i.e. long-term and short-
term future time perspectives).280 For example, Morgenthau’s references to international 
political actors’ repeated attempts at maintaining different status quos serve as examples 
of historical patterns highlighted in his long-term historical time perspectives. 
Conversely, his reference to the advent of nuclear weapons serves as an example of a 
disruptive, unanticipated contingency. Collectively, they both help to create an overall 
trajectory within his theory that suggests certain aspects of international politics that 
can likely be anticipated (e.g. struggles for power) while other aspects are less likely to 
be anticipated (e.g. the tipping point triggering nuclear war).281 Such pre-emptive moves 
within a theory to establish (e.g. identification of cycles) and disrupt (e.g. identification 
of unknowns) teleological linkages between the past and the present and the future are 
necessary for three reasons. First, to maintain internal consistency of a theory’s 
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trajectory and the logic behind it.282 Second, to perpetuate the theory’s relevance to the 
study of international politics in the present and the future. Finally, to attribute 
historical perennial and ephemeral characteristics to contemporary known and 
unknown aspects of international politics, as well as anticipated and unlikely aspects of 
international politics. As a consequence of extending historical attributes to 
contemporary and future aspects of international politics, a theory’s long-term historical 
time perspectives, its explanations, and its claims about international politics derived 
from those long-term historical time perspectives are further reified within a theory. 
 
5.2.5 Problematic issues of reifying and fitting together the past  
 The reification of the long-term historical time perspectives and corresponding 
explanations within a theory is problematic. When included within a theory, the long-
term historical time perspectives essentially become dominating ways of viewing and 
interpreting international politics.283 As a consequence, the trajectory and explanation 
of a theory can become trapped by a theory’s account of history regardless of what occurs 
in the present and the future.284 For instance, the long-term historical time perspectives 
within Morgenthau’s theory suggesting that international political problems (in part) 
stem from human nature is limiting.285 These particular time perspectives prevent a 
reader of his theory from conceiving of a world absent of political problems as long as 
human nature does not fundamentally change from its historical manifestation 
according to Morgenthau’s account. The consequences of this understanding are 
twofold. First, international political actors (past, present, or future) are understood as 
always having international political problems to resolve. Second, the trajectory of 
Morgenthau’s theory and explanation must make sense of and leave spaces open for the 
emergence of new and old problems. This example illustrates how long-term historical 
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time perspectives can limit what particular present(s) and future(s) may fit within a 
theory’s trajectory and explanation.286 What is determined as ‘fitting’ within a theory’s 
trajectory and explanation is based on how international politics of the past has been 
structured and aggregated within a theory’s long-term historical time perspectives.287 The 
effects of long-term historical time perspectives, however, are not limited to delimiting 
what understandings and interpretations fit within a theory’s trajectory.288 
  In the process of limiting what fits within a theory’s trajectory and explanation, 
long-term historical time perspectives are also denoting what does not fit within a 
theory’s trajectory and explanation.289 Examples from Morgenthau’s theory of what does 
not fit within his theory’s trajectory or explanation include the possibilities that 1) 
human nature will cease to be an element of international politics or 2) that 
international politics can return to or move to a point where the nuclear condition is no 
longer a concern. In essence these hypothetical examples illustrate that a theory’s long-
term historical time perspectives predetermine what present and future phenomena do 
not fit within a theory’s trajectory and explanation. These predeterminations, however, 
need not be interpreted necessarily as problematic limitations on a theory’s trajectory 
or explanation, but as instrumental ways of refining the trajectory and explanatory scope 
of a theory.290 As the examples mentioned earlier in the paragraph illustrate, by 
accepting human nature and the nuclear condition as perennial political concerns, 
Morgenthau is delimiting and extending the historical attributes of these theoretical 
claims to their present and future manifestations. Such delimitations enabled 
Morgenthau to tailor the focus of his inquiry and understanding of international 
political around specific theoretical claims without having to explicitly address 
                                                            
286 King and Zeng, “Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference.” This recognition of the delimiting effects of time 
perspectives is not meant to discount the delimiting effects that, for example, existing language or 
concepts may have on a theory’s trajectory and explanation. The point being emphasised is that time 
perspectives, along with other factors, contribute to how a theory’s trajectory and explanation are 
delimited. 
287 Lawson, “The Eternal Divide?,” 204-5; Lustick, "History, Historiography, and Political Science.” 
288 This paragraph, along with the subsequent paragraph, suggest that conscious choices are being made 
by theorists as to what does and does not fit within a theory’s long-term historical time perspectives. This 
may be true in cases when theorists want to highlight that a particular claim is valid at different moments 
of time and in different circumstances. However, conscious choices can have unintended consequences 
and thus suggests that what is interpreted as fitting and not fitting within a theory may be done 
unconsciously as well.  
289 Guzzini, “Ends of International Relations Theory,” 536; King and Zeng, “Pitfalls of Counterfactual 
Inference.” 
290 Elman and Elman, “Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory,” 20.  
109 
 
contemporary or future international political phenomena that are irrelevant to his 
study and understanding of international politics. In other words, long-term historical 
time perspectives help a theory separate out what is relevant for a particular theory of 
international political to account for and interpret, as well as what phenomena should 
be the focus of inquiry by another discipline such as economics, sociology, and law.     
  These predeterminations can become problematic, however, as presents and 
futures become part of the past and are found to not ‘fit’ within the long-term historical 
time perspectives.291 For instance, the rapid speeds that signals can be sent to and from 
individuals anywhere in the world coupled with the increasing automation of traditional 
decision-making processes increasingly affect contemporary struggles for power in the 
world (e.g. currency manipulations by China, the role of artificial intelligence 
programmes in the production of news articles and posts on social media platforms) 
exemplify phenomena that do not quite fit within Morgenthau’s theoretical 
explanations. I interpret these phenomena as not fitting within Morgenthau’s theory 
because his theory’s long-term historical time perspectives suggest that either time lags, 
individual people, or both will always have the potential to affect communications and 
processes in a timely and meaningful manner. However, signals traveling at the speed of 
light that trigger an automated process such as the deployment of a computer virus, 
trades on the currency markets, or the launch of missiles in close proximity to an enemy 
target make any lags in time or potential human interventions irrelevant.292 When such 
non-fitting phenomena arise in international politics, they call into question the validity 
of a theory’s trajectory and a theory’s ability to offer explanations about international 
politics beyond the past.293 Moreover, such phenomena indicate that there are limits to 
a theory’s explanatory power supported by long-term historical time perspectives. These 
limits can highlight three issues: 1) a lack of analysis and elaboration, 2) how the past 
can bind a theory’s explanations to a particular moment or segment of time, and 3) a 
lack of space or flexibility created by a theory’s long-term historical time perspectives. 
Each one is addressed further in the following paragraph. 
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 First, non-fitting phenomena can indicate where a lack of analysis has not been 
done by a theory on particular historical phenomena and where further elaboration 
upon them might be needed in order to explain how such phenomena ‘fit’ within the 
existing long-term historical time perspectives.294 To a limited extent, Morgenthau’s 
discussions in Science: Servant or Master? about the effects of technological 
advancements on individuals in society allude to an awareness of concerns regarding the 
growing automation and increased pace of communication within society. These 
discussions, however, do not detail how these changes fit with long-term historical 
understandings of international politics which suggest considerations of time and 
human intervention are central to understanding international politics. Second, non-
fitting phenomena can indicate that a theory’s explanation is bound to a particular 
historical time and highlight the dangers of classifying claims about the past as 
timeless.295 Morgenthau’s theory is able to avoid the aforementioned issues by 
acknowledging that his theory’s explanation and classification of claims are reflective of 
a particular analysis of international politics during a specific period of time. In essence, 
Morgenthau is aware that his theory’s explanation and claims are bound by and in time 
and specific contexts.296  Finally, the limits can highlight the lack of space or flexibility 
long-term historical time perspectives create within a theory to allow the theory to 
incorporate new international political phenomena. Regarding this final point, whether 
consciously or unconsciously aware of this issue, the introduction of Morgenthau’s 
notion that each present is novel (via his short-term present time perspective) helped 
him to mitigate the potentially limiting effects that his theory’s long-term historical time 
perspectives could have had on his theory.297  
  Before moving on to analyse and discuss short-term historical time perspectives 
and their effects within a theory, a brief summary of the functions and effects long-term 
historical time perspectives have on a theory and its claims is necessary. First and 
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foremost, long-term historical time perspectives provide a macro-level overview of the 
past context of international politics. This overview provides the historical background 
from which subsequent theoretical explanations and claims are drawn. Commonalities 
among international political phenomena, as well as distinctions are made possible via 
long-term historical time perspectives. These commonalities and distinctions help a 
theory identify what aspects of international politics are perennial and ephemeral, as 
well as what time perspectives to use to attribute these aspects to particular theoretical 
claims. The second function long-term historical time perspectives perform is to 
structure and aggregate the past. By structuring and aggregating the past in particular 
ways, specific aspects of international politics are distilled from the past. What remains 
are the perennial (and to a lesser extent ephemeral) aspects which end up framing how 
a theory understands and interprets international politics of the past. The resulting 
theoretical claims about the past are then extended to international politics in 
contemporary and future contexts, thus forming the basis upon which a trajectory can 
be constructed. This extension of historical, perennial claims into the present and the 
future delimits which international political phenomena are interpreted as fitting or not 
fitting within a theory’s explanation of international politics, while simultaneously re-
substantiating theoretical claims derived from a theory’s long-term historical time 
perspectives.  
 
5.3 Short-term historical time perspectives  
5.3.1 Detailing the past   
  Like long-term historical time perspectives, short-term historical time perspectives 
also play several distinct roles in delimiting a theory’s claims and explanations regarding 
international politics. One primary function of short-term historical time perspectives is 
to enable a theory to address ephemeral aspects of international politics in more depth 
at sub-macro levels than would otherwise be possible through long-term historical time 
perspectives alone. Short-term historical time perspectives are essential for theories to 
draw attention to and understand historical ephemeral issues and influences in 
international politics. Although some ephemeral aspects of international politics in the 
past can be identified and understood in part via a theory’s long-term historical time 
perspectives, knowledge about these ephemeral aspects remains incomplete without 
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considering short-term historical time perspectives. This limitation on knowledge occurs 
because the less prevalent factors and daily minutiae constituting ephemeral issues and 
influences are either glossed over or remain hidden within the long-term historical time 
perspective(s). The less prevalent factors and daily minutiae can include, but are not 
limited to, political motivations and pressures, the everyday, emotions, and domestic 
and international economic environments.298 In other words, short-term historical time 
perspectives within a theory can help retain, recover, or make visible details about the 
past not otherwise possible via long-term historical time perspectives.299   
 
  Such minute details, while interesting in their own right, are included in a theory 
via short-term historical time perspectives for a greater purpose; namely to add depth 
and meaning to theoretical claims. In the process of helping to identify, understand, and 
explain details regarding different aspects of international politics via short-term 
historical time perspectives, these details are attached to or associated with claims. For 
example, while long-term historical time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory help 
to highlight the perennial desires among international political actors to maintain a 
balance of power and a status quo, his theory’s short-term historical time perspectives 
call attention to the fact that the balance of power and the status quo are not perennial 
themselves but are constantly in flux.300 This attribute of balance of power and status 
quo, by default, gets attached to theoretical claims regarding both notions. 
Consequently, as this example illustrates, because of the additional dimensions (i.e. 
details) short-term historical time perspectives attribute to claims, the meanings and 
understandings of claims move beyond one-sided, long-term historical meanings and 
understandings toward those that are more profound.301 In other words, short-term 
historical time perspectives serve as a means of associating and attaching ephemeral and 
perennial aspects to theoretical claims which are not otherwise obtainable from or 
possible via long-term historical time perspectives. Consequently, if a theory were to not 
articulate any short-term historical time perspectives, then a theory might not be able to 
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support and make certain general and nuanced claims about the past as a whole or in 
relation to a specific historical period.     
 
  To emphasise the aforementioned points and illustrate in greater detail as to how 
and why short-term historical time perspectives are necessary for capturing and retaining 
empirical details which long-term historical time perspectives cannot easily provide, 
Morgenthau’s recounting of the appeasement of Germany during the second half of the 
1930s serves as an example.302 Through a short-term historical time perspective, 
Morgenthau’s theory is able to add details to claims that alter how they can be 
understood beyond what a long-term historical time perspective alone would suggest. 
For example, viewed through the lens of a long-term historical time perspective the 
appeasement of Germany was merely an ephemeral occurrence that led to World War 
II. Although an ephemeral occurrence, the short-term historical time perspectives within 
Morgenthau’s theory enabled his theory to capture and articulate insights about the 
appeasement process itself in more general terms within the context of countering or 
furthering intermittent imperial ambitions. These insights included an understanding 
of the appeasement process as being both rational and as a means of maintaining the 
status quo in Europe as well as disrupting the status quo, as was the case with Germany 
in the 1930s.303 Furthermore, the appeasement process was also understood as a series 
of successive steps which changed, even if slightly, the status quo of international 
politics. Understood in this way, the resulting appeasement measures are interpreted by 
Morgenthau as finite, short-lived, and part of an evolution toward a particular status 
quo. Appeasement for Morgenthau, then becomes a meaningful, short-term execution 
of or surrendering of power within the context of longer term imperial ambitions. This 
example from Morgenthau’s theory illustrates the significance of the details captured by 
short-term historical time perspectives and their effects on how claims made within a 
theory are understood. 
  What makes the capturing of empirical details possible is that a theory’s short-
term historical time perspectives are able to focus on the finer aspects of international 
politics by limiting the scope of a theory’s analysis. These finer aspects are important to 
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understanding the evolution of ephemeral phenomena. Referring again to Morgenthau’s 
account of the appeasement of Germany, his mentioning of the three month time period 
between Germany’s initial imperialistic ambitions in 1935 to the signing of the Anglo-
German Naval Agreement is not insignificant.304 The short-term historical account 
details and highlights the rapid escalation of events which ultimately led to the outbreak 
of World War II. Other detailed knowledge about ephemeral phenomena in 
international politics that can be derived from short-term historical time perspectives 
articulated within a theory may include the following: how and why particular 
ephemeral aspects begin, exist, and end (e.g. the appeasement process of Germany 
before WWII); relations between perennial and ephemeral aspects of international 
politics (e.g. the perennial struggle for power in Europe and Germany’s ephemeral ability 
to exercise power across Europe); the residual effects that short-lived historical 
ephemeral aspects have on the international political sphere (e.g. World War II’s effects 
on the distribution of power in the world). As a result, a theory’s short-term historical 
time perspectives make it possible (though not guaranteed) for a theory to retain and 
articulate greater detail about ephemeral (as well as perennial) issues and influences 
occurring over a limited period of time in the past. 
  Among the various details obtainable or articulated within a theory’s short-term 
historical time perspectives, three are unique to this type of time perspectives and 
warrant further discussion. The three groupings of details include: 1) details regarding 
the presences and statuses of both perennial and ephemeral aspects over a specific 
period of time in the past, 2) details concerning the relations among perennial and 
ephemeral aspects on sub-macro levels within international politics, and 3) details about 
a theory’s priorities and the congruency of its explanation. A section corresponding to 
each grouping of details follows this paragraph to elaborate further the distinct 
contributions a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives make to adding historical 
substance to claims.305 
 
                                                            
304 Ibid., 61. 
305 As will be made clear after reading through each section, the historical substance added to a theory’s 
claims by a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives differs from the historical substance typically 
added by a theory’s long-term historical time perspectives.  
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5.3.2 Presence and status 
  The first group of details regards the presences and statuses of both perennial 
and ephemeral aspects within international politics over a specific, yet limited period of 
time in the past. Addressing the perennial aspects first, via a theory’s short-term 
historical time perspectives, it is possible to determine how perennial aspects, such as 
the importance of geography in international politics, manifest themselves directly 
through ephemeral influences and issues evident in international politics during 
specified periods of time like during the negotiations regarding the partitioning of 
Palestine or Japan’s invasion of the Manchurian Peninsula in 1931.306 The resulting 
determinations or expressions are necessary for understanding and interpreting how 
theoretical claims are manifested in different contexts. In regards to the status of 
perennial aspects, either active or dormant, a theory’s short-term historical time 
perspectives can also offer insights. For example, the status of national morale in times 
of peace or war can be decisive in determining the success and outcome of either. 
Considering the instability of national morale, it would be difficult to determine the role 
it played in international politics during any particular period by examining it via a long-
term historical time perspective alone. However, by including short-term historical time 
perspectives, the ephemeral nature of perennial aspects of national power such as 
national morale can be understood. 307 
  In regards to assessing the presences and statuses of particular ephemeral aspects 
of international politics, a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives are equally 
valuable. For example, a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives can enable a 
theory to retain details about who the key actors were and what were the unique 
contexts that led to a particular ephemeral phenomena of international politics. This 
observation is supported by various accounts within Morgenthau’s theory of the 
different actors involved in and circumstances contributing to or complicating the 
maintenance of the balance of power in Europe during distinct periods in the past. 
Retention of such details by a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives is vital to 
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not only understanding the international politics that was interpreted to have existed 
during a specific period of time in the past, but to also highlight one or both of the 
following: 1) the contingency and uniqueness of each historical past or 2) the 
(ir)relevance of actors and circumstances in relation to unresolved perennial issues of 
international politics. In the case of the short-term historical time perspectives within 
Morgenthau’s theory, they retain details that highlight both aspects of the past to 
emphasise that each historical, international political issue was distinct and should be 
understood as not repeatable. Morgenthau, however, also recognises there are 
similarities among historical issues and provides multiple short-term historical 
examples within his theory to show underlying commonalities among them. From these 
two understandings, Morgenthau’s notion of international political problems is refined. 
His notion is that each international political problem in the past was a unique 
manifestation of an ongoing perennial problem; similarities between problems can be 
explained because they derive from similar ongoing perennial problems. Thinking 
beyond Morgenthau’s theory, this example illustrates that in the process of articulating 
the presences and statuses of ephemeral aspects of international politics, short-term 
historical time perspectives within a theory can also convey understandings about the 
presences and statuses of perennial aspects of international politics.   
 
  In addition to perennial problems and perennial aspects of international politics 
serving as bases for similarities between ephemeral problems and ephemeral aspects of 
international politics, similarities between ephemeral problems and ephemeral aspects 
of international politics can also be attributed to the effects of short-lived ephemeral 
aspects. These effects can best be retained within a theory’s short-term historical time 
perspectives. Examples of these effects on international politics mentioned within 
Morgenthau’s theory include the failure of the League of Nations and the advent of 
nuclear weapons. With regards to such effects, of particular interest raised by short-term 
historical time perspectives concerns the duration of these effects on historical and later 
occurring international political phenomena. The durations of these effects can be either 
immediate or residual.308  In the first case from Morgenthau’s theory, despite the 
relatively short tenure of the League of Nations and its numerous failures leading up to 
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the outbreak of WWII, the plagued League was immediately followed by the creation of 
the United Nations as a re-imagination and reconstitution of a ‘new’ League of 
Nations.309 In reference to the second case, the residual effects of the U.S.’s development 
and use of nuclear bombs shifted dramatically over time. What began as thinking of 
nuclear weapons as just another advancement of weapons in terms of their magnitude, 
eventually ended up with nuclear weapons fundamentally altering how international 
actors and people in general thought about and interacted within international politics. 
As illustrated in the aforementioned examples, awareness of these different durations 
are useful in establishing and tracing linkages between ephemeral aspects (however 
brief, if at all) and their effects on later occurring international political phenomena. 
Consequently, short-term historical time perspectives can be useful in providing 
explanations about the origins or factors contributing to international politics during 
defined periods in the past and beyond. Furthermore, examples from Morgenthau’s 
theory also suggest that these historical time perspectives can provide insights into how 
effects from ephemeral international political phenomena alter the manifestation of 
perennial international political problems.   
 
5.3.3 Connecting the perennial and ephemeral 
  The altering effects that ephemeral (and perennial) aspects have had on the 
argument of the existence of perennial aspects within international politics in the past 
within a relatively short-term period point to the second type of detail short-term 
historical time perspectives help to expose within a theory. These relations are worth 
examining because they detail at the sub-macro level310 how a theory interweaves and 
(dis)connects perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics to form and 
support coherent and consistent theoretical arguments -- although coherency and 
consistency are not always guaranteed.311 At the sub-macro level, short-term historical 
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time perspectives can expose details which include what, when, how, and why various 
aspects of international politics connect, overlap, and work in concert at a sub-macro 
level in international politics. For example, via short-term historical time perspectives, 
Morgenthau’s theory is able to articulate in detail how multiple historical perennial and 
ephemeral phenomena and surrounding circumstances interact with one another to 
culminate in the inevitable demise of the League of Nations.312 This example from 
Morgenthau’s theory suggests that a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives can 
include details regarding the interactions between historical phenomena which provide 
insights into a theory’s explanations of how international politics unfolds. Furthermore, 
the example suggests that if such a theory had no articulations of short-term historical 
time perspectives, then awareness and understanding of the sites and means of 
connection and interaction between the perennial and ephemeral aspects of 
international politics would be less comprehensive. In essence, short-term historical 
time perspectives within a theory provide a way for a theory to illustrate how it explains 
and links or relates what is perennial about international politics to what is ephemeral.313   
  Implicit within this understanding of the relations among perennial and 
ephemeral aspects of international politics is a sense that both types of aspects do not 
appear out of thin air nor do they exist completely independent of one another. In other 
words, perennial and ephemeral aspects in international politics are interconnected and 
relate to one another. Their contingent interactions and relations help constitute 
international politics in the past, as well as in the present and the future. Furthermore, 
phenomena during these historical periods are often arranged within a theory in 
sequential order. This sequential ordering is done to help readers follow the logic of a 
theory’s explanation in regards to a given historical period in international politics.314 
However, as a consequence of this sequential ordering, periods of international politics 
in the past are represented as always progressing in a linear manner toward particular 
ends; ends that are either explicitly in the past or perhaps ends in the present or the 
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future. For example, discussions from Morgenthau’s theory regarding efforts to establish 
a balance of power (via the Holy Alliance and later the Concert of Europe) that would 
maintain a status quo in Europe during the post-Napoleonic Wars period illustrate how 
international politics of the past is characterised as progressing toward particular 
historical ends.315 While the intentions behind and arrangement of a theory’s linear 
development of international politics articulated within these limited, short-term 
historical contexts may be contested, they do provide insights into how a theory 
understands the linear evolution of international politics in the past. However, short-
term historical time perspectives within a theory also articulate other forms of 
development (e.g. vertical and horizontal development) which provide quite different 
insights into how a theory understands the historical evolution of international politics. 
 
5.3.4 Articulating other forms of development 
  In order to understand these other forms of development within international 
politics that a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives can potentially articulate, 
it is necessary to understand development as not only leading to particular ends. 
Development can also be understood as a spread of perennial and ephemeral changes 
and effects throughout international politics (e.g. the perpetuation or implementation 
of structures and practices). The spread of changes and effects is the result of 
interactions among perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics. This idea 
of development as a spread within international politics, however, is not always obvious 
via a theory’s long-term historical time perspectives which can fail to capture or provide 
details of certain changes and effects within international politics. Conversely, a theory’s 
short-term historical time perspectives can help to capture and highlight the various ways 
(e.g. rates, incremental) in which this spreading occurs at the sub-macro levels of 
international politics than would otherwise be possible via a theory’s long-term historical 
time perspectives.316 Illustrating this contrast between the two types of historical time 
perspectives is Morgenthau’s discussion regarding historical accounts of European 
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thoughts on the protection of human life in war in the past. The discussion begins with 
a general account derived from a long-term historical time perspective that is slim on 
detail and ends with a detailed account (via short-term historical time perspectives) 
regarding the spread of the codification of the protection of human life in war.317 
Consequently, short-term historical time perspectives are useful in helping a theory to 
portray a clear, detailed picture of how international politics has supposedly progressed 
to particular points (which are not necessarily ends) in history over well-defined, limited 
timeframes.  
 Development as a spread of changes and effects occurring within international 
politics can be classified into one of two categories, vertical (or intensive) development 
and horizontal (or extensive) development.318 To elaborate, vertical development occurs 
when new innovations in organising political interests or means of exercising power are 
introduced to the international political sphere. Looking to Morgenthau’s theory, an 
example of the former is the emergence of states as dominant international actors over 
monarchs and empires; an example of the latter is the inclusion of nuclear weapons 
within a state’s military arsenal. With regards to horizontal development, this type of 
development characterises international politics when the systems, processes, means, 
values, and norms that appear to be working are sustained, replicated, and spread 
throughout the international political sphere. An illustrative account of this type of 
development regards the application of law within international politics. The 
overenthusiastic faith in law on the domestic level, coupled with Wilson’s Idealism, led 
to the belief that replicating similar legal structures and processes at the international 
level would produce similar results.319 Both vertical and horizontal ideas of development 
can be useful when a theory is trying to characterise and explain the historical status of 
international politics during a particular period of time and the subsequent outcomes. 
Furthermore, these types of development are helpful in understanding how change takes 
place within a theory’s trajectory derived from its long-term historical time perspectives. 
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  In addition to detailing within a theory the potential vertical and horizontal 
development of international politics, a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives 
can also indicate that the development of perennial and ephemeral changes and effects 
within international politics can look quite different at sub-macro levels of the past 
versus development at a macro-level via a theory’s long-term historical time perspectives. 
Helping to illustrate manifestations of these differences within a theory are various 
discussions by Morgenthau regarding balance of power and status quo. For example, in 
these discussions, his theory’s short-term historical time perspectives help to indicate 
that developments within international politics in the years leading up to the outbreak 
of WWII looks quite different from the perspective of a status quo maintainer such as 
France vs. from the perspective of a status quo disruptor such as Germany.320 In another 
example, short-term historical time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory regarding 
the question of Germany’s development toward appeasement or war during the 1918-
1939 interwar period suggest that a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives can 
help to highlight that development within international politics over a specific period 
can move in potentially different historical directions not always accounted for by a 
theory’s long-term historical time perspectives.321  
  The different views of development provided by a theory’s short-term historical 
time perspectives can also offer insights regarding the statuses of development during 
specific historical periods and its overall nature. For instance, short-term historical time 
perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory regarding the Concert of Europe offer insights 
into how development within international politics during a specific period can become 
fixed by a particular system of power that locks international political actors into 
behaving in certain ways. Conversely, collective consideration of short-term historical 
time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory regarding the Holy Alliance and the 
Concert of Europe suggests that the formation of alliances within international politics 
is in a constant state of flux. Each of the aforementioned points and corresponding 
examples shared thus far in this section help to emphasise that short-term historical time 
perspectives are useful within a theory for providing different perspectives of 
development that might otherwise be overlooked or hidden within a theory’s long-term 
                                                            
320 Ibid., 374-76.  
321 Ibid., 60-3. 
122 
 
historical time perspectives. Of equal importance is that such perspectives are necessary 
to include within a theory because they provide insights into how a theory makes sense 
of the perennial and ephemeral changes and effects shaping the transformations and 
developments (i.e. unfolding) in international politics over time.  
 
5.3.5 Prioritising and congruency  
  When accounting for various details about historical developments, the presence 
and status of perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics, and the 
immediate and ongoing effects of these various aspects, a picture of what a given theory 
prioritises emerges. The highlighting of these priorities is another significant function 
that short-term historical time perspectives can perform within a theory. Essentially, the 
details acknowledged and highlighted in the short-term historical time perspectives 
illustrate which elements of international politics on a sub-macro level a theory values 
most or deems relevant to explanations given the phenomena being examined.322 The 
opposite of the previous statement is also valid and provides insights as to what a theory 
considers to be insignificant or less important. Together, these priorities are significant 
because they serve as dominant narratives within a theory that shape the context within 
which old and new international political phenomena are examined and interpreted. To 
illustrate how aspects of international politics are prioritised by short-term historical 
time perspectives within a theory and the effects those prioritisations have, examples 
from Morgenthau’s theory are detailed in the two following paragraphs. 
  Morgenthau’s references to states and empires are highlighted in his theory’s 
short-term historical time perspectives depending upon which manifestation of an 
international political actor dominated the international political sphere at the specific 
period of time in the past he is offering an explanation of. The entities themselves are 
only significant to Morgenthau within the short-term historical context provided, not 
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necessarily over the long-term. The conclusion drawn from this example is that aspects 
of international politics identified as significant within a theory’s short-term historical 
time perspectives need not necessarily correspond directly to those aspects identified as 
significant via long-term historical time perspectives, although at times they may. This 
incongruence can occur as a result of some aspects being only noticeable at the sub-
macro levels such as emotions, the everyday, or the influence of particular less powerful 
states, but not observable at the macro levels. Conversely, where there is consistency 
between those aspects of international politics emphasised or prioritised in both the 
long-term and short-term historical time perspectives, a theory highlights not only the 
timeless significance of particular perennial aspects of international politics, but also the 
coherence of explanations that a theory provides to scholars. 
  In regards to the latter point about explanatory coherency within a theory ‘across 
time’, a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives can support coherency in two 
different ways. First, short-term historical time perspectives are a means of 
demonstrating the applicability of a theory’s analytical tools, methods, and arguments 
in explaining various situations in international politics at any point in the past. 
Consequently, a theory’s explanatory power appears robust and time-tested over 
multiple historical periods which span the scope of a whole past.323 Examples of this 
usage are demonstrated throughout Morgenthau’s work via the historical case studies 
analysed using his theory (e.g. his analyses of attempts at maintaining peace via the Holy 
Alliance and the League of Nations).324 Second, short-term historical time perspectives 
are selectively chosen to establish a theory’s relevance regarding a particular past of 
international political circumstances and phenomena that are similar to contemporary 
circumstances and phenomena found in the international political sphere. As a result, 
the inclusion and usage of short-term historical time perspectives in this way extends a 
theory’s explanatory power regarding the past into the present.325 This particular usage 
is evident and effective in establishing coherency between the short-term historical time 
perspectives relating to the immediate past leading up to the present and the present 
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itself.326 For example, to understand the seriousness of the political tensions between 
the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the majority of the latter half of the 20th 
Century, Morgenthau referenced the significance that the nuclear context created 
during the same period.327 In supporting and maintaining explanatory congruency in 
these two ways, short-term historical time perspectives play a crucial role in 
(re)validating theoretical claims about perennial and ephemeral aspects of international 
politics derived from both short-term and long-term historical time perspectives.328   
 
5.4 Combined effects 
  Thus far in this chapter, long-term and short-term historical time perspectives 
have been addressed in isolation. This separation is artificial and was done for analytical 
reasons to elaborate the significance of each historical time perspective in relation to the 
understanding and interpretations of a theory’s claims about international politics. In 
practice, however, these historical time perspectives (where they both exist) appear in 
international political theories simultaneously and constitute each theory’s panoptic 
view of the past in its entirety. At times they are complementary of one another; at other 
times they are contrasting, although tension does not always exist between them.329 
Although the co-existence among the two historical time perspectives within a theory 
and their effects on theoretical claims have been alluded to in the earlier sections of this 
chapter, this final section is intended to make their co-existence and cumulative effects 
on theoretical claims more evident. This will be done by examining these historical time 
perspectives and their effects in relation to Morgenthau’s claims about the future; a 
similar examination will be done with respect to present and future time perspectives in 
the final sections of chapters 6 and 7. By calling attention to the co-existence of a theory’s 
long-term and short-term historical time perspectives and their cumulative effects on 
                                                            
326 This usage can be problematic because the coherency established by a theory’s short-term historical 
time perspectives immediately preceding the present can create a small-scale, context-specific, 
predetermined trajectory of time independent of other longer trajectories of time found within a theory. 
327 Hans J. Morgenthau, “Détente: The Balance Sheet,” New York Times, March 28, 1974, https://www.ny 
times.com/1974/03/28/archives/detente-the-balance-sheet.html (accessed April 10, 2018). 
328 Lawson, “The Eternal Divide?,” 205 and 207; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, “Introduction: 
Negotiating International History and Politics,” in Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, 
and the Study of International Relations, eds. Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2001), 7. 
329 Lawson, “The Eternal Divide?,” 218. 
125 
 
theoretical claims, this section helps emphasise the importance of scholars to remain 
attentive to a theory’s long-term and short-term historical time perspectives and their 
effects when studying international politics and making claims.   
  Within Morgenthau’s theory, he explicitly states that the future of international 
politics cannot be predicted.330 At best, he states that all that a theory can do is anticipate 
the likelihood that international politics will unfold in particular ways, however, without 
guaranteed outcomes. This claim is derived, in part, from examining international 
politics from two separate historical time perspectives, long-term and short-term.331 
Based on his theory’s long-term historical time perspectives regarding the patterns, 
trends, and cycles of international politics, Morgenthau understands that particular 
historical perennial aspects of international politics, such as the influence of human 
nature on international politics or the constantly shifting nature of the balance of power 
among international actors, will inevitably continue to manifest themselves in the 
future. These inevitable, ongoing manifestations will occur regardless of the contingent 
circumstances that may arise in the future, just as the contingent circumstances of the 
past did not hinder their previous manifestations.332 Morgenthau is therefore claiming 
within his theory that certain aspects of future politics are known (e.g. interests affect 
politics), or at least more likely to be known (e.g. human nature), based on perennial 
aspects of international politics accounted for in his long-term historical time 
perspectives. These aspects which are more likely to manifest are significant because 
they are used to pre-emptively populate and signpost areas of international politics in 
the future. As a consequence, regardless of how the future will unfold concretely, this 
pre-population and signposting of the future provides some structure as to how to think 
about the future which is embedded into his theory. Examining the past through his 
theory’s long-term historical time perspectives from the aforementioned angle alone 
would suggest that Morgenthau is claiming that the perennial aspects of international 
politics in the future can be predicted or at least be accurately signposted. However, the 
inclusion of short-term historical time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory modify 
and call into question the potential for prediction or signposting derived solely from 
                                                            
330 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 18. 
331 As will be detailed in Chapter 6 and 7, short-term present, short-term future, and long-term future time 
perspectives can also shape a claim. 
332 Morgenthau, "National Interest of the United States?," 4.  
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long-term historical perspectives.333 Thus, short-term historical time perspectives help to 
make readers aware of changes in international politics through empirical foci on the 
minute details of international politics.   
  The short-term historical time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory modify 
and call into question what can be claimed to be known about the future by detailing 
that the timing, form, and activity or dormancy of historical perennial aspects of 
international politics manifest in different ways within a particular, limited period.334 
These different ways can be attributed to the short-term historical contingent 
circumstances which are distinct from other historical (e.g. long-term) and 
contemporary and future contingent circumstances. As Morgenthau’s theory illustrates, 
the details articulated via a theory’s short-term historical time perspectives are essential 
to understanding where in the evolutionary process perennial and ephemeral aspects 
were in the contexts of the past as a whole (i.e. long-term) and within a specific historical 
period (i.e. short-term). Furthermore, such time perspectives are necessary to 
understanding where aspects are or are not possibly and likely headed in the near and 
distant future.335 Because international politics is not static nor are future manifestations 
of international politics independent of the past, knowing the aforementioned details 
derived from short-term historical time perspectives can help reassess, reposition, or alter 
those future signposts originally derived from long-term historical time perspectives. 
Consequently, these modifications end up yielding different potential manifestations of 
the future which are more reflective or fitting with recent historical developments than 
long-term historical time perspectives could yield on their own. In other words, the 
insights Morgenthau gains through short-term historical time perspectives enables him 
to clarify (i.e. modify) the broader claims about the future made within his theory.  
  This clarification, however, does not necessarily guarantee his theory can foretell 
the future of international politics. For example, how the influence of human nature on 
international politics in the future will manifest itself is still a mystery to Morgenthau 
even with the inclusion of short-term historical time perspectives. The future remains a 
mystery because his theory’s short-term historical time perspectives provide numerous 
                                                            
333 Morgenthau, “Problem of Social Planning.” 
334 Morgenthau, “Another “Great Debate”,” 985. 
335 Essentially, history limits what outcomes are possible. 
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and unique examples of when and how human nature’s influence has or could have 
manifested itself differently in international politics in the past. These examples serve as 
templates or representations of what scholars might and might not expect to see 
reflected in other manifestations of human nature’s influence in the future, although the 
actual manifestations can never be guaranteed. Furthermore, accepting that the 
manifestations of human nature’s influence are indeterminate keeps Morgenthau’s 
notions about the future open to various possibilities.336 Therefore, at best, the short-
term historical time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory can only help anticipate 
(not predict) the probability and possibility of future manifestations of international 
politics in similar, future circumstances. In claiming that his theory can anticipate rather 
than predict, Morgenthau is also not completely ruling out the possibility of any future 
phenomena from occurring, including phenomena that have only a slight chance of 
occurring within an anticipated future.    
  Subsequently, the combination of the two historical time perspectives alters how 
he interprets international politics unfolding in the future. Rather than interpreting the 
unfolding of international politics as moving in a particular direction or manner that is 
predictable, the two types of historical time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory 
suggest that the future of international politics is open, with the potential for both the 
known and unknown aspects to unfold in any number of various directions and ways. 
By considering the past in its entirety via the two types of historical time perspectives, 
Morgenthau recognises that perennial aspects in international politics throughout the 
past have not existed in a vacuum nor have their expressions and influences been 
immune to influences from other perennial and ephemeral aspects of international 
politics and beyond.337 Likewise, the expressions and influences of perennial and 
ephemeral aspects of the past are not bound to a particular past or the past as a segment 
of time separate and disconnected from other segments of time such as the present and 
the future.338 Essentially, there is an interaction among perennial and ephemeral aspects 
                                                            
336 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 18. 
337Ibid., 7-9 and 12. 
338 Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, 144-53. The residual effects of the past extend to the future as 
the advent of nuclear weapons during WWII aptly illustrates. 
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of international politics across time which yield distinct outcomes that remain beyond 
prediction because of dynamic, contingent circumstances in international politics.339  
  These interactions may also not be known in advance for any number of reasons. 
Explanations for this might be because the interaction process may be slow and drawn 
out,340 occur on a micro-level that may only come to light after the future has come to 
past,341 or involve yet-to-emerge ephemeral aspects.342 Consequently, Morgenthau 
acknowledges within his theory that making sense of international politics in the future 
can only partially be done prior to its manifestations. While insights from his two types 
of historical time perspectives can offer suggestions of how the manifestations might 
occur as well as their potential for occurring, these historical time perspectives offer no 
guarantees. In other words, only after international politics has manifested in the future 
and time has passed since its manifestation can known and unknown future aspects 
(derived from historical time perspectives) be fitted together and (re)interpreted using 
updated understandings of international politics.343 In both instances, prior to the future 
occurring and after the future has come to pass, insights from his theory’s long-term and 
short-term historical time perspectives are used to make sense of the future of 
international politics. However, in a theory such as Morgenthau’s which aims to 
understand and offer explanations about international politics as it was and is, only in 
the latter case (i.e. a future that has passed) is there value for Morgenthau. For 
Morgenthau, the post analysis has value because it augments our understanding of 
international politics while, in contrast, the pre-analysis will always fall short. In other 
words, predicting and predictions do little to contribute to theoretical understandings 
and explanations of international politics in the future. Consequently, they are thus 
largely absent from Morgenthau’s theory and considered insignificant given the aims of 
                                                            
339 How aspects fit together are not arbitrary but influenced by the structuring and aggregation done via 
long-term historical time perspectives and by the interactions among aspects captured and detailed in the 
short-term historical time perspectives. 
340 The decline of Great Britain as a balancer of power in Europe is one example mentioned in 
Morgenthau’s theory. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 328, 443-44. 
341 This point is illustrated within Morgenthau’s theory via the analysis and discussion regarding the 
appeasement measures that led to the fulfilment of Hitler’s ambitions for Germany. 
342 Here Morgenthau’s discussion of potential common interests that might lead to the need and creation 
of a world state serves as an example of this point. 
343 MacKay and LaRoche, “Conduct of History,” 213. 
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his theory which is to understand and offer explanations about international politics as 
it was and is.344  
  While the primary objective of the chapter was to highlight the distinctions 
between long-term and short-term historical time perspectives, as well as their effects on 
theoretical claims, a secondary objective was to begin to illustrate that the effects of 
historical time perspectives are not self-contained, but work in relation to the effects of 
one another, as well as in relation to time perspectives of the present and the future. The 
relations between the historical time perspectives found within Morgenthau’s theory are 
of particular interest because of what they demonstrate. First, the historical time 
perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory demonstrate how one can think about one time 
perspective within the context of another time perspective; for example how to think 
about short-term historical time perspectives within the context of long-term historical 
time perspectives. Second, they demonstrate the co-existence of two distinct types of 
time perspectives within one segment of time (i.e. the past). Within this co-existence 
one is not necessarily more dominant over the other, but together constitute a whole 
historical context which adds to and delimits the understandings and meanings that can 
be attributed to each theoretical claim by individual historical time perspectives.345 In 
other words, to ignore or be unaware of the multiple historical time perspectives 
associated with particular theoretical claims is to not fully comprehend the 
understandings and meanings attached to theoretical claims.346 Consequently, such 
circumstances contribute to an incomplete understanding of the explanations about 
international politics which Morgenthau’s theory tries to limit.  
 
5.5 Chapter summary 
  In this chapter, an effort has been made to unpack and develop understandings 
regarding the functions and effects of historical time perspectives within a theory which 
have been largely assumed or taken for granted, and only infrequently addressed in a 
                                                            
344 Morgenthau’s prediction that China will one day become a great power is a rare instance where he 
offers a specific prediction. For examples see Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Roots of America’s China Policy,” 
The China Quarterly 10 (April 1962): 45-50; Morgenthau, “World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century,” 
160; Morgenthau, “Realism in International Politics,” 8). 
345 Abbott, “Conceptions of Time and Events,” 144. 
346 Ibid., 146-47. 
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substantive way in the IR literature.347 This effort was made to substantiate and falsify 
assumptions, as well as illustrate how historical time perspectives substantively shape 
international political theories. To unpack and enrich contemporary understandings of 
how historical time perspectives shape the meaning and contextualisation of theoretical 
claims, long-term and short-term historical time perspectives were analysed, individually 
and cumulatively, in relation to theoretical claims across the three sections of this 
chapter. The first section began with an overview of the functions long-term historical 
time perspectives play in a theory and their subsequent effects on theoretical claims. The 
functions and effects covered included the following: providing a macro-level overview 
of the past; indication of historical patterns, trends, and cycles which extended over 
multiple periodisations; the structuring and aggregation of the past; how 
understandings and explanations of the past get extended and reified in the future; and 
the delimiting effects a theory’s trajectory (derived from long-term historical time 
perspectives) has on theoretical explanations and possible explanations.348 The second 
part of the chapter addressed the functions and effects related to short-term historical 
time perspectives. A summary of these functions and effects include the following: the 
drawing out, capturing, and retaining of details which add nuanced and deeper 
understanding and meaning of the perennial and ephemeral aspects of theoretical 
claims; what claims and aspects get prioritised within a theory’s explanation; how 
perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics manifested themselves; the 
interaction and fitting together of various theoretical claims and their related aspects at 
a sub-macro level; the applicability and congruency of a theory’s explanation across 
time. The final section in the chapter highlighted the cumulative effects that the two 
types of historical time perspectives can have on theoretical claims regarding the future.  
  As a consequence of my analyses conducted in the aforementioned sections, this 
chapter has illustrated that multiple historical time perspectives are embedded within a 
theory. Using illustrative examples drawn from Morgenthau’s theory, my analysis 
suggests that the various historical time perspectives within a theory are not arbitrary, 
but are included for particular reasons. Beyond helping to cope with complexity of the 
past in its entirety, my analysis indicates that long-term and short-term historical time 
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perspectives within a theory add meaning and contextualisation to theoretical claims. 
Furthermore, my analysis indicates that the meanings and contextualisations added to 
a theoretical claim are dependent upon how each claim is understood and interpreted 
within each historical time perspective. This insight supports one of the central 
arguments made throughout this study, namely that time perspectives shape theoretical 
claims. Although this chapter only dealt with historical time perspectives, my analysis 
found that the meanings and contextualisations added to theoretical claims by these 
time perspectives were not limited to those of the past. Long-term and short-term 
historical time perspectives can also add meanings and contextualisations to theoretical 
claims in regards to the present and the future. Finally, by unpacking and developing 
more substantive understandings of how the functions and effects of long-term and 
short-term historical time perspectives within a theory shape theoretical claims, this 
chapter offers new insights into how and why (mis)readings and (mis)understandings 
of theoretical claims may emerge within the IR literature. The insights and analyses of 
this chapter also suggest that readers of IR theory should maintain an awareness and 
develop a deeper understanding of a theory’s historical time perspectives in relation to 
understanding and interpreting theoretical claims. Doing so helps reduce the likelihood 




Chapter 6: Short-term Present Time Perspectives  
  Having delved deeply into the nuances of long-term and short-term time 
perspectives of the past in the previous chapter, the attention within this chapter shifts 
now toward the nuances of short-term time perspectives of the present. Consequently, 
the aim of this chapter will be to analyse the functions and effects of a theory’s short-
term present time perspectives. The following analysis will be conducted in a similar 
manner as the one found in the previous chapter. The analysis will begin by addressing 
different functions and effects of short-term present time perspectives that may be found 
within a theory, their relations to each other, and their relations to theoretical claims as 
they can appear within a theory. Guiding my analysis of present time perspectives will be 
a series of questions similar to those which guided my analysis of historical time 
perspectives.349 To maintain consistency, Morgenthau’s theory will once again serve as a 
theoretical example from which examples will be drawn of short-term present time 
perspectives’ manifestations, functions, and effects. From this analysis, distinctions 
among different short-term present time perspectives will be made clear. Furthermore, 
as a consequence of highlighting these distinctions, the differences between short-term 
present time perspectives and historical time perspectives will also be made apparent. By 
the end of the chapter, I will suggest an understanding of how theoretical claims acquire 
unique meaning and contextualisation in the past, present, and future from short-term 
present time perspectives.  
  The chapter is comprised of four sections. The first section begins with a 
discussion regarding the ubiquitous presence of short-term present time perspectives 
across various theories of international politics. The pervasiveness of this type of time 
perspective is unmatched by any other type of time perspective considered in this thesis. 
This pervasiveness matters because it suggests that short-term present time perspectives 
can be used as places to initiate studies of time perspectives in a theory. The second 
section then continues by addressing five primary functions that short-term present time 
perspectives perform within a theory and the effects that these time perspectives have 
                                                            
349 These questions include: What distinguishing features do short-term present time perspectives possess 
in relation to historical and future time perspectives found within the same theory? What purposes do 
short-term present time perspectives serve within a theory? How does the presence or absence of a 
particular short-term present time perspectives affect how theoretical claims can potentially be understood 
and interpreted by readers of a particular theory? How do short-term present time perspectives help 
readers make better sense of international politics? 
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on theoretical claims. These functions include 1) articulating the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of international politics, 2) problematising international politics in the 
present, as well as in the past and the future, 3) characterising the present, 4) building 
relations between a theory’s present and its past and future, and 5) situating a theory 
and its claims internally and externally in time.350 As will be addressed in detail later in 
this section, understanding how these functions are be performed by a theory’s short-
term present time perspectives is important to reflect upon. This understanding helps to 
highlight how a theory’s short-term present time perspectives shape and direct how the 
aforementioned functions are performed within other time perspectives and their 
subsequent effects on claims made within a theory. In the final section, I will illustrate 
the cumulative effects that multiple short-term present time perspectives have on 
Morgenthau’s notions regarding the future in a similar manner as was done in Chapter 
5’s analysis of the combined effects of historical time perspectives. 
 
6.1 Ubiquity and pervasiveness 
  Of all the time perspectives addressed in this thesis, no theory of international 
politics seems to be without a short-term present time perspective accounting for or 
articulating something about a theory’s contemporary international politics. For 
example, classical theories frequently associated with international politics such as 
Clausewitz’s realism, Paine’s liberalism, and Marx’s and Engels’s Marxism all include 
accounts of contemporary international politics that are articulated via short-term 
present time perspectives.351 The ubiquitous presence of these present time perspectives 
                                                            
350 Muzzetto, “Time and Meaning in Alfred Schütz”.  
351 The following quotes from each of the three mentioned classical theories are provided as examples 
illustrating references to a contemporary time. From Clausewitz’s On War: ‘If we examine the conditions 
of modern warfare, we shall find that the wars that bear a considerable resemblance to those of the present 
day, especially with respect to armaments, are primarily campaigns beginning with the War of the 
Austrian Succession. Even though many major and minor circumstances have changed considerably, these 
are close enough to modern warfare to be instructive. The situation is different with the War of the 
Spanish Succession; the use of firearms was much less advanced, and cavalry was still the most important 
arm.’ Karl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 173. From Paine’s 
Common Sense: ‘Our plan is peace for ever. We are tired of contention with Britain, and can see no real 
end to it but in a final separation. We act consistently, because for the sake of introducing an endless and 
uninterrupted peace, do we bear the evils and burthens of the present day.’ Thomas Paine, Common Sense 
(Philadelphia: W. & T. Bradford, 1776), 169. From Marx’s Capital: ‘They show that, within the ruling-classes 
themselves, a foreboding is dawning, that the present society is no solid crystal, but an organism capable 
of change, and is constantly changing.’ Karl Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I: The 
Process of Capitalist Production, ed. Frederick Engels, trans. from the 3rd German edition, by Samuel 
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is not limited to classical theories; other theories stemming from classical theories, like 
neorealism, neoliberalism, and feminism do the same.352 Further supporting this claim 
that every theory contains short-term present time perspectives is the idea that every 
theory begins from the premise that pre-existing theories are insufficient or incomplete 
(in the present) in explaining something about the world. Consequently, short-term 
present time perspectives are ubiquitous across theories of international politics because 
every theory of international politics makes reference to and is an outcome of a 
particular present. Acknowledging that short-term present time perspectives within 
theories of international politics are ubiquitous is important for the following reason. 
  The pervasiveness of short-term present time perspectives within theories of 
international politics suggests that theories of international politics possess, at a 
minimum, one short-term present time perspective. This minimum standard of inclusion 
with respect to short-term present time perspectives is not meant to disregard the 
significance of other time perspectives, either historical or futural. In practice, however, 
the same pervasiveness exhibited by short-term present time perspectives cannot be 
claimed in regards to other types of time perspectives; reasons for this will be addressed 
in later sections of this chapter. Therefore, short-term present time perspectives offer 
unique entry points, within any theory of international politics, through which scholars 
can begin to identify, study, and understand the functions and effects that time 
perspectives have on a theory’s claims. For example, a reader of Morgenthau’s theory 
could start to begin to identify, study, and understand the relationship between time 
perspectives and his theoretical claims regarding balance of power in international 
politics by initially looking at short-term present time perspectives included within 
Morgenthau’s theory articulating the contemporary circumstances between the U.S. and 
the former Soviet Union. By sharing the insight with IR scholars that short-term present 
time perspectives within a theory are unique entry points that can be used to initiate 
studies of time perspectives, new and latent understandings and interpretations 
regarding theoretical claims and their relations with time perspectives can also be 
                                                            
Moore and Edward Aveling, revised and amplified according to the 4th German ed. by Ernest Untermann 
(Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1909), 16. 
352 For examples of each of the latter theories stemming from classical theories see: for neorealism Kenneth 
N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub., 1979); for neoliberalism 
Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); for feminism Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making 
Feminist Sense of International Politics, rev. edn. (1990; Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014). 
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excavated as illustrated in this chapter. Furthermore, this insight regarding short-term 
present time perspectives as entry points of research opens up new, fruitful discussions 
and dialogues about time perspectives and time in general which have thus far been 
limited or difficult to include in contemporary IR conversations. For example, 
discussions around short-term present time perspectives can enable scholars, indigenous 
peoples, and political practitioners, who might maintain different understandings of the 
present (e.g. the present as all-encompassing or the ‘here-and-now’ is all that matters), 
to talk to one another from a single type of time perspective (i.e. a short-term present 
time perspective) that each group can likely relate to. Such dialogues would be fruitful 
in the sense that they would potentially yield a more comprehensive picture of how 
international politics is understood by disparate groups through a ‘shared’ short-term 
present time perspective.353   
 
6.2 Necessary and sufficient 
  To better understand why short-term present time perspectives are always present 
in theories and what makes them distinct from other time perspectives, it is helpful to 
consider what short-term present time perspectives add to a theory and its claims. First, 
short-term present time perspectives provide insights into the necessary and sufficient 
conditions (in a mathematical sense)354 for the manifestation of international politics 
which a theory uses to develop understandings and interpretations of contemporary 
international politics.355 ‘Necessary and sufficient conditions’ are here referred to as 
those historical, contemporary, and potential perennial and ephemeral aspects, 
situations, and problems of international politics which a theory deems to be the most 
                                                            
353 For example, differences between Australian Aboriginal and Western notions of time have made it 
difficult to discuss international politics across time. However, time perspectives that apply in similarly 
recognisable forms in both notions are short-term present time perspectives. For a basic example of 
Australian Aboriginal notions of time and perspectives regarding the present see:  Aleksandar Janca and 
Clothilde Bullen, “The Aboriginal Concept of Time and Its Mental Health Implications,” Australasian 
Psychiatry 11, no. 1_suppl (October 2003): S40–44. For an example of an in-depth discussion regarding 
connections between politics and Aboriginal notions of time see: Eric Kline Silverman, "Politics, Gender, 
and Time in Melanesia and Aboriginal Australia," Ethnology 36, no. 2 (Spring 1997): 101-21.  
354 For example, in ‘2+2=4’ and ‘3+1=4’ the necessary and sufficient conditions such as ‘2’, ‘3’, and ‘1’ are 
varied. However, the sum of ‘4’ limits what possible numbers can be inserted into the equation. Likewise, 
a manifestation of a present imposes limits on what the past and notions about the future can possibly be 
considered to have led to a particular manifestation of a present.  
355 Historical and future time perspectives might not necessarily provide information about conditions 
which are relevant to contemporary conditions of international politics. 
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salient and essential in contemporary international politics.356 Those aspects and 
situations articulated via a theory’s short-term present time perspectives may include the 
existence of states, international norms and laws, or ongoing political tensions that lead 
to conflicts. To illustrate what these conditions might look like within a theory, bringing 
in examples from Morgenthau’s theory is useful. Reflecting upon the short-term present 
time perspectives found within Morgenthau’s theory, the nuclear condition (perennial) 
and the relationship between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union (ephemeral) can be 
considered to be examples of the necessary and sufficient conditions of contemporary 
international politics at the time Morgenthau was writing about and studying 
international politics.357 Although these conditions captured by Morgenthau’s short-
term present time perspectives may on the surface appear random, they are not. His 
theory’s short-term present time perspectives frame and delimit them. 
  A theory’s short-term present time perspectives essentially articulate the present 
in particular ways within a theory. They focus on what a theory considers most salient 
to understanding and interpreting manifestations of contemporary international 
politics. Because those articulations of the present are limited and vary depending upon 
a theory’s short-term present time perspectives, so too are the conditions of 
contemporary international politics embedded into a theory via its short-term present 
time perspectives. The conditions (historical, contemporary, and potential), which are 
identified as contributing to particular manifestations of the present, are deemed as 
‘necessary and sufficient’ conditions of international politics because without them a 
particular present manifestation of international politics would not be possible. In other 
words, certain historical, contemporary, and potential conditions and their 
combinations (articulated via short-term present time perspectives) can only yield a 
particular present.358 An example of how this notion appearing within a theory is evident 
in the following remarks drawn from Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations. First, 
Morgenthau claims that ‘the kind of interest determining political action in a particular 
period of history [(i.e. past presents)] depends upon the political and cultural context 
                                                            
356 Short-term present time perspectives are only able to make unsubstantiated claims about whether 
particular aspects of international politics are perennial or ephemeral; other time perspectives are needed 
to support such claims.  
357 A perennial condition, such as the nuclear condition, captured by a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives illustrates the manifestation of that condition in the present, but does not necessarily mean 
that such a condition does not have a historical or a future manifestation. 
358 MacKay and LaRoche, “Conduct of History,” 211. 
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within which foreign policy is formulated’.359 A few pages latter he goes on to claim that 
‘[t]he events he [the observer of international politics] must try to understand 
are…unique occurrences’360 and are made sense of in the present through ‘the 
correlation of recent events with the more distant past and the perennial qualities of 
human nature underlying both’.361  
  The identification of particular historical, contemporary, and potential 
conditions as ‘necessary and sufficient’ within a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives are of importance because they help outline and define at the time of 
theorisation (in a particular present) the following elements from: 1) what international 
politics is and is not in the past, present, and future from a present perspective, 2) what 
is included and worthy of examination when studying international politics of the past, 
present, and future, and 3) what is excluded or considered less relevant in regards to 
contemporary international politics in a particular present.362 For example, by 
identifying states as contemporary dominant actors, but not permanent actors within 
international politics, the short-term present time perspectives within Morgenthau’s 
theory are delimiting that international politics is not reliant on the existence of states 
or their dominance.363 The consequence of these delimitations stemming from a theory’s 
short-term present time perspectives’ articulation of the present is the establishment, in 
part, of the essence of what international politics is in the present and what historical, 
contemporary, and potential conditions of international politics contribute to the 
present’s manifestation.364 This basic understanding and interpretation of what the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of contemporary international politics are in the 
present also frame and limit how the past and future of international politics are 
understood and interpreted within a theory.365 This is because conditions in both the 
past and future must have some connection between those in the present.366  In this 
                                                            
359 Morganthau, Politics among Nations, 8.  
360 Ibid., 16. 
361 Ibid., 15. 
362 Mueller’s and Walker’s separate discussions regarding the ‘originary moment’ and ‘temporal moment’ 
flag up these unique qualities of the present. Mueller, “Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism,” 430-
31; Walker, “Articulation of Political Space/Time,” 448.  
363 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 9. 
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respect, a theory’s short-term present time perspectives are claimed in this study to be 
providing a theory with an articulation of what it considers to be the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of international politics, which in turn limits the types of 
explanations of international politics that a theory can provide to readers.367 
  To further clarify the abstract points made in the above paragraphs, 
Morgenthau’s notion of the novelty of each present addressed below is a helpful 
illustration. Via short-term present time perspectives, Morgenthau’s theory 
conceptualises the present, or rather each present, as being novel. This particular 
perspective of each present as being novel is dependent upon certain claims made about 
the conditions of international politics such as international politics being contingent 
(i.e. conditional) and in a constant state of flux. At first glance it might appear that 
obtaining any objective ‘truths’ about international politics (such as the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of international politics) from a particular present would be 
difficult. Rösch’s interpretation of passages from Morgenthau’s Über den Sinn der 
Wissenschaft,368 however, suggests that Morgenthau acknowledges that a theory can 
still reveal objective ‘truths’ about international politics; ‘[o]bjectivity is still possible, 
albeit tied to the specific sociopolitical and cultural constellations that inform individual 
perspectives’.369 Consequently, within Morgenthau’s theory, contingencies and the 
constant state of flux of international politics are interpreted as objective truths of 
international politics and as such both are understood as the necessary and sufficient 
conditions which contribute to novel manifestations of each present in international 
politics.  
  In making the aforementioned theoretical claims about the conditions which 
yield each novel present, claims within Morgenthau’s theory are also being made about 
what the essence or core qualities of international politics are in general, namely that 
international politics is dynamic and unpredictable.370 But this essence or core qualities 
are not limited to international politics of the present; they also apply to how 
international politics of the past and future are understood and interpreted throughout 
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Morgenthau’s theory. In other words, that which is identified as ‘necessary and 
sufficient’ in contemporary international politics via a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives, suggests what is likewise ‘necessary and sufficient’ for each present of the 
past and each present in the future.371 Thus, the dynamism and unpredictability of 
international politics are perennial aspects. Consequently, the delimiting effects of a 
theory’s short-term present time perspectives extend beyond a theory’s understanding 
and interpretation of contemporary international politics to international politics in the 
past and the future. This insight suggests to readers that there is a kind of presentism 
within a theory that can effect claims made within a theory and subsequently influence 
readers’ understandings and interpretations of international politics past, present, and 
future.372 Hence, by conducting a detailed and technical analysis of short-term present 
time perspectives within a theory and their effects on theoretical claims, this section and 
others in this chapter aim to highlight what areas of awareness and understanding in 
relation to a theory’s short-term present time perspectives readers should consider 
developing. This development is necessary to better comprehend the limitations of 
theoretical claims available for use in studies of international politics.   
Based on the aforementioned insights that a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives help to frame and delimit the necessary and sufficient conditions 
contributing to the manifestations of international politics, it is not surprising that 
short-term present time perspectives are so pervasive across theories of international 
politics. As will be addressed in the following section, the pervasiveness of short-term 
present time perspectives can also be attributed to their role in problematising 
international politics in contemporary circumstances, as well as those of the past and 
the future. In addition to sharing insights which suggest why short-term present time 
perspectives are so persuasive, these two sections were placed together in this study to 
impress upon readers the fundamental contributions that short-term present time 
perspectives make to a theory and its claims. Having already addressed in the previous 
section one fundamental contribution made by short-term present time perspectives, my 
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analysis of short-term present time perspectives will now address a second contribution, 
namely their role in the problematising international politics within a theory.  
 
6.3 Problematising international politics 
  Among the distinct, salient functions that short-term present time perspectives 
perform, one of their functions is to problematise international politics within a theory. 
The problematisation of international politics via a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives is necessary for three reasons: 1) to help draw attention to perennial and 
ephemeral aspects and situations of international politics that are themselves not 
inherently problematic but remain unresolved or are in need of making sense of, 2) to 
provide a purpose for a theory, and 3) to help a theory prioritise which international 
political problems are most pressing. Regarding the first reason, there is a suggestion 
that perennial and ephemeral aspects and situations of international politics become 
problematised in the present. They become problematized in the present when 
international politics of the past, present, or future do not appear to be resolved or make 
sense given the contemporary understandings and interpretations of international 
politics. To illustrate the point that problematisation occurs in the present, 
Morgenthau’s analysis on appeasement serves as an illustrative example. The idea of 
appeasement itself is not inherently problematic. Based on Morgenthau’s assessment of 
the acceptance of successive German claims beginning in 1935 until 1938, appeasement 
was considered a relatively unproblematic, rational policy option at the time it was 
pursued to maintain a perceived status quo in Europe and avoid war.373 Only in 
subsequent presents after the outbreak of WWII was appeasement of that the same 
period (i.e. 1935-38) broadly reinterpreted as wholly problematic.374 This example 
highlights how contemporary circumstances in international politics problematise an 
aspect of international politics (e.g. a policy of appeasement) when present 
interpretations of an historical record change. Consequently, what becomes 
problematised in the present via a theory’s short-term present time perspectives affects 
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what theoretical claims are made and how understandings and interpretations of those 
claims shape the study of international politics. 
  A second reason why a theory’s short-term present time perspectives problematise 
international politics in the present is to give a theory of international politics its 
purpose.375 Essentially, a theory of international politics is developed with an intention 
to provide an explanation or help make sense of aspects and phenomena of international 
politics. Morgenthau himself shares a similar understanding: ‘...a theory of international 
relations performs the functions any theory performs, that is, to bring order and 
meaning into a mass of unconnected material and to increase knowledge through the 
logical development of certain propositions empirically established’.376 However, not 
every aspect or phenomena is explained; only those which are designated by a theory’s 
short-term present time perspectives as needing explanations are predominately 
addressed. The aspects and phenomena needing explanation include those that are most 
relevant to understanding contemporary international politics.377 They may also include 
aspects and phenomena regarding the past and the future which appear to be 
insufficiently explained by existing explanations or require (re)interpretation because 
the present manifestation of international politics has raised questions about the past 
and the future that previously did not exist. Therefore, a theory’s focus of inquiry and 
explanatory purpose becomes narrowly defined as a consequence of what aspects or 
situations of international politics in the past, present, or future become problematised 
in the present. Understanding how problematisation in the present defines the focus of 
inquiry and purpose of a theory of international politics offers new insights into the 
internal limits short-term present time perspectives place on the explanations and claims 
a theory can provide.  
  To illustrate how international politics is problematised via short-term present 
time perspectives and the subsequent effects of that problematisation, Morgenthau’s 
comments regarding bi-polarity are worth examining. For Morgenthau, a world where 
international politics is dominated by two opposing, yet equally powerful international 
political actors is not necessarily problematic. As Morgenthau’s discussions about the 
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balance of power dynamics in Europe prior to World War II suggest, in general, a bi-
polar world did not automatically pose a great threat for him. The reason why is because 
the actors holding places of dominance were not fixed and the balance could be tilted in 
favour of one actor or another through an alliance with a third actor. However, the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons in both the U.S. and former Soviet Union, short-term 
present time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory problematised Morgenthau’s 
contemporary bi-polar world differently than the bi-polar worlds of old. ‘The [nuclear] 
power of the United States and of the Soviet Union in comparison with the power of 
their actual or prospective allies has become so overwhelming that through their own 
preponderant weight they determine the balance of power between them’.378 The 
nuclear condition of Morgenthau’s contemporary bi-polar world became one of grave 
concern and a contemporary aspect of international politics which he could not ignore. 
On the one hand, Morgenthau was claiming in his theory that the study of contemporary 
international politics must not be blind to the influence that the nuclear condition has 
on the contemporary bi-polar world. On the other hand, Morgenthau was also aware 
that theoretical claims about international politics in the past (e.g. the role of the 
balancer in a bi-polar world) took on different meanings and relevance to his 
contemporary bi-polar world.379 As the above example illustrates, the problematisation 
of contemporary international politics has broad effects on theoretical claims made 
throughout a theory.   
  The third reason why problematisation via a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives is necessary is because the problematisation helps a theory prioritise which 
international political aspects and situations are most pressing and in need of being 
addressed. The aspects and situations of international politics problematised by short-
term present time perspectives help a theory prioritise which particular historical, 
contemporary, and future aspects or situations should receive proportionately more 
attention in the study of international politics. Drawing on an example from the previous 
paragraph, Morgenthau’s singling out of the nuclear condition as a particular 
international political problem needing attention because of the existential threat it 
poses, highlights how short-term present time perspectives prioritise certain problems 
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within a theory. This prioritisation is important in narrowing down the focus of inquiry 
and purpose of a theory. The prioritisation also distinguishes one theory of international 
politics from another without deviating from their shared purpose of trying to offer 
explanations of international politics. Furthermore, by limiting the scope of what a 
theory tries to account for with respect to contemporary international politics, short-
term present time perspectives likewise limit how a theory examines the past and 
explains the future. The past and the future are problematized based on what in the 
present is prioritised and problematized via short-term present time perspectives. 
Although I acknowledge that other time perspectives within a theory do their own 
prioritising and problematising work on international politics, the prioritisation and 
problematisation work done within them is pre-emptively constrained. The work of 
these other time perspectives is pre-emptively constrained because it namely builds 
upon and is governed by what aspects and situations of international politics get 
prioritised and problematised within a theory by its short-term present time perspectives.  
  To gain a better grasp of how and why prioritisations and problematisations made 
within a theory via its short-term present time perspectives warrant consideration, 
reflecting upon Morgenthau’s references to the state offer insights. Via the short-term 
present time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory, international political struggles 
for power and peace in the present are interpreted as caused by interactions among 
states. States are singled out and prioritised among other international political actors 
because they are considered by Morgenthau to be the dominant actors in international 
politics at the time he is trying to develop a theory to make sense of international 
politics.380 According to Morgenthau, the struggles for power and peace among states 
persist for various reasons such as the pursuance of national interests and maintenance 
or expansion of state sovereignty.381 By associating these interests with the state and no 
other actor in international politics in the present, the idea of the state becomes 
problematised in the present within Morgenthau’s theory. Therefore, a theory of 
international politics focused on states and their interactions with one another should 
contribute to an understanding of international politics and the struggle for power and 
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peace. Morgenthau recognises that the struggle for power and peace, however, is not 
unique to the state because the struggle is perennial. Thus, what problematises the state 
might also not be limited to the state or the present.  
  For Morgenthau, the state is merely the latest form of dominant international 
political actors to appear, actors which sustain the perennial struggles for power and 
peace in the world. Other forms of previously dominant international political actors 
include city-states, empires, monarchs, and sovereign religious institutions such as the 
Catholic Church. In claiming that the state shares connections with previous dominant 
international political actors, the problematisation of the state in the present can be 
linked to dominant international political actors of the past.382 This relationship 
suggests that the state as a unit of analysis in his theory is understood within 
Morgenthau’s theory as a contemporary, temporary, and transient representative of the 
broader category of a unit of analysis which include dominant international political 
actors of different forms of the past and the future.383 Therefore, theoretical claims made 
within Morgenthau’s theory about the state as a dominant actor in international politics 
offer insights about international political actors in general.384 In a creative way, the 
prioritisation of the state in Morgenthau’s theory via short-term present time 
perspectives helps to establish the relevance of Morgenthau’s theory to the present 
contexts without undermining the applicability of his theoretical claims in relation to 
international politics of the past and the future.  
 
6.4 Characterising the present 
  As my analyses of the two prior functions have suggested, a third function short-
term present time perspectives perform within a theory which is to characterise the 
present. Through the process of articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions 
which contribute to the manifestations of international politics and problematisation of 
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international politics within a theory, short-term present time perspectives can end up 
characterising international politics in the present in three ways. International politics 
in the present can be understood as 1) a product or consequence, 2) a departure or 
disruption, and/or 3) a staging ground.385 With regards to the first, short-term present 
time perspectives can characterise international politics in the present as a closed, 
predetermined product or consequence of historical trends, cycles, deliberate and 
indirect efforts made by policymakers or other international political actors.386 This type 
of characterisation suggests a theory’s study and explanation of international politics is 
oriented toward the past.387 Essentially, the unique understanding and meaning of 
contemporary international politics these theories often rely on a continual awareness 
of or reference to (i.e. orientation) to the past. Postcolonial theory offers an example of 
a theory that exhibits a definitive orientation toward the past.388 This close association 
and dependency of the present on the past can become problematic within a theory 
because theoretical interpretations of international politics in the present and future 
have difficulty moving beyond the past which is no longer relevant.  
As demonstrated in Morgenthau’s theory, short-term present time perspectives 
can also characterise the present as a product or consequence of a combination of 
circumstances in the past and the present or a combination of circumstances in the past, 
the present, and the future.389 The discussion within Morgenthau’s theory regarding the 
ineffectiveness of the international legal system serves as an example of how 
Morgenthau characterises the present as a product of a combination of circumstances 
of the past, present, and future.390 For Morgenthau, international laws are created and 
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enacted in the present to address specific contemporary international legal issues which 
have occurred neither before nor since. Hence, Morgenthau concludes that 
‘international law is of a clearly static nature’ where-by it ‘limits itself to establishing a 
relationship which has existed in the past at a specific moment in time between two 
given states’.391 The problem of this ‘static nature’ of international law becomes apparent 
to Morgenthau as these laws accumulate over time and are found to be ineffective when 
applied outside of their original historical contexts to contemporary and future legal 
issues which appear to be similar or have relevance with legal issues in the past, but in 
fact exist under different circumstances (e.g. different actors involved in a legal dispute). 
Consequently, the present international legal system is characterised by, and claimed to 
be, ineffective within Morgenthau’s theory not by the past or the present individually 
(both which would assume the system to be effective) but through a combination of 
circumstances of the past, present, and future.  
  In the second instance, a theory’s short-term present time perspectives can 
characterise the present state of international politics as a departure from or disruption 
of historical evolutions.392 International politics in the present is identified as a 
departure or disruption when international politics in the present does not appear to be 
fully explained by, fit with, or be anticipated based on knowledge of international 
politics in the past.393 A departure or disruption can manifest when new forms of 
international political actors arise and supplant older actors’ dominance in the world 
(e.g. states supplanting monarchies) or political, social, and technological developments 
represent a point in international politics that once crossed cannot be returned to or a 
point actors do not want to return to.394 Consequently, the nature of international 
politics appears less static and predictable and more dynamic and indeterminate. Thus, 
by characterising the present as a departure from or disruption of the past, international 
politics in the present cannot be interpreted as merely a continuation or repeat of the 
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past. The aforementioned conceptualisation of international politics in the present 
suggests that more than a historical account is needed to explain manifestations of 
international politics in the present. If history alone is insufficient to make sense of the 
present, then some aspect(s) of the present must be distinct or separate from the past 
and requires another time perspective focused on the present to account for the 
differences. By setting the present apart from the past in this way, there is the suggestion 
that a theory’s focus is oriented toward the present itself based upon the present’s own 
significance.  
  Articulating the present as distinct from the past is a significant claim and one 
which effects other claims made within a theory. For example, within Morgenthau’s 
theory each present is understood to be unique and distinct from previous presents and 
future presents. ‘A given matter, considered to be political today, could no longer possess 
this characteristic tomorrow, while some other matter could suddenly become a prime 
political issue’.395 This interpretation of politics suggests that each present is either a 
departure from the past or disruption of historical patterns; an interpretation that 
Morgenthau finds support for in historical records. If no two presents are the same, 
though they may be similar, then the nature of international politics across time is open 
and indeterminate in Morgenthau’s theory, as Hom and Steele have argued.396 For 
Morgenthau, this interpretation of the present is essential to the study of international 
politics for two reasons. First, claiming each present is unique and the nature of 
international politics is open and indeterminate supports Morgenthau’s theoretical 
claims regarding contingencies and their significance in shaping international politics. 
Second, the open and indeterminate nature of international politics helps explain why 
the claim that international politics is unpredictable (because of contingencies) is made 
within Morgenthau’s theory.397 In other words, unique presents and contingencies are 
mutually reinforcing claims within Morgenthau’s theory that, for Morgenthau, capture 
key aspects of the nature of international politics in any present (and across time). 
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  Finally, a theory’s short-term present time perspectives can characterise 
international politics in the present as a staging ground for the future.398 In this 
characterisation of the present, the importance of the present is about what it can reveal 
about the future rather than what contemporary circumstances can reveal about the 
present itself or the past. Unlike the two previously discussed characterisations of the 
present (i.e. the present as a product or departure), characterising the present as a 
staging ground suggests contemporary international politics has a future (i.e. the 
present is future oriented). As a staging ground, articulations of the present within a 
theory provide the contemporary (and sometimes historical) context from which a 
theory’s particular vision of the future of international politics emerges and is 
understood to have originated. Thus, a theory’s short-term present time perspectives 
create a crucial link between the present and the future within a theory. For example, 
the discussion within Morgenthau’s theory regarding a contemporary two-bloc system 
based around the U.S. and the former Soviet Union help to foreshadow what a two-bloc 
system will be based upon in the short-term future.399  
  This characterisation of the present as a staging ground also adds significance to 
contemporary ephemeral aspects of international politics mentioned within a theory 
that might otherwise be overlooked. For example, Morgenthau’s mentioning of 
uncommitted nations400 (e.g. India, Indonesia, China, Japan, a unified Germany) and a 
Third Force advocated by General DeGaulle in 1946 appear as contemporary ephemeral 
aspects of international politics within Morgenthau’s theory with hypothetical or 
unknown effects on the future of international politics that should not be overlooked.401 
Significance is added to these particular contemporary aspects by suggesting that their 
effects are not confined to the present, but potentially set into motion or are crucial to 
the manifestation of a theory’s particular versions of the future. Over half a century later 
in 2018, contemporary readers of Morgenthau’s theory can appreciate the benefits of not 
overlooking such aspects and presenting them as potential staging grounds for the 
future. Many of the uncommitted nations mentioned by Morgenthau are now, over half 
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a century later, political actors who significantly shape international politics and at times 
serve as leaders challenging dominant political forces (e.g. China, India) or as advocates 
calling for alternatives to the status quo (e.g. France and Germany calling for more EU 
military independence from the U.S.).402 In other words, contemporary international 
politics plant seeds which might later manifest into particular outcomes in the future. 
Regardless of how the notion of the present as a staging ground is expressed via short-
term present time perspectives, the clear focus of the present is on the future.  
  To further illustrate how a theory can interpret the present as a staging ground 
for the future, Morgenthau’s analysis of the nuclear condition is introduced here as an 
example. Within Morgenthau’s theory, the nuclear condition is a defining feature of the 
present within his theory that is articulated via short-term present time perspectives. Had 
Morgenthau only made this claim about the nuclear condition in the present, then the 
claim would have been limited to describing and pertaining to just the present state of 
international politics without alluding to the future. However, more than one short-term 
present time perspective can exist within a theory. Subsequently, additional short-term 
present time perspectives can be included within a theory to add different 
characterisations to claims about the present. In other words, additional short-term 
present time perspectives enable a single claim to be viewed and interpreted from 
different vantage points. The following quote highlights this possibility of articulating 
multiple characterisations about the present. ‘[The] continuous surveillance of the 
prospective enemy's military actions and the continuous readiness for retaliation have 
put both nuclear powers on a permanent footing of readiness for immediate nuclear 
war’.403 The first part of the quote up until ‘retaliation’ indicates the present state of 
international politics. This present state of international politics, however, also serves as 
the ‘permanent footing’ that sets the stage for the future of international politics alluded 
to in the second part of the quote. Therefore, the nuclear condition of the present is a 
staging ground for the future of international politics. As a consequence of making this 
claim, a further claim is attached to the notion of the nuclear condition within 
Morgenthau’s theory. In this additional claim, the nuclear condition of the present is 
                                                            
402 Hans-Werner Sinn, “Europe Finally Pulls the Trigger on a Military Force,” The Guardian, November 21, 
2018, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/nov/21/europe-finally-pulls-the-trigger-on-a-military 
-force-eu-army-trump (accessed December 12, 2018). 
403 Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, 140. 
150 
 
said to be a condition that cannot be overcome or avoided in the future. This additional 
claim suggests that the nuclear condition in the present is a staging ground from which 
a particular present condition (i.e. nuclear condition) will come to determine and 
dominate the future of international politics. The latter claim is significant in the context 
of Morgenthau’s theory. The claim enables Morgenthau to link certain theoretical 
explanations of international politics in the present to the future without having to fully 
develop a particular theoretical vision of what the future of international politics will 
look like.  
  This articulation of the present as having a focus on the future, however, should 
not imply that the present as a staging ground does not also convey something about 
the past. Essentially, anything that happens before a future manifestation of 
international politics, such as contemporary manifestations of international politics, are 
by default part of a future’s past. Consequently, because a present is a point of origin 
from which future manifestations of international politics emerge, a present is also a 
past for a theory’s notions regarding the future of international politics. Therefore, if the 
present is a staging ground for the future and the past of the future of international 
politics, then is accounting for international politics preceding the present (i.e. the past) 
even necessary to making sense of the future? Or would the past and the present need 
to be accounted for separately? The answer to both is no; detailing the past separately 
might not be necessary in a theory which characterises the present as a staging ground 
for the future. To arrive at this interpretation requires accepting that knowledge of the 
past that has any relevance to the present or the future of international politics is already 
embodied within a present characterised as a staging ground because the present is itself 
a product of the past.404 Consequently, this characterisation of the present suggests that 
the present can be a comprehensive staging ground (without explicitly articulating the 
past) that provides all the contexts necessary to yield and make sense of a theory’s 
particular notions about the future. Even for those theories that do not interpret the 
present as a comprehensive staging ground for the future, this idea of the present as a 
staging ground is still helpful in recognising that the present is and will become part of 
                                                            
404 This collapsing of the past into the present and by interpreting the present as a type of past helps 
explain how neorealism accounts for the past and is able to make claims about the past and the future 




the past in relation to a theory’s notions about the future. Thus claims made in the 
present inevitably become claims about the past even when the present is expressed as 
oriented toward the future. 
 
6.5 The present’s orientations toward the past and the future 
  As alluded to in the previous sections, a consequence of the problematisations 
and characterisations a theory’s short-term present time perspectives articulate about the 
present is that the reader develops an awareness of whether a theory’s present is oriented 
more toward the past or the future.405 For example, if the present is characterised as a 
product of history within a theory, then a theory’s present is perceived as oriented 
toward the past. Conversely, if the present is characterised as staging ground for the 
future, then a theory’s present is perceived as oriented toward the future.406 This 
question of orientation relates to the third function that short-term present time 
perspectives perform within a theory; their role in establishing whether the past or the 
future is a dominant influence shaping a theory’s contemporary understandings and 
interpretations of international politics. The subsequent paragraphs aim to unpack this 
role further with corresponding examples. Awareness of a theory’s present orientation 
is useful to recover insights about the following: 1) particular theoretical claims which 
seem derived solely from contemporary circumstances of international politics but in 
fact are linked to circumstances in the past or future, 2) whether claims about the 
present are included within a theory to support (or refute) historical or future theoretical 
claims, and 3) why the past, present, and/or future might not be equally referenced or 
reflected upon within a theory.  These unrecognised insights are important because they 
can dramatically alter orthodox understandings about theoretical claims.407 For 
example, short-term present time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory orient the 
present within his theory namely toward the past.408 Having an awareness of this 
                                                            
405 Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, “Taking Time to Integrate,” 519. 
406 Although Zimbardo and Boyd attach an emotional component to their orientation, this component is 
not addressed in this section as a discussion about the relationship between time, emotion, and 
international politics is beyond the scope of my study. Zimbardo and Boyd, “Putting Time in Perspective”.    
407 ‘Orthodox understandings’ are understood as those which appear in first year undergraduate IR 
textbooks. For an example, see John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owen, eds., The Globalization of 
World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 7th edn. (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2017).  
408 In contrast, short-term time perspectives within Kant’s To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch orient 
the present to the future by articulating a present that is forward looking toward a particular end. 
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orientation helps readers to see Morgenthau’s theory not as a grand or general theory of 
international politics, but a theory that is situated in a particular time and offering an 
explanation that will inevitably become outdated.409 In other words, examining a 
theory’s present orientation can help reduce misreadings and invalidate critiques of 
theoretical claims, as well as augment understandings of how a theory orients the 
present to the past and/or future.  
  To begin to identify a theory’s present orientation, it is necessary to first 
determine whether or not the present is a departure or disruption in relation to the past. 
If the present is not a departure or disruption from the past, then the present is a product 
of history (e.g. a continuation of a historical pattern). In this case, the orientation of a 
theory’s present will depend upon how the present is addressed within a theory. A 
theory’s short-term present time perspectives are considered to be orienting a theory’s 
present to the past when the present is articulated as being a culmination or fulfilment 
of historical patterns or a moment within a cycle.410 Conversely, a theory’s present is 
oriented to the future when articulations of the present describe the present as part of a 
historical process necessary to the manifestation of the future.   
  Not a departure/disruption = present is product of history =   
   1) product as culmination/fulfilment of history = present orientation to  
   the past.  
   2) product as necessary for future manifestations = present orientation to  
   the future.  
However, if a theory’s present is interpreted as a departure or disruption, then a 
different means of determining a theory’s present orientation is needed. Determining 
the orientation of a theory’s present depends upon whether the present marks the end 
of an era, the beginning of a new era, or both.411 If the present marks an end, then the 
orientation of the present is to the past. If the present marks a beginning, then the 
orientation of the present is to the future.412 When a theory’s short-term present time 
                                                            
Immanuel Kant, To Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (1795), trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis 
and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003). 
409 Behr and Heath, “Misreading in IR Theory,” 335-38. 
410 Mueller, “Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism,” 437. 
411 Michelle Bastian, “Time and Community: A Scoping Study,” Time & Society 23, no. 2 (July 2014), 149. 
412 Davenport, “The International and the Limits of History,” 257. 
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perspectives articulate the present as both the end and beginning of an era, then the 
orientation of a theory’s present is either to the past and the future simultaneously or 
on the present itself to emphasise the unique significance of a particular moment in 
international politics. 
  Yes a departure/disruption = present as…  
   1) end of an era = present is oriented toward the past.  
   2) beginning of an era = present oriented toward the future.  
    3) both = present oriented toward past and future and/or the present   
   itself. 
In cases where the present is articulated as a staging ground for the future, then a 
theory’s present orientation is directed to the future.   
  Yes a staging ground = present is oriented to the future. 
  Through the process of identifying a theory’s present orientations, a theory’s 
overall orientation can also be identified and recovered. Essentially, the overall 
orientation of a theory is the broad approach a theory takes to studying and making 
sense of international politics.413 For example, post-colonialism tries to make sense of 
international politics in the present through the colonial past.414 The connection 
between a theory’s present orientation and its overall orientation is that the overall 
orientation can be approximately ascertained through the aggregation and assessment 
of a theory’s various present orientations.415 This relationship between these two types 
of orientations is worth noting. The relationship ensures that every theory of 
international politics which make references to the present, and only the present, 
contains an overall orientation. In other words, a theory’s overall orientation can be 
derived from articulations of the present via short-term present time perspectives. This 
novel insight is not meant to suggest that a theory’s overall orientation could not be 
ascertained by aggregating the orientations of other time perspectives (e.g. historical 
and future) found within a theory. The insight is meant to highlight what short-term 
present time perspectives can articulate about the relations among a theory’s present, 
                                                            
413 Ancona, Okhuysen, and Perlow, “Taking Time to Integrate,” 519. 
414 For an excellent example see Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Israel/Palestine, Iraq 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004). 
415 Zimbardo and Boyd, “Putting Time in Perspective,” 1273. 
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past, and future, irrespective of whether other time perspectives are explicitly articulated 
within a theory.  
  The relationship between a theory’s present orientations and its overall 
orientation also suggests that the latter orientation can be limited by short-term time 
perspectives. This insight helps inform scholars that a theory’s overall orientation does 
not independently impose limitations on a theory. Limitations attributed to a theory’s 
overall orientations actually originate from articulations of the short-term time 
perspectives, as well as other time perspectives if articulated in a theory. As an example, 
the overall orientation in Morgenthau’s theory does not exist independently. To begin 
to make sense of his theory’s overall orientation, it is first necessary to aggregate and 
assess his present orientations. Only after aggregating his accounting of the present as a 
product of history, a departure from the past, and a staging ground for the future does 
his theory’s overall orientation become clear. The result is that his theory’s overall 
orientation is focused on the empirical past and present, not what might have been or 
might be (i.e. the future).416 Therefore, if a theory’s overall orientation does not 
independently impose limitations on a theory, then a theory’s overall orientation does 
not independently impose limitations on theoretical claims. The limitations originate 
from individual orientations of the present articulated within a theory via its short-term 
present time perspectives. This finding affirms arguments made elsewhere in this thesis 
that linkages and relations between the past, the present, and the future are made on a 
micro-level via a theory’s long-term and short-term historical, present, and future time 
perspectives.      
  In addition to highlighting the relationship between time perspectives and a 
theory’s overall orientation, a theory’s short-term present time perspectives are key to 
situating a theory’s present among other time segments (i.e. the past and the future).417 
This situating of a theory’s present can be both internal and external. Regarding the first, 
internal situating of the present within a theory is important because the present serves 
as an anchor point from which to define other segments of time and corresponding 
                                                            
416 This overall orientation can also indicate that a theory may discount the value of speculating about the 
future. Kreb and Rapport, “Psychology of Time Horizons,” 530-1; Philip Streich and Jack S. Levy, "Time 
Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice," The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 (April 
2007): 199-226. 
417 Hartog and Brown, Regimes of Historicity, 82-83. 
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claims within a theory. Illustrating this point is Morgenthau’s Chapter XXI: The New 
Balance of Power in Politics among Nations. In this chapter, Morgenthau is essentially 
articulating the present state of affairs of international politics as he interprets it. 
References which help situate his theory’s present in a particular time within his theory 
include some of the following: the ‘drastic numerical reduction of the players in the 
game’ of international politics; ‘the tendency toward a two-bloc system’ governed by the 
relations between the former Soviet Union and the United States; Great Britain’s lost 
role as ‘the “holder” of the balance’; ‘the disappearance of the colonial frontier’; and the 
spread of revolution among ‘colonial and semicolonial countries’ against colonial 
powers. Subsequently, references to the recent past or foreseeable future become less 
abstract and are allocated in time based off of when the present is situated within a 
theory. However the situating of a theory’s present by short-term present time 
perspectives is not limited to internal situating; these time perspectives also situate a 
theory’s present externally. 
 
6.6 Date-stamping a theory and its claims 
  The external situating of the present occurs as a consequence of the 
contemporary context and status of international politics articulated within a theory by 
short-term present time perspectives. The context and status of international politics 
provided within a theory situates a theory’s present within a particular moment in time 
of international politics and effectively date-stamps the present with a specific time. For 
example, Morgenthau’s references to the UN in Politics among Nations places the 
present of this major work after 24 October 1945, the year the UN officially came into 
existence.418 As a consequence of date-stamping a theory’s present, the present becomes 
fixed. This fixed date of a theory’s present can then be used to situate a theory in time 
as time exists outside a theory; in essence, a theory’s present in relation to ‘now’ (e.g. 
2019). This placing of a theory’s present into a ‘now’ occurs every time a scholar applies 
a theory developed in one present (e.g. 1956) to study or explain international politics 
                                                            
418 The example given is for illustrative purposes. References to other international incidences made within 
each edition of PAN can further refine the date-stamping of Morgenthau’s theory. Care was taken when 
trying to situate his theory’s present using the publication dates of articles and books because these dates 
did not always correspond to the present his theory was referring to in the text under analysis.  
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operating under different contemporary circumstances of another present (e.g. 2019). By 
relating the present of a theory to ‘now’ (e.g. 2019), a theory’s present dated 1956 for 
example becomes externally situated in the past within a contemporary context of 
international politics which is never fixed and being perpetually reconstituted (e.g. the 
present of the reader). Consequently, a theory’s present is for example not necessarily 
reflective of international politics as it is now in 2019, but international politics as it was 
in the past.419 Thus, even if a theory’s claims are outdated in relation to international 
politics in 2019, they still have relevance to explaining international politics of the past. 
The effects of this date-stamping and external situating of a theory’s present extend 
further throughout a theory. 
  By date-stamping and externally situating a present that is articulated within a 
theory, short-term present time perspectives are also date-stamping and externally 
situating a theory’s claims regarding the past, present, and future of international 
politics. The external situating of the present a theory is referring to in the text is 
important to keep in mind when interpreting theoretical claims about international 
politics because as the international political context changes so too does the meaning 
and significance of a theory’s claims. Evidence of this shift in interpretation is evident 
for example when examining claims made in Morgenthau’s theory regarding China. 
Within Morgenthau’s theory, China is always referred to as becoming a potential ‘Great 
Power’ whose significance in international politics is secondary to the actions and 
policies taken by the U.S. and former Soviet Union. Morgenthau’s theory subsequently 
interprets international politics within this context of dominant actors. However, when 
this context of dominant actors circa 1956 is placed within the context of a 2019 present, 
the claims within Morgenthau’s theory about the potentiality of China appear outdated 
because China is taking on the responsibilities of and acting as a ‘Great Power’ that can 
be interpreted as rivalling that of the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. This example 
suggests that a theory’s short-term present time perspectives can be useful in validating 
and invalidating claims, particularly those claims articulated as timeless or universal (i.e. 
                                                            
419 Friedrich Kratochwil, “History, Action and Identity: Revisiting the ‘Second’ Great Debate and Assessing 
Its Importance for Social Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 12, no. 1 (March 2006): 5–
29. There is a suggestion here that there is a time lag between a theory’s claims about international politics 
and contemporary claims that can be made about international politics in the present (e.g. 2019). This 
presence of a time lag, which a theory’s short-term time perspectives contribute to, suggests that the 
usefulness and relevance of a theory’s claims to contemporary international politics in either 1980, 2006, 
or 2019 might have a finite shelf-life. 
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perennial). When these time perspectives and corresponding claims are considered in 
the context of international politics in a future ‘now’, they help to validate whether or 
not theoretical claims made in a particular present are in fact perennial. Furthermore, 
the aforementioned China example suggests that claims relevant to a present articulated 
within a theory are contextualised and interpreted internally but can subsequently 
become fixed in time and limit the applicability of a theory over time.420   
  The cumulative effect of examining a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives both internally and externally is the removal of the ambiguity of the present 
referenced within a theory. As a result, the origins of a theory’s claims, from the 
problematisation of international politics to how the past and future are constructed 
and interpreted, become clearer.421 From this clarity, theoretical claims are found to be 
bound to a particular account of international politics as they exist in a theory’s 
articulated present.422 This insight raises new doubts as to whether a theory can ever 
make the claim that its theoretical claims are timeless or that reflecting on time is not 
relevant to understanding and interpreting the meaning and significance of claims.423 
Furthermore, the binding of theoretical claims to a particular present suggests that a 
present articulated by a theory’s short-term present time perspectives places a particular 
set of ‘contemporary’ interpretive lenses onto a theory regarding what international 
politics is or is not. These lenses are important to acknowledge because they have a 
biasing effect on studies of international politics. The insights contained within this 
chapter not only illustrate how short-term present time perspectives embed biases within 
a theory, but also highlight how any attempts at removing or altering these biases to 
reduce their effects when studying international politics is problematic. Any removal or 
alteration of short-term present time perspectives would result in fundamental changes 
to how claims are understood and interpreted. Therefore, by removing the ambiguity of 
a present within a theory via an analysis of a theory’s short-term present time 
                                                            
420 Mueller, “Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism,” 431-32. 
421 Mueller, “Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism,” 433. 
422 Hartmut Behr and Felix Rösch, “The Ethics of Anti-Hubris in the Political Philosophy of International 
Relations – Hans J. Morgenthau,” in Religion and the Realist Tradition: From Political Theology to 
International Relations Theory and Back, ed. Jodek Troy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 116; Karl Mannheim, 
Ideology and Utopia (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1968), 76. 
423 For incidence, Marxists have made the former claim when referring to contemporary class struggles. 
The latter claim suggests no theory of international politics can ever be like a theory of mathematics where 
time is not necessary to understand or interpret claims. 
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perspectives,424 the new insights shared in this chapter can enable scholars to more 
objectively assess whether a particular theory’s interpretive lenses, explanations, and 
claims are still relevant to study an updated contemporary international politics or 
whether they are outdated.425  
 
6.7 Delimiting effects on the predictability of the future 
  The discussion that follows regarding the effects of a theory’s short-term present 
time perspectives on its notions of the future is markedly different from the final sections 
found in Chapters 5 and 7. The difference is that short-term present time perspectives 
were the only present time perspectives analysed in this chapter because long-term 
present time perspectives are not currently articulated within theories of international 
politics, although I recognise that they exist.426 Nevertheless, the aims of this final 
section remain similar to the final sections of chapters 5 and 7; to illustrate that time 
perspectives do not exist in isolation and that they have cumulative effects on theoretical 
claims. However, rather than demonstrating the lack of isolation by discussing how time 
perspectives of different categories (i.e. long-term and short-term) co-exist, this section 
will be emphasising that multiple time perspectives within the same category (e.g. short-
term present time perspectives) co-exist. This point is worth highlighting because it 
illustrates that a theory with only one category of time perspective can still contain 
multiple time perspectives which shape and effect understandings and interpretations 
of theoretical claims.427 To illustrate that multiple short-term present time perspectives 
co-exist among themselves (as well as with other time perspectives) within a theory and 
have cumulative effects on theoretical claims, this section will again use Morgenthau’s 
claims about the future as examples. In particular, the following discussion will highlight 
                                                            
424 ‘Man’s capacity to rise above his social and historical situation seems to be conditioned by the 
sensitivity with which he recognizes the extent of his involvement in it’ from E.H. Carr, What is History? 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964): 54. 
425 Furthermore, awareness of when a theory’s present is situated can also be used to explain deficiencies 
or limitations of a particular theory’s explanations of and claims about international politics. 
426 For a brief discussion of long-term present time perspectives and reasons for not including them in my 
analysis of present time perspectives, see section 3.4. 
427 Currently, I am unaware of a theory with only one category of time perspectives, but I acknowledge 
that cultures may exist in the world where everything is interpreted and understood in the present. For a 
primer, see the following work on aboriginal thought: Janca and Bullen, “Aboriginal Concept of Time” and 
Silverman, "Time in Melanesia and Aboriginal Australia."  
159 
 
how multiple short-term present time perspectives shape and delimit claims found within 
Morgenthau’s theory regarding the predictability of the future of international politics. 
  For Morgenthau, no notions about the future are made from nowhere. 
Predictions and speculations about the future begin in a present based upon 
contemporary interpretations of international politics in the past and the present. In 
reference to the past, one of the short-term present time perspectives within 
Morgenthau’s theory characterises the present as a unique product of the past. ‘A 
historical situation always contains only a limited number of potentialities into which it 
might develop’ in the present.428 Subsequently, ‘the contingencies of the present and 
future present themselves in a limited number of typical patterns [(i.e. perennial 
patterns)]’.429 Therefore, predictability within Morgenthau’s theory is delimited by the 
uniqueness of the present as a historical product and contemporary contingencies of 
international politics well before future contingencies are taken into consideration. The 
predictability is inhibited further within Morgenthau’s theory by adding another short-
term present time perspective which characterises each present as a perpetual departure 
from the past where ‘the social cause itself is an indeterminate element which can never 
be reproduced identical with itself and which we are never sure to reproduce with 
exactly those qualities relevant to the result’.430 This short-term present time perspective 
emphasises that a present is perpetually reconstituted, thus limiting the accuracy of a 
prediction. In yet another short-term present time perspective found within 
Morgenthau’s theory, the ‘nuclear age’ of the present is characterised as a staging ground 
for the nuclear condition of the future which potentially cannot be escaped.431 This 
short-term present time perspective suggests that aspects of international politics in the 
future (e.g. the nuclear condition) can be predicted with some level of accuracy based 
upon contemporary aspects of international politics. Cumulatively, these three short-
term present time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory add various layers of 
delimitations on the present which subsequently shape the basis upon which notions 
about the future are created.  
                                                            
428 Morgenthau, “Problem of Social Planning,” 183. 
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430 Ibid., 175. 
431 Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, 152-3; Abbott, “Conceptions of Time and Events,” 150. 
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  Awareness of this aforementioned basis is crucial to understanding notions about 
the future as articulated within Morgenthau’s theory. This basis outlines the necessary 
and sufficient conditions of international politics in a particular present which can only 
yield certain outcomes. These conditions essentially are that international politics is 
open and indeterminate in the present.432 Consequently, the future of international 
politics is difficult to predetermine or know (i.e. unpredictable); each political problem 
‘must be solved every day anew’.433 This difficulty of foretelling the future, however, is 
not unique to the particular present of international politics Morgenthau’s theory is 
addressing; the difficulty is a feature shared by all contemporary moments of 
international politics, past and future. According to Morgenthau’s theory, difficulty in 
foretelling the future is shared by all contemporary moments of international politics 
because the present is perennially novel. In other words, the novelty of one present 
yields the novelty of a future present which continues on in perpetuity.434 The additional 
inclusion within Morgenthau’s theory of short-term present time perspectives 
articulating the present as a staging grounding for the future sets this perpetual process 
in motion and helps to explain why the future remains unpredictable in the foreseeable 
and unforeseeable future according to Morgenthau’s theory.   
  Two further ways that predictability and notions about the future are curtailed 
within Morgenthau’s theory regard the role short-term present time perspectives can play 
in problematising international politics as detailed earlier in Section 6.4 and the overall 
orientation of the present within Morgenthau’s theory. Regarding problematisation, 
short-term time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory place an emphasis on the 
urgency of addressing contemporary problems (that may trigger the use of nuclear 
weapons) over future problems.435 Consequently, thinking about future problems 
becomes secondary to contemporary problems. This urgency attributed to 
contemporary problems also contributes to the overall orientation of the present within 
Morgenthau’s theory away from the future. Other short-term present time perspectives 
orienting the focus of the present on the past further deemphasise the significance of 
                                                            
432 This openness and indeterminacy does not necessarily preclude that certain perennial aspects of 
international politics, such as the nuclear condition, cannot continually effect the manifestation of 
international politics in the future. As was discussed in Chapter 5, the manifestations of perennial aspects 
and their effects can be altered by ephemeral aspects of international politics.   
433 Morgenthau, Scientific Man, 216. 
434 Morgenthau, “Problem of Social Planning,” 184. 
435 Morgenthau, “Another “Great Debate”,” 977. 
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the future in relation to the present and the past addressed within Morgenthau’s theory. 
Therefore, by emphasising the urgency of international political problems in the present 
in relation to those potential problems in the future and orienting the present away from 
the future toward the present itself and the origins of the contemporary problems (i.e. 
the past), short-term present time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory do little to 
create a space or need within his theory for predictions. This lack of space or need makes 
sense given the general stated concern of Morgenthau’s theory which is to explain and 
understand international politics ‘as it actually is’ and the relevant ‘historical processes 
as they actually take place’ by ‘ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through 
reason’.436 Consequently, short-term present time perspectives within a theory play a 
crucial part in delimiting how notions and claims about the future can be articulated 
within a theory.  
 
6.8 Chapter summary 
  Unlike chapters 5 and 7 which analyse and discuss two categories of time 
perspectives, long-term and short-term perspectives, the contents of this chapter only 
address one category of time perspective, short-term present time perspectives. Despite 
addressing one category, this chapter has illustrated the diversity of short-term present 
time perspectives that can potentially be found within a theory and the extensiveness of 
their effects. The arguments made throughout this chapter highlight how a theory’s 
short-term present time perspectives shape notions of the present, which in turn shape 
how claims about international politics are interpreted and understood within the 
contemporary circumstances articulated. As addressed throughout the chapter, the 
shaping effects of a theory’s short-term present time perspectives were not limited to 
claims regarding contemporary international politics, but also extended to claims about 
international politics in the past and the future. To recover an awareness and 
understanding of these effects, distinctions among various short-term present time 
perspectives which can potentially be found within a theory were first individually 
                                                            
436 Unlike the present or the past, the future has not occurred and therefore future facts cannot be 
ascertained for examination to help explain and understand international politics of the future. All that 
can be understood about the future at any contemporary moment is facts that relate to the present and 
the past. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 4-5. 
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identified, analysed, and discussed using examples drawn from Morgenthau’s theory. 
Analysis and discussion at the individual level was followed by an analysis and discussion 
of their combined effects on notions about the future and prediction within 
Morgenthau’s theory. By addressing the functions and effects of short-term present time 
perspectives individually and collectively, this chapter provides scholars with key 
insights into where and how claims about international politics are initially established 
within a theory.  
  The key insights about short-term present time perspectives within a theory 
shared in this chapter include the following. First, a theory’s short-term present time 
perspectives help to initially outline what the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
international politics are according to a theory. Such an articulation of these conditions 
is crucial within a theory because it serves as a shared basis from which international 
politics in the past, present, and future can be linked, analysed, and discussed. Second, 
these time perspectives delimit how international politics is problematised in the past, 
present, and future within a theory. Third, by characterising the contemporary 
circumstances of a claim as a product or consequence, a departure or disruption, and/or 
a staging ground, a theory’s short-term present time perspectives play key roles in 
establishing relations between claims about international politics within a particular 
present context to claims about international politics in the past and potential future. 
Fourth, a theory’s short-term present time perspectives help to establish whether the past 
or the future is a dominant influence shaping a theory’s contemporary understandings 
and interpretations of international politics in the past, present, and future (i.e. a 
theory’s overall orientation). Finally, these particular time perspectives date-stamp a 
theory’s claims which is useful when evaluating the applicability and validity of those 
claims beyond a theory’s own articulated contemporary international political context. 
Collectively, these insights indicate how short-term present time perspectives shape 
claims within a theory.  
  The aforementioned insights also provide strong evidence as to why short-term 
present time perspectives are so pervasive within theories of international politics. 
Without having the basis short-term present time perspectives embed within a theory of 
what is and is not considered international politics, how international politics is 
problematised, and how contemporary international politics is and is not related to 
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international political phenomena of the past and the future, then a theory would be 
unable to provide logical explanations and understandings about international politics 
past, present, or future. Consequently, short-term present time perspectives are essential 
to include within a theory in a way that historical and future time perspectives are not. 
In other words, it is possible for a theory to exist without long-term and short-term 
historical or future time perspectives, but it is impossible for a theory to exist without a 
short-term present time perspective. Nevertheless, there are limits to what short-term 
present time perspectives can perform within a theory in relation to claims. The following 
chapter addressing short-term and long-term future time perspectives will emphasise the 
previous point. Furthermore, the next chapter will draw attention to what delimitations 
future time perspectives add to claims made within a theory which short-term present 
time perspectives (and historical time perspectives) would have difficulty executing.   
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Chapter 7: Long-term and Short-term Future Time Perspectives 
 In this chapter, the aim is to recover an awareness of and appreciation for how 
long-term and short-term future time perspectives shape particular understandings and 
interpretations of claims about international politics within a theory. Similar to chapters 
5 and 6 addressing historical and present time perspectives respectively, this chapter’s 
analysis has three foci: 1) the functions and effects that make each future time perspective 
distinct, 2) the relations, or lack thereof, between the two future time perspectives and 
3) the relations between future time perspectives and a theory’s claims. Once again, 
examples illustrating and supporting the arguments presented throughout this chapter 
will be drawn from Morgenthau’s work.437 On occasion, references will be made in this 
chapter to examples appearing in previous chapters because they are useful for 
highlighting more than one aspect of a future time perspective.438 By the end of the 
chapter, the recovered awareness of what future time perspectives uniquely add to a 
theory’s explanation and claims will alter current scholarly perceptions regarding the 
role of future time perspectives within a theory. Consequently, this chapter offers new 
insights about how essential future time perspectives are in shaping theoretical claims. 
Furthermore, this chapter fills a space in the discipline’s current understanding of 
international politics, which is largely focused on the past and the present, by examining 
how claims are conceptualised in regards to a theory’s notions about the future.   
  Helping to recover an awareness of and appreciation for future time perspectives, 
the following questions were used to guide my analysis of long-term and short-term 
future time perspectives and their effects. What distinguishing features do long-term and 
short-term future time perspectives possess? Why include either future time perspective 
within a theory? How does the presence or absence of a particular future time perspective 
effect how theoretical claims are understood and interpreted? How do these future time 
perspectives help scholars make better sense of international politics? I intentionally 
designed these questions to be non-theory specific to enable readers to apply them to 
their analyses of other theories of international politics whose future time perspectives 
                                                            
437 Although future time perspectives feature very little in Morgenthau’s theory in comparison the theory’s 
historical and present time perspectives, the examples of Morgenthau’s theoretical future time perspectives 
included in this chapter are sufficient to illustrate and support the arguments made.  
438 For practical reasons, the repeat usage of an example is a consequence of Morgenthau’s infrequent 
referral in his theory to the future in general. This stems from his theory’s primary foci on providing 
explanations of international politics in the past and present.  
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have yet to be fully examined and understood. To illustrate the usefulness of these 
questions, they were directed at Morgenthau’s theory. Although the broad range of 
insights regarding the distinctness of future time perspectives and their effects covered 
in this chapter are exhibited through one theory, future time perspectives in other 
theories may exhibit fewer (or more) distinctions or play limited (or greater) shaping 
roles. In other words, insights derived from analysing future time perspectives within 
other theories may be more or less comprehensive than the insights presented in this 
chapter as Morgenthau’s theory is less focused on understanding and interpreting the 
future of international politics and more focused on the making sense of the past and 
the present. Therefore, the analysis of future time perspectives that follows is not 
intended to be comprehensive, but suggestive of some of the features and effects 
scholars are likely to find when examining future time perspectives and their effects on 
theoretical claims within other theories of international politics used in the discipline. 
  To address long-term and short-term future time perspectives and their effects, 
this chapter consists of three sections. The first section of the chapter addresses the 
functions performed by and effects of short-term future time perspectives within a 
theory.439 The functions discussed in this section cover two broad categories: 1) 
providing predictions or approximations about the immediate future and 2) moving a 
theory’s explanation beyond the known/knowable world. As these broad categories are 
unpacked, new insights about short-term future time perspectives are gained. These 
insights include: 1) the transition or bridging work that these time perspectives perform; 
2) how particular unknowns of the near future become known; 3) the inseparable linkage 
between the present and the immediate future; 4) how certainty is attached to near 
future predictions; and 5) how meaning and significance are pre-emptively added to 
aspects of international politics in the near future. While these insights help to 
differentiate short-term future time perspectives from long-term future time perspectives, 
they are also important because they help differentiate short-term future from the 
present (e.g. short-term future is an extrapolation from the present). The importance of 
the latter distinction between the short-term future and the present is that without 
making this distinction clear, short-term future time perspectives could easily be 
                                                            
439 A discussion on short-term future time perspectives precedes the discussion on long-term future time 
perspectives because the immediate future articulated via short-term future time perspectives directly 
follows the present according to Western chronological notions of time. 
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misinterpreted as rearticulating the present or a type of long-term present time 
perspective. 
  In the chapter’s second section, the functions and effects of long-term future time 
perspectives within a theory are identified and discussed. In regards to the functions 
performed by a theory’s long-term future time perspectives, the two primary functions 
include 1) extending a theory’s applicability beyond the foreseeable future and 2) 
providing glimpses into the long-term future evolutions and manifestations of 
international politics. As a consequence of performing these functions, new insights 
about a theory’s claims and explanations are gained. These insights include how long-
term future time perspectives can effect: 1) how theoretical claims are interpreted as finite 
or infinite; 2) interpretations of the applicability and usefulness of a theory’s claims in 
both familiar and unfamiliar international political contexts; 3) what known aspects of 
international politics are retained via a theory’s long-term predictions, probabilities, and 
aspirations; and 4) the interpretations of historical and contemporary theoretical claims 
via the introduction of new theoretical claims about the distant future. Examining long-
term future time perspectives can also indicate how long-standing, salient international 
political questions and problems of concern within a theory can be solved or adequately 
addressed in the distant future. Even if not comprehensive or realistic, the solutions and 
depictions of the distant future provided by a theory’s long-term future time perspectives 
affect how a theory’s claims and explanations are to be understood and interpreted. 
Considering all the above functions and effects that long-term future time perspectives 
have within a theory, it is surprising that more attention has not been given to long-term 
future time perspectives regarding their role in shaping claims within a theory.440  
  The final section of the chapter offers an illustration of how a theory’s short-term 
and long-term future time perspectives simultaneously shape theoretical claims. To 
maintain consistency with the final sections found in chapters 5 and 6, I will again be 
using examples from Morgenthau’s theory regarding notions about the future and the 
(in)ability to foretell it to analyse how his theory’s future time perspectives affect both. 
                                                            
440 Neumann and Øverland, “International Relations and Policy Planning,” 264; Bernstein, Lebow, Gross 
Stein, and Weber, "God Gave Physics the Easy Problems,” 54. Difficulties in collaboration between IR and 
Future Studies (FS) offer potential reasons as to why long-term future time perspectives and their effects 
within IR theories have received less attention among IR scholars than historical and present time 
perspectives and their effects. For a more detailed discussion see Mert Bilgin, "The State of Future in 
International Relations," Futures 82 (September 2016): 52-62.  
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The purpose of discussing these two time perspectives together is to show how their co-
existence within a theory delimit understandings and interpretations regarding the 
future of international politics which cannot be done via other time perspectives (e.g. 
historical and present). Furthermore, by looking at how these two time perspectives 
relate to one another and theoretical claims about the future, new insights about the 
limits of what each future time perspective can convey about such theoretical claims are 
obtained. Consequently, this section augments contemporary understandings of how a 
theory’s conceptions and articulations of the future in its entirety (conveyed via short-
term and long-term future time perspectives) contribute to the shaping of how claims 
about international politics are understood and interpreted. By the end of this section, 
the distinct contributions that future time perspectives make to the meanings of a 
theory’s claims will be difficult to disregard and recognised as being on par with those 
contributions stemming from historical and present time perspectives.  
    
7.1 Short-term future time perspectives 
  At a minimum, short-term future time perspectives serve two basic roles in a 
theory, 1) predicting or approximating the near future and 2) moving a theory beyond 
the known/knowable world. The first role regards providing guaranteed predictions (e.g. 
the world will continue to be anarchic) or high probabilities of likely outcomes regarding 
the immediate future within a theory.441 Formulations of these predictions or 
probabilities are based upon a theory’s own understanding and interpretation of known 
perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics existing in the past and the 
present. Given the historical and contemporary basis of their formulations, these 
predictions or probabilities can be seen as expressions of a theory’s own confidence in 
its arguments and claims made about the near future. While I acknowledge that a 
theory’s confidence in its explanations can also be expressed via historical and present 
time perspectives, both of the latter categories of time perspectives have the luxury of 
addressing aspects of international politics that are known or potentially knowable 
                                                            
441 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 121. Prediction and probability (or forecast) are understood as 
distinct from one another in this study, a distinction that should not be overlooked. Essentially, 
probability lacks the certainty that a prediction implies. A similar distinction can be seen in Havard Hegre, 
Nils W Metternich, Havard Mokleiv Nygard, and Julian Wucherpfennig, “Forecasting in Peace Research,” 
Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 2 (March 2017): 118. 
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through additional research.442 Short-term future time perspectives, on the other hand, 
address both known and unknown aspects of international politics alike. In other words, 
addressing unknown aspects is a defining feature of future time perspectives. However, 
the unknowns addressed by short-term future time perspectives are distinct from those 
unknowns addressed by long-term future time perspectives. The unknowns addressed by 
short-term future time perspectives are directly tied to or products of known aspects 
about international politics that have either already occurred or are in the process of 
occurring.443 Whereas a long-term future time perspectives do not necessarily have to 
address all known aspects nor those unknown aspects with connections to the past or 
present.444  
  The following excerpts from Morgenthau’s section in Politics among Nations on 
the ‘Continuation of the Cold War’ illustrate how short-term future time perspectives 
account for both known and unknown aspects of international politics. The section 
begins with a claim about the short-term future based on the contemporary known 
aspects of international politics as perceived from the perception of the present in 
Morgenthau’s theory. ‘Turning…to short-run probabilities, we find it likely that two 
power blocs centred on two superpowers [(i.e. the U.S. and the former Soviet Union)] 
will continue to dominate the arena of world politics’.445 He continues on in the section 
to claim that the known strategies used in the past to maintain or restore a balance of 
power in international politics are no longer effective in the present nor the future 
because of the new structure of Morgenthau’s contemporary bi-polar world. The section 
concludes by addressing the unknown aspects of this new balance of power. ‘[T]he new 
balance of power is a mechanism that contains in itself the potentialities for unheard-of 
good as well as for unprecedented evil. Which of these potentialities will be realized 
depends not upon the mechanics of the balance of power, but upon moral and material 
forces which use that mechanism for the realization of their ends’.446 Consequently, 
Morgenthau’s short-term future time perspectives articulate notions about how the 
                                                            
442 MacKay and LaRoche, “Conduct of History,” 222-23. 
443 Short-term future time perspectives help a theory account for unknowns in the present. Dunne, Hansen, 
and Wight, “The End of International Relations Theory,” 420. 
444 A discussion regarding the unknowns addressed by long-term future time perspectives is detailed in 
section 7.2.1 of this chapter. 
445 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 338. 
446 Ibid, 339. 
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struggle for power and peace between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union can unfold 
from known and unknown aspects of international politics. 
 
7.1.1 Bridging and extending the known into the unknown 
  By addressing both types of aspects, short-term future time perspectives fulfil their 
second role of extending a theory’s explanatory power regarding known aspects of 
international politics onto the not wholly known world of international politics in the 
near future. The importance and consequences of this transition or bridging work done 
by short-term future time perspectives (discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
paragraphs) further distinguish these time perspectives from the other time perspectives 
identified thus far in chapters 5 and 6. Within short-term future time perspectives, the 
linkages made between the known aspects and the not wholly known aspects of the near 
future are understood as given. This understanding can be heuristically derived 
considering the present is directly followed by an immediate future which is not wholly 
known. Consequently, the evident linkages between the present and the immediate 
future help claims made about the near future appear less random and more consistent 
with the logic of a theory’s explanation. Conversely, linkages between known aspects 
and the aspects of the near future appear less clear, if at all, within long-term future time 
perspectives. Therefore, long-term future time perspectives cannot be relied upon within 
a theory to perform the necessary bridging work to enable a theory’s explanation to be 
extended beyond the known/knowable world. Similarly, the historical and present time 
perspectives are also unable to perform the bridging work because at best they can only 
allude to or suggest the layout of the foundation upon which the immediate future might 
is based. What is markedly missing from the articulations of the historical and present 
time perspectives is what the immediate future will or might manifest as; short-term 
future time perspectives provide those manifestations in more definitive terms. These 
near future manifestations are essential to pulling together known and existing aspects 
(i.e. knowable) of international politics into configurations which yield particular 
notions of the future yet-to-be realised. In other words, the manifestations provided 
enable short-term future time perspectives to extend a theory’s explanation of known 
(and knowable) aspects to an imminent future.      
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  This type of bridging work performed by short-term future time perspectives is 
evident in Morgenthau’s theory when referring to China’s rise in the near future. 
According to Morgenthau, ‘Asians beheld with a mixture of awe and admiration’ China’s 
position as a prospective great power, a ‘fact that determines today, and is likely to 
determine tomorrow, the fate of Asia’.447 This quote clearly illustrates an understanding 
within Morgenthau’s theory that known aspects of today (i.e. the present) effect how 
tomorrow (i.e. the near future) will manifest. Referring to the rise of China again in 
another piece, he wrote that ‘once 600 million Chinese are in the possession of modern 
instruments of industry’ the threat posed by China to the U.S. during the Cold War will 
become real.448 The aforementioned quote is useful for illustrating that claims within 
Morgenthau’s theory regarding the rise of China in the near future are rooted in known 
aspects of international politics. As a consequence of the bridging work done by the 
short-term future time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory, the known aspects of 
international politics are extended into the near future to such an extent that China’s 
near future status is not completely unknown. Furthermore, the bridging work enables 
claims within his theory, such as the significance of industrial capacity and size of 
population as sources of national power, to be extended beyond the past and the present 
into the future. 
  In addition to extending known aspects of international politics and the 
relevance of a theory’s claims into the near future, the bridging work done by short-term 
future time perspectives also introduces particular unknowns into a theory. The 
particular unknowns introduced into a theory appear as a theory’s articulated 
manifestations of the near future; manifestations which are attributed with known 
aspects. Thus, particular unknowns of the near future, in part, become ‘known’ and help 
to make a theory’s perception of the near future seem less ambiguous. As a consequence 
of helping to make sense of the near future, the particular unknowns introduced into a 
theory become a theoretical claim about the near future. In other words, short-term 
future time perspectives introduce new theoretical claims into a theory that might not 
be evident in a theory’s historical or contemporary account of international politics. 
Interpreted as theoretical claims, the unknowns introduced into a theory have the effect 
                                                            
447 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 393. 




of both validating and invalidating theoretical claims made elsewhere in the theory via 
historical and present time perspectives. Even if the unknowns are restricted to only 
conveying something about the near future, they still remain claims about the near 
future.  
  To clarify why historical and present time perspectives are not interpreted as 
introducing new unknowns (i.e. theoretical claims about the future) in the same way as  
short-term future time perspectives do, it is helpful to reflect upon how Morgenthau’s 
theory refers to China’s rise as a great power. Within Morgenthau’s theory, long-term 
historical trends regarding the rise of China are not mentioned, therefore historical 
trends are not useful in attributing known aspects to China’s unknown future. The short-
term historical time perspectives refer to the U.S.’s support for building a strong Japan as 
a counterweight to China’s expansionary interests post 1949; expansionary interests 
which do not extend beyond China’s traditional notion of where its borders should be.449 
While these expansionary interests may contribute to China’s rise in the near future, 
they alone are not sufficient to conclude that China will be a great power in the near 
future. The addition of a short-term future time perspective articulating the 
manifestation of China as a future great power changes how China’s expansionary 
interests can be interpreted. Short-term future time perspectives found within 
Morgenthau’s theory also indicate that China’s rise is not perpetual as conveyed via his 
theory’s short-term present time perspectives, but is leading toward a particular end. By 
articulating what the end is (i.e. China assuming its status as a great power), a theoretical 
claim is introduced by a short-term future time perspective into his theory’s notion about 
the near future. Consequently, a theory’s short-term future time perspectives play an 
essential role in introducing theoretical claims (i.e. unknowns) into a theory which 
would not otherwise be possible via a theory’s other time perspectives.450  
 
  
                                                            
449 Morgenthau, Truth and Power, 394-5. 
450 The unknowns articulated via long-term future time perspectives differ from those articulated via short-
term future time perspectives in that the former’s unknowns have the potential to appear as more random 
and their realisations are not seen as imminent.   
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7.1.2 Direct extrapolation  
 Unlike the other time perspectives, short-term future time perspectives are 
sequentially and inseparably linked to a particular conceptualisation of the present 
within a theory.451 This link exists because short-term future time perspectives are direct, 
rather than indirect, extrapolations from a theory’s particular notions of the present and 
corresponding theoretical claims.452 As direct extrapolations, short-term future time 
perspectives serve a dual purpose with respect to offering insights about time within a 
theory. These future time perspectives simultaneously articulate a theory’s ideas about 
the immediate future as well as its ideas about the present.453 The dual insights offered 
by short-term future time perspectives highlight the impossibility of disjoining a theory’s 
ideas about the present from its ideas about the immediate future. Furthermore, short-
term future time perspectives cannot exist independently (detached from the present) 
within a long-term future time perspective without direct reference to and obvious 
connections with a theory’s notions of the present.454 Consequently, awareness and 
knowledge of a theory’s notions of the present are necessary to understanding and 
interpreting short-term future time perspectives. Without this awareness and knowledge, 
then a theory’s short-term future time perspectives appear as random, groundless 
insertions within a theory; pure speculations doing little to strengthen or extend a 
theory’s explanatory relevance. For these reasons, short-term future time perspectives do 
not appear in a theory unless present time perspectives have also been articulated 
elsewhere in a theory.  
 An example of the close relationship between a theory’s notions of the present 
and a theory’s short-term future time perspectives is found in the following excerpt from 
Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations regarding ‘the problem of a “Third Force”’.  
  In view of the disparity of power between them [(i.e. a Third Force)] and the two   
  superpowers, it is hard to see at present how they can hope for more. While it  
                                                            
451 Long-term and short-term historical time perspectives do not have to immediately precede the present 
or be rooted to a particular present to be understood and interpreted. The lack of connectivity with 
historical time perspectives is possible when the present is considered a point of departure or disruption 
with the development of the past. Likewise, the long-term future time perspectives might also be 
envisioned as departures from the present, as well as the past (e.g. utopias).  
452 Hutchings, Time and World Politics, 60-1. 
453 Neumann and Øverland, “International Relations and Policy Planning,” 269. 
454 Ibid., 269. Alternatively, historical and long-term future time perspectives can exist independently. 
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  would certainly be presumptuous to suggest that their hopes to play a decisive  
  role as a “Third Force” in the world balance of power can never be fulfilled, it is  
  safe to say that they are bound to be disappointed in the foreseeable future.455  
In this excerpt, Morgenthau is leaving little doubt about the prospects of a ‘Third Force’ 
filling the balancer role vacated by the UK after WWII.456 Morgenthau’s doubt, however, 
is a direct extrapolation of international politics in his own present. Understanding his 
notion of the immediate future does not require some unknown aspect of international 
politics of the future to intervene or materialise; in essence, there is no unknown 
intermediary step necessary to arrive at similar conclusions. Consequently, this excerpt 
is helpful in illustrating that a theory’s short-term future time perspectives are derived 
and dependent upon a theory’s articulations of the present.  
  As the above example suggests, short-term future time perspectives are shaped by 
particular notions of the present (and to some extent by historical time perspectives as 
well) in different ways. On the one hand, short-term future time perspectives can be 
interpreted as articulations of the inevitable consequences of present circumstances. In 
this sense, the shaping of the immediate future is restrictive and predetermined, thus 
attaching a guaranteed level of certainty to predictions about how the future will 
manifest itself in the short-term given the contemporary context of international 
politics. This understanding of the immediate future suggests that theoretical claims 
about international politics in the near future are known in the present. For example, if 
the present within a theory is considered to be part of a repetitive cycle of processes and 
events, then the immediate future will be predicted to unfold and manifest itself in 
accordance with the expected next phase of the present cycle or trend.457 Predictions 
derived in this way, in turn, appear to add further credibility and validation to a theory’s 
explanation of the present and the past. However, understanding predictions solely as 
inevitable consequences of present circumstances can be problematic for the following 
reasons. This interpretation runs the risk of negating or underestimating the significant 
effects that unknown and unforeseen aspects of international politics can have on the 
                                                            
455 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 329. 
456 According to Morgenthau, this ‘Third Force’ is the group of states (e.g. India, Indonesia, and the Arab 
and Latin American states) ‘which have not committed themselves definitely or completely to the Western 
or Eastern bloc’ (Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 329). 
457 Neumann and Øverland, “International Relations and Policy Planning,” 258. 
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immediate future. Furthermore, when the predictions do not come true, a theory’s short-
term future time perspectives are subsequently called into question and can potentially 
result in a domino effect of questioning other time perspectives and claims made by the 
theory. However, short-term future time perspectives are not limited to being shaped by 
notions of a theory’s present in just one way. 
 Alternatively, the shaping of short-term future time perspectives can be less 
restrictive and indeterminate about what the near future will look like. Rather than 
providing predictions or certainties, they offer probabilities of likely outcomes in 
statistical terms. For example, the probability of states remaining the dominant 
international political actors in international politics in the immediate future (e.g. next 
10 years) is high. However, merely having a high probability does not rule out the low 
probability of multi-national corporations becoming the most dominant actors in 
international politics in the near future. Short-term future time perspectives which are 
less restrictive and indeterminate effectively leave the future open to any number of 
potential outcomes and enables a theory to acknowledge forecasting mistakes without 
calling into question fundamental claims that a theory may make. This openness also 
allows a theory to acknowledge the relevant effects that particular historical and present 
contexts have on the immediate future without having to claim that these contexts only 
lead to one particular outcome. Finally, interpreting short-term future time perspectives 
as indeterminate indicates a theory’s self-awareness of its limited ability to accurately 
account for unknowns aspects which can alter the probabilities of particular outcomes 
manifesting in the near future.458 Consequently, interpreting short-term future time 
perspectives in this way acknowledges the significance of unknown aspects in regards to 
the roles they can play in shaping the near future.  
  Although shaped by notions of the present, short-term future time perspectives 
also offer assessments of various known aspects of international politics in the present 
(and possibly the past) that cannot otherwise be determined. The various known aspects 
assessed include both perennial aspects of international politics as well as newly 
emergent ephemeral aspects of international politics. In regards to the perennial 
                                                            
458 Ian Wilson, ‘‘The Effective Implementation of Scenario Planning: Changing the Corporate Culture,’’ in 
Learning from the Future: Competitive Foresight Scenarios, eds. Liam Fahey and Robert M. Randall (New 
York, NY: John Wiley and Sons, 1998), 354. 
175 
 
aspects, short-term future time perspectives indicate what theoretical claims can be made 
about the influences of perennial aspects on the near future. For example, are perennial 
aspects in decline, stable, rising, or dormant?459 Regarding newly emergent ephemeral 
aspects, a theory’s short-term future time perspectives indicate which ephemeral aspects 
will play greater or smaller influential roles in the near future. In other words, short-
term future time perspectives attribute near future significance and status to theoretical 
claims through their assessments. Knowing that short-term future time perspectives can 
alter how theoretical claims are understood and interpreted in the near future helps to 
explain how a theory can have multiple understandings of its claims within a historical 
context or contemporary context. An example of this can be seen in the discussions 
within Morgenthau’s theory regarding the role of a balancer of power in international 
politics in the immediate future. In the past a role of a balancer of power -- played by 
Great Britain for many centuries with respect to European great powers – existed and 
was a perennial aspect of the structure and function of international politics within 
Europe. However, in consideration of the contemporary bipolar world dominated by the 
U.S. and the former Soviet Union as articulated within Morgenthau’s theory, a claim is 
made that the place for a balancer of power no longer exists and thus it is ‘futile…to hope 
that another nation or group of nations will take the place vacated by Great Britain’.460 
This example illustrates how short-term future time perspectives lock their assessments 
of theoretical claims in the near future without undermining past and present 
understandings and interpretations. Short-term future time perspectives enable a theory 
to account for recent or pending changes in international politics or discount seemingly 
important developments in contemporary international politics without compromising 
theoretical claims made about the past or the present.461  
  By adhering to a theory’s particular aggregation and structuring of contemporary 
international political contexts, short-term future time perspectives maintain a theory’s 
internal consistency and coherence in the arguments and explanations. For example, if 
a theory claims international politics is the result of cycles and trends, then the 
predictions suggested within a theory’s short-term future time perspectives should reflect 
                                                            
459 Mueller raises similar questions in regards to the existence of imperialism. Mueller, “Temporality, 
Sovereignty, and Imperialism,” 429. 
460 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 329. 
461 Streich and Levy, "Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal Choice."  
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the continuation of a theory’s existing claims about those cycles and trends. Illustrating 
this point are discussions within Morgenthau’s theory regarding the tendency of a two-
bloc system and the continuation of the Cold War in the near future.462 Within these 
discussions claims are made that the two-block system dominated by the U.S. and the 
former Soviet Union will continue to keep other nations within the system and influence 
international politics in the near future. Conversely, if a theory characterises 
international politics as indeterminable and dynamic, then a theory’s short-term future 
time perspectives might suggest alternate states of the international politics which may 
be clear departures from the present state of affairs. This characterisation of 
international politics is illustrated within Morgenthau’s theory where Morgenthau states 
that ‘[t]he changed structure of the balance of power [(between the U.S. and the former 
Soviet Union)] has made the hostile opposition of two gigantic power blocs possible, but 
it has not made it inevitable’.463 In either case, the aggregation and structuring 
articulated by short-term future time perspectives allow a theory to extend its arguments 
and explanations into the future and thus preserve the theory’s continued relevance to 
the study of international politics in the future.464  
  While aggregating and structuring known aspects of international politics, short-
term future time perspectives also simultaneously do the same with unknown aspects. 
This aggregation and structuring can appear in a theory as an acknowledgement that 
factors not yet materialised (i.e. unknown) will contribute to the manifestations of 
international politics in the near future. Conversely, unknown aspects may also be 
excluded from consideration; in essence, left out of the structuring because such 
unknown aspects are considered to have diminishing effects on international politics. 
The reason why short-term future time perspectives have to aggregate and structure both 
types of aspects is because these future time perspectives are rare nexus points within a 
theory where the knowns and unknowns of international politics are discussed in 
conjunction with one another.465 The resultant discussions are insightful because they 
                                                            
462 Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, 326 and 338. 
463 Ibid., 339. 
464 The two examples mentioned in this paragraph indicate the tension within Morgenthau’s theory that 
readers of Morgenthau have picked up on over the years. For examples see Richard Rosecrance, "The One 
World of Hans Morgenthau," Social Research 48, no. 4 (Winter 1981): 749-65; Duncan Bell, ed., Political 
Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009), 56-7. 
465 Historical and present time perspectives typically focus on known aspects of international politics.  
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demonstrate how a theory addresses known and unknown variables existing or yet-to-
exist within international politics. An illustrative example of a theory addressing known 
and unknown variables can be found in a brief discussion within Morgenthau’s theory 
regarding the possibility of a peaceful co-existence in the ‘foreseeable future’ between 
the U.S. and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War.466 At the end of the 
discussion a claim is made that a peaceful co-existence between the two superpowers 
does ‘not seem likely to materialize in the foreseeable future’.467 This example also 
suggests that a theory’s short-term future time perspectives helps to outline and map out 
a theory’s logic regarding how international politics will unfold toward or away from 
particular manifestations in the near future under known and unknown contemporary 
and near-future circumstances. It is thus important to understand the logic that is found 
within a theory’s short-term future time perspectives because this logic provides the 
framework that a theory uses to prescribe rational outcomes in the near future.  
  Via the logic articulated in a theory’s short-term future time perspectives, a theory 
is able to perform three prescriptive functions. First, a theory is able to signpost which 
areas or aspects within international politics where unknowns may or may not arise in 
the near future. For example, discussions within Morgenthau’s theory regarding a world 
community and the future of diplomacy help to signpost which aspects, where unknown 
advancements may take place in the near future, would lead to the emergence of a world 
state.468 Second, the logic provides guidance as to how unknowns in the near future 
should be recognised, classified, and assessed by a theory (i.e. either as perennial or 
ephemeral). For example, a theory’s logic might underestimate or relegate the 
significance of all near future unknown variables in comparison to known perennial and 
ephemeral aspects of international politics. This type logic can be derived from 
discussions within Morgenthau’s theory regarding near future unknown variables of 
limited warfare which are only considered within the context of total warfare (i.e. a 
perennial aspect of international politics in the future).469 Conversely, a theory’s logic 
might prescribe unknown variables the same or greater significance as known variables. 
For example, within Morgenthau’s theory unknown variables of the near future 
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regarding diplomatic practices have greater significance in the struggle for peace than 
known variables associated within UN action or peace through force because of their 
potential to support and advance efforts of peace. Finally, an awareness of which 
unknown variables fall within and outside the logic embedded within a theory’s short-
term future time perspectives indicate the explanatory limits of a theory with respect to 
the near future. For example, the impossibility of unknown variables arising in the near 
future that would render the nuclear condition of international politics an insignificant 
concern would fall outside the logic of Morgenthau’s theory. Consequently, a conclusion 
that can be drawn from this observation is that the explanatory power of Morgenthau’s 
theory with respect to the near future of international politics are bound by a nuclear 
condition in the near future.  
  In addition to the prescriptive functions mentioned above, short-term future time 
perspectives pre-emptively add meaning and significance (i.e. perennial and ephemeral) 
to international political aspects beyond what their historical and contemporary 
meaning and significance are (i.e. their future manifestations). As examples, the threats 
of terrorism, cyberwarfare, and climate change in the 21st Century are and will continue 
to redefine how states organise and coordinate their defence and security in the near 
future. Conversely, in the 20th century these issues were of less importance in 
comparison to the threat of nuclear war or the struggle for global domination between 
the former Soviet Union and the United States as articulated within Morgenthau’s 
theory. By pre-emptively assigning meaning and significance to certain aspects of 
international politics manifesting in the near future, a theory is effectively extending its 
theoretical explanations into the near future. This explanatory extension into the future 
via short-term time perspectives ends up foreshadowing and directing where future 
developments of politics should head. In the case of Morgenthau’s theory, the discussion 
emphasising the revival of quality diplomatic practices among states indicates 
diplomacy as an area of international politics where developments need to take place in 
the near future. Furthermore, these time perspectives prepare the theoretical 
groundwork in the near future for subsequent scholars using a particular theory to study 
international politics. In other words, as a consequence of this explanatory extension 
into the near future a theory pre-establishes and predetermines its relevance and 
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applicability to the unknown international political sphere.   
 
7.2 Long-term future time perspectives   
  Long-term future time perspectives serve at least one of two primary roles within 
a theory; they extend a theory’s applicability beyond the foreseeable future (i.e. beyond 
the short-term future and present to some extent) into the unforeseen (long-term) 
future and they provide glimpses into the long-term future evolution of international 
politics. In regards to the first role, long-term future time perspectives are crucial to 
establishing either the long-lasting, but finitude of a theory’s explanatory power on the 
distant future or its indefinite relevance. This distinction is worth noting because each 
distinction has different effects on a theory’s claims. I classify a theory’s relevance as 
‘long-lasting’ when a theory’s long-term future time perspectives convey a point in time 
when a theory’s claims are no longer helpful in making sense of international politics in 
the present or future. An expression of this point in time articulated via a theory’s long-
term future time perspectives can appear as a utopia or a grand resolution of a 
fundamental problem or situation in international politics.470 Although Morgenthau’s 
theory does not offer either a utopia or grand resolution in the way other theories such 
as liberalism and Marxism do, his criticisms of such theories indicate where examples of 
long-term future time perspectives articulating utopias or grand resolutions can be 
drawn.471 An example of a utopia or grand resolution articulated via a theory’s long-term 
future time perspectives can be found in Marxism which calls upon workers to overthrow 
existing capitalist modes of production and reorganise society into a classless utopia.472 
The significance of these points in time is that they bracket or bookend the length of the 
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future within which a theory’s claims can be understood as having relevance to making 
sense of international politics in the future. In other words, a theory’s claims will be valid 
up to a particular point in time in the future. After this point is reached (e.g. Marxism’s 
classless utopia), a theory’s claims about international politics are considered by that 
theory as only relevant to the past because international politics of the future is 
fundamentally different than what came before. This interpretation of theoretical claims 
contrasts with a theory’s long-term future time perspectives which suggest theoretical 
claims have indefinite relevance. 
  The use of ‘indefinite’ to describe the relevance of a theory’s claims suggests that 
these claims are not bound by a point in time in the future and have the potential to be 
applicable forever (i.e. timeless). Such enduring relevance can be suggested in three 
ways by a theory’s long-term future time perspectives:  1) through articulations of 
perennial truths, 2) timeless epistemologies, and 3) potential future scenarios. First, a 
theory might articulate that particular perennial aspects of international politics will 
never cease to exist in the future (e.g. cyclical nature of international politics, dominant 
actors). For example, in neorealism, anarchy among states will always be a dominant 
aspect of the international political system.473 Consequently, there is no conceivable 
reason or scenario under which a world state as described by Morgenthau would emerge 
because states would never completely cede their sovereignty to a world state. Second, 
epistemologies within a theory might be considered relevant to the study of 
international politics indefinitely regardless of how international politics is constituted 
at any point in the future. For example, social constructivist epistemology, according to 
Wendt, is supposed to be continually applicable to and relevant for examining 
international politics as long as ‘the structures of human association are determined 
primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and 
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7.2.1 Predictions, probabilities, and aspirations  
 Unlike the two previous ways which suggest certain theoretical claims are 
timeless in a nondescript future, articulations of potential future scenarios provide 
specific future contexts of international politics where the timelessness of theoretical 
claims is demonstrated. These potential future scenarios and associated contexts within 
theories can be expressed as predictions, probabilities, or aspirations about the 
unforeseeable future. By placing a theory’s claims within unforeseen future contexts that 
differ from those historical, present, and foreseeable future contexts identified elsewhere 
within a theory, a theory’s long-term future time perspectives help to illustrate that a 
theory’s claims do not only apply to known contexts but also to unrealised and unknown 
contexts. In essence, articulating claims via a theory’s long-term future time perspectives 
have the potential to ascribe a timeless quality to such claims. However, articulating the 
relevance of a theory’s claims within future contexts that differ slightly from historical 
and present contexts (e.g. such as those mentioned within short-term future time 
perspectives) are not enough to convey that a theory’s claims are timeless. To convey the 
timelessness of a claim, potential future contexts must differ substantially from known 
contexts (historical, present, or short-term future) in that they either 1) challenge 
historical, contemporary, or short-term future contexts of international politics or 2) are 
so far removed from known contexts of international politics that potential future 
contexts seem almost unimaginable. Long-term future time perspectives are able to 
articulate these more substantial differences of potential future contexts because the 
contexts articulated by these future time perspectives are not bound as closely to the 
present and known aspects of international politics as those contexts articulated by 
short-term future time perspectives. In essence, the future contexts articulated within 
long-term future time perspectives help to liberate theoretical claims from their historical 
and contemporary contexts so they can be interpreted as indefinitely relevant to the 
study of international politics in the unforeseeable future. 
  An example of how the future contexts introduced into a theory by long-term 
future time perspectives support interpretations of particular theoretical claims as 
timeless can be found in Morgenthau’s discussion regarding interest defined as power 
in relation to the creation of a world state. Long-term future time perspectives are used 
within Morgenthau’s theory to outline the potential future requirements and contexts 
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where a world state could become the dominant actor preserving international peace. 
‘For the world state to be more than a dim vision, the accommodating processes of 
diplomacy, mitigating and minimizing conflicts, must be revived’.475 As a consequence 
of the revival of diplomacy, ‘the interests uniting members of different nations [will 
eventually] outweigh the interests separating them’.476 From these shared interests, 
Morgenthau claims that an international community can develop and provide the 
foundation for a future world state.477 Although placed in an unforeseeable (i.e. 
imagined) future context, his claims about interest defined as power are not undermined 
and remain central to his explanation of how international politics works. By including 
this specific future context alongside the historical, present, and foreseeable future 
contexts found elsewhere in Morgenthau’s theory where interest defined as power is 
discussed, this claim can be interpreted as indefinitely applicable to the study of 
international politics (i.e. timeless). Morgenthau’s discussion of the creation of a future 
world state does not bracket his theory’s long-term future time perspectives, but serves 
as an example of a potential future scenario demonstrating the timelessness of his 
theoretical claims regarding interest defined as power.    
  The second primary role served by a theory’s long-term future time perspectives 
is to articulate long-term predictions, probabilities, and aspirations about the 
unforeseeable future. Long-term predictions and probabilities and long-term aspirations 
are distinct from one another in four ways. First, predictions and probabilities are 
grouped into one category because both denote precision and some degree of certainty 
in contrast to the uncertainty and imprecision or potential disregarding of reality 
associated with aspirations.478 Discussions within Morgenthau’s theory regarding the 
probability of the creation of a world community479 and aspirations of disarmament 
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being a first step toward or ‘solution to the problem of international order and peace’ 
help to clarify the distinction between predictions/probabilities and aspirations 
articulated within a theory via its long-term future time perspectives.480 Second, 
predictions, probabilities, and aspirations can have connections to past and 
contemporary international politics, however, only the predictions and probabilities are 
derived primarily from experience; whereas aspirations may or may not be derived from 
experience.481 Aspirations, however, cannot originate without the influence of an 
emotional component, namely hope or desire, with regards to the unforeseeable future. 
Again, the aforementioned discussions within Morgenthau’s theory regarding world 
community and disarmament help to highlight the aforementioned points. For example, 
the specialised agencies of the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and 
the European Coal and Steel Community are presented as evidence of how and where a 
world community might develop from contemporary experience;482 conversely, it is the 
belief among statesmen in ‘disarmament as a devise to insure international order and 
peace’ that keep disarmament as a policy option worth pursuing despite the many failed 
attempts made at disarmament in the past.483  
  A third distinction between predictions and probabilities and aspirations is that 
aspirations are primarily articulated in the context of the distant future rather than in 
the immediate future. An example of such an aspiration articulated in the distant future 
is evident within Morgenthau’s theory where the manifestation of a functioning 
international police is addressed.484 Conversely, predictions and probabilities appear 
equally in the context of both short-term and long-term future time perspectives. Those 
predictions and probabilities relating to the long-term future try to account for a 
disproportionately greater number of unknowns vs. known variables that may occur in 
international politics than their short-term counterparts. The final distinction is that 
aspirations might not be accompanied by (nor require) detailed explanations as to how 
they are connected to the rest of a theory’s explanation. Furthermore, some aspirations 
may appear to not be in accordance with the evidence presented within a theory in 
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support of a theory’s central arguments. Drawing on Morgenthau’s theory for an 
example of this latter point is difficult because aspirations mentioned in his theory are 
rare and remarkably consistent with the evidence presented within his theory; 
consequently an example of this latter point must be drawn from another theory.  For 
example within Marxist theory, as articulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, 
aspirations of society evolving in particular stages towards a pure communist society at 
some point in the distant future runs counter to the historical evidence presented in the 
theory which suggests capitalism’s adaptive qualities can prevent such a linear 
progression or lead to a different end.485 This implicit acceptance of discordance within 
a theory is not afforded to predictions and probabilities relating to the unforeseeable 
(i.e. long-term) future as it would undermine the validity and credibility of long-term 
predictions and probabilities presented within a theory. By clarifying distinctions 
between long-term predictions and probabilities and aspirations, the different ways 
through which a theory addresses the long-term future of international politics become 
more apparent. 
  Although the predictions, probabilities, and aspirations articulated via long-term 
future time perspectives relate to the unforeseeable future, they are not devoid of all 
known and foreseeable aspects of international politics. For these predictions, 
probabilities, and aspirations to remain connected with a theory’s general explanation 
of international politics, they must include or reference at least one known core 
perennial aspect of international politics referenced elsewhere in a theory. For example, 
within Morgenthau’s theory the struggle for power and peace is a known core perennial 
aspect of international politics that is evident within the predictions, probabilities, and 
aspirations about the distant future articulated within his theory. Such references to a 
perennial aspect may include its active presence in international politics, dormancy, 
overall decline, or ultimate end in the distant future. These references, however, do not 
need to match how that particular perennial aspect has been interpreted in the past; 
they need only acknowledge the existence of a perennial aspect. This point is illustrated 
within Morgenthau’s theory by making references to the nuclear condition as a 
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perennial aspect in the present and future of international politics, though not the past. 
Without the inclusion of or reference to at least one perennial aspect, claims about the 
distant future would appear as random and disconnected from the rest of a theory’s 
explanation.486 In addition to addressing known perennial aspects of international 
politics, the predictions, probabilities, and aspirations articulated within long-term 
future time perspectives may also include known ephemeral aspects of international 
politics of the present (e.g. rising international actors such as China and India). The 
inclusion of contemporary ephemeral aspects within articulations of the distant future 
enable a theory to attach long-term significance and perennial attributes to these 
aspects. An example of this point is evident within Morgenthau’s theory regarding 
references made to the role of China as an important political actor in international 
politics in the distant future.487 The attachment of these qualities to ephemeral aspects 
occurs as a consequence of illustrating their manifestations in the distant future. 
Consequently, understandings and interpretations of contemporary ephemeral aspects 
in the present can be altered by a theory’s long-term future time perspectives. 
  To grasp the significance of long-term future time perspectives retaining known 
aspects of international politics, reflecting upon two known aspects of international 
politics mentioned in Morgenthau’s discussion of the creation of a world state found in 
his theory is again helpful. One of the known aspects is perennial (e.g. survival interest 
motivating international political action) and the other known aspect is ephemeral but 
not found in the long-term past (e.g. the nuclear condition). Within Morgenthau’s 
theory, these two known aspects are combined to consequently suggest that the 
contemporary nuclear condition has created an immediate and perpetual urgency 
among states regarding their survival. Morgenthau suggests that this shared threat to 
survival has the potential at some point in the future to prompt states to consider 
pursuing the development of a world state which can help secure permanent peace and 
ensure the survival of humanity for future generations.488 In this example, the world 
state is a long-term aspiration that Morgenthau’s theory suggests is created and 
perpetuated by an ephemeral aspect (i.e. the nuclear condition) of the contemporary 
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world as articulated within Morgenthau’s theory. Morgenthau’s theory interprets the 
creation of a world state as a long-term project which involves multiple developmental 
stages (e.g. building of a world community and a revival of diplomacy) that would 
require the convergence or alignment of states’ competing interests regarding how to go 
about creating a world state and what type of world state should be created. The 
sequence of these developmental stages outlined within his theory suggest the creation 
of a world state will not happen in the short-term, but over an extended period of time 
with no definitive date of creation. Until that date arrives, the threat to states’ survival 
posed by the nuclear condition is ongoing and becomes a perennial aspect of 
international politics in the future. Consequently, from this example, the known 
perennial interest for survival and known ephemeral aspect regarding the nuclear 
condition retained by long-term future time perspectives help to connect notions of a 
distant future to the general explanations of international politics offered by 
Morgenthau’s theory.  
 
7.2.2 Projecting as a common purpose 
  As the previous example indicates, long-term future time perspectives can serve a 
common purpose within a theory which is to offer solutions or suggestions -- in the form 
of predictions, probabilities, and aspirations -- that attempt to adequately address 
international political questions and problems in the unforeseeable future.489 In one 
sense, this common purpose is meant to help the reader understand what accepting a 
theory’s argument means in relation to thinking about the future of international 
politics. For example, Morgenthau’s discussions regarding the difficulties of creating a 
world state and a world community in the distant future helps him lead the reader to a 
particular end, a revival of diplomacy.490 In another sense, the common purpose of long-
term future time perspectives may also be to provide a response (either conclusive or 
open-ended) to questions or concerns raised by a theory, thus helping to complete a 
theory’s main argument. An example of long-term future time perspectives illustrating 
this type of common purpose can be found in the discussion within Morgenthau’s theory 
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regarding the resurrection of the practice of diplomacy among states in the future.491 
According to Morgenthau, resurrecting the practice of diplomacy is a response to 
addressing the struggles for power and peace in international politics as outlined 
throughout Politics among Nations. The discussion is significant because it draws 
attention to Morgenthau’s disbelief that the struggle for power and peace can be 
sufficiently addressed, though not resolved (in the context of the nuclear condition) in 
the foreseeable future.  
  Regardless of the common purpose(s) that a theory’s long-term future time 
perspectives serves, as a consequence of addressing or providing solutions to 
international political questions and problems in the unforeseeable future, a theory ends 
up projecting out particular views of how international politics may or will evolve and 
manifest in the distant future. Included within these projections are general notions 
about international politics in the future. The potential futures put forward by a theory 
may include, but are not limited to dystopias, utopias, or ends to ongoing, systemic 
international political tensions. Where a theory does not put forward specific views of 
how international politics will evolve or manifest in the unforeseeable future, such a 
theory may still project out certain notions that are reflective of a particular awareness 
or understanding of international politics in the distant future. For example, some 
usages of Critical Theory suggest that theory projects out the idea that alternative 
understandings and interpretations of international politics which have been 
historically silenced or marginalised (e.g. notions of international politics from non-
Western or gendered perspectives) should not be immediately barred from 
consideration or adoption in the distant future.492 While the objectives of the future 
projections of certain theories may not always be clear or even exist, particular objectives 
of the future projections of other theories are more evident and go beyond merely 
articulating long-term future manifestations of international politics.  
  To illustrate the additional insights that an examination of a theory’s projections 
can reveal about long-term future time perspectives within a theory, I have provided the 
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following three examples. In the first case, long-term future projections may serve as 
warnings and/or calls of action against the current practice or evolution of international 
politics. For example, Morgenthau warns against beliefs that efforts to create a world 
community via state engagement in NATO, the European Coal and Steel Community, 
and specialised agencies of the UN (e.g. UNESCO, WHO) will lead to peace and 
individual citizens transferring their loyalties from a state to a supranational entity.493 
In the second case, long-term future projections may provide reassurances that despite 
the historical or contemporary status of international politics, long-term aspirations for 
the future can be significantly different and seemingly not rooted in the past or present. 
For example, Morgenthau’s claims regarding the revival of diplomatic practices via 
overcoming certain vices and following four fundamental rules provide reassurances 
that there remained possibilities to avoid the outbreak of a nuclear war despite tenuous 
relations between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.494 Finally, long-term future 
projections may (re)confirm international politics is governed by dominate cycles, 
trends, and/or forces (i.e. particular perennial factors) which ultimately lead to known 
ends or serve as an accepted set of factors which maintain a general status quo (e.g. 
anarchy, international law) within the international political sphere.495 To illustrate, 
Gilpin offers a theoretical perspective which suggests that there will always be 
hegemonic states which dictate international politics to other states, as well as 
acknowledges that the anarchic state of international politics is the status quo for the 
long-term future.496 While the above examples are not meant to constitute an exhaustive 
list, they do highlight what a theory’s long-term projections can reveal about its long-
term future time perspectives.  
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7.3 Combined effects 
  Up to this point, the analyses and discussions regarding future time perspectives 
have focused on how each individual future time perspective functions within a theory 
and subsequently shapes theoretical claims. The purpose of addressing each future time 
perspectives individually was to highlight the unique ways that they each shape claims 
within a theory, ways that are distinct from each other as well as other time perspectives 
relating to the past and the present. Short-term and long-term future time perspectives, 
however, do not exist in isolation within a theory; they co-exist and together constitute 
a theory’s panoptic view of the future in its entirety. To illustrate how short-term and 
long-term future time perspectives co-exist within a theory and the subsequent effects of 
this co-existence on theoretical claims, this final section presents and discusses an 
example from Morgenthau’s theory. This example concerns the relations within 
Morgenthau’s theory between its future time perspectives and theoretical claims 
regarding the future as it relates to the notion of immortality. By the end of this section, 
a greater appreciation for and awareness of the co-shaping roles that short-term and 
long-term future time perspectives play within a theory will be difficult to ignore, 
particularly considering future time perspectives feature less prominently in his theory 
than time perspectives relating to the past and the present. This welcomed difficulty 
arises because of the proscriptive and retrospective understandings and interpretations 
of theoretical claims scholars gain via an analysis of future time perspectives; an analysis 
which has yet to be fully developed in the IR literature. 
To begin to gain an understanding of the co-shaping roles short-term and long-
term future time perspectives within Morgenthau’s theory play in regards to his 
theoretical understandings and interpretations of immortality, initially addressing 
Morgenthau’s general claims about foretelling the future is necessary. As stated in 
previous chapters, Morgenthau was quite explicit that the future of international politics 
cannot be predicted. In place of prediction, Morgenthau refers to the likelihood or 
statistical probability of international politics developing in particular ways in the 
future. In regards to Morgenthau’s theoretical claims about the possibility of 
immortality within the future context of international politics where nuclear weapons 
exist, the probability is infinitesimally small so as to equate to zero.497 In other words, 
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the probability of immortality in the future is so low as to suggest that immortality is no 
longer considered achievable in the future. This claim of the low probability of 
immortality is supported by the absence of references made to immortality as an 
aspiration within Morgenthau’s theory. Consequently, Morgenthau’s theory is 
essentially offering a prediction that achieving immortality is impossible in the future. 
In offering this assessment regarding the inability to achieve immortality, Morgenthau’s 
theory is making a claim about how to conceive of immortality in the future. The central 
claim is that the notion of immortality is not relevant to thinking about the future 
because it is not possible. This claim stems from how Morgenthau’s theory addresses the 
future of international politics via short-term and long-term future time perspectives. 
When looking at how claims about immortality are affected within Morgenthau’s 
theory by future time perspectives, recognising immortality as a long-term future time 
perspective itself must be considered. The longest long-term future time perspective 
referenced within Morgenthau’s theory relate to his thoughts on immortality.498 As the 
longest long-term future time perspective, immortality provides the extent to which 
Morgenthau’s theoretical explanations and claims might potentially be applicable. 
Furthermore, this claim implies that no other future time perspective can be longer. 
With no discernible end, immortality essentially sustains a long-term future time 
perspective within Morgenthau’s theory that is indefinite. When this notion of a long-
term future time perspective with no end is considered alongside Morgenthau’s 
theoretical claims regarding notions of contingency, human nature, and the nuclear 
condition with respect to international politics, these claims are understood and 
interpreted as indefinitely relevant to explaining international politics in the unforeseen 
future. Via these claims, therefore, the applicability of Morgenthau’s theory in helping 
to make sense of international politics in the long-term future can also be understood 
as extended indefinitely. Morgenthau recognises, however, that the infiniteness of 
immortality should not be taken for granted.  
For Morgenthau, the nuclear condition of international politics in the present 
and future, challenges the infinite aspect of immortality. Essentially, Morgenthau’s 
short-term future time perspectives extend the nuclear condition and the threats it poses 
in contemporary international politics to the future (i.e. bridging work). The 
                                                            
498 Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, 144-52. 
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introduction of the nuclear condition and corresponding threats into the future is 
significant because they represent existing, known ends to the world. In identifying 
existing, known ends to the world, those ends effectively signpost the limits of 
immortality. Consequently, the infinite aspect of immortality loses its significance and 
thus suggests that immortality within Morgenthau’s theory is finite; in other words 
immortality becomes an irrational possibility for Morgenthau.499 Morgenthau’s notion 
that immortality is an irrational possibility is further reinforced via his recognition of 
the immediacy with which nuclear weapons can be used at any point in the short-term 
or long-term future.500 The cumulative effects of this curtailing of immortality within 
Morgenthau’s theory is fourfold. First, a long-term future time perspective that has no 
end is eliminated from Morgenthau’s consideration because of the potential usage of 
nuclear weapons in the future. Second, the longest long-term future time perspective is 
drastically reduced in duration to the point that a nuclear strike tomorrow would make 
this time perspective a short-term future time perspective.501 Third, because the ends of 
immortality are derived from the present nuclear condition (and immortality is 
representative of the longest long-term future time perspective within Morgenthau’s 
theory), the nuclear condition becomes perennialised in international politics of the 
future. Finally, the possibility of immortality is interpreted as dependent upon the 
political actions of the present. 
The aforementioned final point regarding immortality’s dependence on the 
present is significant because it offers key insights into how Morgenthau’s theory 
constrains notions of the future and maintains its primary aim of making sense of 
international politics in the present. By making the existence of immortality dependent 
upon contemporary international politics, Morgenthau reorients his longest long-term 
future time perspective and corresponding theoretical outlooks back onto the present. 
Thus, instead of having this particular long-term future time perspective focused on the 
future for its own sake, its focus is on the present. This reorientation of long-term future 
theoretical outlooks back onto the present, however, is not unique. As extrapolations of 
the present, Morgenthau’s short-term future theoretical outlooks regarding immortality 
                                                            
499 Morgenthau, Science: Servant or Master?, 144-52. 
500 Ibid., 137, 140. 
501 As a result of shortening immortality, the scope of time Morgenthau’s theory covers is also shortened. 
This is similar to an earlier discussion in Section 5.2.5 regarding how the scope of time considered within 
his long-term historical perspectives constrains theoretical predictions. 
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also contribute to reorienting the theory’s notions of the future back onto the present. 
This interpretation is based upon an understanding that immortality’s end (defined by 
the nuclear condition) remains the same in the short-term and long-term future. 
Consequently, Morgenthau’s short-term and long-term future time perspectives 
regarding immortality illustrate how notions about the future are constrained within his 
theory to maintaining a focus on the present, even when addressing the future. This 
insight suggests Morgenthau’s short-term and long-term future time perspectives are 
dominated by the present.502 Given the aim of Morgenthau’s theory to help make sense 
of international politics in the present, this dominance of the present within 
Morgenthau’s future time perspectives regarding immortality and the future in general 
is not surprising.  
The dominance of the present in the future also indicates the relationships 
between both future time perspectives and short-term present time perspectives. Each 
time perspective delimits the claims Morgenthau can make in his theory to render 
particular understandings and interpretations of immortality with respect to the future; 
in essence immortality has a finite end.503 These relationships further support the 
arguments consistently presented throughout this thesis that time perspectives co-exist, 
interact, and simultaneously shape claims about international politics within a theory. 
Consequently, this final section shows that to ignore or remain unaware of the substance 
and meaning future time perspectives add to theoretical claims is to not fully 
comprehend the purpose and meaning of including particular theoretical claims within 
a theory. In the case of Morgenthau’s references to and discussions of immortality, an 
analysis of his future time perspectives helps to recover the sincerity and severity of his 
warning against perpetuating what he saw as incomplete or delusional understandings 
and interpretations of the realities of contemporary international politics.504 In other 
words, the individual and combined effects of a theory’s future time perspectives are not 
                                                            
502 For a good discussion the difficulties of escaping the influences of the present and presentism in 
relation to historicity, see Hartog and Saskia, Regimes of Historicity. 
503 Although not addressed, long-term and short-term historical time perspectives also shape claims about 
immortality within Morgenthau’s theory. Specifically, these historical time perspectives illustrate how 
immortality was a possibility in the past. McQueen, “Salutary Fear?,” 89. By acknowledging that this 
possibility existed in the past and contrasting it with the impossibility of immortality in the future, the 
future is made more distinct and the significance of the nuclear condition is increased. 
504 These views are evident in Morgenthau’s critique of liberalism; for examples see Morgenthau,  
Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, 1946, 72-3 and 85. 
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just relevant to making sense of theoretical claims about international politics in the 
future, but across the timescape articulated within a theory. 
 
7.4 Chapter summary 
 The analyses and discussions regarding short-term and long-term future time 
perspectives articulated in this chapter have helped recover an awareness of and 
appreciation for how these two future time perspectives can potentially function within 
a theory and shape understandings and interpretations of theoretical claims about 
international politics. Similar to the analyses and discussions of historical and present 
time perspectives found in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, distinctions between short-term 
and long-term future time perspectives were individually detailed and highlighted 
through examples drawn primarily from Morgenthau’s theory of international politics. 
As a consequence of addressing and highlighting these distinctions, the contrasts 
between future time perspectives and historical and present time perspectives became 
more evident. The contrasts between future time perspectives and other time 
perspectives are significant because they indicate that a theory’s future time perspectives 
can shape and confer meaning and significance on a theory’s claims about international 
politics which are not otherwise possible via a theory’s historical and present time 
perspectives (e.g. the perennialisation of an ephemeral aspect of the past or the present). 
Consequently, to only interpret theoretical claims from a theory’s historical and present 
time perspectives when at least one future time perspective exists within a theory, would 
lead to a partial understanding of how that particular theory makes sense of 
international politics. By addressing the functions and effects of short-term and long-
term future time perspectives individually and collectively, this chapter provides scholars 
with new insights that can be used to avoid partial understandings of theoretical claims 
resulting from superficial readings and interpretations of future time perspectives. 
  The new insights provided by this chapter are summarised below. The first 
section contains insights about the various functions and effects of a theory’s short-term 
future time perspectives in relation to theoretical claims. Among the insights recovered 
through my analysis, short-term future time perspectives were found to perform crucial 
transition and bridging work within a theory between a theory’s understandings of 
international politics in the past and present and the future. This transition and bridging 
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work enables a theory to introduce particular known aspects of the past and the present 
into international politics of the future, thus making parts of the future foreseeable and 
pre-emptively adding prospective meaning and significance to a theory’s historical and 
contemporary claims. In other words, a theory’s short-term future time perspectives help 
facilitate the extension of a theory’s explanatory power and claims beyond the 
known/knowable world to the yet-to-be world (i.e. unknown future). In the second 
section, insights recovered about the functions and effects of a theory’s long-term future 
time perspectives were less about the foreseeable future and more centred on aspects of 
the unforeseeable future of international politics. The insights recovered from my 
analysis include: 1) how a theory’s long-term future time perspectives help to explain 
within a theory how international politics will evolve and manifest in the unforeseeable 
future, 2) the extent to which a theory’s explanation and claims are applicable in familiar 
and unfamiliar contexts, and 3) the shelf-life of theoretical claims in the distant future. 
Essentially, these insights indicate that a theory’s long-term future time perspectives help 
to convey how a theory tries to resolve or address longstanding or pressing questions 
and problems in international politics of the past, present, and future. 
  In the final section of this chapter, insights regarding the co-existence and 
simultaneous effects of short-term and long-term future time perspectives within a theory 
reconfirmed findings discussed in the final sections of chapters 5 and 6 with respect to 
historical and present time perspectives; time perspectives do not exist in isolation from 
one another and collectively shape how claims are understood and interpreted within a 
theory. Furthermore, the delimiting effects that both future time perspectives have on 
known and unknown aspects of a theory’s notions of the future help to make the future 
less uncertain. By making the future less uncertain, future time perspectives within a 
theory contribute to making sense of international politics in the future, even if it 
remains wholly unknown. This particular insight is significant because it indicates that 
a theory is capable of addressing and making claims about both known and unknown 
aspects of international politics via its historical, present, and future time perspectives. 
Consequently, the insights shared in this final section (and chapter) help to draw out 
the relevance of future time perspectives with regards to how theoretical claims are 
defined. Awareness of these insights makes new contributions to readers’ 
understandings and interpretations of theoretical claims because these insights both 
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refine, and in some cases, redefine more accurately claims about international politics 
made within a theory. 
With my analysis of time perspectives and their effects on claims within a theory 
of international politics complete, my analysis now moves on to time perspectives and 
their effect on claims within the political practice of a peace process. My chosen case 
study for a peace process was the Oslo Accords. Remaining mindful of the ideas and 
understandings regarding time perspectives and their effects developed and presented 
in this chapter, as well as those presented in chapters 5 and 6, my analyses of time 
perspectives and their effects within the Accords did not begin from scratch. 
Furthermore, the insights recovered by my analysis of Morgenthau’s theory mirrored 
those recovered from my analysis of the Accords. Consequently, it was not necessary to 
conduct the same ground-clearing exercises in the following chapters as was done in 
chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
Conducting my analyses of time perspectives and their effects within the Accords 
in this way was beneficial for two reasons. First, it reduced the need to repeat 
explanations and discussions appearing in previous chapters at the same level of detail. 
This consequently freed up a considerable amount text space which could be devoted to 
presenting and discussing nuanced insights about the relationship between a peace 
process and its time perspectives as found in the Accords. Second, this was a way of 
illustrating that the insights about time perspectives and their effects on claims gained 
from my analysis of Morgenthau’s theory applied to more than just theoretical contexts, 
but empirical contexts as well. Therefore, the aims of both analyses remain the same in 
that they improve contemporary understandings of long-term and short-term time 
perspectives of the past, present, and future and the shaping effects of each type of time 
perspective on respective claims. 
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Chapter 8: A Background to a Peace Process and its Time Perspectives 
 This chapter marks a break between two key parts of my thesis, one theoretical 
and one empirical. Thus far, my analyses and discussions have namely focused on long-
term and short-term time perspectives of the past, present and future and their effects 
on claims made within a theory. From these analyses and discussions, insights into the 
relationships between time perspectives and theoretical claims were recovered.  The 
insights gained from my exploration of these relationships collectively indicate that time 
perspectives shape claims and thus a theory’s understanding and interpretation of 
international political phenomena. These insights I have made about time perspectives 
with respect to claims, however, contribute to more than augmented understandings of 
time perspectives found in a theoretical context. To illustrate the relevance of the 
insights gained from my analyses beyond the confines of a theory, the two following 
chapters articulate a separate analysis on an empirical case study which led to the 
recovery of similar insights obtained from my theoretical case study. The chosen 
empirical example addressed is the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, with specific focus 
on the Oslo Accords.505 In addition to illustrating the similarities among time 
perspectives and their effects within a theory and those within a peace process, an effort 
is made to highlight the practical value of the insights obtained from my empirical study. 
The value of these insights is that they can be used to understand, evaluate, and explain 
historical and existing peace processes and their corresponding claims at various stages 
of development and execution, as well as in the drafting of future peace processes; 
examples of both are presented in this chapter and Chapter 9. Consequently, by detailing 
the relationships between time perspectives and a peace process, I am suggesting that 
time perspectives have broad shaping effects on the study, practice, and manifestation 
of the international pursuit of peace. 
  To help the reader to understand and interpret the effects that time perspectives 
have on the peace process articulated in the Accords, I have spread my analysis over two 
chapters. Within this first chapter, explanations of key concepts and historical 
background information relevant to my empirical case study are provided as they help 
                                                            
505 Throughout the remainder of the chapter, all references made to ‘the Accords’ will refer to both Oslo I 
and Oslo II collectively.  When necessary distinctions between Oslo I and Oslo II are made.   
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the reader to make sense of the analyses, discussions, and suggestions presented later in 
Chapter 9.   The structure of this first chapter is divided into three sections. In the first 
section, I address 1) what a peace process is understood to be in this study and 2) why 
an awareness of liberal and democratic peace theories is needed to help recover and 
understand the presence and absence of long-term and short-term time perspectives 
within the Accords.506 Discussions in this section will provide the broad theoretical 
context of the Accords and highlight the connection between theory and practice in a 
peace process. The reasons as to why an extensive analysis of the time perspectives and 
claims found within liberal and democratic peace theories was not conducted is also 
addressed in this section. The second section of the chapter offers an overview of the 
Accords’ historical contexts regarding 1) the primary issues the Accords were intended 
to address and 2) what circumstances made drafting the Accords necessary and possible.  
By no means is the historical overview presented in this section intended to be a 
comprehensive account of Israeli-Palestinian relations or disregard the complexity of 
the situation and relationship that has existed and continues to exist.507  The historical 
overview presented is rather intended to provide the reader with general historical 
contexts necessary to follow the analysis and argument articulated in Chapter 9.   
The chapter’s final section provides a description of how the time perspectives 
within the Accords’ peace process were demarcated via the extreme anchor points 
articulated within the Accords. These anchor points, however, are different than those 
articulated within Morgenthau’s theory. The differences of duration between time 
perspectives of a similar type become apparent when comparing for example long-term 
historical time perspectives from Morgenthau’s theory to those made in the Accords.  The 
value of this comparison, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapter, is significant 
because the duration of time perspectives from one source (e.g. Morgenthau’s theory) 
may be potentially useful to embed different aspects into a future peace process seeking 
to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations. Although no specific suggestions are provided 
in this chapter as to what anchor points should be established within future peace 
processes, knowing when the Accords’ anchor points are situated is necessary when 
                                                            
506 For an explanation as to why the distinction between liberal peace theory and democratic peace 
theory matters see Vesna Danilovic and Joe Clare, “The Kantian Liberal Peace (Revisited),” American 
Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (April 2007): 397-414. 
507 For an even-handed historical overview see Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
(Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009).   
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thinking about how to adjust time perspectives within future peace processes to improve 
their potential for success. The consequences of adjusting the Accords’ anchor points 
are detailed in Chapter 9 under the various sections relating to specified time 
perspective suggestions for future peace processes. 
 
8.1 An understanding of what a peace process is 
Before beginning my analysis of the relationships between time perspectives and 
peace processes, there is a need to provide an understanding of what a peace process is. 
The challenge of developing or providing a definition of what a peace process is stems 
from the various forms that peace processes can take.508 Variations among peace 
processes can namely be attributed to the context specific aspects and issues of 
international politics that the processes seek to include and address. For example, the 
location of Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East and religious considerations 
among Jews, Muslims, and Christians pull in a distinct group of political actors that 
differs markedly from the actors involved in, for example, the Northern Ireland peace 
process which dealt with manifesting peace in a different location and under different 
religious considerations among Catholics and Protestants. Despite this diversity, 
however, peace processes in general also share common aspects. For example, peace 
processes are all political, work to build confidence among conflicting parties, and have 
the ultimate goal of working towards peace. Therefore a useful understanding of what 
peace processes are must be mindful of both the commonalities and variations among 
peace processes. Such an understanding is provided by former U.S. diplomat Harold H. 
Saunders.509 
According to Saunders, a peace process is ‘a political process in which conflicts 
are resolved by peaceful means’ via ‘a mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing 
relationships, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue in both official and unofficial 
                                                            
508 For an exemplary survey and comparison of different peace processes see Alpaslan Özerdem and Roger 
Mac Ginty, Comparing Peace Processes (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2019). 
509 Saunders earned his PhD at Yale before serving as Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs and 
Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research. His involvement in the Kissinger Shuttles, Camp 
David Accords, Iran Hostage Crisis, and facilitation of the ‘Framework for a Public Peace Process’ among 
Israeli and Palestinian citizen-leaders are evidence of his familiarity and active participation in peace 
processes. “Framework for a Public Peace Process: Toward a Peaceful Israeli-Palestinian Relationship,” 
conclusion date: July 19, 1991, Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation and the Beyond War 
Foundation, http://traubman.igc.org/ppp.pdf (accessed October 15, 2018). 
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arenas.’ 510 This understanding underpins what a peace process is in this study. In 
addition to capturing the common aspects among the various forms that peace processes 
can take, there are three additional aspects of Saunders’s understanding of what a peace 
process is that are relevant to and useful for my analysis. First, Saunders’s 
acknowledgement that a peace process can occur in both official and unofficial arenas 
has particular relevance to my analysis of the Accords. As will be articulated later in this 
chapter, official and unofficial arenas were utilised in the build up to the drafting of the 
Accords.511 Second, other definitions of what a peace process is were found to be too 
limiting in regards to the types of peace processes that could be covered under these 
definitions or too prescriptive in terms of what sequential structures peace processes are 
supposed to have. 512  In consideration of the multi-layer complexity of the Israeli-
Palestinian peace process and the limitations of other definitions, Saunders’s definition 
of a peace process provides an inclusive and useful understanding for my analysis. 
Finally, Saunders articulation of what a peace process is does not prescribe or 
predetermine the form peace would take as a result of the process itself; in other words, 
his definition is focused on describing the process rather than peace. By not defining or 
predetermining what peace is, this articulation provides a useful definition that can be 
operationalised and used in subsequent studies of peace processes and their 
corresponding time perspectives which do not share the liberal and democratic peace 
foundations that underpin the Accords’ peace process. 
 
  
                                                            
510 Harold H. Saunders, “Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Multilevel Peace Process,” 
in Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler 
Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace 2001); 483. For a sample of other 
definitions of what a peace process is see Darby and MacGinty, Contemporary Peacemaking, ; Jasmine-
Kim Westendorf, Why Peace Processes Fail: Negotiating Insecurity after Civil War (Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner, 2015), 18-20; Stina Högbladh, “Peace Agreements 1975-2011: Updating the UNDP Peace 
Agreement Dataset, in States in Armed Conflict 2011 - Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report 
99, eds. Therése Pettersson and Lotta Themnér (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2012), 42. 
511 Louis Kriesberg, “Mediation and the Transformation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” Journal of Peace 
Research 38, no. 3 (May 2001): 373–92.  
512 For examples of other definitions of what a peace process is see: Timothy D. Sisk, "Democratization and 
Peacebuilding: Perils and Promises," in Turbulent Peace, 787; Nicole Ball, “The Challenge of Rebuilding 
War-torn Societies,” in Turbulent Peace, 721-2. 
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8.2 Remaining mindful of peace 
  In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as articulated in the 
Accords, the type of peace that the process was working towards was a liberal democratic 
peace.513  This type of peace combined notions from liberal and democratic peace 
theories.514 From liberal peace theory, notions of economic integration between Israel 
and a yet-to-be established Palestinian quasi-state, among their regional neighbors, and 
with the broader global market were incorporated into the Accords as means of building 
and sustaining peace.  The idea was that the economic integration and prosperity gained 
by both sides would be an incentive to engage in the Accords’ peace process, as well as 
make the cost of engaging in contemporary and future conflicts too high to sustain or 
start.515 Other liberal peace notions embedded into the Accords included respect for 
human rights, acceptance of international law, mutual recognition among conflicting 
parties, adherence to democratic norms (e.g. elections), well-functioning domestic 
institutions, and respect for property, political, and civil rights.516  The most striking 
notion from liberal peace theory embedded into the Accords was the notion that peace 
could be perpetual (i.e. perennial) if all of the aforementioned liberal notions became 
inherent features of Israel and a Palestinian quasi-state entity.  The notion that peace 
can be perpetually sustained over time by adopting particular liberal ways of governance 
and interaction is also supported by democratic peace theory.517    
While many of the aforementioned notions from liberal peace theory overlap 
with those found in democratic peace theory, a discussion about democratic peace 
theory helps to clarify the type of peace the Accords’ peace process was aiming to create, 
as well as provide explanations which support the pursuit of democratic peace as 
outlined in the Accords. First, democratic peace theory claims that peace between two 
                                                            
513 Footnote 127 on page 46 includes a sampling of literature that addresses various types of peace that may 
be sought after in a peace process.  
514 For an example of the Oslo Accords’ links to liberal peace theory see Richmond and Franks, Liberal 
Peace Transitions, 157; for links to democratic peace theory see Baumgart-Ochse, “Democratization in 
Israel,” 1116. 
515 Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” 323. 
516 Edward Newman, Roland Paris, and Oliver P. Richmond, eds., New Perspectives on Liberal Peacebuilding 
(Tokyo: UNU Press, 2009); Richmond and Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions, 152.  For more on liberal peace 
theory’s association with property, political, and civil rights see Larry Jay Diamond, Promoting Democracy 
in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on 
Preventing Deadly Conflict (Washington, DC: The Commission, 1995); Sharun Mukand and Dani Rodrik, 
“The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy,” CESifo Working Paper Series No. 6433, entry posted April 
24, 2017, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2973082 (accessed August 30, 2018), 3-4. 
517 Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986,” 636-7. 
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states is more likely to become a norm between two democracies than between a 
democracy and a non-democracy or two states that are non-democracies.518  
Consequently, by emphasising within the Accords that the Palestinian people ‘govern 
themselves according to democratic principles’, the Accords are specifying that the 
peace it is aiming for is a peace between two democracies.519 Second, democratic peace 
theory claims that peace is most stable between two stable democracies rather than 
among young democracies. Accepting this claim, the Accords outlined the steps and 
stages of how a stable Palestinian democracy was to be established and then linked them 
to various stages and agreements of the peace process. As a consequence of this 
approach to statebuilding and peacebuilding, democracy and the Accords’ peace process 
were deliberately and inextricably connected to one another.520 Therefore, as Palestinian 
democracy advanced, so too would the peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Third, 
democratic peace theory provided structural, cultural, and normative explanations as to 
why the democratic peace aimed for within the Accords was thought to be possible to 
achieve and a peace that should be sought.521  These explanations are significant because 
they are based upon theory-supporting empirical case studies which provide empirical 
support and justification for pursuing the democratic peace aimed for in the Accords. In 
other words, the incorporation of democratic peace theory into the Accords added 
empirical support to the Accords’ peace process and its aimed for peace. 
 
8.3 Historical context 
In the subsequent section, various historical aspects are covered to provide a slim, 
yet foundational overview of the historical context that led to the drafting of the Accords 
and contributed to the difficult implementation of the peace process.522 This historical 
overview is intentionally basic and slim for two reasons. First, constructing a 
comprehensive historical account of all the aspects contributing to the drafting and 
                                                            
518 Merkel Wolfgang, “Democracy through War?,” Democratisation 15, no. 3 (June 2018): 487-508. 
519 Oslo I, art. III, para. 1.  
520 Baumgart-Ochse, “Democratisation in Israel,” 1116. 
521 Baumgart-Ochse, “Democratisation in Israel,” 1134; Maoz and Russett, “Causes of Democratic Peace, 
1946-1986,” 624-6 and 634-6. 
522 For a historiographic review of the literature on the origins of the origins of the conflicts a couple of 
years before the signing of Olso I see Kenneth W. Stein, "A Historiographic Review of Literature on the 
Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict," The American Historical Review 96, no. 5 (December 1991): 1450-465.  
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implementation difficulties of the Accords’ peace process would inevitably introduce 
topics of discussions that would distract more than contribute to my analysis and 
argument.523 For example, discussions of the religious histories of Jews and Arabs 
pertaining to the territories of modern day Israel and Palestine are not key histories 
mentioned within the Accords and unnecessarily introduce historical dimensions of the 
conflict the Accords do not explicitly address.524 Consequently, such a comprehensive 
historical account would exceed the restricted scope of my analysis. Second, my 
historical overview uses the histories mentioned in the Accords as the basis from which 
to construct a historical context relevant to understanding the conflict, the purpose of 
the Accords, the potential reasons for its failure, and its historical time perspectives. 
Using the histories mentioned within the Accords as my basis significantly reduced the 
number of tangentially related histories I had to consider including in my historical 
overview which were not necessary to recover and interpret connections between the 
time perspectives and the peace process examined in this chapter. Consequently, this 
approach yielded a slim, yet foundational historical context that could be manageably 
constructed without losing sight of the purpose for providing such a historical context 
in this chapter.  
An overview of the historical context relevant to my analysis of the relationship 
between the time perspectives and the peace process articulated within the Accords 
begins with recognising the purpose of the Accords. The collective aims of the Oslo 
Accords (i.e. Oslo I and Oslo II) was to work toward a peaceful and permanent resolution 
of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip that would lead ‘to the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 and 
338’.525 The military and political actions by Israel that prompted the passing of the 
Security Council resolutions mentioned in the Accords and subsequent drafting of the 
Accords regarded competing Israeli and Palestinian political claims of sovereignty over 
                                                            
523 For examples of works addressing the history of the territories of modern day Israel and Palestine see: 
Arthur Goldschmidt Jr. and Lawrence Davidson, A Concise History of the Middle East, 8th edn. (Boulder, 
Colo.: Westview Press, 2006); Gudrun Krämer, A History of Palestine: From the Ottoman Conquest to the 
Founding of the State of Israel, trans. Graham Harman and Gudrun Krämer (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); Nur Masalha, “The Concept of Palestine: The Conception of Palestine from the 
Late Bronze Age to the Modern Period,” Journal of Holy Land and Palestine Studies 15, no. 2 (November 
2016): 143-202. 
524 For more on the histories of Judaism and Islam see Adam J. Silverstein, Guy G. Stroumsa, and Moshe 
Blidstein, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Abrahamic Religions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).   
525 Oslo I, art. I; Oslo II, preamble. 
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particular territories within former Mandatory Palestine. Although there are many 
explanations as to the causes of the conflict, my analysis focuses primarily on those that 
can be traced backwards starting from references made in the Accords. The territories 
in question that the Accords and Resolutions 242 and 338 focus on were once part of 
Mandatory Palestine, a League of Nations mandate administered by the United 
Kingdom from 1922-1948.526 At the end of the British mandate, these same territories 
were intended to one day become part of a future Arab state as outlined in UN General 
Assembly Resolution 181. According to Resolution 181, the recommendation was made 
that Mandatory Palestine be partitioned into three parts: an independent Arab state, an 
independent Jewish state, and the City of Jerusalem.527 Although not the sole reason for 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Accords suggests that part of its focus was on 
addressing those aspects of the conflict that could be linked back to the 1947 partitioning 
plan. 528 
Subsequent to the adoption of the partitioning plan, on May 14th, 1948, the Jewish 
People’s Council declared the establishment of the State of Israel.529 This declaration is 
significant and relevant to my analysis of the Accords for three reasons. First, Israel’s 
mentioning of Resolution 181 in its declaration of independence was used to legitimate 
                                                            
526 Council of the League of Nations, Nineteenth Session, “Mandate for Palestine,” C.529.M.314.1922.VI. 
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Mohamed H. El-Zayyat, and Abba Eban, UN Security Council Resolution 242 – A Case Study in Diplomatic 
Ambiguity (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981), 13 and second quote from Lord 
Caradon, interview on Kol Israel Radio, February 1973, https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide 
/pages/statements%20clarifying%20the%20meaning%20of%20un%20security%20c.aspx (accessed Sep- 
tember 5, 2018). ‘We didn’t attempt to deal with it [the questions of the Palestinians and of Jerusalem] 
then, but merely to state the general principles of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. 
We meant that the occupied territories could not be held merely because they were occupied, but we 
deliberately did not say that the old line, where the troops happened to be on that particular night many 
years ago, was an ideal demarcation line.’ Lord Caradon, “An Interview with Lord Caradon,” ’ Journal of 
Palestine Studies 5, no. 3/4 (Spring – Summer 1976), 45. ‘It was from occupied territories that the 
Resolution called for withdrawal. The test was which territories were occupied. That was a test not 
possibly subject to any doubt. As a matter of plain fact East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, the Golan 
and Sinai were occupied in the 1967 conflict. It was on withdrawal from occupied territories that the 
Resolution insisted.’ Lord Caradon, et. al., UN Security Council Resolution 242 – A Case Study in Diplomatic 
Ambiguity (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1981), 9. 
529 “Declaration of Independence of the State of Israel,” declaration date: May 14, 1948, Israel State 




the establishment of Israel as a sovereign state.530 Second, the establishment of Israel 
was the initial implementation of the partitioning plan articulated in Resolution 181. 
Third, at the time of the declaration, Israel initially honoured the territorial boundaries 
outlined in Resolution 181. Considered collectively, these reasons suggest that Resolution 
181’s recommendations was initially only partially implemented. Further 
implementation of the resolution would require the establishment of an Arab state and 
the corpus separatum (i.e. body to be separated) of the City of Jerusalem in the 
designated territories. 531  However, the establishment of an Arab state became 
immediately problematic when hostilities between Jews and Arabs residing in newly 
created Israel caused neighbouring countries, particularly Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, to 
intervene on the side of the Arabs residing within Israel, as well as those residing in the 
yet-to-be established Arab state as mentioned in the resolution. Consequently, the 
territories of a would-be Arab state became a battleground between Israel and its 
neighbours, with each side over a series of decades claiming control or auspices of over 
these territories. Resolutions 242 and 338 (both of which are referenced in the Accords) 
were periodic attempts at restoring the status of these contested territories to their 
initial statuses in 1948 when Israel’s declaration began the initial implementation of 
Resolution 181’s partition plan. Therefore, in consideration of the historical context that 
has been derived from the Accords’ references to Resolutions 242 and 338, the roots of 
the conflict the Accords attempted to address can be traced back to the 1947 partition 
plan as detailed in Resolution 181. These identified roots suggest that the Accords were 
an attempt to create conditions between Israel and the Palestinians that would lead to 
the fulfilment of the remaining recommendations as articulated in the 1947 partition 
plan, the establishment of an Arab state and the corpus separatum of Jerusalem.532   
                                                            
530 The following are texts of the two incidents where references to Resolution 181 in the Declaration of 
Independence of the State of Israel are made: ‘On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General 
Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General 
Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for 
the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish 
people to establish their State is irrevocable.’ ‘By virtue of our natural and historic right and on the 
strength of resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a 
Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the state of Israel’. 
531 Included in the partition plan was the establishment of the international status of the City of Jerusalem. 
This aspect was to be addressed in the final stages of the Accords’ peace process after the establishment 
of an Arab state. Oslo I, art. V, para. 3.  
532 The outcome the Accords does not appear in this chapter as they are mentioned in the subsequent 
chapter along with suggestions of time perspectives for a future peace process where mentioning the 




8.4 Demarcating time perspectives within a peace process 
Tracing the origins of the conflict addressed by the Accords back to the 1947 
partition plan also helps to recover key anchor points which are necessary to identify 
existing time perspectives within the Accords. The first anchor point implicitly 
recognised by the Accords is the 1947 partition plan outlined in Resolution 181. 533  This 
anchor point serves as an extreme historical anchor point that delimits one end of a long-
term historical time perspective considered within the Accords. By rooting the issues that 
the Accords are trying to address to the 1947 partition plan, a long-term time perspective 
with respect to the future can also be derived. First, this linkage to the partition plan 
suggests that the peace process of the Accords is part of an ongoing process of 
completing the implementation of Resolution 181’s partition plan in the long-term 
future. Second, the partition plan itself provides an end to the Accords’ peace process, 
the establishment of an Arab state and the corpus separatum of Jerusalem. An 
acknowledgement of this end within the Accords is significant because this end marks 
an extreme future anchor point that delimits one end of a long-term future time 
perspective considered within the Accords. Therefore, both the historical and future 
extreme anchor points of the Accords are derived from one aspect of the past in the form 
of Resolution 181.534  Together these two anchor points provide the scope of the conflict 
and timescape that the Accords considers.  
In addition to the extreme anchors points of the past and future, other important 
anchor points are indicated within the Accords. These anchor points -- corresponding 
to the past, present, and future -- warrant identification because they help delimit short-
term and long-term time perspectives within the Accords which makes analysing the 
effects of time perspectives on the peace process possible. One set of anchor points 
corresponds with references in the Accords to UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 
338. Resolution 242 in 1967 and Resolution 338 in 1973 delimit short-term historical time 
perspectives that shape how the Accords are understood, points which will be elaborated 
                                                            
533 Pappe’s work suggests that Palestinians ground the origins of the conflict to Israel’s declaration of 
independence and that Israel considers 1967 the point in history which created the issues needing 
addressed by the Accords. Ilan Pappe, A History of Modern Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
534 This significance of this common point of origin will be addressed in more detail later in the chapter. 
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further in subsequent sections. Another set of key anchor points correspond with the 
adoptions of Oslo I in 1993 and Oslo II in 1995. The adoption of each Accord helps to 
situate the short-term present time perspectives within an ongoing peace process that 
spans over multiple years. The final grouping of anchor points worth highlighting regard 
the prescribed timelines and deadlines articulated in the Accords for the future 
implementation of various aspects and stages of the peace process. These timelines 
provide fixed points in the short-term future from which the range of short-term future 
time perspectives can be determined and indicate the limits of how far into the future 
the drafters of the Accords thought a peace process could be scripted out and foreseen 
to unfold. The range of short-term future time perspectives found within the Accords 
goes from the shortest future time perspective being ‘as soon as possible’ to the longest 
articulated one spanning five years.535  In general, the Accords’ long-term future time 
perspectives lack a specified timetable attached to them, which helps to generally 
distinguish them from short-term future time perspectives.  Collectively, these anchor 
points and general distinctions, along with the aforementioned extreme historical and 
future anchor points, helped with the identification and delimitation of short-term and 
long-term time perspectives of the past, present, and future found within the Accords; a 
necessary initial step before beginning the subsequent analysis. 
 
8.5 The analysis going forward 
The purpose of this chapter has been threefold. First, to lay a context specific 
foundation upon which analyses, discussions, and suggestions regarding the 
relationship between the Accords’ time perspectives and its peace process detailed in 
the next chapter can begin. Second, to make clear the limits of the scope of the analyses, 
discussions, and suggestions the reader can expect to find in the subsequent chapter. 
Finally, to serve as a transition between two key parts of my thesis, time perspectives in 
relation to a theory of international politics and time perspectives in relation an 
empirical case study of international politics in practice.  Given the level of detail and 
technical analysis already provided in chapters 5-7 on similar time perspectives and their 
effects within Morgenthau’s theory, related information as it corresponds to my analysis 
                                                            




of the Accords’ will not be repeated in the same level of detail in the following chapter. 
Consequently, the following chapter is more compact because a lot of the heavy lifting 
has already been done in the preceding chapters. Going forward, remaining mindful of 
the contexts provided in this chapter along with explanations shared in chapters 5-7 
were helpful in the recovery of novel insights about the shaping effects the Accords’ time 
perspectives had on the Accords’ peace process. The value of these new insights shared 
in the next chapter is that they to indicate how time perspectives can be used to improve 




Chapter 9: Time perspectives within a Peace Process  
Like time perspectives within a theory, time perspectives also have shaping 
effects on a peace process. To support the latter claim, this chapter provides analyses 
and illustrations of how these shaping effects are manifested within the Accords. In 
addition to this aim, this chapter serves four additional aims. First, to develop an 
understanding of the shaping effects time perspectives have on the Accords’ peace 
process. Second, to illustrate an empirical example of how time perspectives affect the 
practice of international politics. Third, to demonstrate the relevance of the insights 
gained from the analyses conducted in chapters 5-7 beyond a theoretical context. 
Fourth, to suggest the ways insights about the relationship between time perspectives 
and international politics presented in this chapter and throughout this thesis could be 
used to improve future peace processes. In the process of pursuing these aims, the 
central argument in this thesis that time perspectives shape international politics and 
the breadth of the contexts in which time perspectives and their effects can manifest is 
further substantiated. Thus, the insights presented in this chapter should not be 
considered just in isolation but alongside those insights shared earlier in this thesis.  
The structure of the chapter is broken into five parts corresponding to the 
following time perspectives: long-term historical, short-term historical, short-term 
present, short-term future, and long-term future time perspectives.  Starting from the 
conceptual foundations laid in previous chapters, each one of the Accords’ time 
perspectives is analysed and discussed in the initial sections. Following each analysis and 
discussion are sections regarding suggestions of time perspectives to be included within 
future peace processes.536 Some of the suggestions include adding time perspectives not 
found within the Accords, maintaining existing time perspectives, and removing or 
altering problematic time perspectives. The central aim of these suggestions is to address 
problematic issues embedded into the Accords so that similar issues do not arise or are 
minimised within future peace processes to improve their potential for successful 
implementation. While the suggestions provided are not meant to constitute a 
comprehensive list or apply to every future peace process between Israel and the 
                                                            
536 Because the suggestions provided were not originally intended to necessarily be used together as they 
all might not be appropriate within every future peace process, no section is provided regarding how they 
might work together within a single future peace process.    
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Palestinians, each suggestion provides an illustration of the various types of time 
perspective changes that can be made across the five time perspectives and included 
within future peace processes. Collectively, all five parts of the chapter provide the 
reader with an in-depth understanding of how time perspectives delimit a peace process 
and suggest that examinations and reconsiderations of past and existing peace processes 
might help improve the formulation and successful execution of future peace processes. 
 
9.1 Long-term historical time perspectives 
Among the time perspectives articulated within the Accords’ peace process, the 
long-term historical time perspectives were mentioned the least in comparison to other 
time perspectives referred to in the Accords and, where they did appear, they were only 
in the opening lines of the Accords. Nevertheless, the presence of these historical time 
perspectives still had significant effects. From my analysis of the relationship between 
the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives and their effects, I was able to recover 
and highlight the theoretical claims that were embedded into the Accords’ peace 
process. These recovered insights related to both perennial aspects and their 
corresponding consequences found within the Accords. The particular perennial aspects 
and their corresponding consequences addressed in the subsequent paragraphs help to 
illustrate the shaping effecting long-term historical time perspectives can have within a 
peace process. Among the perennial aspects recovered, the following three perennial 
aspects and their corresponding consequences are noteworthy and warrant further 
discussion. First, my analysis of the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives 
suggest that ‘confrontation and conflict’ are perennial aspects of the relations between 
Israel and the Palestinians spanning decades.537 Second, the long-term historical time 
perspectives emphasise Israel and the Palestinians as the principle perennial actors in 
the conflict. Finally, historical resolutions to the conflict (i.e. UN Resolutions 242 and 
338) remain persistent aims for the peace process in the past, present, and future. 
Collectively, these perennial aspects embed into the peace process particular 
interpretations and understandings of the conflict and issues the Accords seeks to 
address.  
                                                            
537 Oslo I, preamble. 
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As perennial aspects, they pre-emptively suggest and define the various ways the 
future of Israel and the Palestinian people may unfold. Examples of these various ways 
the future may unfold include: 1) the future will continue to be marked by confrontation 
and conflict without the implementation of a successful peace process, 2) each perennial 
actor will remain united in the future (e.g. the Palestinian actor will not split into a West 
Bank Palestinian actor and a Gaza Strip Palestinian actor), or 3) the 1967 border lines 
will remain the border lines each side will seek to secure in the future. These perennial 
aspects, however, should not be interpreted as objective truths. As insights from section 
5.2.3 indicate, perennial aspects of the past that are identifiable or highlighted via long-
term historical time perspectives are the result of subjective constructions of the past. 
Therefore, the particular way that the past have been structured and aggregated within 
the Accords over the long-term past limits what perennial aspects are and can be 
identified or highlighted within the Accords. As the subsequent paragraphs will 
illustrate, these subjectively constructed perennial aspects are problematic and remain 
inadequately acknowledged or unaddressed by the peace process articulated in the 
Accords.538  
The first example of how perennial aspects can be problematic was evident in 
how the long-term the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians was 
characterised in the Accord.  In the first paragraph in Oslo I and second paragraph in 
Oslo II, the long-term historical time perspective helps to define the Israeli-Palestinian 
relationship as being perennially confrontational and conflict oriented.539  Two different 
conclusions regarding the outcomes of the peace process can be drawn from these 
perennial characterisations. If confrontation and conflict are perennial aspects of the 
relationship between the two sides, then success of the Accords would mean perennial 
aspects of the relationship have been changed. Conversely, any failures of the Accords 
would be attributed to the enduring strength of the perennial aspects of the relationship 
and appear to be expected. Therefore, an acknowledgement within the Accords of 
confrontation and conflict as perennial aspects of the relations between Israel and the 
Palestinians suggests that the manifestation of the intended outcome of the Accords’ 
peace process was problematic. In reading through the Accords, however, this problem 
                                                            
538 Markus Kornprobst and Martin Senn, "Introduction: Background Ideas in International Relations," The 
British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18, no. 2 (May 2016), 278. 
539 Oslo I, preamble; Oslo II, preamble. 
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is not immediately evident because it gets readily resolved by introducing particular 
short-term and long-term future time perspectives (derived largely from liberal peace 
theory) which focus namely on the intended success of the peace process. These future 
time perspectives articulate a vision of the future which suggests that perennial aspects 
of the past can be either altered or replaced by new perennial aspects and thus make 
historical perennial aspects irrelevant or dormant in the future. By delimiting how the 
future will unfold via short-term and long-term future time perspectives in the peace 
process, the potential enduring strength of the historical perennial aspects of 
relationship between the two sides no longer needed to be considered or addressed in 
Accords’ peace process. The ultimate demise of the peace process and return to a 
situation of confrontation and conflict, however, indicates two things: 1)that perhaps the 
enduring strength of these perennial aspects of the relationship and 2) the notion of 
doubt regarding the peace process embedded into the Accords were not adequately 
addressed by the Accords’ future time perspectives. 
A second example of how the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives 
embedded problematic perennial aspects within the Accords relates to how Israel and 
the Palestinian people are categorised as actors in the situation. Via the Accords’ long-
term historical time perspectives, both Israel and the Palestinians are categorised as the 
principle perennial actors in creating the conflict and developing and carrying out the 
peace process. However, these long-term historical time perspectives disregard and de-
emphasise the roles of other perennial political entities of the past who contributed to 
the creation of the conflict and the execution of the peace process. For example, the 
Ottoman Empire, the United Kingdom, and Russia all played significant roles which 
contributed to the creation of the conflict but are not mentioned in the Accords. 
Regarding the development and execution of the peace process, Egypt, Jordan, and the 
United States also made ongoing efforts and contributions during the period covered by 
the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives but again are not mentioned in the 
Accords long-term historical account. By narrowing the principle perennial actors to 
Israel and the Palestinians, the long-term historical time perspectives place the 
responsibility of addressing the historical legacies of foreign policies by various 
international political actors (e.g. states) of the past namely on Israel and the 
Palestinians. The advantage of narrowing the number of principle perennial actors is 
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that there are less parties that need to be consulted with and satisfied during the peace 
process. The disadvantage of limiting the number of principle perennial actors, as the 
demise of the peace process illustrated, is that one actor can easily derail the whole 
process.   
In addition to categorising Israel and the Palestinians as perennial political 
actors, the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives assign further perennial 
attributes to Israel and the Palestinians which are problematic. For example, by 
simultaneously referencing Resolution 242 and 338 (adopted as a result of Israeli 
incursion into non-Israeli territories), Israel is categorised as a perennial aggressor in the 
past while the Palestinian people are categorised as perennial victims during the same 
period in their struggles over the contested territories. These historically derived 
perennial attributes demarcate positions of power and inequalities between the two 
within the Accords. Furthermore, these assigned perennial attributes are extended into 
the future via the future time perspectives as evidenced in Oslo I regarding the future 
redeployment of Israeli Forces 540 and the future withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the 
Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,541 as well as via Oslo II.542 Consequently, these divisive 
perennial attributes of Israel and the Palestinian people originating from the Accords’ 
long-term historical time perspectives remain unchanged and contribute to undermining 
the aims of the peace process. For example, these perennial attributes make it easier for 
Israelis to interpret the Accords as a threat on Israel sovereignty because the Accords 
outline the various ways in which Israeli sovereignty over certain lands and governing 
practices will be lost. Conversely, these perennial attributes also enable Palestinians to 
interpret parts of the Accords as maintaining Israel’s dominance over Palestinians and 
any territories that fall under a future Palestinian government’s administration (e.g. 
Israel’s exclusive right with respect to foreign policy). These conditions consequently 
limit the extent of positive peace that the Accords’ peace process can possibly yield, thus 
                                                            
540 Oslo I, art. XIII. 
541 Oslo I, annex II. 
542 Oslo II, art. X, annex I, art. I and appendix I. Withdrawal of Israeli Forces from the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Area was detailed and addressed prior to the signing of Oslo II via the signing of the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement on May 4, 1994.  
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indicating the delimiting effects long-term historical time perspectives can have on a 
peace process in terms of what type of peace it can possibly yield.543       
The final example illustrating how perennial aspects identified within the 
Accords via their long-term historical time perspectives can be problematic regards the 
ultimate aim of the peace process, ‘a permanent settlement based on Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338’.544  By structuring and aggregating the long-term past as a 
series of ongoing attempts to realise a quasi-fulfilment of the partition plan as outlined 
in Resolution 181, the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives help to establish a 
partition plan as a perennial goal of the past that was worthy of pursuit over the decades 
of conflict. Acceptance of this perennial goal of the past as a central aim for the Accords 
is significant because it helps to legitimise the Accords’ peace process in two ways. First, 
Resolution’s 181 partition plan of the past comes with an endorsement by the global 
community which is allegedly represented by the UN’s member states. Therefore, 
accepting a similar partition plan as an aim of the Accords adds legitimacy to the peace 
process before it even begins. Second, acceptance of a similar partition plan as an aim of 
the Accords links the peace process articulated in the Accords to a long history of worthy 
attempts (ex. Resolutions 242 and 338) at resolving the competing territorial claims 
between Israel and the Palestinians. Despite the legitimacy that is gained by the Accords’ 
peace process via the acceptance of a partition plan as a perennial goal to resolve the 
situation between the two sides, this perennial goal is problematic for two reasons. 
The first of two reasons this perennial goal is problematic is because it 
perpetuates a historical solution to a particular historical situation as a viable solution 
to the particular contemporary situation which the Accords’ peace process was trying to 
address.545  The original historical situation changed fundamentally with the creation of 
Israel, its subsequent incursion into territories originally earmarked for a future Arab 
state, and the intervention of nearby states such as Jordan and Egypt in the contested 
territories. Therefore, the perennial goal of partitioning the contested territories from 
and for another time in the past is outdated and not suited for the Accords’ 
                                                            
543 Positive peace includes both the cessation of violence (i.e. negative peace), but also the deliverance of 
justice. For a detailed discussion of positive and negative peace see Galtung, “On the Meaning of 
Nonviolence.” 
544 Oslo I, art. I; Oslo II, preamble. 
545 Richmond, Peace in International Relations, 17. 
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contemporary situation. Consequently, perpetuating this goal as a central aim in the 
Accords’ peace process suggests the peace process is working toward a solution that is 
out of sync with the times and potentially no longer viable.546  The second reason 
acceptance of this perennial goal is problematic is that it restricts the peace process to 
one end, a partitioning of sovereignty within the contested territories between Israel and 
the Palestinians. Although the peace process may be conducive to leading to other 
ultimate ends547, a partitioning of sovereignty is the only outcome that has been 
consistently put forward as worthy of pursuing over the long-term past as confirmed via 
the past articulated by the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives. By recognising 
partitioning as the historical perennial aim of the peace process, the Accords’ long-term 
historical time perspectives limit the definition of success against which the Accords can 
be evaluated. Success of the Accords’ peace process would effectively mean the 
establishment of a Palestinian government that would exercise sovereignty within 
territories previously under Israeli control which is respected by and independent of 
Israel.  This limitation effectively suggests that the Accords’ peace process is closed 
rather than open, thus prohibiting Israel and the Palestinians from taking advantage of 
other forms of peace that may organically evolve from the Accords’ peace process in the 
future. Collectively, the two aforementioned reasons illustrate how the Accords’ long-
term historical time perspectives helped to embed a problematic trajectory within the 
peace process with little guarantee of yielding the sought after outcome.  
 
9.2 Perennial aspects need not be problematic  
 As problematic as these individual perennial aspects are, they all can be linked 
back to how the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives have been constructed 
in order to provide a convincing explanation of Israeli-Palestinian relations and the aims 
of the Accords.548  This linkage suggests that going forward, future peace processes 
                                                            
546 The rise of the Likud party in Israel supports this claim regarding the unviability of the Accords’ original 
aim with respect to partitioning. David C. Unger, "Maps of War, Maps of Peace: Finding a Two-State 
Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Question," World Policy Journal 19, no. 2 (Summer 2002), 6.  
547 As examples, Palestinian territories could be set-up as an autonomous entity existing within another 
state similar to how Hong Kong existed within China after the British lease ended in 1997. 
548 In reference to the origins of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, Mac Ginty asks ‘[H]ow far back do we 
need to go to find a convincing explanation of the causes of a conflict?’ (Mac Ginty, No War, No Peace, 
69).    
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should pay more attention to the long-term historical time perspectives they make 
reference to and the effects the perennial aspects (these time perspectives draw 
attention to have) on peace processes.549 For example, by implicitly beginning the 
Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives with the initial implementation of the 
1947 partition plan, the Accords captured only one part of Middle Eastern history during 
which Israel and the Palestinian people were violently and openly competing for 
sovereignty over the same territory. Delimiting the Accords’ long-term historical time 
perspectives to this small segment of history not only restricted interpretations of the 
situation to one perennially marked by ‘confrontation and conflict’, but also helped 
define Israel’s identification as the perennial aggressor and the Palestinians as the 
perennial victims in the situation.550  How these long-term historical time perspectives 
have been constructed, whether intentionally or unintentionally, effectively excludes 
those perennial aspects which could have been captured by a more extensive long-term 
historical time perspective regarding the relations between Jewish and Arab and Arab-
Muslim populations (of which Palestinians were a part of) in the contested territory and 
beyond. Those excluded perennial aspects are worth recognising and including within 
future peace processes as they may help to support the aims of future peace processes 
rather than work against those aims as the perennial aspects do within the Accords. To 
illustrate the noteworthiness of the perennial aspects and their effects extended long-
term historical time perspectives highlight, the following example has been provided.  
By stretching the Accords’ original long-term historical time perspectives back to 
the time of Muhammad, the founder of Islam, different perennial aspects of the 
relationship between the two sides become more evident.551 These different perennial 
aspects, while not completely unproblematic, do not necessarily embed unnecessary 
issues and challenges in future peace processes that the Accords’ peace process had to 
address and overcome.  Within these extended long-term historical time perspectives 
spanning more than 1400 years, peaceful co-existence appeared to be a defining 
perennial aspect of the relationship between Jewish and Arab and Arab-Muslim 
populations. For example, long periods of relative peaceful co-existence between Jewish 
                                                            
549 Kornprobst and Senn, "Background Ideas in International Relations," 273-4 and 278; John R. Searle, The 
Construction of Social Reality (New York: Free Press, 1995), 129. 
550 Darby and Mac Ginty, Contemporary Peacemaking, 3. 
551 Neumann and Øverland, “International Relations and Policy Planning,” 263. 
216 
 
and Arab and Arab-Muslim populations within the contested territories following the 
end of the Ninth Crusade and peaceful co-existence within Al-Andalus when large 
portions of the Iberian Peninsula were under Muslim rule (711 -1492) suggest strong 
evidence of perennial aspects that are in contrast to those highlighted by or derived from 
the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives.552 Furthermore, these extended long-
term historical time perspectives suggest that the perennial aspects of confrontation and 
conflict associated with the relationship between the two sides according to the Accords’ 
are ephemeral aspects unique to a particular short-term period of the past.553  This 
redefining of the Accords’ original perennial aspects (e.g. confrontation) as ephemeral 
aspects along with the recovery of previously unacknowledged perennial aspects is 
significant.  Via the process of redefining aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship, 
future peace processes are relieved of the burdens of having to address how these 
particular perennial aspects of the relationship are overcome or altered.554 In other 
words, the previously unacknowledged perennial aspects no longer require overcoming 
or altering because they support the peace process. As a consequence, future peace 
processes can instead be seen as building upon a long-term past defined by peaceful co-
existence and working toward the restoration of the peaceful and cooperative perennial 
historical tendencies exhibited among previous generations of Jewish and Palestinian 
populations. These are not the only promising effects of extending the long-term 
historical time perspectives of future peace processes.  
Two additional effects that extended long-term historical time perspectives can 
have on future peace processes regard religion and options toward peace. With regards 
to religion first, although not referenced in Accords, religious views have factored into 
the relationship and peace process between Israel and the Palestinians for centuries.555 
                                                            
552 María Rosa Menocal, The Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture 
of Tolerance in Medieval Spain: How Muslims, Jews, and Christians, Created a Culture of Tolerance in 
Medieval Spain (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2002).  
553 Milton-Edwards, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 9; Avigdor Levy, ed., Jews, Turks, Ottomans: A Shared 
History, Fifteenth through the Twentieth Century (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2002), 6, 89, 
and 98. Other incidents of disputes between the two sides occurring within the extended long-term 
historical time perspective can also be acknowledged via short-term historical time perspectives without 
calling into doubt the perennial aspect of peaceful co-existence exhibit over the centuries. 
554 Kelman’s discussion regarding the negotiating identity supports this claim. Herbert C. Kelman, "The 
Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process and Its Vicissitudes: Insights from Attitude Theory," The American 
Psychologist 62, no. 4 (May/June 2007), 301-02.   
555 Baumgart-Ochse, “Democratization in Israel,” 1120; Hasenclever and de Juan, “Grasping the Impact of 
Religious Traditions on Political Conflicts: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Perspectives,” Die Friedens-
Warte 82, no. 2/3 (2007): 19–47; Hasenclever and Rittberger, “Does Religion Make a Difference? 
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Including long-term historical time perspectives stretching back to Muhammad enables 
future peace processes to acknowledge religion as a crucial perennial factor that effects 
the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. What this acknowledgement of religion in general 
does within future peace processes is enhance the breadth of the long-term historical 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship these peace processes account for; a 
historical context which provides insights into the intimate connections between 
civilian and religious aspects existing within Israeli and Palestinian societies. In other 
words, extended long-term historical time perspectives allow essential perennial aspects 
such as religion to be brought back into the peace process so that these aspects can be 
evaluated and dealt with accordingly. Although bringing an acknowledgement of 
religion into a future peace process could be potentially problematic or seen as 
unnecessary for a peace process that is focused solely on building civil peace rather than 
a more comprehensive peace that includes religious peace, evidence from the particular 
extended long-term historical time perspective discussed thus far in this section suggests 
otherwise.  
A review of the extended historical time perspectives regarding Jewish and 
Muslim relations suggests that despite the different religious views held by the 
corresponding populations, they generally got along with one another when they resided 
in close proximity to one another or within the same territory. Therefore, differences in 
religious views between Jews and Muslims were never perennially so divisive as to 
eliminate the possibility of establishing long periods of peaceful co-existence. This 
insight can be potentially a useful argument against those who might claim that religion 
in a broad sense is a perennially divisive aspect of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. 
Consequently, embedding future peace processes with certain extended long-term 
historical time perspectives can do more than just highlight perennial aspects of the past, 
they can also provide a bulwark against religion in general from being used to thwart 
future peace processes. Whether the drafters of the Accords intentionally chose to limit 
the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives as a type of bulwark against aspects 
and discussions of religion cannot be known for certain. Nor can it be known that the 
choice of delimiting the Accords’ long-term historical time perspectives was to avoid 
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inviting any aspects and discussions of religion into the peace process because of the 
potential problems they might have introduced into the agreement and execution of the 
peace process. What can be known for certain however, as Israel’s Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin’s speech to the Knesset on October 5, 1995 regarding the ratification of 
Oslo II indicates, is that officials involved in the drafting, negotiating, and execution of 
the peace process recognised that there was a connection between religion and the peace 
process.556  Therefore, the aforementioned extended long-term historical time 
perspectives is offered as an option (and illustration) which enables future peace 
processes to engage with the recognised connection between the perennial aspect of 
religion and a peace process in a meaningful and constructive way without making the 
claim that a particular peace process will resolve religious differences. 
The connection between religion and a peace process alludes to the second effect 
extended long-term historical time perspectives can have on future peace processes; their 
effects on options toward peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. By making 
the connection between religion and a peace process more apparent, extended long-term 
historical time perspectives suggest that a future peace process focused solely on building 
a civil peace via democracy and capitalism (as exhibited in the Accords) might not be 
enough to establish or restore peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinian 
people. This recognition of the insufficiencies of 1) the Accords as a narrowly defined 
peace process and 2) its corresponding civil peace in resolving Israeli-Palestinian 
relations indicates that future options toward peace (i.e. future peace processes) should 
be considered more broadly to effectively address various perennial aspects of the 
relationship.  These future options toward peace should include both a variety of 
processes as well as types of peace they aim to yield.  As a place to begin to look for 
examples of what various forms future peace processes and their corresponding 
outcomes might take, extended long-term historical time perspectives can provide a 
valuable source. The connections among perennial aspects, as well as between perennial 
and ephemeral aspects, highlighted within these extended time perspectives can 
indicate what forms previous peace processes have taken, what made them successful 
                                                            
556 Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, “Speech to Knesset on Ratification of Oslo Peace Accords,” October 5, 
1995, Jewish Virtual Library, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/pm-rabin-speech-to-knesset-on-
ratification-of-oslo-peace-accords (accessed October 18, 2018). 
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and unsuccessful, and which forms of future peace processes might hold the most 
promise in resolving difficulties in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship.     
Using the extended long-term historical time perspectives as a source from which 
to gather historical insights that might be relevant to developing future Israeli-
Palestinian peace processes is helpful for considering other peace processes not rooted 
in liberal peace theory. These time perspectives include a greater variety of historical 
templates that future peace processes can replicate or build from which is in contrast to 
the lack of historical templates included or available within the Accords’ long-term 
historical time perspectives.557  As a consequence of broadening the range of historical 
templates that future peace processes can use as models, these extended historical time 
perspectives open up possibilities for peace processes in the future which the Accords’ 
long-term historical time perspectives could not have done given their limited historical 
perspectives.558 This opening up of possibilities for future peace processes essentially 
creates multiple ways or trajectories of arriving at a two-state solution rather than 
limiting it to one type of peace process as the Accords does. For example, a future peace 
process need not be limited to a democratic peace process where Palestinians must first 
establish a democratic government. In the long-term past, there were long periods of 
peaceful co-existence between Jewish and Muslim populations (e.g. during the Ottoman 
Empire and Muslim-ruled Spain) where democratic governments did not exist as they 
do in 2019. These periods suggest that successful peace processes can happen between 
non-democratic political entities. Consequently, the variety of historical peace processes 
and corresponding outcomes suggest that there are a variety of forms future peace 
processes might take; forms of peace processes which might prove to be more successful 
than those processes (e.g. the Accords) that have restricted long-term historical time 
perspectives and work toward predetermined ends. As the following section will 
illustrate, however, the success or failure of future peace processes does not rest on long-
term historical time perspectives alone.  
 
                                                            
557 The potential for greater variety to be found within extended long-term historical time perspectives 
stretching back to the time of Muhammad is evidenced by the various examples of peaceful co-existence 
between Jewish and Arab and Arab-Muslim populations under different governing situations. 
558 Neumann and Øverland, “International Relations and Policy Planning,” 263. 
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9.3 Short-historical time perspectives 
Like long-term historical time perspectives, short-term historical time perspectives 
shape peace processes and their corresponding claims as well.  To better understand this 
relationship, the following analysis was conducted of the Accords’ short-term historical 
time perspectives in relation to its articulated peace process and corresponding claims. 
The analysis was informed by relevant explanations and discussions appearing in 
Chapter 5 regarding connections between short-term historical time perspectives and 
theoretical claims. Based on my analysis, and despite their limited appearance within 
the Accords, short-term historical time perspectives were found to play four noteworthy 
roles in the peace process. These roles included the following: 1) supporting the claim 
that there is a historical precedence and legitimacy for the Accords’ peace process and 
one of its aims, 2) limiting the scope of and aims of the Accords’ peace process, 3) 
highlighting progress made in the peace process between Oslo I and Oslo II, and 4) 
trivialising previous peace agreements. Analyses of these roles and their effects on the 
Accords’ peace process and corresponding claims appear in the first half of this section, 
while the second half focuses on how short-term historical time perspectives not 
included in the Accords might be of use in future peace processes. By the end of the 
section, the reader will have gained an augmented understanding of the relationship 
between short-term historical time perspectives and a peace process, as well as an 
awareness of the importance of not neglecting the shaping roles short-term historical 
time perspectives can play in future peace processes.  
My analysis begins by considering the support roles short-term historical time 
perspectives play within the Accords. To illustrate this role, the following example has 
been provided. The example relates to how short-term historical time perspectives 
helped provide support for the claim that there is a historical precedence for two of the 
central aims of the Accords’ peace process; those aims are the implementation of 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. By citing these resolutions, the Accords’ drew 
attention to particular ephemeral moments in the past (i.e. short-term historical time 
perspectives) which shared an ongoing aim of restoring Israel’s borders back to their 
original frontiers prior to the 1967 Six-Day War.559  While these resolutions shared this 
aim, they were nevertheless consequences of two separate conflicts; Resolution 242 was 
                                                            
559 What these prior frontiers were, however, were not clear as footnote 528 indicates. 
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the consequence of the Six-Day War in 1967 and Resolution 338 was the consequence of 
the Yom Kippur War in 1973.560  As consequences of separate conflicts, these resolutions 
mark the ends of two distinct short-term periods in history and represent separate 
instances (i.e. ephemeral) in the past where the same aim was sought. Therefore, the 
mentioning of these resolutions essentially embeds two distinct short-term historical 
time perspectives into the Accords. Considered together, these two historical time 
perspectives offer support for the claim within the Accords that the aim of Israeli border 
restoration has historical precedence.  
This historical precedence is of importance in the Accords because it helps to 
legitimise the primary aims of the peace process (i.e. the restoration of Israel’s 1967 
borders) via the perennial aspects the historical precedence seems to attribute to this 
particular aim. Legitimising an aim of the peace process, however, does not necessarily 
mean that the peace process is automatically legitimised. In other words, legitimate ends 
(i.e. aims) do not alone legitimise the means (i.e. a peace process).   In the case of the 
Accords, however, the legitimation of the aim of 1967 border restoration was extended 
to the peace process itself. As a consequence of this extension, the peace process was 
assumed to be legitimate. This assumption can only be made if in addition to supporting 
a claim of historical precedence for one of the Accords’ aims, short-term historical time 
perspectives within the Accords also contributed to supporting claims of the legitimacy 
of the peace process. Without this assumption, legitimacy of the peace process would 
find no support from the Accords’ short-term or long-term historical time perspectives.  
Because this assumption was accepted, however, additional support for the legitimacy 
of the Accords’ peace process can be drawn from the same short-term historical time 
perspectives supporting the legitimacy of the Accords’ aims. By linking the Accords’ 
peace process to Security Council resolutions, the peace process indirectly gained 
support of the international community of states via the Security Council members 
which had already endorsed one of the primary aims of the Accords’ peace process, the 
implementation of Resolution 242 and 338.561  This approach to establishing the 
legitimacy of a peace process via short-term historical time perspectives suggests that the 
                                                            
560 Each resolution was a consequence of a specific conflict over the contested territory between Israel and 
various neighbouring states such Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. 
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legitimacy of the Accords’ peace process is less than robust as it rests ultimately on an 
assumption that the legitimacy of the peace process’s ends extended to its means. Future 
peace processes may benefit from seeking firmer grounds of legitimacy not based on 
assumptions but through either multiple short-term historical time perspectives which 
legitimise the peace processes and their aims simultaneously, separately, or in 
correspondence with long-term historical time perspectives.  
Just as short-term historical time perspectives play support roles with respect to 
claims of historical precedence and legitimacy within a peace process, a second role 
short-term historical time perspectives play regards their effects on limiting the scopes 
of the peace process and its aims. Illustrating this point are two examples, references 
made to the Marshall Plan and to the 1967 displacement of people from the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. First, the Marshall Plan is mentioned in Article XVI of Oslo I as guidance 
for the type of Israeli-Palestinian regional cooperation the Accords’ peace process was 
aiming to promote.562 By mentioning the Marshall Plan, ideas of liberal and democratic 
peace processes and corresponding aims were embedded into the Accords.563 This plan, 
however, was structured and implemented for a particular time in the past when 
democracy and capitalism were competing for global dominance against communism 
and planned economies. Furthermore, the plan was designed to work among pre-
existing democracies already in existence and through pre-existing governmental and 
administrative structures. Therefore, by using the Marshall Plan as a guide for Israeli-
Palestinian cooperation, particular out of date short-term historical time perspectives 
regarding how to build peace were imposed on the Accords’ peace process and aims. As 
a consequence, the scope of the 1993/95 peace process and aims of the Accords were 
delimited to one similar to the Marshall Plan. This delimited scope covered regional 
cooperation programs relating to economic and resource development. This narrowing 
of the Accords’ scope restricted how multilateral regional economic cooperation and 
development between Israel and the Palestinian people could evolve. Additionally, this 
narrowing of the scope was problematic as it maintained the balance of power in favour 
of Israel given the extent of its democratic governance and economic development in 
                                                            
562 Norrin M. Ripsman, “Peacemaking and Democratic Peace Theory: Public Opinion as an Obstacle to 
Peace in Post-Conflict Situations,” Democracy and Security 3, no. 1 (March 2007), 98 and 107. 
563 Kathleen Burk, "The Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks," Contemporary European History 10, 
no. 2 (July 2001): 267-94. 
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relation to the Palestinians. To help avoid these issues in future peace processes, 
maintaining a more open plan of regional economic cooperation and development or a 
plan that can change as a future peace process progresses might be worth considering.   
While the aforementioned example illustrates how short-term historical time 
perspectives limited the broad scope of the Accords’ peace process and its aims, this 
second example regarding displaced persons illustrates how short-term historical time 
perspectives limited the scope of the Accords’ peace process and its aims at a sub-macro 
level. Article XII of Oslo I and Article XXVII of Oslo II articulate how the issue of 
displaced persons from the West Bank and Gaza Strip was to be addressed. These 
articles, however, did not apply to all displaced persons in these regions, only those 
displaced in 1967. The mentioning of this date is significant because it inserts a specific 
short-term historical time perspective into the Accords that effectively limits the aims of 
the Accords with regards to displaced person to a specific group of persons. This specific 
1967 group did not include any persons displaced pre-1967 as a result of the 1948 Arab-
Israeli War following Israel’s declaration of independence.564  The exclusion of pre-1967 
groups of displaced persons in favour of the inclusion of those persons displaced in 1967 
suggests that addressing the issues surrounding the 1967 group were considered more 
integral to the overall adoption of the peace process than those issues associated with 
the other groups. In other words, some short-term historical time perspectives are more 
important than others to include within a peace process. As consequences of prioritising 
particular short-term historical time perspectives, the aims of a peace process are 
narrowed to such an extent that some issues remain unresolved and the 
comprehensiveness of the peace a peace process tries to help manifest is drastically 
limited. These consequences are necessary to bear in mind when drafting future peace 
processes because they highlight how crucial a peace process’s short-term historical time 
perspectives are in determining whether a process and its aims are comprehensive or 
limited in scope. 
In the aforementioned examples of short-term historical time perspectives, these 
same time perspectives appear in both Oslo I and Oslo II and perform similar roles 
                                                            
564 For an insightful discussion regarding 1948 refugees see “1948 Refugees: Proceedings of an International 
Workshop, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Faculty of Law, 14–15 December 2016,” Israel Law Review 51, 
no. 1 (February 2018): 47–110.  
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across the Accords. In the following paragraph, however, the differences among the 
short-term historical time perspectives found within Oslo I and Oslo II indicate the third 
role short-term historical time perspectives can play within a peace process, highlighting 
progress. For example, the additional short-term historical time perspectives included in 
Oslo II illustrate the implicit claim of vertical development565 being made in the Accords’ 
peace process from Oslo I to Oslo II. Examples of these additional short-term historical 
time perspectives include the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the 1994 and the 1995 
agreements regarding the transfer of powers and responsibilities between Israel and an 
elected Palestinian government. By illustrating the progress made between Oslo I and 
Oslo II, there is a suggestion that the peace process was working and that it had some 
traction going forward. Contributing further to this sense of progress were two other 
short-term historical time perspectives included in Oslo II, but absent from Oslo I; one 
related to the 1991 Madrid Conference and the other related to an exchange of letters 
between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman of the PLO in 1993. While both 
predate the signing of Oslo I, their marked absence from Oslo I but inclusion in Oslo II 
along with other short-term historical time perspectives during the interim period 
between Oslo I and Oslo II suggests their inclusion contributed to the aforementioned 
sense of development.  There is risk, however, in illustrating such development; it can 
lead to a false sense of security and faith in a peace process that has yet to be tested. 
Furthermore, short-term historical time perspectives focused on articulating only vertical 
development ignores the importance of articulating horizontal development; horizontal 
development is a necessary condition for lasting peace.566  Reflecting upon both 
concerns suggests that thinking more broadly about the various types of short-term 
historical time perspectives that can be included in future peace processes can help 
future peace processes articulate their progress more accurately.  
To gain insights about the final role short-term historical time perspective play 
within a peace process, it was necessary to understand each peace agreement and effort 
as an indicator of a distinct segment of time; in essence a short-term historical time 
perspective. Via this understanding, my analysis suggests that the Accords’ short-term 
historical time perspectives had a role in downplaying specific previous peace 
                                                            
565 For clarification on vertical development see page 120. 
566 For clarification on horizontal development see page 120. 
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agreements and efforts made to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations.  This down playing 
can occur as a consequence of: 1) emphasising and citing certain peace agreements and 
efforts of cooperation between the two sides within specific periods of the past which 
lend support to the currently pursued peace process and/or its aims or 2) by leaving out 
particular peace agreements and efforts at cooperation in the final articulations of a 
peace process.567  For example, the mentioning in Oslo II of the 1991 Madrid Conference 
and the 1993 exchange of letters between the Prime Minister of Israel and the Chairman 
of the PLO just prior to the signing of Oslo I suggest that they played important roles in 
making the drafting and execution of the Accords’ peace process possible. The absence 
of both in Oslo I, however, suggests that perhaps their importance was later exaggerated 
as the peace process progressed or problematic in the peace process’s infancy. In another 
example, the important roles that either the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty568 or the 1994 
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty569 played in making conditions for the drafting and execution 
of the Accords’ peace process possible were not mentioned in the Accords.570  
Considering that both fell well within the spans of time referenced within the Accords 
and were crucial to its success, their absence suggests that their relevance or importance 
was somehow less than those peace agreements and efforts mentioned specifically in the 
Accords. In essence, the significance of these peace agreements and efforts (i.e. 
ephemeral aspects of the past) were trivialised in the Accords by the short-term 
historical time perspectives by leaving them out, as well as by highlighting those 
agreements that were retained by the short-term historical time perspectives.  
The effects of this trivialisation, whether intentional or not, helped to distance 
the Accords’ peace process and its aims from previous peace agreements and efforts that 
either: 1) failed like the Geneva Conference in 1973, 2) were controversial for one side 
(e.g. the Palestinians) like the Camp David Accords in 1978 and the Egyptian-Israel Peace 
                                                            
567 Potential reasons for leaving out particular peace agreements may include their failure to yield the 
desired aims, they created more problems than they solved, they competed with the proposed peace 
process and its aims, or they highlighted deficiencies in the proposed peace process. 
568 “Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty,” conclusion date: March 26, 1979, Economic Cooperation Foundation – The 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/606 (accessed 
October 18, 2018). 
569 “Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty,” conclusion date: October 26, 1994, Economic Cooperation Foundation - 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/616 (accessed 
October 18, 2018). 
570 Article 9 of the 1994 Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty directly links this treaty to the Israel-Palestinian Peace 
Process articulated in the Accords.  
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Treaty in 1979, or 3) did not exclusively address Israeli-Palestinian relations or involve 
both sides as the equally invested, primary participants.571  This observation regarding 
the role short-term historical time perspectives played in downplaying particular peace 
agreements and efforts in the past is not intended to suggest that future peace processes 
need to include and articulate all relevant short-term historical time perspectives and 
their corresponding details. This observation is rather intended to flag up two points to 
bear in mind when drafting and evaluating future peace processes. First, the inclusion 
and omission of particularly short-term historical time perspectives can be strategically 
used to down play previous peace process and aims which might cast doubt on the 
success of or introduce unwanted problems and complications into future peace 
processes. Second, reflecting upon what details of the past are and are not omitted 
within future peace processes can help ensure that those short-term historical time 
perspectives included within future peace processes are necessary and those that are left 
out are not necessary. Remaining mindful of these two points, while not ensuring 
success of future peace processes, helps ensure that a broad range of short-term 
historical time perspectives are considered when drafting and evaluating future peace 
processes rather than just those historical time perspectives which seem to be obviously 
linked or not linked to particular peace processes. 
 
9.4 Using short-term historical time perspectives to open up a peace process 
As has been illustrated thus far in this section, short-term historical time 
perspectives play various roles within a peace process such as supporting claims, limiting 
the scope of a process and its aims, highlighting progress, and emphasising and down 
playing parts of the past. At the end of each role’s analysis and discussion, broad 
recommendations were offered without giving specific examples. In the subsequent 
paragraphs, specific examples regarding the first two roles addressed in the previous 
section are provided. The purpose is to give the reader an idea of what possible changes 
related to short-term historical time perspectives can be made to improve the likelihood 
of success of future Israeli-Palestinian peace processes. Specific examples of the latter 
                                                            
571 This trivialisation also helped support a notion in the Accords that a liberal and democratic peace 
process and its corresponding peace would be successful where other manifestations of peace processes 
and peace had failed in the past.   
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two roles regarding highlighting progress and emphasising and down playing segments 
of the past, however, are not provided for the following reasons. In regards to short-term 
historical time perspectives highlighting a peace process’s development, this observation 
was only made possible because Oslo I was followed up by Oslo II; there is no guarantee 
that a future peace process will be contain a follow-up process. Therefore, making 
specific recommendations would be purely speculative and would not contribute any 
additional guidance to improve future Israeli-Palestinian peace processes beyond the 
general recommendations that were presented in the previous section. Regarding 
providing examples of short-term historical time perspectives emphasising and down 
playing parts of the past, this would also not be helpful without knowing how a future 
peace process would be structured and what processes and aims will be prioritised.  
Despite not providing specific examples of short-term historical time perspective changes 
related to these latter two roles, these roles are nevertheless important to bear in mind 
when draft future peace processes and their corresponding aims. 
Among the examples of short-term historical time perspective changes that are 
provided in this section, the first examples to be considered regards possible short-term 
historical time perspectives which future peace processes might be included to improve 
the robustness of the legitimacies of the peace processes and their aims. As my analysis 
of the short-term historical time perspectives within the Accords illustrated, the 
legitimacy of one of the Accords’ stated primary aims (e.g. restoring Israel’s 1967 
borderlines) was extended to the Accords’ peace process. This legitimacy was based on 
two short-term historical time perspectives relating exclusively to an aim of the Accords 
not the process by which that aim was to be achieved. Consequently, future peace 
processes have three options for providing firmer ground for their legitimacy; they can 
either 1) include short-term historical time perspectives which link to long-term historical 
time perspectives so as to suggest the existence of a long-term legitimacy, 2) use short-
term historical time perspectives which legitimatise both the process and its aims 
without the need for assumptions, or 3) include separate short-term historical time 
perspectives that legitimise either the peace process or its aims. For reasons which will 
be made clear in the next paragraph, the third option is the most promising. 
The first and second options are not as promising as the third option because of 
the practical challenges they present. For example, regarding the first option, finding an 
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existing long-term historical time perspectives that corresponds to and legitimatises a 
peace process which has only recently been conceived of and implemented in the recent 
past would be challenging because of a lack of available evidence. Other practical 
challenges include finding connections between peace processes of the short-term and 
long-term past, as well as being able to make those connections appear as self-evident 
and in support of a historical precedence of legitimacy within a few brief lines of a future 
peace process. Regarding the second option, finding a single short-term historical time 
perspective that legitimises both a particular process and its aims is daunting because it 
would have to perform two tasks simultaneously.  A single short-term historical time 
perspective would have to simultaneously 1) illustrate that a particular peace process 
executed in the short-term past was designed to yield and did in fact yield specific aims 
and 2) illustrate that the same process and corresponding aims were similar enough to 
a peace process and corresponding aims that were planning to be deployed in a 
contemporary situation.  Even if such a short-term historical time perspective performing 
both tasks could be found, finding more than one short-term historical time perspective 
legitimising both a peace process and its aims is preferred. Multiple short-term historical 
time perspectives legitimising both a process and its aims would suggest that a particular 
peace process and its corresponding aims have been tested and yielded satisfactory 
outcomes in similar or various circumstances; thus making the claims of the legitimacy 
of a peace process and its aims more convincing. Considering the aforementioned 
practical challenges posed by the first two options, the third option is more promising 
because it does not burden any single short-term historical time perspective with having 
to perform too many legitimacy-related functions in a future peace process.  
The third option essentially suggests that a future Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process and its aims can be legitimised separately via individual short-term historical 
time perspectives. By disaggregating how a peace process and its aims are legitimised, 
this option opens up access to multiple short-term historical time perspectives that could 
be potentially included in a future peace process.  This multiplicity enables claims of the 
legitimacies of a future peace process and its aims to be established and supported 
independently via various short-term historical time perspectives embedded throughout 
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a future articulated peace process.572  Consequently, extending the legitimacy of a future 
peace process’s aims would no longer be needed to establish claims of legitimacy 
regarding the peace process itself. Although examples of what these short-term historical 
time perspectives might look like in the future would vary depending upon which peace 
process and aims were pursued in the future to improve Israeli-Palestinian relations, a 
few examples are offered below for illustrative purposes.  As discussed earlier in this 
section, the short-term historical time perspectives relating to Resolutions 242 and 338 
help to support claims of legitimacy regarding the aims of the Accords. Similar 
references to specific UN resolutions and international agreements which clearly 
articulate the aims of a peace process can be included in a future Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process to help establish claims of legitimacy regarding its aims. With regards to 
helping support claims of legitimacy regarding a future peace process itself, mentioning 
the peace processes used to improve relations between Jordan and Israel since the 
signing of the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace treaty would support legitimacy claims of a future 
peace process that adopted similar processes.573  Considered together, both examples 
illustrate the distinct roles different short-term historical time perspectives can play in 
providing comprehensive support for claims of legitimacy of both a future peace process 
and its aims, a support that is missing in the Accords. 
Continuing with this theme of using short-term historical time perspectives to 
open up future Israeli-Palestinian peace processes so that such peace processes might 
be more successful than the Accords, is the recommendation made earlier in this section 
to open up the scope of a future peace process and its aims. Essentially, the limited scope 
problem, stemming from particular short-term historical time perspectives, has two 
consequences. The limited scope 1) restricts a peace process and its aims to such an 
extent that the future becomes pre-emptively defined as a perpetuation of the past and 
2) it ignores the broader issues threatening the long-term success of the a peace process.  
While there is nothing wrong with using short-term historical time perspectives in this 
way, there are some benefits to rearticulating similar short-term historical time 
perspectives that may be included within future peace processes. These re-articulations 
                                                            
572 This use of short-term historical time perspectives to support claims is similar to how Morgenthau uses 
them (i.e. to highlight illustrative examples) within his theory to support theoretical claims regarding 
perennial and ephemeral aspects of international politics. 
573 “Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty” concluded on October 26, 1994. 
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can help to characterise these short-term historical time perspectives as beginnings. For 
example, a future peace process can include articulations that specifically convey the 
idea that focusing on addressing those persons displaced in 1967 is a starting point from 
which to begin to address the broader issue of displaced persons in Israel and the 
contested territories. Such an articulation both maintains the aim of addressing persons 
displaced in 1967 while also characterising the aim as a beginning step that leaves open 
the possibility of addressing other displaced persons in the future. Likewise, these re-
articulations of short-term historical time perspectives within a future peace process can 
help to characterise historical models of regional cooperation and development 
mentioned (e.g. the Marshall Plan) within a future peace process as examples of how 
regional cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian people might begin to develop 
rather than define how regional cooperation must develop. Both examples illustrate how 
re-articulations of short-term historical time perspectives within a future peace process 
can be altered to broaden the scope of a future peace process and its aims. The benefits 
of broadening of scope are as follows: 1) it enables a peace process to organically evolve 
over time as contingencies arise and circumstances change without having to redraft a 
new peace process and 2) it embeds within a future peace process the notion that peace 
is not manifested once a process’s aims are reached, but a process of peace is ongoing 
with ever emerging aims.     
 
9.5 Short-term present time perspectives 
Much like long-term and short-term historical time perspectives, short-term 
present time perspectives appear sparingly in the Accords. Despite their sparing 
appearances, the few short-term present time perspectives that appear in the Accords do 
shape the peace process and certain claims made within it in particular ways.  These 
particular ways, however, are not immediately clear. Only after reviewing insights about 
short-term present time perspectives addressed in Chapter 6 did the effects of the 
Accords’ short-term present time perspectives on the peace process and its claims 
become clear. In this section, analyses of these particular ways is present and includes 
how the Accords’ short-term present time perspectives 1) constitute the necessary and 
sufficient conditions which prompted the creation of and sustained need for the 
Accords, 2) situate the Accords’ peace process and its steps in time, 3) articulate and 
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characterise the Accords’ present in relation to the past and the future, and 4) 
problematise and unproblematise the Israeli-Palestinian relations. Some insights gained 
from these analyses both highlight how problematic articulations of the present can be 
within a peace process, as well as suggest how short-term present time perspectives 
within future peace processes can be altered to make them less problematic.  In general, 
however, the insights gained from my analyses indicate that short-term present time 
perspectives cannot be absent from an articulation of a peace process, as is the case of 
their pervasive presence within a theory. 
Supporting the claim that a peace process must contain short-term present time 
perspectives is the idea that short-term present time perspectives within a peace process 
articulate the contemporary context of relations between actors involved and interested 
in the outcome of a conflict. This contemporary context is crucial in a peace process 
because it provides the necessary and sufficient conditions which initiate the creation of 
and support the sustained need for a peace process. For example, references to the 
redeployment of Israeli Forces in Oslo I574 and Oslo II575 suggest that the conditions of 
each corresponding present are not peaceful. These references also indicate that Israeli-
Palestinian relations were not peaceful in the past, nor will they be immediately peaceful 
with the signing of each agreement. Essentially, the non-peaceful relations between the 
two sides in the Accords’ presents are manifestations of a perennial aspect of the 
relationship.  By articulating the present in this way, short-term present time perspectives 
outlined the contemporary conditions of Israeli-Palestinian relations as perennially, 
problematic conditions which were necessary and sufficient to create a contemporary 
need for a peace process in the form of the Accords. Need alone, however, is not enough 
to prompt the creation of a peace process or encourage the conflicting parties to engage 
in a peace process; political desire and commitment are also needed.  
In the preamble of Oslo I, words such as ‘agree’, ‘recognise’, and ‘strive’ indicate 
contemporary desires and commitments (i.e. political will) among both Israel and the 
Palestinian negotiating delegation for a peace process. These contemporary desires and 
commitments are reaffirmed in a subsequent present articulated within Oslo II’s 
preamble. By mentioning the contemporary desires and commitments in both 
                                                            
574 Oslo I, art. XIII. 
575 Oslo II, art. X and annex I, art. I. 
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preambles, the Accords were essentially indicating that existing sets of contemporary 
conditions in 1993 and 1995 were conducive to supporting both parties’ engagement in 
the Accords’ peace process. In other words, the contemporary conditions in 1993 and 
1995, although ephemeral, provided the necessary and sufficient ephemeral conditions 
for the Accords to materialise and be accepted.576  Therefore, short-term present time 
perspectives within a peace process articulate perennial and ephemeral aspects of 
contemporary conditions surrounding Israeli-Palestinian relations in particular ways 
which delimit how the present is contextualised within a peace process. These ways 
indicate the necessary and sufficient conditions which give rise to an opportunity to 
engage with a peace process as well as sustain the need for a peace process beyond the 
present. Capturing the perennial and ephemeral necessary and sufficient conditions 
within a peace process’s short-term present time perspectives in the ever changing Israeli-
Palestinian relationship is no easy task and will continue to be difficult in the future. 
Nevertheless, this fluctuation is not an excuse to disregard particular contemporary 
conditions which currently affect or have the potential to affect the implementation and 
functioning of a peace process in the future.577  Therefore, future peace processes should 
not be devoid of clear articulations of short-term present time perspectives or fail to use 
these time perspectives to their fullest extent to try to capture the necessary and 
sufficient contemporary conditions of a future peace process. By attempting to capture 
and embed a fuller account of the necessary and sufficient conditions of a contemporary 
context of a future peace process, then a future peace process would be more likely to 
adequately address the contemporary issues sustaining the confrontational relationship 
between Israel and the Palestinians.   
In addition to articulating the necessary and sufficient conditions of a present 
within an Israeli-Palestinian peace process, short-term present time perspectives also 
situate a peace process and its steps in time. For example, the present of Oslo I is situated 
on September 13, 1993 and the present of Oslo II is situated on September 28, 1995. 
Knowing when each present is situated in time is necessary for making sense of how 
various future steps and stages of a peace process are organised and work together, as 
well as when they will be implemented.  For example, references in the Accords to future 
                                                            
576 Darby and MacGinty, Contemporary Peacemaking, 2.    
577 Examples of contemporary conditions disregarded by the Accords include the religious context and the 
actions of quasi-political actors such as Hamas. 
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steps and phases being implemented ‘within a period not to exceed four months after 
the signing of this agreement’578 or ‘immediately following the signing of this 
Agreement’579 would make little sense without having an idea of when the Accords’ 
present is situated. By articulating when the Accords’ present is situated in time, 
however, short-term present time perspectives date-stamp the separate presents for Oslo 
I and Oslo II and remove the ambiguity of the timelines mentioned above. This date-
stamping of each agreement’s present effectively defines an anchor point from which 
subsequent steps and stages of the Accords’ peace process are organised. For example, 
the timeline for the numerous phases regarding the redeployment of Israeli military 
forces outlined in Article X of Oslo II and elaborated further in Annex I: Article I of Oslo 
II are sequentially organised from the particular present articulated in Oslo I. Thus, to 
make sense of the implementation and organisation of the sequencing of Israeli military 
redeployments, the present within Oslo I had to be articulated clearly by its short-term 
present time perspectives as well as later linked in Oslo II to Oslo II’s own present.580  
Considered collectively, these observations suggest another role short-term present time 
perspectives play in a peace process; their role in articulating how a present relates to 
the past and the future. 
By looking at how short-term present time perspectives within a peace process 
articulate or characterise the present in relation to the past and the future, key insights 
about what claims are being made and embedded within a peace process can be 
recovered. For example, in both Oslo I and II, each present is characterised as a ‘historic 
reconciliation’ and ‘an end’ to a particular type of confrontational relationship between 
Israel and the Palestinians.581 Characterising the present as a termination of the past 
suggests that the conflictual perennial and ephemeral aspects of the past will not persist 
in the future.  In essence, these characterisations empty out the future of the problematic 
aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian relationship in the past and subsequently help to create 
a ‘new era’ with the necessary and sufficient conditions for the successful 
implementation of the Accords’ peace process in the future.582 By articulating the 
                                                            
578 Oslo I, annex II, para. 2. 
579 Oslo II, chapter I, art. II, para. 4. 
580 The latter part of the previous sentence also suggests that the implementations of future steps and 
stages not linked to the situated present within a peace process are left to chance and indicate where a 
peace process might potentially fail to progress. 
581 Oslo I, preamble; Oslo II, preamble. 
582 Oslo II, preamble. 
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present of a peace process as a departure from a particular problematic past, short-term 
present time perspectives begin to unproblematise a peace process’s future and introduce 
new perennial aspects to the future.583 This process of unproblematising the future is 
done by a peace process’s short-term present time perspectives because the necessary and 
sufficient conditions in the future need to be made less problematic in the present to get 
a peace process started or encourage an existing process to continue to move forward. 
Furthermore, without creating an allusion of an unproblematised future, participants in 
and beneficiaries of a peace process would not support or have any faith that a peace 
process would be successful. Short-term present time perspectives, however, also 
problematise a peace process’s future via their articulations of the present. 
Short-term present time perspectives within a peace process can problematise the 
future in different ways. For example, in the previous paragraph an argument was 
presented that suggested the Accords’ short-term present time perspectives 
unproblematises the future. This unproblematisation is itself problematic because it 
suggests that a future without defined substance is unproblematic or that which is 
problematic is inconsequential to the future operation and success of the Accords. 
Articulations of the present via short-term present time perspectives, however, are not 
unproblematic; they sustain and introduce aspects which contribute to the 
problematisation of a peace process’s future. This role of short-term present time 
perspectives can be seen via the bridging work they do between a peace process’s present 
and future. Essentially, through short-term present time perspectives’ articulations of a 
present, they extend problematic present conditions of a peace process into the future.  
As a consequence, the future context of a peace process becomes pre-populated by short-
term present time perspectives that articulate what present aspects (both new and 
historical) of the Israeli-Palestinian situation will continue into the (un)foreseeable 
future. Two examples of this extension of the present into the future found within the 
Accords relate to issues of foreign relations and defence. In both cases, short-term 
present time perspectives within the Accords articulated that Israel will continue to 
maintain its present responsibilities ‘in the sphere of foreign relations’584, ‘for defending 
                                                            
583 Examples of the perennial aspects will be addressed in the subsequent paragraph. 
584 ‘[This] sphere includes the establishment abroad of embassies, consulates or other types of foreign 
missions and posts or permitting their establishment in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip, the appointment 




against external threats’585, and ‘for the overall security of Israelis for the purposes of 
safeguarding their internal security and public order’586 well into the future. 
Consequently, the historical dominant position of power of Israel in relation to the 
Palestinians is affirmed in the present and perpetuated in the future; essentially making 
it a perennial aspect of the future. This insight illustrates how short-term present time 
perspectives problematise a peace process’s present and its future. Furthermore, this 
insight suggests that the seeds of a peace process’s failure may not exclusively originate 
from problematic conditions of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the past, but that such 
seeds can be sown via short-term present time perspectives.587  
  
9.6 Amending articulations of the present 
As the above analyses illustrate, short-term present time perspectives within a 
peace process embed a peace process with a particular articulation of the present. The 
articulation of the present that is rendered delimits how a peace process such as the 
Accords will unfold in the future. This articulation, however, is truly unique to the 
Accords’ particular contemporary circumstances unlike the long-term and short-term 
historical and future time perspectives of the Accords which could conceivably be 
included with little to no change within a future peace process. Given the uniqueness of 
a future present which a future peace process will need to capture, the discussion below 
includes ways of amending articulations of a present in a future process via short-term 
present time perspectives. These suggestions correspond with the analyses found in the 
previous section relating to short-term present time perspectives’ roles in shaping 
contemporary necessary and sufficient conditions, situating a peace process and its steps 
in time, articulating and characterising a peace process’s present in relation to its past 
and future, and (un)problematising the Israeli-Palestinian relations.  The shared aims of 
these suggestions is to maximise the accuracy of a present that is embedded within a 
future peace process by its short-term present time perspectives, while simultaneously 
minimising the potentially problematic effects new short-term present time perspectives 
can embed within a future peace process.  
                                                            
585 Oslo I, art. VIII. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Mueller’s discussion of the origins of the brutalities associated with imperialism illustrate this point. 
Mueller, “Temporality, Sovereignty, and Imperialism,” 438. 
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The first suggestion considered regards the role short-term present time 
perspectives play with respect to embedding contemporary necessary and sufficient 
conditions within a peace process. While I acknowledge that no grouping of short-term 
present time perspectives within a peace process can ever capture all the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of a contemporary Israeli-Palestinian situation, the absence of 
particular contemporary conditions within the Accords should nevertheless not be 
repeated in future peace processes. For example, leaving out the contemporary religious 
context which is known to be intertwined with the Israeli-Palestinian situation limits 
the comprehensiveness of the peace process within societies where religious differences 
exist and matter.588  Even if not explicitly addressed by a future peace process, including 
a short-term present time perspective within a future peace process that acknowledges 
religion as part of the contemporary conditions helps to include Israeli and Palestinian 
religious communities as beneficiaries in a future peace process. Alongside the absence 
of articulating a contemporary religious context within the Accords, the Accords’ short-
term present time perspectives also do not articulate contemporary peaceful engagement 
between Israelis and Palestinians at the grassroots level.589  Again, acknowledging, even 
if not explicitly naming, contemporary efforts at all levels would suggest an awareness 
among Israel and the Palestinians that contemporary necessary and sufficient conditions 
must exist at all levels if a peace process is to have any hope of being successful.  
Including each of the above short-term present time perspectives within a future peace 
process both improves the comprehensiveness of the contemporary necessary and 
sufficient conditions embedded within a future peace process, as well as augments an 
awareness among Israelis and Palestinians of the potential areas that a future peace 
process’s success and failure can spread. 
In regards to short-term present time perspective suggestions related to situating 
the present of a future peace process, there is value in continuing to use to short-term 
present time perspectives within a future peace process to establish a contemporary 
                                                            
588 The Good Friday Agreement is an example of how an acknowledgement of the contemporary religious 
context within a peace process can broaden the comprehensiveness of a peace process. Section 6: Rights, 
Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity – Human Rights.   
589 The foundings of Seeds for Peace (1993), Ir Shalem (1994), and the Parents Circle-Families Forum (1994) 
are examples of grassroots level engagement between Israelis and Palestinians. For an account of 
academics creating opportunities for Israelis and Palestinians to engagement with one another see Ben 
Mollov and Chaim Lavie, “Culture, Dialogue, and Perception Change in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict,” 
The International Journal of Conflict Management 12, no. 1 (2001): 69-87. 
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anchor point. This solitary anchor point, as illustrated in the Accords, serves as a 
moment in time from which to ascertain the necessary and sufficient conditions of the 
Israeli-Palestinian situation, as well as to determine how various future steps and stages 
will be implemented. The Accords also illustrated the need to update articulations of a 
peace process’s present via short-term present time perspectives to ensure that such a 
present reflects any progress made between peace agreements which are parts of the 
same peace process. While it is difficult to conceive of a future peace process that would 
not clearly articulate when it’s present is situated, the importance of the present within 
any future peace process and keeping it up to date is nevertheless worth emphasising 
considering how quickly Israeli-Palestinian relations can change. In other words, when 
the present is situated matters in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. 
Likewise, characterisations of the present within a future peace process also matters. 
The articulations and characterisations of the present in the Accords by short-
term present time perspectives are to be expected as necessary aspects within a peace 
process. These aspects help create an allusion that a peace process is introducing a new 
era (e.g. Oslo I) or a continuation of an existing successful peace process (e.g. Oslo II) 
that is conducive to the proposed peace process. Consequently, similar articulations and 
characterisations of the present should also appear in future peace processes to create 
allusions that future conditions will be conducive to allow for the successful 
implementation of plans outlined within future peace processes.  As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, however, these allusions are problematic because they assume that a future 
peace process’s short-term present time perspectives are not perpetuating or introducing 
aspects into the future which hinder the possibilities of achieving a lasting peace 
between Israel and the Palestinians.590 A future peace process can reduce, but not 
eliminate these problematic aspects in three ways via short-term present time 
perspectives. First, a future peace process can avoid including short-term present time 
perspectives which perpetuate or introduce problematic aspects into the future. For 
example, short-term present time perspectives referring to Israel’s continued dominance 
in foreign relations and defence could be excluded from a future peace process which 
                                                            
590 See section 9.5 regarding the role short-term present time perspectives play in perpetuating Israel’s 
dominance in foreign relations and defence in the Accords’ present and future. 
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supports the allusion that the future will be unproblematic.591  Second, a future peace 
process can temper its allusions by altering short-term present time perspectives. For 
example, short-term present time perspectives referring to Israel’s ongoing dominance in 
foreign relations and defence could include language that indicates Israel’s dominance 
in these areas will continue from a present until some future point when it becomes the 
final barrier to securing lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians.  Finally, short-
term present time perspectives can be added to a future peace process which 
acknowledge that its contemporary circumstances will continue to present known and 
unknown challenges throughout the implementation of a future peace process. These 
additional present time perspectives can help limit the extent to which a future peace 
process’s present and future are unproblematised, as well as build in an expectation that 
a future peace process might not progress smoothly; such an expectation is missing from 
the Accords.   
 
9.7 Short-term future time perspectives 
Given the focus of the Accords’ future oriented peace process and aims, it is not 
surprising that short-term future time perspectives feature prominently within the 
Accords. Much of this prominence stems from the sheer number of short-term future 
time perspectives articulated within the Accords. Despite the large number of short-term 
future time perspectives, in general, all these time perspectives within the Accords 
essentially provided various types of prescriptions for the immediate future and helped 
to outline how the Accords’ peace process would move forward.  The prescriptions and 
outline provided by the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives were not general in 
content however, but specific.  This specificity was significant, as well as problematic, 
because it delimited how the immediate future between Israel and the Palestinians could 
have possibly unfolded and left little room for the accommodation of future 
contingencies which arose and stalled the peace process.  To unpack the various ways 
short-term future time perspectives’ specificities were manifested within the Accords and 
                                                            
591 This particular option would not be acceptable to Israel for practical reasons.  Allowing the Palestinians 
to elevate their existing foreign relations activities to be on par with that of a sovereign state such as Israel 
would quickly move the Palestinians closer to establishing a Palestinian state which neither Israel nor the 
Palestinians were prepared for at the time of the signing of the Accords.   
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why their delimitations on the Accords’ immediate future were problematic, 
explanations and discussions about short-term future time perspectives from Chapter 7 
were useful in my analysis in this section.  These insights helped to explain how short-
term future time perspectives within the Accords 1) bridged the present with the 
immediate future, 2) attached certainty to near future prescriptions, 3) made particular 
unknowns in the near future known, and 4) pre-emptively added meaning and 
significance to certain aspects of the near future relationship between Israel and the 
Palestinians. As a consequence of my analysis, suggestions were developed as to how 
best to structure and incorporate short-term future time perspectives within a future 
peace process to allow for greater flexibility in the near future should future 
contingencies arise which might threaten to derail or halt a future peace process. 
My analysis of short-term future time perspectives within the Accords began by 
looking at how these future time perspectives helped bridge the Accords’ present with 
the immediate future and examining its effects on how the peace process would unfold.  
A contiguous link between the Accords’ present and articulated near future is 
established via the timeframe a short-term future time perspective specifies for the 
implementation of a particular future step or stage included in the Accords’ peace 
process.  For example, a short-term future time perspective in Oslo I specifies that an 
agreement regarding the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho area will be signed within two months of Oslo I’s ‘date of entry into force’.592  The 
timeframe specified begins with Oslo I’s present and extends into the near future for a 
potential two months; thus a link between the present and the immediate future is 
established.593  These links between a peace process’s present and immediate futures are 
necessary because they enable contemporary notions of a peace process to be extended 
into the immediate futures and explain how particular contemporary notions are 
extended into the immediate future.  In other words, the links articulated via short-term 
future time perspectives provide the means of prescribing what the immediate future of 
a peace process will be.  The prescribing done by short-term future time perspectives 
done within the Accords, however, is problematic. 
                                                            
592 Oslo I, annex II, para. 1. 
593 The specificity of the timeframe also attaches certainty to the prescriptions made within the Accords. 
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One of the reasons the prescribing articulated within the Accords’ short-term 
future time perspectives is problematic is because the resultant prescriptions are based 
on presumptions about the immediate future made in the present.  Only what is known 
in the present is considered to be potentially possible in the near future, as discussed 
earlier in section 9.5 of this chapter. Thus, the prescriptions articulated within the 
Accords’ short-term future time perspectives are limited by contemporary presumptions 
about the immediate future; presumptions which are themselves direct extrapolations 
of the Accords’ short-term present time perspectives. An example of contemporary 
presumptions upon which the Accords accepted included presuming that prescriptions 
outlined in the Accords would become reality at a particular point in the immediate 
future (e.g. election of a Palestinian Council). Other presumptions included presuming 
that specific consequences and conditions of the Accords’ peace process will manifest 
within the particular timeframes attached to the articulated prescriptions of the 
immediate future as such consequences and conditions are necessary pre-conditions for 
the actualisation of the prescriptions (e.g. phased redeployment of Israeli military 
forces).  While the aforementioned examples of presumptions about the immediate 
future of the Accords are clearly problematic, and consequently make the Accords’ 
prescriptions clearly problematic, these issues are not immediately apparent in the 
Accords.    
Prescriptions appear sound within the Accords because of the certainty that is 
attached to them within short-term future time perspectives’ articulations of how the 
immediate future of the Accords’ peace process will unfold.  Certainty is attached to 
prescriptions by articulating timeframes as to when they are going to happen or by 
integrating them in a sequence of other prescriptions which appear likely to occur.  An 
example of how certainty is attached to prescriptions is detailed in Oslo’s II plan 
regarding the phased transfer of jurisdiction of contested lands from Israel to an elected 
Palestinian government. Essentially, the phased transfer coincides with the timelines 
associated with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in Areas A, B, and C because 
it is explicitly linked to the redeployment plan.594  These timelines, ranging from ’22 days 
before the day of the [Palestinian] elections’ to ’18 months from the date of the 
inauguration of the Council’, attach deadlines as to when the transfer of jurisdiction will 
                                                            
594 Oslo II, art. XI, para. 2, sec. A. 
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be complete.595  Simultaneously, linking the phased transfer of jurisdiction with the 
phased Israeli military redeployment plan embeds the former into a sequence of 
prescriptions which had already begun by the time Oslo II was signed. Both the 
deadlines and integration of a set of prescriptions into an existing sequence are examples 
of how short-term future time perspectives add certainty to prescriptions found within a 
peace process.  This certainty is false because there remains the ongoing possibility that 
future contingencies could arise which might disrupt or halt a peace process as 
illustrated by the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in November 1995 
and the election of harsh Accords critic Benjamin Netanyahu as Israeli Prime Minister 
in June 1996.596  Therefore, short-term future time perspectives within future peace 
processes need to be more explicit in articulating the limits of the certainty they attach 
when prescribing how the immediate future will unfold. 
Another reason why the prescribing short-term future time perspectives within 
the Accords is problematic relates to its role in making particular unknowns in the near 
future known.  Short-term future time perspectives are used in the Accords to introduce 
new norms and institutions which, according to liberal and democratic peace theories, 
should improve Israeli-Palestinian relations and foster peace between the two sides.597  
Examples of the range of new norms and institutions short-term future time perspectives 
introduce are outlined in Article VII and Annex IV of Oslo I. These new norms and 
institutions include, but are not limited to, the creation of independent Palestinian 
judicial organs598, various means of developing and engaging in regional trade599, and 
institutions involved in the development and administration of Palestinian 
infrastructure projects600. By articulating exactly what the immediate future will look 
like, short-term future time perspectives introduced new aspects (e.g. norms and 
institutions) into Israeli-Palestinian future relations. In essence, the immediate future is 
pre-populated by short-term future time perspectives. This pre-population of the 
immediate future is problematic because it limits how a peace process can continue to 
advance.  Rather than letting the Accords’ peace process evolve organically without 
                                                            
595 Oslo II, art. X, para. 1 and 2. 
596 Dowty, Israel/Palestinian, 163 and 273. 
597 Kristine Höglund and Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs, "Beyond the Absence of War,” 371. 
598 Oslo I, art. VII, para. 2. 
599 Oslo I, annex IV, para. 2, 3, and 6. 
600 Oslo I, art. VII, para. 4. 
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knowing how or where it will advance, the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives 
predetermine the evolution of the peace process by making the immediate future 
known.  But the immediate future is not knowable, as events following the signing of 
Oslo II illustrated (e.g. Israeli PM Rabin’s assassination and Netanyahu’s election as 
Israel’s PM), and need to be acknowledged by a peace process’s short-term future time 
perspectives. Embedding future peace processes with short-term future time perspectives 
that acknowledge and preserve the inability to know what the immediate future holds 
can help them better accommodate and weather whatever contingencies arise in the 
immediate future. 
When articulating aspects about the immediate future, as either known or 
unknown, short-term future time perspectives within a peace process also pre-emptively 
add meaning and significance to certain aspects of the near future relationship between 
Israel and the Palestinians. For example, along with introducing new norms and 
institutions into the immediate future, the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives 
also articulated these new aspects as perennial.  In Oslo I, Article III regarding the 
election of a Palestinian Council and Article XI regarding Israeli-Palestinian cooperation 
in economic fields are examples of how short-term future time perspectives introduce 
and link liberal and democratic peace ideals of democratic governance, cooperation, and 
economics to the peace process. This link is significant because liberal and democratic 
peace ideals (upon which the Accords’ peace process was based) require that democratic 
governments and institutions, free-market economies, respect for international law, and 
cooperation be perennial for perpetual peace to exist.601  Consequently, these aspects 
introduced via short-term future time perspectives into the Accords’ peace process have 
a perennial significance that extends beyond the immediate future. These aspects help 
to pre-emptively define the future perennial aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations 
which will contribute to a lasting peace. In other words, the foundations of perennial 
aspects of Israeli-Palestinian future relations articulated within the Accords originate 
and are laid down via short-term future time perspectives. 
                                                            
601 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 4. Russett does include ‘economic liberties and secure political 
freedom’ in his definition of democracy as Rummel and Doyle do. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 
15; Rudolph J. Rummel, “Libertarianism and International Violence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 27, no. 
1 (March 1983): 27-71; Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”. 
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By singling out particular perennial aspects within the Accords’ short-term future 
time perspectives, certain claims about known and unknown aspects of the future are 
being put forward by the Accords which delimit how the peace process is able to unfold. 
For example, the singling out of liberal and democratic peace aspects within the Accords’ 
short-term future time perspectives suggest that they 1) will profoundly shape the Israeli-
Palestinian relationship in the foreseeable and unforeseeable futures and 2) are 
necessary to lead to the sought after peace as articulated within the Accords. The 
perennial aspects highlighted within the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives 
also suggest that other aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the foreseeable and 
unforeseeable futures are either ephemeral (e.g. conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians) or perennial but less significant (e.g. Palestinians living in Israel as Israeli 
citizens).  These claims about the future, which appear in the Accords via short-term 
future time perspectives, have the effect of oversimplifying the future unfolding of the 
Accords’ peace process. This oversimplification of the immediate and distant future 
negates the complexity of international politics and Israeli-Palestinian relations, as well 
as the possibility that anything in the immediate or distant future could arise that would 
disrupt or halt the Accords’ peace process. Thus pre-emptively adding meaning and 
significance to particular aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relations via short-term future 
time perspectives should be done cautiously within a future peace process and in a way 
that allows either Israel or the Palestinians to adjust course as needed to enable a future 
peace process to continue to unfold towards its ultimate aims. 
 
9.8 Adjusting the perception of near future realities 
The above analyses of the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives addressed 
examples of how these future time perspectives shaped and restricted the immediate 
future of the Accords’ peace process.  By providing specific timelines, goals, and details 
about various aspects of the immediate future, short-term future time perspectives were 
able to predetermine how the Accords’ peace process would unfold.  The specificity 
provided by the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives, however, negated the 
reality that the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations and international politics cannot 
be scripted out in advance.  Consequently, the Accords’ peace process was unable to 
adjust to near future realities as they arose and thus failed prematurely. Future peace 
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processes, however, might be able to avoid premature endings if their short-term future 
time perspectives are adjusted. Below are three potential adjustments that could be made 
to short-term future time perspectives included within future peace processes to possibly 
improve their success.  The first two adjustments are offered as suggestions as to how 
short-term future time perspectives’ articulations of certainty and the unknowability of 
the near future could be improved upon. The final adjustment suggests how the pre-
emptive meanings and significance added to aspects of the immediate future can be 
refined by the addition of short-term future time perspectives to allow a future peace 
process room to adjust course as conditions change in the near future.  The adjustments 
provided are for illustrative purposes and based upon an assumption that a future peace 
process will contain similar elements that are found within the Accords’ peace process. 
The first adjustment to be presented regards the issue of certainty. The certainty 
attached to particular steps and stages throughout the peace process is problematic 
because it is a false certainty based upon presumptions that the immediate future will 
unfold along a specific linear path within specified timeframes.  Any obstacle or event 
that occurs in the future along that path has the potential to stop a peace process from 
advancing or force timeframes to be extended.  Rather than ignoring the fact that 
certainty can never be guaranteed because no one can know what will happen in the 
immediate future, a future peace process should explicitly acknowledge the limitations 
of the certainties short-term future time perspectives articulate.  For example, a short-
term future time perspective can be added to a future peace process which articulates 
that the timelines and progression of steps and stages outlined within a future peace 
process can be achieved so long as both parties remain committed to the peace process 
and near future conditions remain conducive to the outlined peace process. Although 
the wording is generic, explicitly acknowledging the limitations of the certainties 
articulated by short-term future time perspectives will help to keep a future peace process 
grounded to the notion that the future is uncertain.  This grounding essentially makes 
the certainties appear less false. 
In addition to adding short-term future time perspectives that make certainties 
less false in a future peace process, short-term future time perspectives can also be added 
to help a future peace process weather or accommodate unforeseen near future 
contingencies and evolve more naturally.  As the Accords’ peace process was structured, 
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Israel was able to largely control how the peace process unfolded, from the phased 
withdrawal of military forces to the transfer of jurisdiction to the newly elected 
Palestinian Council. Therefore, short-term future time perspectives within a future peace 
process would need to be constructed in ways that 1) rapidly decouple Israel’s control 
over the peace process, 2) create an environment that increasingly raises the stakes for 
both Israel and the Palestinians to not abandon a future peace process, and 3) open up 
multiple avenues for a future peace process to continue to advance even if one avenue 
fails.  These additional short-term future time perspectives might articulate the following: 
1) near future economic incentives offered by other states with vested interests in 
establishing peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinians, 2) near future 
concessions regarding settlements, villages, and religious sites in Area C of the 
Accords602, and 3) multiple points in the near future when key processes can possibly 
begin rather than just limiting their starting points to just one moment in time.  By 
introducing these types of short-term future time perspectives, participants of a future 
peace process might be better able to capitalise on the temporary political will to engage 
in the peace process, weather unforeseen near future contingencies, and adjust to 
unknown near future conditions as needed.  Furthermore, these additional short-term 
future time perspectives essentially open up the immediate future of a future peace 
process to multiple possibilities of arriving at the long-term future aims of a future peace 
process.603   
The final adjustment to be suggested relates to how additional short-term future 
time perspectives can be used to clarify the pre-emptive meanings and significance added 
to aspects of the immediate future of a future peace process or Israeli-Palestinian 
relations.  For example, short-term future time perspectives within a future peace process 
can be added to explicitly articulate whether or not an aspect introduced in the peace 
process, like an institution or norm, is intended to be perennial or ephemeral.  Making 
these distinctions explicit can help participants in a future peace process to identify 
which perennial aspects must be accounted for or can be relied upon throughout the 
peace process and which aspects are or can be made ephemeral.  Furthermore, these 
                                                            
602 Area C contained a number of sites that were of interest to both Israel and the Palestinians. For 
examples see Oslo II, annex III, art. II, appendix I. 




short-term future time perspectives help to contain perennial or ephemeral 
characteristics to particular aspects of a future peace process rather than letting these 
characteristics apply implicitly more broadly to the near future of a pace process.  By 
containing the near future parameters of aspects articulated within a future peace 
process, the aforementioned short-term future time perspectives are creating space for 
unknowns to exist within a future peace process’s near future. This space for unknowns 
is important to explicitly identify within a future peace process because it is where future 
contingencies might be able to be accommodated and where a future peace process 
might be able to adjust its course going forward. The Accords lacked this type of space 
in the near future because its short-term future time perspectives pre-emptively filled it 
and thus severely limited what adjustment could be made when changes in domestic 
Israeli and Palestinian politics occurred. 
 
9.9 Long-term Future Time Perspectives  
Despite the contributions the Accords’ short-term future time perspectives made 
in clarifying how the Accords’ peace process should have unfolded in the future, no 
articulation of the future of the Accords’ peace process would have been complete 
without long-term future time perspectives. To understand what roles these future time 
perspectives do and do not play within the Accords and what roles long-term future time 
perspectives could play in future peace processes, the following analysis of the Accords’ 
long-term future time perspectives was conducted with an awareness of the insights 
about long-term future time perspectives discussed in Chapter 7. Based upon this 
analysis, long-term future time perspectives within the Accords were seen to provide 
general glimpses into the long-term evolution and manifestations of the Accords’ peace 
process, as well as Israeli-Palestinian relations beyond the peace process.  While some 
of these glimpses were fundamental to the aims of the Accords, as they are in any peace 
process, some were also problematic given the Accords’ ultimate aim for peace between 
Israel and the Palestinians.  Examples of these various types of glimpses are provided 
below along with some suggestions as to what types of long-term future time perspectives 
can be included in future peace processes to avoid these problematic issues arising again. 
By the end of this section, the ways in which long-term future time perspectives delimit 
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a peace process will be made clear and provide useful insights which can help in the 
drafting of other peace processes in the future. 
Evidence of long-term future time perspectives shaping peace process is scattered 
throughout the Accords. At a foundational level, long-term future time perspectives 
within the Accords provide support to the idea that a ‘lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement’ will be reached.604  By articulating and supporting this idea, the Accords’ 
long-term future time perspectives are suggesting that the Accords’ peace process has an 
end in the form of ‘a permanent settlement’ between Israel and the Palestinians and no 
additional peace processes are needed to build or maintain peace. While there is nothing 
wrong with suggesting that a particular peace process can end, the Accords’ suggestion 
that no subsequent processes are needed goes against what some of the literature on 
peace studies suggests.605  Peace studies literature suggests that the process of building 
and maintaining peace is ongoing and may only be deemed (if ever) no longer necessary 
long after peace has been consciously and unconsciously realised among the populations 
of conflicting parties and materialised on the ground.  Within the Accords, however, 
there is no mention of what happens after the Accords’ initial peace process ends. There 
are no additional long-term future time perspectives articulating that any subsequent 
peace processes are needed. These missing long-term future time perspectives indicate 
that the process of building and maintaining peace is not conceived of in the Accords as 
an ongoing process, but as finite. According to liberal and democracy peace theories, 
upon which the Accords were based, this finiteness is presumed not to be a problem 
because the democratic institutions and norms are presumed to serve any of the 
functions a subsequent peace process would serve between two democracies. This 
understanding, however, is not explicitly articulated in any of the Accords’ long-term 
future time perspectives. Consequently, the Accords’ long-term future time perspectives 
appear underdeveloped and thus call into question the viability of the permanence of 
the peace the Accords claimed to be leading to and might have created between Israel 
and the Palestinians had the Accords’ peace process not been abandoned.  These insights 
about the Accords’ underdeveloped and missing long-term future time perspectives 
                                                            
604 Oslo I and II, preambles. 
605 For an example see Eamonn O'Kane, “The Perpetual Peace Process? Examining Northern Ireland's 
Never-ending, but Fundamentally Altering Peace Process,” Irish Political Studies 28, no. 4 (2013): 515-535. 
Literature reviewed in section 2.6.3 contain additional examples. 
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suggest ways in which long-term future time perspectives within a future peace process 
can be used to help account for peace studies’ observation that the process of peace is 
ongoing.  
Along with articulating that the Accords’ peace process will end, long-term future 
time perspectives are also conveying other aspects of Israeli-Palestinian relation. For 
example, these future time perspectives help convey that peace will become a perennial 
aspect of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the distant future. As a consequence of 
articulating peace as perennial, long-term future time perspectives are also conveying 
that the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is (or will become) ephemeral.606  
Evidence of both these claims are found in the Preambles of Oslo I and Oslo II which 
make references to a ‘lasting and comprehensive peace settlement’ and ‘negotiations on 
the permanent status’. Words such as ‘lasting’ and ‘permanent’ denote that certain 
aspects of the relationship will continue unchanged in the distant future (i.e. be 
perennial) while a phrase like ‘comprehensive peace settlement’ suggests numerous 
aspects of the conflict will be resolved at some point in the distant future. Making these 
claims are necessary within the Accords because they provide reasons for both Israel and 
the Palestinians to see the Accords’ peace process through to the end. These claims are 
made more believable and probable via the Accords’ long-term future time perspectives 
because they are articulated as both aspirations607 and predictions608 of what the distant 
future relationship between Israel and the Palestinians will be. Articulating claims in 
this way enables the Accords’ long-term future time perspectives to attach emotional and 
logical appeals to claims about the distant future being peaceful.  Future peace processes 
would benefit from including long-term future time perspectives that perform similar 
functions to help keep Israel and the Palestinians emotionally and logically motivated 
during the peace process.   
                                                            
606 This notion that the conflict is ephemeral is not unique to the Accords’ long-term future time 
perspectives, but is also conveyed by its short-term present time perspectives as mentioned in section 9.5. 
The correspondence between these two different types of time perspectives highlights that the Accords’ 
long-term future time perspectives serve a validating function within the Accords which reinforces claims 
made elsewhere within the Accords regarding the finiteness of the conflict between Israel and the 
Palestinians. 
607 Oslo II, preamble: ‘Reaffirming their desire to achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace 
settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process...’. 
608 Oslo II, preamble: ‘Reaffirming their understanding that...the negotiations on the permanent 
status...will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338...’.  
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Missing from the Accords’ articulations of the distant future via long-term future 
time perspectives, however, are timelines as to when these claims about perennial and 
ephemeral aspects will become reality.  This absence is most apparent in Article V of 
Oslo I and Article XXXI in Oslo II regarding the permanent status negotiations.  Within 
these articles, a number of details are provided about the negotiations regarding the 
range of potential starting dates609 to issues to be covered during the negotiations.610  
Nowhere in these articles nor elsewhere within the Accords,611 however, does one long-
term future time perspective articulate a specific date as to when the permanent status 
negotiations will end.  Given the details provided by the Accords’ long-term future time 
perspectives, as well as its other four time perspectives regarding start dates and 
timelines for particular steps or stages of the peace process and what was to happen at 
each step or stage in the process, the absence of a specific end date to the permanent 
status negotiations suggests that the Accords’ long-term future time perspectives were 
limited in terms of the extent to which they could articulate a predetermined distant 
future.  Furthermore, fact that the permanent status negotiations officially began within 
the Accords’ articulated timeframe on May 5, 1996 but went nowhere after that date 
suggests that the timelines and dates articulated by the Accords’ long-term future time 
perspectives potentially provided traction for the peace process to continue into the 
distant future.612  Collectively, these insights suggest that it may be unrealistic to try to 
simultaneously maintain a notion that the distant future cannot be completely known 
and a need to articulate details of the distant future.  Therefore, long-term future time 
perspectives within a future peace process should try to focus on maintaining one or the 
other.  
                                                            
609 Oslo I, art. V, para. 2: ‘Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later 
than the beginning of the third year of the interim period...’. Oslo II, art. XXXI, para. 5 specified a start 
date no later than ‘May 4, 1996’.  
610 Oslo I, art. V, para. 3: ‘It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other 
neighbors, and other issues of common interest’. Similar issues were articulated in Oslo II, art. XXXI, para. 
5. 
611 Among the 39 times the ‘permanent status negotiations’ are mentioned within Oslo II, the references 
mostly regard matters related to the future jurisdiction of Area C within the contested territory.  Examples 
of these matters include jurisdiction of archaeology and religious, sites, parks, natural resources, property 
taxes, and tourism. 
612 “The Wye River Memorandum,” conclusion date: October 23, 1998, Economic Cooperation Foundation 
– The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict: An Interactive Database, https://ecf.org.il/media_items/634 (accessed 




9.10 Adjusting long-term future time perspectives to reality 
In the above analysis, efforts were made not to point out where the Accords’ long-
term future time perspectives got articulations of the distant future wrong, but rather 
how they could be made more accurate, less problematic, or be used to tie up loose ends. 
The choice should be made based upon which one will lead to long-term future time 
perspectives that best support claims made within a future peace process.  For example, 
long-term future time perspectives within a future peace process need to better account 
for insights about the peace process highlighted within the peace studies literature. If 
the process of peace is ongoing, then a future peace process’s long-term future time 
perspectives need to be more explicit that at most they can only articulate that the end 
of a particular process contributes to peace, but does not alone produce a lasting peace.  
Following this suggestion, a future peace process adopting a similar structure of the 
Accords’ peace process would be able to use its long-term future time perspectives to 
articulate that an outlined future peace process would need to be followed by a 
subsequent peace process. Such an articulation introduces the idea that the process of 
peace is indeterminate within a future peace process. Furthermore, these long-term 
future time perspectives would support any claims within a future peace process that the 
process will lead to, though not solely create, a permanent and peaceful settlement 
between Israel and the Palestinians. 
Introducing long-term future time perspectives within a future peace process that 
embrace ideas that a process of peace is ongoing and its final end date is indeterminate, 
does not mean that specific end dates should not be articulated by long-term future time 
perspectives as well.  For example, long-term future time perspectives can be added within 
a future peace process to articulate when a particular peace process will end or a deadline 
by which a subsequent peace process needs to be framed and agreed to by Israel and the 
Palestinians.  The importance of specifying these terminal dates or timelines is twofold. 
First, these dates and timelines draw attention to the limitations and finiteness of a 
future peace process. Second, as the implementation of the Accords illustrated 
(particularly Oslo I), adding these dates and timelines would provide traction and 
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deadlines which help keep a peace process moving forward into the distant future.613 
These suggestions would fit well within future peace processes modelled after the 
Accords where peace processes are structured to unfold linearly and according to 
detailed timelines.  These additional long-term future time perspectives might also have 
roles to play within future peace processes that are not structured linearly, but require 
clear indications as to when particular peace processes end.  Regardless of a future peace 
process’s structure, however, at some point specifying particular ends and timelines 
becomes either impractical or useless because of unforeseen contingencies that might 
occur in the distant future. Therefore, all future peace processes would benefit from 
restricting the inclusion of long-term future time perspectives specifying dates and 
timelines to tying up loose ends that are necessary before a subsequent peace process 
can begin.  
In addition to the suggestions mentioned above, a few words need to be said 
regarding the roles long-term future time perspectives play in relation to emotional and 
logical appeals found within peace processes.  Embedding future peace processes with 
both types of appeals via long-term future time perspectives will be necessary for two 
basic reasons. First, emotional and rational appeals in relation to long-term peace cut 
across social, economic, and political divisions and serve as a means of bringing different 
segments of Israel and Palestinian societies together in support of a future peace 
process.614 Second, both appeals can be called upon to support a future peace process at 
various stages of its implementation to help ensure that a process is not pre-maturely 
abandoned.  In other words, by articulating these appeals within a future peace process, 
long-term future time perspectives contribute to ensuring that the hearts and minds of 
Israelis and Palestinians remain committed to a future peace process and its aims.  The 
suggestion to articulate both appeals via long-term future time perspectives within future 
peace processes, however, is not simply a matter of including equal numbers of 
emotional and rational appeals. Situational and cultural considerations should be the 
drivers behind to what extent each type of appeal is highlighted.615  As the Accords 
illustrated, a future peace process’s overreliance on logical appeals for its long-term 
                                                            
613 Goetz, “Time and Power in the European Commission,” 585. 
614 Sophie A. Whiting, Spoiling the Peace?: The Threat of Dissident Republicans to Peace in Northern Ireland 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 48. 
615 Nancy D. Albers-Miller and Marla Royne Stafford, “An international analysis of emotional and rational 
appeals in services vs goods advertising,” Journal of Consumer Marketing 16, no. 1 (1999), 51. 
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success may be insufficient to sustain a peace process when external emotional appeals 
arise. Consequently, long-term future time perspectives included within a future peace 
process need to ensure that their articulated emotional appeals are robust enough to 
defend a future peace process against external emotional appeals that may arise 
throughout its implementation.    
 
9.11 Chapter summary 
Throughout this chapter, the relationships between long-term and short-term 
time perspectives and the Accords’ peace process were analysed and discussed. To 
unpack the aforementioned relationships each of the five time perspectives within the 
Accords were examined using the methods and notions addressed in chapters 3 and 4, 
as well as the insights gained about long-term and short-term time perspectives from 
chapters 5-7. Based on the analyses and discussions detailed in this chapter, suggestions 
were offered to illustrate how time perspectives could be altered or added to potentially 
improve the success of future peace processes. Collectively, the analyses, discussions, 
and suggestions presented offer readers new insights into how time perspectives are 
manifested in and shape the practice of international politics in regards to a peace 
process. Furthermore, the insights gained from this empirical case study also suggest 
how theoretical claims made in a particular theory of international politics (e.g. 
democratic peace theory) are embedded into peace processes via time perspectives.  
Thus, the shaping effects of time perspectives in relation to theoretical claims are not 
limited to theories of international politics, but can be carried over into the practice of 
international politics.616 This observation suggests a connection between theory and 
practice, via time perspectives, which scholars of international politics have yet to study 
in-depth but could offer suggestions as to what time perspectives within a theory of 
international politics need to be modified to improve the potential success of a future 
peace process.  
To arrive at the insights presented in this chapter, I began by looking at the 
Accords’ long-term term historical time perspectives.  Based on my analysis, the Accords’ 
                                                            
616 This point was not elaborated in this thesis because links between the Accords and the writings of 
particular democratic peace theorists could not be clearly identified.  
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existing long-term historical time perspectives framed the Accords’ peace process as one 
trying to change problematic perennial aspects of Israeli-Palestinian historical relations 
rather than a peace process trying to restore peaceful perennial aspects of the past. To 
reframe future peace processes as restorative processes, I suggested that future peace 
processes extend the scopes of their long-term historical time perspectives. Doing so 
would enable these future peace process to not only redefine the perennial aspects of 
Israeli-Palestinian historical relations as peaceful, but also address the role of religion in 
the relationship and open up peace options beyond those linked to liberal and 
democratic peace theories.  Among all the suggestions addressed throughout this 
chapter, extending the long-term historical time perspectives as I have described and 
highlighting the same aspects I have drawn attention to would be the easiest to 
incorporate in future peace processes and have significant effects on the outlook for 
future peace processes.   
Following my analysis and discussion of the Accords’ long-term historical time 
perspectives, the effects of the Accords’ short-term historical time perspectives on the 
peace process were considered.  Among the roles short-term historical time perspectives 
played within the Accords’ peace process, the roles regarding the support they lend to 
the legitimatization of the peace process and the limitations they place on the evolution 
of the peace process were of particular interest. They highlighted areas within the 
Accords that could be changed in future peace processes to potentially improve their 
success. In relation to these areas, the most promising suggestions presented included 
1) having short-term historical time perspectives that legitimise the peace process and its 
aims separately and 2) re-articulating some short-term historical time perspectives to 
suggest that specific moments or periods of the past are historical beginnings and 
models that a future peace process can build upon.  Both suggestions embed future 
peace processes with more freedom to evolve organically than the Accords’ short-term 
historical time perspectives allowed for.  Despite the freedom these suggested short-term 
historical time perspectives may introduce into a future peace process, the extent to 
which this freedom can be exercised will be dependent upon how a future peace 
process’s present is articulated by its short-term present time perspectives. 
As noted in the third part of this chapter, the Accords’ short-term present time 
perspectives articulated the necessary and sufficient conditions of relationship between 
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Israel and the Palestinians.  My analysis, however, revealed that the Accords’ short-term 
present time perspectives provided an incomplete contemporary context of the situation. 
To address this issue and to augment the comprehensiveness of the contemporary 
conditions being embedded in future peace processes, suggestions were made to include 
short-term present time perspectives within future peace processes that acknowledged 
the contemporary religious context and efforts of peaceful engagement being made at 
all levels of society. In addition to these suggestions, my analysis also led to presenting 
a separate grouping of suggestions relating to the allusions about the future created by 
short-term present time perspectives within a peace process.  Suggestions on how future 
peace processes could use or not use short-term present time perspectives to improve 
control over their allusions included the following: 1) avoiding the inclusion of short-
term present time perspectives which perpetuate or introduce problematic aspects into 
the future, 2) altering short-term present time perspectives to temper the effects of a 
future peace process’s allusions have on the future, and 3) adding short-term present 
time perspectives which acknowledge that contemporary circumstances will continue to 
present known and unknown challenges throughout the implementation of a peace 
process.      
In the fourth section of the chapter, the focus of the analysis and discussion 
shifted to the effects short-term future time perspectives had on the Accords’ peace 
process. A noteworthy insight recovered from my analysis of the Accords’ short-term 
future time perspectives regarded the details these time perspectives provided about the 
immediate future. The specificity of the immediate future articulated via the Accords’ 
short-term future time perspectives delimited the peace process’s immediate future to 
such an extent that the peace process was unable to adjust to near future realities as they 
arose. To help open up the possibility of adjustment within future peace processes, my 
analysis indicated that short-term future time perspectives within future peace processes 
needed to 1) be more explicit in defining the limits of the certainty short-term future time 
perspectives articulated, 2) preserve space for unknowns to arise and exist, and 3) create 
multiple avenues through which a peace process could continue to move toward peace 
when certain paths became blocked. Consequently, the suggestions presented were 
examples of how short-term future time perspectives within future peace processes could 
be constructed to enable future peace processes to adjust their courses going forward as 
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various changes in domestic Israeli and Palestinian politics, as well as international 
politics, arose. 
The final section of the chapter addressed the Accords’ long-term future time 
perspectives. In general, my analysis suggested that long-term future time perspectives 
within the Accords provided general glimpses into the long-term evolution and 
manifestations of Israeli-Palestinian relations throughout the duration of the Accords’ 
peace process and beyond.  The glimpses provided, however, were limited and at times 
misleading.  As a consequence, recommendations were offered on how to improve the 
quality of the long-term future time perspectives and the accuracy of the articulations of 
the distant future included within future peace processes.  These recommendations 
included inserting long-term future time perspectives within a future peace process that 
1) acknowledge that the process of peace is ongoing, 2) recognise the impracticality of 
pre-emptively scripting out the distant future, and 3) contain emotional and logical 
appeals which are conducive to sustaining a future peace process in the distant future 
given the contemporary context of the Israeli-Palestinian relations. Although these 
recommendations alone will not ensure the success of a future peace process, they will 
ensure that later steps and stages of implementation of a future peace process will 
remain grounded in certain realities of the future; a process of peace is ongoing and the 




Chapter 10: A New Understanding of Time Perspectives in IR  
10.1 Thesis summary 
 Throughout this thesis, the reader has been taken through a series of steps, 
analyses, and discussions to help develop an understanding and acute awareness of long-
term and short-term time perspectives and how they shape understandings, 
interpretations, and claims of international politics within a theory and a peace process. 
Developing this understanding and acute awareness is important because it highlights 
the unique ways in which time perspectives perform within and effect theory and 
practice. To develop this understanding and awareness, the reader was provided with 
conceptualisations of what long-term and short-term time perspectives are, methods for 
distinguishing between various time perspectives, and various types of time-related 
aspects (e.g. perennial, ephemeral, and contingent) that time perspectives can attribute 
to claims and practices (chapters 3 and 4). These conceptualisations, methods, and 
aspects were then used in my analyses and discussions of long-term and short-term time 
perspectives and their effects found within Morgenthau’s theory (chapters 5-7) and the 
Oslo Accords (chapters 8-9). These two case studies were included in this thesis to 
illustrate the insights these conceptualisations, methods, and aspects can help recover 
about claims and practices of international politics. Admittedly, the analyses and 
discussions were quite technical and abstract at times. However, these were necessary 
ground clearing exercises that needed to be performed to begin to unpack relations 
between time perspectives and claims and political practices. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 below 
provide a concise overview of what time perspectives and corresponding salient effects 
were recovered and addressed in this thesis. Considered collectively, the information in 
these tables constitute the new understandings of time perspectives and their effects 
developed in this thesis which readers can reference going forward. 
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Table 10.1: Time perspectives addressed in this thesis   
 Temporal Focus 
















Within the shaded area, six distinct time perspectives are identified conveying both 
temporal focus and temporal depth.  
 
 
Table 10.2: The most salient effects and functions of each time perspectives  















• Provide macro level accounts of the past 
• Structure and aggregate international political 
phenomena to recover patterns and anomalies within 
international politics 
• Extend the explanatory power and relevance of a 
theory, political practice, or claim beyond the past 
• Predetermine what contemporary and future 
international political phenomena ‘fit’ with a certain 













• Provide sub-macro level accounts of the past 
• Capture and retain minute details of the past 
• Articulate the presence and status of perennial and 
ephemeral aspects of international politics in the past 
• Illustrate how perennial and ephemeral aspects of 
international politics interact 
• Detail historical development within international 
politics missed or deemphasised by long-term 






• Draw to the forefront those elements of international 
politics or a political situation that a theory or a 
political practice deems most important to address or 
focus attention on 
• Highlight explanatory congruency or rationale for 






• Serve as ubiquitous time perspectives from which all 
other time perspectives articulated within a theory or a 
political practice can begin to be identified 
• Offer insights into the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the manifestation of international 
politics 
• Problematise international politics 
• Characterise the present 
• Indicate the present’s orientations toward the past and 
the future 






• Provide predictions or approximations about the 
immediate future of international politics 
• Perform transition/bridging work that moves a theory’s 
explanation or a political practice beyond the 
known/knowable world 
• Help particular unknowns in the near future become 
known 
• Attach certainty to near future predictions or 
approximations 
• Pre-emptively add meaning and significance to aspects 







• Extending a theory’s or political practice’s applicability 






• Provide glimpses into the long-term future evolutions 
and manifestations of international politics 
• Articulate the shelf-life of claims about international 
politics 
• Allude to the applicability and usefulness of claims in 
both familiar and unfamiliar international political 
contexts 
• Can alter the interpretations of historical and 
contemporary theoretical claims via the introduction 
of new theoretical claims about the distant future 
• Indicate how long-standing, salient international 
political questions and problems of concern might be 
solved or adequately addressed in the distant future 
 
 
10.2 Moving forward  
 In the process of carrying out the initial leg work to conceptualise and analyse 
the time perspectives and their effects highlighted in Table 10.2, my awareness of 
additional areas of research needing attention in the future was raised but not fully 
explored or developed for various reasons in this thesis. Chief among these reasons were 
two: the word limit constraints of the thesis and the initial conceptualisation work 
completed in this thesis needed to be done before either of the following topics could 
be addressed. Among these additional areas of research needing further exploration and 
development, two in particular warrant further comment: 1) long-term present time 
perspectives and 2) the notions of time used in the articulation, study, and practice of 
international politics. Regarding the first, long-term present time perspectives warrant 
further research and conceptualisation because these time perspectives have the 
potential to help scholars interpret and articulate time perspectives and claims about 
particular international political phenomena which the five time perspectives addressed 
in this thesis could not or only partially help with. Two examples of unique international 
political phenomena which further conceptualisation and analysis of long-term present 
time perspectives would be of help to scholars include the everyday experiences of 
civilians awaiting the end of a crisis or conflict and refugees awaiting confirmation of 
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their status as refugees, asylum seekers, or citizens.617 In both cases, there is a sense that 
the present is never ending or that time is suspended for an individual because the 
contemporary circumstances surrounding the individual creates a perception that there 
is no discernible difference from one day to the next. Long-term present time perspectives 
would enable scholars to articulate and study such experiences which have occurred in 
the past, are occurring in the present, and will likely occur in the future.618    
In addition to conceptualising long-term present time perspectives, the insights 
presented in this thesis suggests that IR disciplinary aspects of time used in the 
articulation, study, and practice of international politics need to be explored and 
developed further. While Hutchings’ work on chronos and kairos suggests different 
types of time at work in international politics and Hom’s work suggests that time is a 
matter of organising occurrences within a timing regime, there are other aspects of time 
which can contribute to contemporary understandings of time within international 
politics.619 One such aspect of time worth exploring and developing further regards 
different ontologies of international political time. For example, ontologies of time (e.g. 
absolute time, arrow of time) derived from the block time, presentism, and growing 
block universe theories of time discussed in the fields of Philosophy and Physics would 
enable scholars to recover, study, interpret, and articulate new insights about time(s) 
within international political theory and practice from various Western and non-
Western perspectives.620 To illustrate, considering the Accords from a block time 
perspective (which suggests that the past, present, and future are all real and equally 
exist) helps to provide insights into the ontological claims regarding time articulated in 
                                                            
617 An account by one of Serbia’s representatives with UNICEF claiming that some refugee children are 
“breaking down emotionally because they don’t know what’s next. They don’t see any future” suggests 
that these children might have long-term present time perspectives. This example along with others can 
be found in Rania Abouzeid, “Thousands of Refugee Children Are Stranded on Europe’s Doorstep,” 
National Geographic, October 23, 2017, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/photography/proof/2017/10 
/unaccompanied-minors-refugees-serbia-afghanistan-pakistan-children-migration/ (accessed November 
30, 2018). 
618 The notion of a long-term present time perspective may also help scholars in the recovery and 
articulation of long-term present time perspectives found within the everyday practices and everyday 
embodiments of international politics. Examples of ‘everyday’ literature this notion could be applied to 
include Michele Acuto, “Everyday International Relations: Garbage, Grand Designs, and Mundane 
Matters,” International Political Sociology 8, no. 4 (December 2014): 345–362; Oliver Kessler and Xavier 
Guillaume, “Everyday practices of international relations: People in organizations,” Journal of 
International Relations & Development 15, no. 1 (2012): 110–120. 
619 Hutchings, Time and World Politics; Hom, “Timing is Everything”. 
620 For more detailed discussions regarding different ontologies of time addressed in Philosophy and 
Physics see Emily Thomas, Absolute Time and Rovelli, The Order of Time.  
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the Accords. From a block time perspective, separating the past from the present or 
future is not possible and becomes problematic for Israel and the Palestinians during 
any peace process seeking to move beyond the historical confrontations. Such 
ontological insights, combined with those insights regarding long-term and short-term 
time perspectives and their effects shared earlier in this thesis, have the potential to offer 
more comprehensive understandings of relations between international politics (in 
theory and practice) and time. 
Thus, as the two aforementioned examples indicate, this thesis serves as a 
significant first step that both opens up new discussions of time perspectives and time 
within international political research, as well as provides the concepts, means, and 
understandings necessary to begin to engage with such research inquiries more 
extensively in the near and distant future. Consequences of this further engagement will 
hopefully lead to refined understandings and interpretations of 1) claims about 
international politics made within a theory or a peace process and 2) the ways that 
different perspectives of time shape the study and practice of international politics. 
Considering that international politics is never static but perennially dynamic, the study 
of time perspectives with respect to international politics in theory and practice that this 
thesis contributes to is unlikely to be exhausted, but remain a perennial pursuit in the 
foreseeable and unforeseeable future. This observation suggests that the relevance of the 
work completed within this thesis and the corresponding insights may have residual 
effects within IR research over time. Only time will tell, however, as to whether those 
effects will be immediate or emerge periodically over time. As Thales of Miletus said 
“Σοφώτατον χρόνος· ἀνευρίσκει γὰρ πάντα”; “Time is the wisest of all things that are; for 
it brings everything to light”.621 
  
                                                            
621 Quote attributed to Thales of Miletus in Diogenes Laërtius, The Lives Eminent Philosophers, 2 vols., 
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